

E17

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 USUN N 03423 01 OF 02 141950Z
ACTION AF-01

R

INFO LOG-00	CIAE-00	C-01	OASY-00	HA-09	H-01	TEDE-00
INR-00	IO-19	L-03	ADS-00	NSAE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01
PA-01	PM-02	PRS-01	P-01	RPCS-01	SNP-00	SP-00
SS-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	CORE-00	/043W	

-----D6E867 141951Z /38

O 141944Z JUL 93
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8161
INFO WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
CJCS WASHDC IMMEDIATE
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

Dept. of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Grafeld, Dir.
(X) Release () Excise () Deny (X) Declassify
Date 9/18/98 Exemption _____

SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 003423

STATE FOR AF DAS BUSHNELL AND IO/UNP
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA AND DAS SEWELL
JCS FOR J3, J5
WHITE HOUSE PLEASE PASS NSC

E.O.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, MARR, UN, RW
SUBJECT: POSSIBLE PEACEKEEPING OPERATION IN RWANDA

REF: A) STATE 210975, B) USUN 2899, C) USUN 3028, D)
USUN 3046, E) KIGALI 2414

1. [REDACTED]

PAGE 02 USUN N 03423 01 OF 02 141950Z

2. SUMMARY: IN ANSWER TO REF A, THERE ARE PROS AND
CONS BEING DISCUSSED WITHIN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
REGARDING A UN INTERPOSITIONAL FORCE IN RWANDA, REFERRED
TO IN THE (PENDING) ARUSHA ACCORD AS A NEUTRAL
INTERNATIONAL FORCE (NIF). PROBABLY, THE BEST WAY
FORWARD WILE, BE TO DEVISE AN IMAGINATIVE WAY FOR THE UN
TO HELP THE OAU UNDERTAKE THE MAJOR PART OF THE
PEACEKEEPING TASK, ALLOWING THE OAU TO TAP INTO UN
EXPERTISE, BUT AVOIDING PAYING FOR THE PKO THROUGH

UNCLASSIFIED

ASSESSMENTS ON UN MEMBER STATES. THIS NIF IS SEPARATE FROM, BUT COMPLEMENTARY TO, UNOMUR (THE OBSERVER AND MONITORING GROUP ON THE UGANDAN SIDE OF THE BORDER).
END SUMMARY.

HISTORY

3. [REDACTED] THIS CABLE WILL DISCUSS THE SECOND STAGE OF MULTILATERAL ACTION IN RWANDA. AS DOD AND STATE WILL RECALL, THE MANDATE AND OPERATING PRINCIPLES FOR THE FIRST STAGE--A BORDER MONITORING GROUP--WAS NEGOTIATED BY REPRESENTATIVES OF DOD/OSD/ISA, JCS, AND STATE'S AF AND IO BUREAUS WITH A HIGH LEVEL FRENCH DELEGATION IN NEW YORK JUNE 11 (REF B). ONCE THE USG AND FRENCH HAD REACHED A CONVERGENCE OF VIEWS, THE FRENCH PRESENTED A TEXT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL, WHICH WAS TAKEN UP IN INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS (REF C) AND ADOPTED (REF D).

4. [REDACTED] THE SECOND STAGE OF MULTILATERAL ACTION IN RWANDA CANNOT BE THOROUGHLY ANALYZED UNTIL AN AGREEMENT
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

PAGE 03 USUN N 03423 01 OF 02 141950Z
BETWEEN THE PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT IS FINALIZED AND SIGNED AT ARUSHA, TANZANIA. THE ARUSHA ACCORD MAY BE SIGNED BY THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT AND THE RWANDAN PATRIOTIC FRONT (RPF) AS EARLY AS JULY 15. REPORTEDLY, THE ACCORD WILL CALL FOR THE UN TO SEND A NEUTRAL INTERNATIONAL FORCE (NIF) TO INTERPOSE ITSELF IN THE 70-MILE WIDE BUFFER ZONE BETWEEN THE TWO FORCES' FRONT LINES. THIS WILL CREATE THE ATMOSPHERE OF STABILITY WHICH WILL ENABLE THE ALMOST ONE MILLION DISPLACED PERSONS TO RETURN SAFELY TO THEIR HOMES. THE OAU IS CURRENTLY IN THE BUFFER ZONE WITH A NEUTRAL MONITORING AND OBSERVING GROUP (NMOG), WHICH BY ALL ACCOUNTS IS NOT/NOT DOING A VERY GOOD JOB.

