

*The General*  
*President's Chief of Staff*

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to the attention of the President of the Republic  
(care of the Secretary General)

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S U B J E C T: RWANDA.

The military situation remains very worrisome. President HABYARIMANA called this morning. He thinks that Ugandan involvement in the RPF is such that, according to information gathered elsewhere, the Rwandan forces will not be able to hold the present lines near KIGALI for much longer. He reports several killings of civilians in the zones taken over by the RPF and fears the intensifying of the massacres. Reliable testimony confirms these statements.

In response to your request and instructions, the following measures could be considered:

1\*/ the evacuation of our nationals, in the next few days, if the RPF maintains its intention to take the city, and the withdrawal of NOROIT. President HABYARIMANA's power will not survive this departure and bloody ethnic cleansing will ensue. This will be the failure of our presence and our policy in RWANDA. Our credibility on the continent will suffer as a result.

2\*/ immediately sending at least two companies to KIGALI in order to effectively protect our nationals and all the expatriates, in case of the brutal arrival of rebel troops in the capital, but also to send a clear signal to the RPF in order to curb its appetite. This action, although it will not resolve the underlying problems, would buy us some time.

3\*/ the dispatch of a larger contingent, de facto prohibiting the RPF from taking KIGALI and allowing the Rwandan units to reestablish their positions along the previous cease-fire line. This last option would necessitate both a Rwandan request specifying that the country is the victim of an exterior aggression and the consultation of Presidents HOUHOUET-BOIGNY, ABDOU DIOUF, and BONGO. It has the advantage of showing our determination to resolve the

Rwandan crisis solely by political means. However, it would be the signal for semi-direct involvement.

Options 2 and 3 must be accompanied by explanations of our position: defense of French nationals and other expatriates, protection of the capital in order to limit inter-ethnic massacres, opposition to any non-negotiated settlement.

For now, we support solution 2, which, in case of failure, could form a base structure for solution 3. These two solutions, each accompanied by intense diplomatic action, could, at the opportune moment, allow us to withdraw under more dignified conditions.

Dominique PIN

General QUESNOT