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PAGE 01 STATE 073815 220536Z
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PAGE 02 STATE 073815 220536Z

S E C R E T STATE 073815

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: XA, PREL, PINR
SUBJECT: INR ANALYSES

"ROME FOR CHACON AND ALSO FOR VATICAN, LONDON FOR MC
KINLEY, BRUSSELS FOR DUBROW, MADRID FOR CLARKE, PARIS
FOR PERLOW, USNATO FOR FOX, BONN FOR KLEMP, USCINCEUR

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE

REVIEW
AUTHORITY: ROBERT R. STRAND

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302

'AND HQ US CENTRAL COMMAND FOR POLADS, HQ USEUCOM FOR EC
J-5, COMMANDER USASETAF FOR G-2"

1. SECTIONS ON ANGOLA AND NIGERIA ARE SECRET, ALL OTHER
SECTIONS ARE CONFIDENTIAL.

2. THIS CABLE TRANSMITS THE FOLLOWING RECENT INR
ANALYSES FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND COMMENTS, AS
APPROPRIATE.

INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS

- A. ANGOLA/NATIONAL UNITY TALKS: A WAY OUT OF THE
IMPASSE?; 3/19
- B. SOUTH AFRICA: THE HOMELANDS CONUNDRUM; 3/21

INTELLIGENCE VIEWPOINTS

- C. RWANDA/BURUNDI: REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF UPHEAVAL;
3/9
- D. NIGERIA/CAMEROON: SABRE-RATTLING IN THE SWAMPS;
3/18

SECRET

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PAGE 03 STATE 073815 220536Z
BEGIN TEXT

A. ANGOLA/NATIONAL UNITY TALKS: A WAY OUT OF THE
IMPASSE?

3. THE GOVERNMENT DECLARED YESTERDAY THAT ITS MARCH 10
OFFER OF HIGH-LEVEL POSITIONS FOR UNITA WAS
NON-NEGOTIABLE, EVEN THOUGH UNITA'S MARCH 17
COUNTERPROPOSAL HAD REVEALED A SHIFT IN EMPHASIS FROM A
REQUEST FOR MORE MINISTERIAL POSITIONS TO GREATER
REPRESENTATION IN PROVINCIAL AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS.

4. PROPOSALS AND COUNTER-PROPOSALS. THE GOVERNMENT'S
OFFER ALLOCATED FOUR INSIGNIFICANT MINISTRIES (HEALTH,
TOURISM, COMMERCE, AND CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS), SIX
VICE-MINISTRIES (INCLUDING DEFENSE), THREE
GOVERNORSHIPS, AND FIVE VICE-GOVERNORS AS WELL AS
SEVERAL AMBASSADORSHIPS AND LOCAL-LEVEL POLITICAL
ADMINISTRATIVE POSITIONS TO UNITA. THE OFFER DID NOT
INCLUDE MINISTRIES UNITA CONSIDERS KEY--FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
INTERIOR, INFORMATION, TERRITORIAL ADMINISTRATION, OR
GEOLOGY AND MINERALS.

Page - 2

Date Printed: 12/31/1997 DOC_NUMBER: 94STATE073815 CHANNEL: n/a 302
FileName : .../t940357/aaaabrnd.tel

5. AMONG THE OFFERED GOVERNORSHIPS--IN UIGE, LUANDA SUL, AND CUANDO CUBANGO PROVINCES--THE FIRST ARE AREAS WHERE UNITA HAS LITTLE POLITICAL FOLLOWING, AND THE LAST IS IN REMOTEST SOUTHEASTERN ANGOLA. THE GOVERNMENT DID NOT OFFER HUAMBO OR BIE, THE UNITA HEARTLAND, AND UNITA PROBABLY REGARDED THE PROPOSED POSTS AS AN ATTEMPT TO SCATTER ITS FORCES AND EXILE IT INTO HINTERLANDS WITH SCANT RESOURCES--MOST LIKELY THE GOVERNMENT'S INTENT.

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PAGE 04 STATE 073815 220536Z

6. UNITA'S NEW PROPOSAL PLAYS DOWN EARLIER DEMANDS FOR MINISTERIAL PORTFOLIOS BUT SEEKS TO STRENGTHEN ITS PRESENCE IN PROVINCIAL AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. UNITA ACCEPTED THE OFFER OF FOUR CABINET MINISTRIES BUT ASKED FOR PUBLIC WORKS IN PLACE OF CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS; IT REQUESTED VICE-MINISTERIAL POSITIONS IN INTERIOR, FINANCE, AND TERRITORIAL ADMINISTRATION. UNITA REQUESTED THE GOVERNORSHIP IN HUAMBO AND THREE OTHER VICE-GOVERNORSHIPS AS WELL AS MORE LOCAL ADMINISTRATIVE POSTS. THE GOVERNMENT FLATLY REJECTED THIS PROPOSAL AND ANY FURTHER DISCUSSION OF ITS EARLIER OFFER.

