

*Advisor to the Presidency*

**N O T E**

**to the attention of the President of the Republic  
(c/o the General Secretary)**

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**Subject – RWANDA: MISSION TO KIGALI and KAMPALA**

I met with the director of Africa Quai in KIGALI (2/12) and KAMPALA (2/13).

Here are the main results and conclusions:

**1) – In RWANDA:**

The RPF is in a dominant position on the ground. According to our officers in KIGALI, the RPF is militarily in a position to take KIGALI.

President HABYARIMANA and the Prime Minister are not on the same page, which reflects the divide between northern Hutus and southern Hutus, which results in, schematically:

For the President: resistance to political concessions (“better to die than to submit to the Tutsis”)

For the Prime Minister: negotiation with the RPF, ultimately to oust President HABYARIMANA.

This situation is disastrous: it provides an avenue to the RPF, which, with Ugandan military support, Belgian sympathy for the Tutsis, an excellent system of propaganda emphasizing the wretched abuses committed by extremist Hutus, and the benevolent complicity of the Anglo-Saxon world, has been steadily scoring points on the military and political map.

After several hours of discussion with President HABYARIMANA (who at first did not seem to appreciate the gravity of the situation and seemed to count on direct involvement of French troops to defend KIGALI), then with the Prime Minister (with whom I shared the risks of the presence of a third power in a time of war within a country, from DIEM to MINH...), we

were able to see the two men again during the night and to obtain, through reciprocal concessions, a common appeal that they will give to the nation and the international community, to:

- denounce the RPF's violation of the cease-fire,
- engage in pursuing the process of democratization,
- resume the Arusha negotiations.

## 2) – IN KAMPALA,

I had almost four hours of discussion with President MUSSEVENI [sic]. He is resolved, cunning, and ambitious with regard to his newly pacified country's role in the region.

We were able to get from him:

- a) – that he will encourage a cease fire and a retreat spread out over the course of a week for the RPF, back to its initial position, under the supervision of neutral observers.
- b) – the deployment of United Nations observers along the international border between Uganda and Rwanda.

That being said, that he does not like HABYARIMANA and openly wishes for his departure. But, as he is worried about our attitude and our degree of involvement (which was left ambiguous, as necessary for a good deterrent), I think that he will have to at least contribute to controlling the appetite of the RPF.

It must be said that, as he told me, his real problem is in the North: Sudan. He fears a sudden Sudanese offensive against GARANG, which would have him directly facing Islamist southern expansion. He asked that France permit him to purchase Milans (antitank missiles) in exchange for “good behavior” from him in the Rwandan case...

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It remains now to put these theoretical results (cease-fire with the RPF's retreat, observers on the border, resumption of Arusha negotiations) into practice. We are working on it now with the Quai d'Orsay [Ministry of Foreign Affairs]. But the situation remains extremely delicate for us:

- We are at the limit of the strategy of indirect support to the forces of the Rwandan army. (We are accelerating the deliveries of munitions and materials). Their degree of motivation is too uneven (because of differences between northern and southern Hutus) to contemplate a stabilization of the military balance of power with equanimity. If the border is crossed, **we will**

**have no other** choice than **to evacuate KIGALI** (the official mission of our two infantry companies is to protect expatriates), **unless we want to become cobelligerents.**

- Because of our isolation in this case internationally (the Belgians, English, and Americans do not like HABYARIMANA) we must **deploy an even more aggressive diplomatic effort** to achieve the necessary diplomatic support to see implementation of the results – theoretical – that we have obtained from this mission to KIGALI and KAMPALA. The Quai d’Orsay is committed to this effort.

Bruno DELAYE