

CONFIDENTIAL DEFENSE

RESTRICTED COUNCIL

Wednesday, August 4, 1993

SITUATION IN RWANDA AND CONGO

Participants in this restricted council, presided over by the President of the Republic:

Mr. BALLADUR	Prime Minister
Mr. LEOTARD	Minister of State, Defense Minister
Mr. JUPPE	Foreign Affairs Minister
Mr. ROUSSIN	Minister of Cooperation

**PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC**

Mr. VEDRINE	Secretary General
General QUESNOT	President's Chief of Staff
Mr. PIN	Special Envoy In Charge of Mission

**OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER**

Mr. BAZIRE	Chief of Staff
Rear Admiral LECOINTRE	Chief of Military Staff

**NATIONAL DEFENSE SECRETARIAT**

General LERCHE	Secretary General
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**FOREIGN AFFAIRS MINISTRY**

Mr. BOIDEVAIX	Secretary General
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**DEFENSE MINISTRY**

Admiral LANXADE	Chief of Defense Staff
General RANNOU	Military Chief of Staff

**GOVERNMENT GENERAL SECRETARIAT**

Mr. DENOIX DE SAINT MARC	Secretary General
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## **SECRETARIAT**

Colonel BENTEGEAT

Chief of Staff

## **RWANDA**

### **MINISTER OF COOPERATION**

The Arusha Accords should be signed today. We will therefore see RPF forces arriving. Now, on the ground, there are two important elements among our forces, two detachments of military advisors, twenty people in Gabiro and Mukamira.

Given the development of the situation and since our troops are supposed to leave Rwanda 37 days after the signing of the accord, it would be desirable to return these elements to Kigali.

I'll add that, if these advisors' mission is finished, if they are not needed in Kigali, I propose to terminate it.

### **PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC**

We must align our decisions with the reality on the ground. This makes good sense.

I would now like to ask this question again in the area of general French policy. Mr. Juppé?

### **FOREIGN AFFAIRS MINISTER**

We anticipate withdrawing French troops when the international force is in place. The problem is that there is little enthusiasm at the United Nations about this implementation, essentially for financial reasons. This is especially true for the Russians.

I propose to whole-heartedly support the creation of this force, even if it means accepting a compromise with the OAU concerning the GOMN if we don't succeed. But we can only decide on our forces' retreat when the new force is deployed. We will maintain our troops until the new force is on the ground.

### **DEFENSE MINISTER**

I agree with this analysis.

### **PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC**

Agreed.

## CONGO

### **MINISTER OF COOPERATION**

The situation has developed in the past few hours.

I had some meetings in Gabon last week. President Bongo met with both parties for six hours and I received them for four hours.

This morning, I had a telephone call from President Bongo announcing to me that the presidential camp and the opposition had entered into negotiations in Brazzaville. An agreement is within sight. The two parties will accept the results of the first round of the elections and do the second round, which was contested, over. Opposition personalities will become part of the government.

I would like to emphasize President Bongo's decisive role and also to say that the Minister of Cooperation in Libreville's trip was useful...

### **PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC**

He's cut out for this!

### **MINISTER OF COOPERATION**

True, but in Africa it's not always obvious.

### **PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC**

Yes, that's true.