7. GOVERNMENT WRAPPED IN LEGITIMACY. THE GOVERNMENT BELIEVES THAT AS THE LEGALLY CONSTITUTED AND INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED AUTHORITY IT HAS THE RIGHT TO DEFINE THE NUMBER AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE POSITIONS TO BE ALLOCATED TO UNITA. LUANDA HOLDS ITS LEGITIMACY WAS FURTHER CONFIRMED BY THE JULY 15 UNSC RESOLUTION ASSERTING THE GOVERNMENT'S RIGHT TO PROTECT ITSELF AND BLAMING UNITA AS THE SOLE CAUSE OF THE CIVIL WAR.

8. UNITA'S ELECTORAL POWER AND BULLETS. UNITA BASES ITS DEMANDS FOR SIGNIFICANT POSITIONS ON ITS WINNING 34 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL VOTE IN THE LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS, INCLUDING AN OUTRIGHT MAJORITY IN FOUR PROVINCES, AND ITS MILITARY CONTROL, HOWEVER LOOSE, OVER 75 PERCENT OF THE COUNTRY. UNITA ALSO BELIEVES THAT IF THE GOVERNMENT IS ALLOWED TO DOMINATE THE ADMINISTRATIVE AND SECURITY FORCES, IT WILL ATTEMPT TO DESTROY UNITA AS A POLITICAL ORGANIZATION

B1

SECRET

PAGE 05 STATE 073815 220536Z

B1

9. UNITA'S NEW PROPOSALS, EMPHASIZING A GREATER AND MORE CONSOLIDATED PRESENCE IN THE PROVINCES AND IN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, AIM AT STRENGTHENING ITS POLITICAL BASE FOR FUTURE NATIONAL COMPETITIONS. UNITA'S CHANGE IN TACTICS CHALLENGES LUANDA TO COME UP WITH A COMPROMISE THAT WILL BE ACCEPTABLE TO UNITA BUT MAINTAIN GOVERNMENT SOVEREIGNTY. THE SHIFT IN FOCUS OF THE TALKS FROM SCARCE CABINET SEATS TO MORE PLENTIFUL PROVINCIAL AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT POSITIONS COULD PROVIDE SUFFICIENT SLACK FOR THE TWO SIDES TO COME TO AN ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT. (BERNTSEN)

B. SOUTH AFRICA: THE HOMELANDS CONUNDRUM

10. THE VIOLENCE THAT ROCKED BOPHUTHATSWANA THE WEEKEND OF MARCH 11-13 IS NOT LIKELY TO BE REPEATED IN SOUTH AFRICA'S OTHER HOMELANDS. BUT A NUMBER OF THEM SUFFER THE TENSIONS THAT OPENED THE WAY FOR THE BOPHUTHATSWANA VIOLENCE AND THUS WILL PRESENT THEIR OWN PROBLEMS IN THE RUN-UP TO THE APRIL 26-28 ELECTIONS - AND LATER.

11. BECAUSE SOUTH AFRICA'S 10 HOMELANDS WILL CEASE TO EXIST AFTER THE ELECTIONS, REINTEGRATION INTO THE NEW SOUTH AFRICA IS A POLITICALLY AND EMOTIONALLY CHARGED ISSUE. WITH THE EXCEPTION OF KWAZULU, ONLY THE FOUR "INDEPENDENT" HOMELANDS--TRANSKEI, BOPHUTHATSWANA VENDA, AND CISKEI--WEIGH HEAVILY IN SOUTH AFRICA'S PRE-ELECTION CALCULUS. THEY WILL ADD SOME 1.5 MILLION


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PAGE 06 STATE 073815 220536Z
VOTERS TO THE ESTIMATED 18 MILLION BLACK VOTERS IN SOUTH AFRICA PROPER, OVERWHELMINGLY FOR THE ANC.

12. THE REMAINING HOMELANDS, THOUGH DESIGNATED AS "SELF-GOVERNING," HAVE ALWAYS BEEN LEGALLY PART OF SOUTH AFRICA, AND THEIR POPULATIONS, WITH AN ADDITIONAL 1.6 MILLION ELIGIBLE VOTERS, HAVE RETAINED THEIR SOUTH AFRICAN CITIZENSHIP. THE ANC VOTE IN THE "SELF-GOVERNING" HOMELANDS IS LESS EASY TO PREDICT.

B1



TO HELP SHORE UP HIS POSITION, CISKEI LEADER BRIGADIER GOZO, WHO AT FIRST HAD FOUGHT REINCORPORATION, EARLIER THIS YEAR DRIFTED AWAY FROM THE FREEDOM ALLIANCE AND ON JANUARY 10 ANNOUNCED HE WAS JOINING THE TRANSITIONAL EXECUTIVE COUNCIL LED BY THE GOVERNMENT AND THE ANC.

15. SHARED PROBLEMS. WHETHER INDEPENDENT OR SELF-GOVERNING, THE HOMELANDS ALL SUFFER FROM A CONGERIES OF WOES: HIGH UNEMPLOYMENT, POOR EDUCATION, WEAK ECONOMIES, GROSS MISMANAGEMENT AND CORRUPTION, MANIPULATION BY PRETORIA, AND BLOATED BUREAUCRACIES MORE CONCERNED WITH SELF-PRESERVATION THAN PUBLIC SERVICE. GOZO, RECENTLY AVERTED A PROCLAIMED "BOPHUTHATSWANA-STYLE ACTION" BY CIVIL SERVANTS DEMANDING PENSION PROTECTION BY AGREEING TO PAY PARTIAL BENEFITS INTO THEIR PENSION FUND.

16. PRESIDENT DE KLERK AND MANDELA RESTATED THAT

Date Printed: 12/31/1997 DOC NUMBER: 94STATE073815 CHANNEL: n/a 302
FileName : .../t940357/aaaabrnd.tel

HOMELAND BUREAUCRATS WOULD BE REINCORPORATED INTO THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT. IT WILL PROVE MORE DIFFICULT TO REINTEGRATE THE HOMELANDS ECONOMICALLY AND SOCIALLY, HOWEVER, FOR THEIR MAIN CONTRIBUTION TO THE NEW SOUTH AFRICA WILL BE TO ADD TO THE ECONOMIC BURDENS ON THE NEW GOVERNMENT, WHICH NO LONGER WILL BE ABLE TO AVOID IMPROVING LIVING STANDARDS FOR BLACKS IN SOUTH AFRICA PROPER IN FAVOR OF SUBSIDIZING AN INHERITED HOLDOVER OF APART HEID. (RISTAINO)

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PAGE 08 STATE 073815 220536Z
C. RWANDA/BURUNDI: REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF UPHEAVAL

17. THE ONGOING TURMOIL IN RWANDA AND BURUNDI--ROOTED IN THE CENTURIES-OLD FRICTION BETWEEN THE MAJORITY HUTU AND HISTORICALLY DOMINANT TUTSI ETHNIC GROUPS, -IS UNLIKELY TO FAN VIOLENCE BEYOND THE IMMEDIATE REGION, BUT THE BURDEN OF THE REFUGEE POPULATIONS CREATED BY THE UPHEAVAL WILL CONTINUE TO BE FELT THROUGHOUT A WIDER AREA. ETHNIC VIOLENCE, WHICH HAS ALREADY DISPLACED ROUGHLY ONE-SIXTH OF THE RWANDA/BURUNDI POPULATION, WILL IMPEDE DEVELOPMENT AND FUEL DEMANDS FOR INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE.

18. REGIONAL LIMITS. THE CONFLICTS IN RWANDA AND BURUNDI ARE LARGELY CONFINED TO THOSE TWO COUNTRIES AND ADJACENT AREAS OF NEIGHBORING STATES. DESTABILIZATION MAY WELL INTENSIFY IN CURRENTLY AFFECTED AREAS, BUT PROBABLY WILL NOT SPREAD FAR BEYOND. RWANDANS AND

