CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01  KIGALI  02265  01 OF 06  111500Z
ACTION AF-01

INFO LOG-00  CTAB-00  C-01  OASY-00  DODE-00  DOE-00  EUR-01
HA-09  H-01  TEBE-00  INR-00  IO-19  L-03  ADS-00
MMP-00  NSAE-00  NSCE-00  OIC-02  OIG-04  OMB-01  PA-01
PM-02  PRS-01  P-01  SNP-00  SP-00  SS-00  TRSE-00
T-00  USIR-00  FMP-00  RPE-01  CORE-00  /048W

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02  KIGALI  02265  01 OF 06  111500Z

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: KPRP, PINS, PGOV, PREL, MOPS, RW
SUBJECT: THE MILITARY AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS

REF: KIGALI 2023

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. THIS MESSAGE FULFILLS AN ESSENTIAL REPORTING

UNCLASSIFIED
SUMMARY

3. RWANDA'S ARMED FORCES ARE IN A STATE OF FLUX. THE TRANSITION TO MULTIPARTY DEMOCRACY, CHANGES IN THE ROLE OF THE ARMED FORCES, NEW POLITICAL TENDENCIES, NORTH-SOUTH REGIONALISM, RESENTMENT AMONG YOUNG OFFICERS, ETHNICISM, AND THE SPECTERS OF INTEGRATION AD DEMOBILIZATION ARE ALL CAUSING FRICTION WITHIN THE INSTITUTION. THIS ONCE WELL-TRAINED AND PROUD INSTITUTION HAS LOST THE CONFIDENCE OF THE POPULATION IT IS SUPPOSED TO DEFEND, STANDING ACCUSED OF LOOTING, INVOLVEMENT IN POLITICAL VIOLENCE, AND GROSS HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS.

4. THE INSTITUTION IS NOT MONOLITHIC, AND ITS POSSIBLE REACTION TO DEMOCRATIC CHANGES UNDERWAY IS DIFFICULT TO PREDICT. THEIR OPTIONS SEEM TO BE TO ACCEPT THEIR NEW ROLE IN DEMOCRACY, SELF DESTRUCT IN CONFIDENTIAL LEADERLESS MUTINY, OR TAKE POWER IN A COUP D'ETAT. THERE APPEARS TO BE NIETHER EVIDENCE OF NOR AN APPARENT LEADER FOR A COUP. WHILE THE MILITARY'S RESPONSE TO A DOD TEAM OF MILITARY LAWYERS, IN KIGALI TO PLAN A SEMINAR ON THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY A DEMOCRACY, WAS VERY POSITIVE, POST DOES NOT KNOW IF THERE IS A CRITICAL MASS IN THE MILITARY SUPPORTIVE OF THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY. SHOULD PEACE COME, INTEGRATION AND DEMOBILIZATION WILL BE THE CRITICAL FACTORS IN DETERMINING WHETHER DEMOCRACY WILL SURVIVE IN RWANDA. END SUMMARY.

TRANSITION TO MULTIPARTY DEMOCRACY

CONTROL OF THE DEPUTY CHIEFS OF STAFF (ARMY: COL. SERUBUGA; GENDARMERIE: COL. RWAGWAFILITA). ARMY OFFICERS HELD MINISTERIAL POSITIONS, WERE ELECTED AS DEPUTIES, AND WERE APPOINTED TO OTHER CIVIL JOBS.


8. HOWEVER, THE NEW POLITICAL TENDENCIES IN THE SOCIETY ARE INCREASINGLY REFLECTED WITHIN THE ARMED FORCES. SOLDIERS TALK OF THIS OR THAT OFFICER BEING ALLIED WITH OPPOSITION PARTIES, IN SPITE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITION AGAINST PARTY MEMBERSHIP. IN SOME CASES, THIS HAS LED TO ONCE UPWARDLY MOBILE OFFICERS BEING REASSIGNED TO LESS RESPONSIBLE POSITIONS. ON THE OTHER HAND, MINISTER OF DEFENSE JAMES GASAMA HAS REPLACED HARDLINERS WITH MORE MODERATE OFFICERS IN SOME KEY POSITIONS. THE
MILITARY REACTED VERY POSITIVELY TO THE VISIT OF A DOD TEAM OF MILITARY LAWYERS WHICH VISITED KIGALI IN MAY, 1992 TO PLAN AN IMET-FUNDED SEMINAR ON THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN A DEMOCRACY.

NORTH VS. SOUTH

9. SINCE HABYARIMANA'S TAKING OF POWER IN 1973, RECRUITMENT TO THE ARMED FORCES HAS CONCENTRATED HEAVILY ON MEN FROM THE PRESIDENT'S HOME PREFECTURE OF GISENYI, AND TO A LESSER EXTENT ON THE NEIGHBORING

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03

KIGALI 02265 02 OF 06 111502Z

RUHENGERI PREFECTURE. WHILE SOME MEN FROM OTHER AREAS DID MANAGE TO ENTER THE OFFICER'S CORPS AND DO RELATIVELY WELL PRIOR TO THE OUTBREAK OF WAR, OFFICER RECRUITMENT SINCE OCTOBER, 1990 HAS BEEN ALMOST UNICELY FROM GISENYI. SOURCES WITHIN BELGIAN MILITARY COOPERATION, DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN OFFICER TRAINING AT THE OFFICER'S ACADEMY, TOLD ECONOFF THAT OF THE 120 MEN GRADUATED IN THE LAST THREE CLASSES, ONLY 10 WERE FROM A PREFECTURE OTHER THAN GISENYI.

10. THIS HEAVY RELIANCE ON OFFICERS FROM GISENYI IS NOT COMPLETELY REFLECTED IN THE RANK AND FILE. WHILE CANDIDATES FOR NCO POSITIONS ARE LARGELY FROM THE PROMISED LAND, PLACE OF ORIGIN FOR SOLDIERS ARE MORE EVENLY DISTRIBUTED. THIS HAS CAUSED PROBLEMS AS WELL. DURING THE FEB. 8, 1993 RPF OFFENSIVE, FRENCH SOURCES STATED THAT ENTIRE UNITS FLED IN THE FACE OF THE ENEMY, AND THAT UNITS MADE UP OF SOUTHERNERS WERE MORE LIKELY TO DESERT. THE ONLY AREA WHERE THE ARMY MANAGED TO RETREAT, REGROUP, AND COUNTERATTACK WAS IN RUHENGERI; THE TROOPS THERE ARE ALMOST ENTIRELY FROM RUHENGERI AND GISENYI PREFECTURE.

11. THIS HAS CREATED THE IMPRESSION THAT SOUTHERNERS WON'T FIGHT FOR THEIR COUNTRY AND THAT SOLDIERS FROM THE SOUTH ARE ALLIED WITH THE MDR OPPOSITION PARTY, AND MAY BE IN CAHOOTS WITH THE RPF. WHEN DESERTERS ARE SUBJECT TO NONJUDICIAL MILITARY DISCIPLINE, RWANDA'S HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS POINT TO THE ORIGINS OF THE ACCUSED AS THE BASIS FOR THEIR PROSECUTION.
12. THE NORTH - SOUTH DICHOTOMY HAS ALSO HAD ITS EFFECT ON PROMOTIONS. SOLDIERS SPENT THE NIGHT FIRING THEIR WEAPONS INTO THE AIR IN MAY 1991 IN PROTEST OF THAT YEAR'S PROMOTIONS LIST, WHICH MAY SAID FAVORED ONLY OFFICERS FROM THE NORTH. (THE PROMOTION LIST WAS LATER REVISED.)

OLD VS. YOUNG

13. LACK OF UPWARD MOBILITY WITHIN THE OFFICER'S
THE MILITARY AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS

14. HOWEVER, THE RANKS OF LT. COL. AND COL. ARE OVER SUBSCRIBED, CREATING A INVISIBLE WALL BLOCKING PROMOTION. THE YOUNGER OFFICERS FEEL THAT THEIR CAREERS ARE STYMIED BY MEN WHO ARE LITTLE MORE THAN MRND PARTY HACKS, WITH NO REAL MILITARY SKILLS. MANY OF THESE YOUNG TURKS CONSIDER THEMSELVES LOYAL TO THE PRESIDENT AND HIS PARTY, AND ARE AS LIKELY TO ACCUSE THE OPPOSITION PARTIES OF DISLOYALTY TO THE COUNTRY, AND EVEN OF HAVING TREASONOUS CONTACTS WITH THE RPF. HOWEVER, IT IS AMONG THESE OFFICERS THAT ONE FINDS A FLEXIBILITY OF THINKING AND PHILOSOPHY WHICH COULD LOAD THEM TO SUPPORT THE TRASITION TO DEMOCRACY, AS LONG AS IT IS DONE WITHOUT DESTROYING THE INSTITUTION
15. The Rwandan armed forces have been dominated by the Hutu ethnic group since independence. While some Tutsis did enter the army, and a few made it into the officer's corps, the outbreak of war saw many of them arrested as collaborators or forced into reserve status. RPF protestations to the contrary, the Rwandan armed forces see the war as a conflict between their Hutu army and the Tutsi invaders. Many consider the RPF's ultimate aim to be total power, whether by force of arms in open warfare, or by fifth column action and sabotage -- even sabotage after the signing of a peace accord and the entering of the RPF into a transition government in Kigali.

16. Peace will bring with it integration of forces. There will be RPF officers in the high command, and RPF politicians among the army's civilian masters (although the minister of defense will come from the MRMD party). Many officers see the possibility that the RPF forces in the army will in fact act as infiltrators, assisting the RPF political leaders in the planning of a coup from within, and thus accomplishing the RPF's ultimate goal -- total power.

Demobilization

17. Massive recruitment since the beginning of the war has swelled the ranks of the army and gendarmerie from some 10,000 men in 1990 to roughly 36,000 at present. Many of these recent recruits will
LOGICALLY BE THE FIRST TO GO IF PEACE RETURNS TO THE COUNTRY AND SOME 30,000 GOR AND RPF TROOPS ARE DEMOBILIZED. MANY SOLDIERS AND OFFICERS BELIEVE THAT THE GOVERNMENT INTENDS TO SIMPLY PUT THEM OUT TO PASTURE WITH NO THOUGHT TO THEIR REINTEGRATION INTO CIVILIAN SOCIETY. THE FIRST TIME DEMOBILIZATION WAS DISCUSSED ON THE NATIONAL RADIO (MAY, 1992), SOLDIERS MUTINIED IN THE TOWNS OF GISENYI AND RUHENGERI, PILLAGING AND DESTROYING SHOPS AND HOMES. FOR MAY OF THESE MEN, PEACE AND DEMOCRACY HOLD NO POSITIVE DIVIDENDS.
A POPULATION DECEIVED

18. PRIOR TO THE WAR, THE ARMY WAS WELL REGARDED BY THE POPULATION (AT LEAST, THE HUTU MAJORITY). THE INITIAL SUCCESS IN REPELLING THE RPF INVASION WAS APPLAUDED, ALTHOUGH THE WHOLESALE ARREST OF TUTSIS AND PERSECUTION OF SOME SOLDIERS FOR ALLEGED COMPLICITY WITH THE REBELS WAS A FORETASTE OF THINGS TO COME. WITH THE CREATION OFOPPOSITION PARTIES THE MILITARY QUICKLY CAME UNDER FIRE, ACCUSED OF INVOLVEMENT IN DEATH THREATS AGAINST NON-MRND POLITICIANS, ATTACKS ON JOURNALISTS, AND INVOLVEMENT IN A POLITICALLY MOTIVATED DEATH SQUAD.

20. AS NOTED ABOVE, THE MILITARY IS NOT THE MONOLITHIC PARTY INSTITUTION IT ONCE WAS. SOME SENIOR COLONELS SEE THEIR DESTINY AS TIED TO THE PRESIDENT AND HIS PARTY. MANY HAVE NOisy SKELETONS RATTLING IN THEIR CLOSETS, AND FEAR PROSECUTION FOR PAST CORRUPTION AND INCOMPETENCE.

21. THE YOUNG TURKS ARE DIFFICULT TO CATEGORIZE, BUT APPEAR DIVIDED INTO AT LEAST THREE CAMPS. FIRST IS THE MRND LOYALISTS, WHO BELIEVE THE OPPOSITION PARTIES TO BE DUPlicitous, SEEKING ONLY THE OUSTER OF THE PRESIDENT, EVEN IF THIS REQUIRES COMMITTING TREASON WITH THE RPF. THE SECOND APPEARS READY TO THROW ITS LOT IN WITH ONE OR ANOTHER OF THE OPPOSITION PARTIES, SEEING NO FUTURE FOR THEMSELVES IN SUPPORTING THE PRESIDENT. MOST OF THESE WOULD APPEAR TO SUPPORT THE SOUTHERN-BASED MDR PARTY, SEEING IN IT AT LEAST A HUTU-DOMINATED ORGANIZATION WITH A FACTION COMMITTED TO THE PROTECTION OF THE MAJORITY.

22. THE LAST CAMP SEEMS TO REALIZE THAT CHANGE IS INEVITABLE, AND THEORETICALLY SUPPORT THE MOVE TOWARD MULTIPARTY DEMOCRACY. THEY HAVE NO TRUST FOR ANY OF THE POLITICAL PARTY LEADERS, AND THEREFORE SEE THEIR SALVATION IN BEING APOlitical, IN THE HOPE THAT INSTITUTIONALIZING ELECTIONS WILL SOONER OR LATER BRING FORTH COMPETENT POLITICIANS TO RULE THE COUNTRY. HOWEVER, THEY SHARE THE FEAR OF THE FIRST TWO GROUPS THAT THE PEACE MAY BE MORE DIFFICULT THAN THE WAR. THEY FEAR THAT INTEGRATION AND DEMOBILIZATION OF FORCES WILL CREATE A DIVIDED ARMY WHICH COULD TURN ON ITSELF AT THE SLIGHTEST
CONFIDENTIAL

PROVOCATION.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01  KIGALI 02265  05 OF 06  111507Z
ACTION AF-01

INFO LOG-00 CIAE-00 C-01 OASY-00 DODE-00 DOEE-00 EUR-01
    HA-09 H-01 TEDE-00 INR-00 TO-19 L-03 ADS-00
    MMP-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 OIC-02 OIG-04 OMB-01 PA-01
    PM-02 PRS-01 P-01 SNP-00 SP-00 SS-00 TRSE-00
    T-00 USIE-00 FMP-00 RPE-01 CORE-00 /048W

--------------------CA29DE 111750Z /38

R 111428Z JUN 93
FM AMEMBASSY KIGALI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4049
INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
AMEMBASSY LILONGWE
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE
USCINCEUR VAITHINGEN GE //ECJ4-SA//
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 05 OF 06 KIGALI 02265

DEPT FOR AF/C AND INR/IL/RD
LILONGWE FOR DAO
ADDIS FOR DAO
YAOUNDE FOR DAO

CONFIDENTIAL
WHAT ARE THE ARMED FORCES’ OPTIONS?


24. THE THIRD OPTION IS FOR THE ARMY TO ATTEMPT TO TAKE POWER. POST CONSIDERS AN ANTI-HABYARIMANA/MRND COUP IMPROBABLE. THE SENIOR OFFICER’S CORPS, PLUS THE TWO GROUPS OF YOUNG TURKS EITHER SUPPORTIVE OF THE PRESIDENT OR APOLITICAL, WOULD NOT GO ALONG WITH IT. THERE COULD BE MORE BACKING FOR A COUP TO KEEP THE PRESIDENT IN POWER AND END BOTH NEGOTIATIONS AND THE TRANSITION TO MULTIPARTYISM.

25. THE RESULTS OF SUCH A COUP WOULD PROBABLY BE CATASTROPHIC. POST ASSUMES THAT IT WOULD BE FOLLOWED IMMEDIATELY BY A MASSIVE RPF ATTACK, WHICH WOULD MAKE
MAJOR GAINS, PERHAPS EVEN SIEZING POWER IN KIGALI. THIS WOULD BE FOLLOWED BY MASS MURDER OF TUTSIS IN MUCH OF THE COUNTRY, CIVIL WAR, AND CHAOS.

26. AT THIS TIME THERE IS NO SERIOUS EVIDENCE THAT A COUP D'ETAT OF ANY KIND IS IN THE CARDS. IN PARTICULAR, THERE DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE ANYONE CAPABLE OF LEADING ONE. SENIOR OPPOSITION PARTY LEADERS DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THE HARDLINERS COULD GARNER SUFFICIENT SUPPORT IN THE ARMED FORCES FOR A SUCCESSFUL COUP. GIVEN THE DIVISIONS DESCRIBED ABOVE, IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THE WHOLE OF THE ARMED FORCES COULD BE COUNTED ON TO SUPPORT A COUP D'ETAT, NO MATTER WHO ITS LEADER OR WHAT ITS OBJECTIVES WOULD BE.