PRD-13

5. [REDACTED] THE PROPOSED NIF (ALTHOUGH NOT FULLY FLESHED OUT) SEEMS TO GO A LONG WAY TOWARDS FULFILLING THE CRITERIA IN PRD-13. A) THE THREAT TO INTERNATIONAL ORDER INCLUDES INTERNATIONAL AGGRESSION BY REBEL FORCES LOCATED ACROSS THE BORDER IN UGANDA AND A HUMANITARIAN

UNCLASSIFIED

DISASTER INVOLVING ALMOST ONE MILLION DISPLACED WHO HAVE FLED THEIR HOMES IN THE FACE OF VIOLENCE. B) THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY OF INTEREST IS DEMONSTRATED BY THE PRESENCE OF OAU FORCES IN RWANDA, SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 846 ESTABLISHING A BORDER MONITORING GROUP, AND THE TANZANIAN-FACILITATED PEACE TALKS IN ARUSHA WHICH ARE OBSERVED BY SEVERAL CONCERNED COUNTRIES INCLUDING THE U.S. C) THE CLEAR OBJECTIVES, WHICH SHOULD BE CLARIFIED BY THE ARUSHA ACCORD, SEEM TO BE

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 04 USUN N 03423 01 OF 02 141950Z
THOSE OF A CLASSICAL PEACEKEEPING OPERATION IN WHICH A CEASEFIRE EXISTS AND BOTH SIDES ACCEPT THE PKO. THIS PROPOSED FORCE DOES NOT APPEAR TO SPILL OVER INTO PEACE ENFORCEMENT. THE PEACEMAKING HAS ALREADY BEEN (ALMOST) ACCOMPLISHED BY THE TANZANIANS. D) THIS IS THE AREA WHERE SOME QUESTIONS REMAIN. PARTICULARLY, THE QUESTIONS OF FINANCING AND WHETHER THE MANDATE SHOULD BE TAKEN UP BY THE UN OR OAU ARE STILL AT ISSUE.

PRO

6. (U) THE SECRETARIAT, AS WELL AS SOME MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE DONOR COMMUNITY, ARE WILLING TO ACCEDE TO THE ANTICIPATED REQUEST FOR A UN-LED NIF. THEY SAY THERE IS A MORAL OBLIGATION FOR THE UN TO HELP BRING PEACEFUL SOLUTIONS TO CONFLICTS WHEN ASKED. THIS IS ONE CASE WHERE BOTH PARTIES ACTUALLY SEEM TO BE DISPLAYING THE WILL TO LAY DOWN THEIR ARMS AND MOVE TOWARDS A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT, AS OPPOSED TO OTHER AREAS

[REDACTED]

NNNN

UNCLASSIFIED
Page - 3 -

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 USUN N 03423 02 OF 02 141950Z
ACTION AF-01

INFO LOG-00 CIAE-00 C-01 OASY-00 HA-09 H-01 TEDE-00
INR-00 IO-19 L-03 ADS-00 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01
PA-01 PM-02 PRS-01 P-01 RPCS-01 SNP-00 SP-00
SS-00 TRSE-00 T-00 USIE-00 CORE-00 /043W
-----D6E86C 141951Z /38

O 141944Z JUL 93
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8162
INFO WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
CJCS WASHDC IMMEDIATE
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

SECTION 02 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 003423

STATE FOR AF DAS BUSHNELL AND IO/UNP
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA AND DAS SEWELL
JCS FOR J3, J5
WHITE HOUSE PLEASE PASS NSC

E.O.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, MARR, UN, RW
SUBJECT: POSSIBLE PEACEKEEPING OPERATION IN RWANDA

(E.G. ANGOLA, BOSNIA, GEORGIA) WHERE THE GOODWILL OF THE
PROTAGONISTS IS QUESTIONABLE. THE CEASEFIRE HAS BEEN
HOLDING FOR QUITE SOME TIME. UN PEACEKEEPERS IN RWANDA
WOULD HAVE A REASONABLY GOOD CHANCE OF EFFECTIVELY

[REDACTED]

PAGE 02 USUN N 03423 02 OF 02 141950Z
BRINGING PEACE TO MILLIONS OF SUFFERING PEOPLE. TURNING
AWAY FROM THIS CALL FOR HELP COULD HAVE TRAGIC HUMAN
CONSEQUENCES.

7. (U) FINANCIALLY, THE SECRETARIAT REALIZES IT WILL
COST LESS TO PUT A PKO IN PLACE FOR A LIMITED TIME
ALLOWING THE POPULATION TO RETURN TO ITS VILLAGES, THAN
TO PAY FOR THE FEEDING AND UPKEEP OF ONE MILLION PEOPLE
IN REFUGEE CAMPS.