BURUNDIANS--UNLIKE, FOR EXAMPLE, THE FULANI OF WEST AFRICA AND THE SAHEL--ARE NOT TRADITIONALLY MIGRATORY SOCIETIES, AND THEIR RELATIVE CULTURAL ISOLATION IS REINFORCED BY EXISTING NATIONAL BOUNDARIES. THE UNIQUENESS OF RWANDA AND BURUNDI WAS RECOGNIZED BY 19TH CENTURY GERMAN COLONIAL RULERS, WHO ADMINISTERED THESE TERRITORIES SEPARATELY FROM TANGANYIKA, THEIR OTHER EAST AFRICAN POSSESSION. THE UNIQUE SYSTEM OF STRATIFICATION THAT PROVIDED THE BASIS FOR THESE TWO KINGDOMS ENABLED THE TUTSI MINORITY--ROUGHLY 14 PERCENT OF THE POPULATION--TO DOMINATE THE HUTU MAJORITY FOR AT LEAST FOUR CENTURIES IN A FEUDAL SOCIETY, FUELING THE

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 09 STATE 073815 220536Z
JEALOUSIES THAT PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR THE CURRENT
CONFLICTS.

19. REFUGEE FLOWS. OUT OF A COMBINED POPULATION OF
ROUGHLY 14 MILLION IN RWANDA AND BURUNDI, NEARLY THREE
MILLION HAVE BEEN INTERNALLY DISPLACED OR FORCED TO FLEE
TO NEIGHBORING STATES SINCE 1990. IN BURUNDI, WITH A
POPULATION OF ROUGHLY SIX MILLION PEOPLE, ABOUT ONE
MILLION WERE INTERNALLY DISPLACED BY THE VIOLENCE THAT
FOLLOWED PRESIDENT NDADAYE'S OCTOBER 1993 ASSASSINATION,
WHILE 750,000 OTHERS FLED TO NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES;
NEARLY HALF HAVE SINCE RETURNED. IN RWANDA, THE 1990-93
CIVIL WAR DISPLACED UP TO ONE MILLION PERSONS, OUT OF A
TOTAL POPULATION OF ABOUT EIGHT MILLION, BUT RELATIVELY
FEW FLED THE COUNTRY.

20. THE RECENT POPULATION FLOWS COMBINE WITH EARLIER
GENERATIONS OF REFUGEES. IN 1959-62 ALONE, BETWEEN
150,000 AND 250,000 MAINLY TUTSI REFUGEES FLED RWANDA,
WHILE IN BURUNDI, ETHNIC CONFLICT BETWEEN 1972 AND 1992
FORCED NEARLY 200,000 PEOPLE--MAINLY HUTUS--TO FLEE.
OVER A MILLION BURUNDIAN AND RWANDAN REFUGEES AND THEIR
DESCENDANTS NOW INHABIT RWANDA, BURUNDI, TANZANIA,
UGANDA AND EASTERN ZAIRE.

21. REFUGEE EFFECTS--NATIONAL POLITICS. DESPITE THE
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL IMPACT OF THE REFUGEES IN
NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES, THESE POPULATION MOVEMENTS HAVE
NOT SERIOUSLY AFFECTED THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENTS IN ZAIRE
OR TANZANIA--WHOSE CAPITALS ARE LOCATED SEVERAL HUNDRED
MILES AWAY--AND ARE UNLIKELY TO DO SO. IN EASTERN

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 10 STATE 073815 220536Z
ZAIRE, THE REGIONAL ECONOMY HAS OPERATED WITH VIRTUAL
AUTONOMY FROM KINSHASA FOR MORE THAN A DECADE. IN 1993,
SERIOUS OUTBREAKS OF ETHNIC VIOLENCE DIRECTED AT RWANDAN
INHABITANTS OF EASTERN ZAIRE WERE LARGELY IGNORED IN

KINSHASA.

22. IN CONTRAST, RWANDAN REFUGEES IN UGANDA HAVE HAD A SUBSTANTIAL IMPACT ON NATIONAL POLITICS OVER THE PAST 15 YEARS. TUTSI RESIDENTS OF SOUTHERN UGANDA HELPED OUST FORMER PRESIDENT IDI AMIN IN 1979 AND SUPPORTED PRESIDENT MUSEVENI--WHO TRACES HIS OWN ETHNIC ROOTS TO THE TUTSI POPULATION OF RWANDA/BURUNDI--IN THE 1980-86 CIVIL WAR AS MEMBERS OF HIS NATIONAL RESISTANCE ARMY (NRA). AFTER MUSEVENI TOOK POWER, HE APPOINTED TWO RWANDAN-BORN TUTSI NRA VETERANS, FRED RWIGYEMA AND PAUL KAGAME, AS UGANDA'S DEFENSE MINISTER AND ARMY CHIEF OF INTELLIGENCE, RESPECTIVELY. THEY SUBSEQUENTLY LEFT TO LEAD THE RWANDAN PATRIOTIC FRONT (RPF) REBEL ARMY IN ITS 1990-93 WAR AGAINST PRESIDENT HABYARIMANA'S MAINLY HUTU GOVERNMENT.

23. REFUGEE EFFECTS--LOCAL POLITICS. REFUGEE INFLOWS HAVE UPSET LAND OWNERSHIP AND PRODUCTION PATTERNS IN THE DENSELY-POPULATED EAST/CENTRAL AFRICA HIGHLANDS, WHICH INCLUDE BURUNDI, RWANDA, AND THE ADJOINING KIVU PROVINCES OF EASTERN ZAIRE. THEY ALSO DRAIN DWINDLING RESOURCES FOR HEALTH, EDUCATION AND OTHER SOCIAL SERVICES. LONG-TERM RWANDAN REFUGEES IN UGANDA AND ZAIRE--MOSTLY TUTSIS--HAVE FOR DECADES SUFFERED DISCRIMINATION AT THE HANDS OF INDIGENOUS RESIDENTS.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 11 STATE 073815 220536Z
DISCRIMINATION IN SPARSELY POPULATION AREAS OF TANZANIA NEAR THE RWANDA/BURUNDI BORDER HAS, HOWEVER, BEEN LESS PRONOUNCED. DESPITE ADVERSITY, SOME REFUGEES HAVE FLOURISHED--NOTABLY A SMALL, RELATIVELY WEALTHY POPULATION OF RWANDAN TUTSIS WHO NOW FORM THE CORE OF A SUCCESSFUL BUSINESS COMMUNITY IN NAIROBI AND OTHER URBAN CENTERS IN EAST AFRICA.

24. DIRECT ECONOMIC EFFECTS. THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE CONFLICTS IN RWANDA AND BURUNDI HAS BEEN ENORMOUS. RWANDA BEFORE 1990 WAS RELATIVELY STABLE AND PROSPEROUS--A WORLD BANK "SUCCESS STORY." THE RPF INVASION IN 1990 SEVERED IMPORTANT TRANSPORTATION ROUTES THROUGH UGANDA, IMPEDED TRADE, EMPTIED THE TREASURY AS THE GOVERNMENT IN KIGALI SOUGHT TO PAY FOR THE WAR, AND DISRUPTED AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION AS PEOPLE FLED THE CONFLICT. THE 1993 UPHEAVAL IN BURUNDI CAUSED CASH-CROP CULTIVATION TO PRACTICALLY CEASE FOR THREE MONTHS. THE DISRUPTION, HOWEVER, APPARENTLY DID NOT HURT COFFEE

PRODUCTION, WHICH IS EXPECTED TO BE HIGHER THAN LAST YEAR.

25. ALTHOUGH BURUNDI AND RWANDA ARE NOT IMPORTANT REGIONAL "ENGINES OF GROWTH," BOTH COUNTRIES EXPERIENCED POSITIVE GROWTH DURING THE 1970S AND 1980S, EVEN WHILE THE ECONOMIES IN NEIGHBORING UGANDA, ZAIRE AND TANZANIA WERE DEGENERATING. A FAIRLY GOOD NETWORK OF ROADS HELPED INTEGRATE RWANDAN AND BURUNDIAN COMMERCE INTO THE EAST AFRICAN ECONOMY ANCHORED BY NAIROBI AND MOMBASA TO THE WORLD MARKET. THE TRANSNATIONAL EFFECTS OF INSTABILITY IN RWANDA AND BURUNDI WILL PROBABLY BE MOST
SECRET

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PAGE 12 STATE 073815 220536Z
SIGNIFICANT IN EASTERN ZAIRE. ZAIRE'S EASTERN HIGHLANDS AND KIVU PROVINCES--WITH A POPULATION OF AT LEAST 1 MILLION--HAVE BEEN INCREASINGLY DEPENDENT ON TRADE THROUGH RWANDA AND BURUNDI SINCE 1980 AS ZAIRE'S ROAD AND TRANSPORT SYSTEM DETERIORATED.

26. EFFECTS ON FOREIGN ASSISTANCE. EFFORTS TO PROMOTE REGIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND USE DEVELOPMENT AID EFFICIENTLY WILL DEPEND ON THE AMELIORATION OF ETHNIC VIOLENCE. WORLD BANK AND INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (IMF) PROGRAMS IN RWANDA HAVE BEEN SUSPENDED UNTIL A TRANSITION GOVERNMENT IS IN PLACE. IN BURUNDI, THE IMF AND WORLD BANK HAVE EFFECTIVELY ENDED THEIR DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE UNTIL THE POLITICAL/SECURITY SITUATION IS SETTLED. INCREASED LEVELS OF HUMANITARIAN AID, THOUGH ESSENTIAL FOR FEEDING AND HOUSING REFUGEES, CANNOT TAKE THE PLACE OF DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE IN PROMOTING SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIC GROWTH. (BYRNES/EHRENREICH)

C. NIGERIA/CAMEROON: SABRE-RATTLING IN THE SWAMPS

27. WHILE NEITHER NIGERIA NOR CAMEROON WANTS THE BAKASSI PENINSULA BORDER DISPUTE TO ERUPT INTO A SERIOUS CONFLICT, THE CURRENT CRISIS

[REDACTED] WITH NUMEROUS AFRICAN LEADERS OFFERING MEDIATION, A RESOLUTION OF THE IMMEDIATE CRISIS, IF NOT THE LONG-STANDING BORDER DISPUTE, IS LIKELY.

B1

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 13 STATE 073815 220536Z

28. PUBLIC OUTRAGE OVER CAMEROONIAN HARASSMENT OF NIGERIAN NATIONALS IN THE DISPUTED AREA HAS MOMENTARILY DIVERTED NIGERIAN ATTENTION FROM THE COLLAPSE OF DEMOCRATIZATION AND THE WORSENING ECONOMY. FOREIGN MINISTER KINGIBE HAS STOUTLY ASSERTED THAT NIGERIA WILL NOT CEDE ANY OF ITS TERRITORY, AND HAS REFUSED TO

WITHDRAW TROOPS FROM THE DISPUTED AREA.

29. CAMEROON IS ENJOYING A RARE ANGLOPHONE-FRANCOPHONE HARMONY IN THE FACE OF THE COMMON THREAT, AND THE PAINFUL EFFECTS OF THE CFA DEVALUATION MAY BE LESS NOTICED DURING THE BAKASSI CRISIS. AT THE SAME TIME, SOME [REDACTED] BLAME THE BIYA REGIME FOR PROVOKING THE NIGERIANS, SAYING GENDARMES HAVE ENGAGED IN THE SAME KINDS OF HARASSMENT OF THEM.

30. COMPETING CLAIMS. GERMANY AND GREAT BRITAIN IN 1895 AGREED THAT THE RIO DEL REY RIVER WOULD BE THE BOUNDARY BETWEEN NIGERIA AND CAMEROON, THUS PLACING THE BAKASSI PENINSULA ENTIRELY ON THE NIGERIAN SIDE. LATER IT WAS DISCOVERED THE RIO DEL REY WAS NOT AN 80-MILE LONG RIVER, BUT MERELY AN ESTUARY THAT JOINED THE AKPA YAFE RIVER A SHORT DISTANCE INLAND AND DID NOT EXTEND OUT TO THE OCEAN. AN IMAGINARY LINE EXTENDED SEAWARD THROUGH THE ESTUARY WOULD HAVE PLACED THE PENINSULA ON THE NIGERIAN SIDE, BUT THIS WAS A HYPOTHETICAL, NOT AN ACTUAL, BOUNDARY.

31. THE 1913 TREATY BETWEEN GERMANY AND GREAT BRITAIN SET THE BOUNDARY AS THE AKPA YAFE RIVER, EXTENDING THREE

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 14 STATE 073815 220536Z

NAUTICAL MILES SEAWARD IN THE THALWEG (DEEPEST NAVIGABLE CHANNEL), THUS PLACING ALL OF THE BAKASSI PENINSULA IN CAMEROON. PROVISIONS WERE MADE IN THE TREATY FOR AN EXACT DEMARCATION OF THE NAUTICAL BOUNDARY BUT THIS WAS NOT DONE. THE TREATY WAS NEVER RATIFIED BY EITHER COUNTRY'S PARLIAMENT BECAUSE OF THE OUTBREAK OF WORLD

WAR ONE. AFTER THE WAR, FRANCE AND GREAT BRITAIN
ADMINISTERED CAMEROON IN A TRUSTEESHIP.

32. WITH THE DISCOVERY OF OFFSHORE OIL BY BOTH
COUNTRIES IN THE 1960S THE NAUTICAL BOUNDARY BECAME
CRITICALLY IMPORTANT. PRESIDENTS GOWON OF NIGERIA AND
AHIDJO OF CAMEROON IN 1975 DELINEATED AND AGREED UPON
THIS BOUNDARY EXTENDING OUT FROM THE AKPA YAFE RIVER.
GOWON WAS OVERTHROWN A MONTH LATER AND THE TREATY WAS
NEVER RATIFIED BY THE NIGERIAN GOVERNMENT. ACCORDING TO
THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT THE AGREEMENT WAS REGISTERED WITH
THE UN AND THERE WAS NO NIGERIAN PROTEST LODGED WITHIN
THE PRESCRIBED SIX MONTHS' WAITING PERIOD. SUBSEQUENT
NIGERIAN GOVERNMENTS HAVE REJECTED THE AGREEMENT, WHILE
CAMEROON HAS STEADFASTLY ADHERED TO IT. OTHER THAN THE
1895 BRITISH/GERMAN AGREEMENT, LAGOS BASES ITS CLAIM TO
THE PENINSULA ON THE FACT THAT MOST BAKASSI INHABITANTS
ARE ETHNIC NIGERIANS.

33. THE INHABITANTS, MOSTLY FISHERMEN WHO EVEN CAMEROON
ACKNOWLEDGES ARE OVERWHELMINGLY NIGERIAN, ARE TIRED OF
BEING HARASSED BY CAMEROONIAN GENDARMES. AT THE LAST
BORDER COMMISSION HEARING ON THE SUBJECT IN AUGUST 1993
THE NIGERIANS THOUGHT CAMEROON HAD AGREED TO STOP THE

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 15 STATE 073815 220536Z
HARASSMENT WHILE NEGOTIATIONS CONTINUED AT A HIGHER
LEVEL ON THE FINAL STATUS OF THE AREA. FISHING, AS WELL
AS OIL; RIGHTS ARE AN ISSUE FOR BOTH COUNTRIES.

34. TENSIONS ERUPT. THE MOST RECENT ERUPTION OF THE
LONG-STANDING DISPUTE OCCURRED IN THE LATTER PART OF
1993 WHEN [REDACTED] CAMEROONIAN GENDARMES LAUNCHED A
PUNITIVE ANTI-SMUGGLING CAMPAIGN WHICH UPSET BOTH THE
CAMEROONIAN AND NIGERIAN INHABITANTS. THIS IS THE THIRD
SUCH BORDER CRISIS IN THE PAST 15 YEARS. SMUGGLING OF
LESS EXPENSIVE NIGERIAN OIL INTO CAMEROON HAS BEEN GOING
ON FOR YEARS AND HAS CAUSED CONCERN IN BOTH COUNTRIES,
BUT ESPECIALLY IN CAMEROON. THE NIGERIANS COMPLAINED OF
THIS LATEST CRACKDOWN, IN WHICH SEVERAL PEOPLE WERE
REPORTEDLY KILLED, TO THEIR AUTHORITIES IN CALABAR.
NIGERIAN TROOPS IN RETALIATION ON JANUARY 4 TOOK OVER
ATABONG IN SOUTHWEST CAMEROON, JUST NORTH OF THE BAKASSI

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
PENINSULA. YAOUNDE PROTESTED TO LAGOS THAT THE JANUARY 4 INCURSION WAS AN "ACT OF WAR", DEMANDED AN IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS, AND SENT ITS OWN TROOPS TO THE AREA.

35. CAMEROON SEEKS AN INTERNATIONAL SOLUTION. KNOWING IT COULD NOT MATCH NIGERIA MILITARILY, YAOUNDE HAS ASKED FRANCE, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, THE ORGANIZATION FOR AFRICAN UNITY, AND THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL FOR HELP. CAMEROON BELIEVES IT IS LEGALLY IN THE RIGHT AND WANTS PERMANENT AND BINDING INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION OF ITS SOVEREIGNTY IN THE AREA. SINCE ITS FORMER COLONIAL POWER, FRANCE, IS PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL THIS MONTH IT WOULD LIKE TO OBTAIN A

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 16 STATE 073815 220536Z
FINAL RESOLUTION NOW. WITH THE UPCOMING APRIL
ANGLOPHONE CONFERENCE AND TALK OF SECESSION,



B1

37. NIGERIA NERVOUS. NIGERIA IS CONCERNED ABOUT THE FATE OF ITS 1-2 MILLION CITIZENS IN CAMEROON;

UNCONFIRMED RUMORS HAVE BEEN FLYING IN NIGERIA ABOUT
PLOTS TO ARREST NIGERIAN BUSINESSMEN AND FREEZE THEIR
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 17 STATE 073815 220536Z
ASSETS. LAGOS, IN APPARENT RETALIATION, HAS BEEN
GATHERING INFORMATION ABOUT THE WHEREABOUTS AND ASSETS
OF CAMEROONIAN BUSINESSMEN IN NIGERIA. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] FRU NDI
ANNOUNCED ON MARCH 15 THAT HE WOULD TRAVEL TO NIGERIA TO
HELP RESOLVE THE BORDER DISPUTE.

38. [REDACTED] THE FEBRUARY 27
ARRIVAL OF 15-30 REGULAR FRENCH TROOPS IN YAOUNDE,
ADDING TO THE NORMAL COMPLEMENT OF FRENCH MILITARY
ADVISORS. [REDACTED] LAGOS ACCUSED FRANCE
OF LEADING THE DEPLOYMENT OF CAMEROONIAN TROOPS IN THE
PENINSULA, WHICH BOTH PARIS AND YAOUNDE HAVE DENIED.
CITING "SELF-DEFENSE," LAGOS IS NOW BUILDING A PERMANENT
MILITARY INSTALLATION ON THE PENINSULA. NIGERIAN
BRAVADO NOTWITHSTANDING, ABACHA WILL, HOWEVER, GO TO
GREAT LENGTHS TO AVOID A MILITARY ENCOUNTER. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

39. FRENCH AND U.S. INTERESTS. WHILE FRANCE HAS
SIGNIFICANT INVESTMENTS IN BOTH COUNTRIES, IT HAS
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PAGE 18 STATE 073815 220536Z
STRONGER LINGUISTIC AND CULTURAL TIES, AS WELL AS A
DEFENSE PACT, WITH CAMEROON. FRANCE HAS BECOME
INCREASINGLY CONCERNED BY THE LACK OF PROGRESS IN
RESOLVING THE DISPUTE AND THE BUILD-UP OF TROOPS ON BOTH

SIDES. THE STATE-OWNED OIL FIRM ELF, IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE US FIRM PECTEN, OPERATES MOST OF CAMEROON'S OIL RIGS, NEARLY ALL OF WHICH LIE IN THE DISPUTED AREA. [REDACTED]

B1, B4

40. AFRICAN MEDIATION EFFORTS. FRENCH, INTERNATIONAL AND BILATERAL MEDIATION EFFORTS HAVE SO FAR PROVED UNSUCCESSFUL, BUT THERE IS A GLIMMER OF HOPE ON THE AFRICAN FRONT. PRESIDENT EYADEMA OF TOGO AND PRESIDENT SOGLO OF BENIN, THE PRESENT ECOWAS CHAIRMAN, MAY SERVE AS POSSIBLE MEDIATORS. BIYA SAID HE WOULD NOT MEET WITH ABACHA UNTIL NIGERIAN TROOPS WERE WITHDRAWN FROM THE PENINSULA, AND ABACHA WAS JUST AS INSISTENT THAT THEY
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SECRET

PAGE 19 STATE 073815 220536Z
REMAIN. LAGOS HAS JUST AGREED TO BIYA'S SUGGESTION OF MEETING WITH ABACHA IN CAIRO WITH OAU PRESIDENT MUBARAK AS INTERMEDIARY. FOREIGN MINISTER KINGIBE WENT TO EGYPT ON MARCH 16 TO ARRANGE THE MEETING.

41. HOPE FOR A PEACEFUL SOLUTION. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] WHILE NEITHER SIDE WANTS WAR, WITH SUBSTANTIAL RECIPROCAL TROOP BUILD-UPS IN CLOSE PROXIMITY THERE IS A CHANCE THAT NEW FIGHTING

B1

COULD, PERHAPS INADVERTENTLY, BREAK OUT AND ESCALATE. THE STEPPED-UP PACE OF BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS INDICATES THAT BOTH SIDES WANT TO AVOID AN ESCALATION OF THE CONFLICT AND RECOGNIZE THE URGENT NEED FOR A MUTUALLY FACE-SAVING SOLUTION. THE MEDIATORY EFFORTS OF OTHER

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AFRICAN LEADERS MAY WELL BRING A REDUCTION IN TENSIONS
AND A WITHDRAWAL OF SOME OF THE TROOPS IN BAKASSI
REGION. UNLESS THE BORDER ISSUE IS DEFINITELY
RESOLVED, SIMILAR CRISES ARE LIKELY IN THE FUTURE.
(WAGONER) CHRISTOPHER

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*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a
*** Current Classification *** SECRET