COMMENT

27. ARE THERE POSITIVE FORCES FOR CHANGE WITHIN THE ARMED FORCES? POST MUST NOTE THAT OUR ACCESS TO THE OFFICER'S CORPS, WHILE GOOD, IS STILL LIMITED. THAT GROUP OF OFFICERS CONSIDERED TO BE HARDLINERS HAS BEEN ESPECIALLY INACCESSIBLE. IN POST'S EXPERIENCE, THERE ARE A NUMBER OF GOOD OFFICERS WHO APPEAR TO BELIEVE THAT THE CHANGES BEFORE THEM CAN BE POSITIVE FOR THE MILITARY (OR AT LEAST ARE NOT NEGATIVE ENOUGH TO BE ACTIVELY OPPOSED). AS AN EXAMPLE, THE CURRENT CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE GENDARMERIE, COL. NDINDILYIMANA, IS WIDELY CONSIDERED TO BE AN HONEST SOLDIER/POLITICIAN. SINCE TAKING THE UNENVIABLE JOB IN JUNE, 1992, HE HAS MADE SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS IN REVAMPING THE IMAGE OF HIS FORCE. WHILE THERE ARE STILL SEVERAL THOUSAND RANK AND FILE GENDARMES WITH NO SPECIALIZED TRAINING AFTER BOOT CAMP, A GOOD PROPORTION OF THE 7,000-STRONG FORCE HAS BEEN GIVEN SPECIFIC POLICE TRAINING, WITH
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01  KIGALI 02265 06 OF 06 111508Z
ACTION AF-01

INFO LOG-00 CIAE-00 C-01 OASY-00 DODE-00 DOEE-00 EUR-01
HA-09 H-01 TEDE-00 INR-00 IO-19 L-03 ADS-00
MMP-00 NSA-00 NSCE-00 OIC-02 OIG-04 OMB-01 PA-01
PM-02 PRS-01 P-01 SNMP-00 SP-00 SS-00 TRSE-00
T-00 USIE-00 FMP-00 RPE-01 CORE-00 /048W

R 111428Z JUN 93
FM AMEMBASSY KIGALI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4050
INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
AMEMBASSY LILONGWE
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE //ECJ4-SA//
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 06 OF 06 KIGALI 02265

DEPT FOR AF/C AND INR/IL/RD
LILONGWE FOR DAO
ADDIS FOR DAO
YAOUNDE FOR DAO

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02  KIGALI 02265 06 OF 06 111508Z

B.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

Page - 15
THE GOAL OF CHANGING THEIR MENTALITY FROM ONE OF "DESTROY THE ENEMY" TO THAT OF "PROTECT THE POPULATION." THE CHIEF OF STAFF IS HAVING SOME SUCCESS IN REMOVING HIS MEN FROM COMBAT DUTIES AT THE FRONT AND RE-INSTITUTING DISCIPLINE, AND IS PERHAPS THE MOST PROMINENT SENIOR MILITARY OFFICER TO BE GENERALLY TRUSTED BY OPPOSITION PARTIES.

28. AMONG THE YOUNG TURKS WHO SEEM COMMITTED TO DEMOCRACY, WE FIND HIGHLY TRAINED OFFICERS FROM THE FRENCH SENIOR OFFICER'S ACADEMY AND THE U.S COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE. OF INTEREST IS THEIR OPINION THAT SOLDIERS SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO VOTE IN THE FIRST MULTIPARTY ELECTIONS, TO FORCE THEM INTO AN APOLITICAL POSITION AND KEEP THE ARMY FROM BEING USED TO SKEW THE RESULTS.

29. IS THERE A CRITICAL MASS IN THE ARMED FORCES FOR POSITIVE CHANGE? THIS IS UNCERTAIN. EVEN IF THE ANSWER IS YES, THE PEACE, SHOULD IT COME, WILL BE VERY DIFFICULT. THE DEMOBILIZATION AND INTEGRATION PERIOD WILL BE CRITICAL TO MILITARY SUPPORT FOR THE ENLARGED MULTIPARTY TRANSITION GOVERNMENT AND DEMOCRACY IN GENERAL. BADLY HANDLED, THIS COULD BE THE SINGLE MOST DANGEROUS FACTOR IN OBTAINING MILITARY SUPPORT FOR PEACE AND DEMOCRACY IN RWANDA.

CONFIDENTIAL

END COMMENT.

CONFIDENTIAL