UNCLASSIFIED

8. [REDACTED] SUPPORTING THE NEED FOR A UN ROLE, THIS POINT OF VIEW CITES THE POOR JOB THE OAU HAS BEEN DOING TO DATE. THE OAU HAS BEEN DRAGGING ITS FEET IN PROPOSING CONCRETE WAYS TO SHORE UP ITS OPERATION, DESPITE A VISIT BY A SECONDED OFFICER FROM UN DPKO. THERE ARE COMPLAINTS THAT THE OAU IS INEXPERIENCED, CORRUPT, INCOMPETENT, LACKING IN FUNDS, ETC. THE UN HAS THE EXPERTISE TO BE MORE EFFECTIVE. UN SYG BOUTROS-GHALI EXPRESSED THIS POINT OF VIEW TO THE PERMREPS OF FRANCE, BELGIUM AND THE U.S. IN THE SPRING. OF THE P-5, THE FRENCH ARE MOSTLY STRONGLY IN FAVOR OF HAVING A UN-LED PKO, SINCE THEY ARE STAUNCHLY AGAINST THE OAU, WHICH IS ALSO OUT OF FAVOR WITH THE GOR.

CON

9. [REDACTED] ARGUING ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE COIN, RUSSIA AND THE UK ARE LEARY OF UNDERWRITING ANOTHER COSTLY PKO. BOTH HAVE SAID THEY DO NOT HAVE PROBLEMS WITH THE MERITS OF THE FORCE, ONLY WITH THE FINANCING. HOWEVER,

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 03 USUN N 03423 02 OF 02 141950Z
 RUSSIA MIGHT GO SO FAR AS TO VETO A RESOLUTION PUTTING THE BURDEN ON THE UN. ALSO, THE SECRETARIAT FEARS THE ARUSHA ACCORD'S REQUEST MAY BE FOR A BIGGER (READ "MORE EXPENSIVE") PKO THAN IS FEASIBLE. THEY MAY NOT BE ABLE TO RUSTLE UP THE REQUISITE NUMBER OF TROOP CONTRIBUTORS.

10. [REDACTED] PRD-13 DISCUSSES THE SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION THAT REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS CAN POTENTIALLY MAKE TO PEACEKEEPING ONCE THEY ENHANCE THEIR COMPETENE AND EXPERIENCE. BY HANDING THE RWANDA NIF TO THE UN, THE OAU LOSES AN OPPORTUNITY TO LEARN ON THE GROUND HOW PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS SHOULD AND SHOULD NOT BE DONE. FAILURE TO LEARN QUICKLY, OF COURSE, RUNS THE RISK OF DISASTROUS CONSEQUENCES FOR THE LIVES AND WELL-BEING OF MILLIONS OF INNOCENT CIVILIANS.

IMAGINATIVE ALTERNATIVES NEEDED

11. [REDACTED] IF THE UN AND THE OAU CAN FIND A WAY TO RUN AN

[REDACTED]
UNCLASSIFIED

Date Printed: 03/17/1998

DOC_NUMBER: 93USUNN03423

CHANNEL: n/a

1

FileName : ...t9307102/aaaadadm.tel

OPERATION JOINTLY, MUCH LIKE THE OAS AND UN HAVE DONE IN HAITI, THERE MAY BE THE POSSIBILITY OF FUNDING SUCH AN OPERATION THROUGH VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS, OR THROUGH CONTRIBUTIONS IN KIND. THE FRENCH AND BELGIANS, WHO HAVE THE KEENEST NATIONAL INTERESTS IN RWANDA, HAVE EXPRESSED RELUCTANCE TO CONTRIBUTE, BUT SHOULD BE PRESSED TO DO SO. OTHERS SUCH AS THE SCANDINAVIANS MAY BE WILING TO CONTRIBUTE. AFRICAN MILITARY CONTINGENTS WITH PRIOR UN PEACEKEEPING EXPERIENCE COULD BE SOUGHT, AND PLACED UNDER SOME TYPE OF JOINT COMMAND TO TAKE

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 04 USUN N 03423 02 OF 02 141950Z
ADVANTAGE OF THE UN'S PRIOR EXPERIENCE. MILITARY OFFICERS FROM NON-AFRICAN COUNTRIES COULD BE RECRUITED BY THE UN AND SECONDED TO THE RWANDA OPERATION. ANY OR ALL OF THE ABOVE WOULD GO AGAINST PRECEDENT FOR UN PKO'S, AND WOULD REQUIRE IMAGINATIVE INNOVATIONS.

ALBR
IGHT

[REDACTED]

NNNN

*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a
*** Current Classification *** [REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED