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Republic of Rwanda

Kigali, 27 July 1992

Ministry of Defence  
Rwandan Armed Forces  
Staff Headquarters

Intelligence Service (G2)

Memorandum to the Army Chief of Staff

[ CONFIDENTIAL ]

SUBJECT: MOOD OF THE MILITARY AND CIVILIANS

1. The political situation of our country and the ongoing war have aroused many comments by soldiers and civilians alike.

Coming in the wake of certain political events and pressure from the enemy, the comments have created a certain mood which must be brought to your attention as it is certainly a matter of concern.

You will find below some of the comments, followed by my opinion and views.

2. These comments which are often made by both civilians and soldiers have been generated by various issues.

(A) The Arusha Accords

(1) The comments made by civilians on these Accords are many but I need not mention them since they are made publicly, even over the radio during news programmes broadcast by political parties or the coverage of rallies.

In a nutshell, many people severely criticize the contents of the Accords which only favour the RPF to the detriment of Rwanda. They are therefore calling for their review so that the points which do not favour us should be revisited.

Most of those who criticize the Accords are worried about the possible merger between the Rwandan Armed Forces and RPF elements

The civilian population is opposed to this eventuality and believes that it is a devious way of seizing power in Rwanda from within.

Even members of some opposition political parties, especially the MDR, are not in favour of any merger between the Rwandan Armed Forces and RPF armed elements. In fact, all those who are against the merger believe that our country is being sold to the enemy.

The people are therefore afraid of all this. Some of them are even saying that they are immediately going to get ready to flee before the INKONTANYI arrive, adding that prior to their flight they

will massacre the Tutsi.

(2) As for the military, many soldiers virulently disapprove of any merger between the INKONTANYI and the Rwandan Armed Forces. Officers are among those denouncing this provision of the Arusha Accords opining that they could, eventually, put up with the absorption of a few INKONTANYI elements in the Army, in proportion to the Tutsi population in this country.

If the Tutsi account for 14 percent of Rwandans, the INKONTANYI to be absorbed should represent 14 percent of the future Rwandan Armed Forces. To go beyond that, say the Officers, in fact, the other soldiers as well, would amount to selling this country to the enemy, what the Military would not allow.

In their conversations, some officers go as far as wondering whether things should stay the way they are, in other words whether civilian authorities should continue issuing directives and taking decisions which go against the interests of the Nation, for the sole purpose of protecting the immediate interests of their parties.

They wonder how long this is going to last, while expressing their worries over the interference of politicians in purely military matters. They conclude that it is time this situation changed.

Regarding the merger with the INKONTANYI or their absorption, the officers are of the opinion that the Government, through MINAFET and the Ministry of Defence should, in a meeting to which more military officials should be invited, endeavour to explain this matter and allow an open discussion thereon in order to get the feel of and record the worries and views of soldiers on this issue. Such views should be taken into account in future negotiations. They say that it is right to do so since they, and not civilians, are the ones who will be required to work with the INKONTANYI.

In any case, the military is apprehensive about a possible merger between the INKONTANYI and the Rwandan Armed Forces. They already have a premonition that if the INKONTANYI are absorbed in great numbers they will massacre our soldiers, especially our cadres.

Some of our officers are even saying that before they flee from this country they will first settle old scores with those of our leaders who caused the disaster by naively yielding to all the demands of the enemy fighting us.

(3) Many civilians are now beginning to approach soldiers telling them that the Rwandan Armed Forces are their last hope and that they should therefore right the situation in time by putting an end to the intrigues of irresponsible civilians who are only seeking immediate returns under the umbrella of political parties, instead of taking into account the interests of all the Rwandan people.

Therefore, on the whole, there is widespread anxiety among civilians and soldiers in view of the possible merger between the Rwandan Armed Forces and the INKONTANYI. Many people feel that our leaders do not have the interests of the Nation at heart.

(4) The officers object to the provision in the Arusha Accords that a new a new army is going to

be created, which provision ignores the fact that the Rwandan Armed Forces already exist. They severely criticize the fact that even Radio Rwanda no longer talks of "The Rwandan Armed Forces" but rather of "Government Armed Forces". The officers underscore that this reasoning gives the impression that the Rwandan Armed Forces are a faction on the same footing as the RPF elements, a view they loathe.

They too do not hesitate to say that "this country has been sold out".

(5) Members of all political parties (save, of course, the *Parti Liberal*) do not understand at all the unilateral and unconditional release by Rwanda of prisoners of war and the acolytes of the enemy.

To most people, this is further proof that only the enemy is deriving any benefit from the Arusha Accords and that the Government allows itself to be hoodwinked all the time.

Some people believe that there are some individuals among the negotiators of the Accords who are working for the enemy, offering the enemy everything, to the detriment of the interests of the Nation.

The people are therefore asking the Rwandan Armed Forces to do something to put the situation right before it is too late. Greatly vexed, some even go as far as saying that our troops should withdraw from the war front, for it serves no purpose to be riddled with bullets when so-called political leaders are busy selling out the country to the very enemy whom we are fighting.

The soldiers speak almost the same language. They want to know when and under what conditions their colleagues captured by the enemy will be released, now that the enemy has secured the unconditional release of their own people. This has, of course, increased their demoralization, especially as some of them think that the officers sanctioned the operation during their meeting with the Prime Minister and MINAFFET at the ESM. Some soldiers are saying that before they flee, as the enemy advances in great numbers towards the capital, they will deal with the officers who easily gave in to the wishes of reckless civilian authorities (I am only repeating what is being said).

For their part, the officers feel they have been tricked by MINAFFET and the Prime Minister. Indeed, they do not understand why these two authorities met so many military officials purportedly to explain to them the Arusha Accords and yet forgot, of course knowingly, to speak to them on the unilateral and unconditional release of prisoners of war and the acolytes of the enemy.

The officers say they have thus been misled because both civilians and the military believe that they were aware of the manoeuvre which occurred on the very evening of the meeting with the authorities mentioned above. It is with a lot of bitterness that they refer to this matter.

#### B. Dismissal of Communal authorities (KUBOHOZA)

(1) Some people think that the "KUBOHOZA" phenomenon which consists, in particular, of dismissing officials who are not well looked upon by opposition political parties, especially pro-MRND bourgmestres, may create disorder in the country, if the Government does not put an end to it in time. This is all the more disquieting as senior political leaders, including the Prime Minister, officially endorse and support these reprehensible acts.

People wonder whether the Prime Minister, for example, still feels he is the Prime Minister of the entire Government when he goes to the extent of practising "KUBOHOZA" himself by distributing MDR badges to bourgmestres forcibly converted during party rallies.

People also wonder how worse the situation could get, if the Head of State does the same thing for the benefit of his party, the MRND.

The same questions are being asked as people wonder why State civil servants should be relieved of their posts without compensation, simply because they do not belong to the same party as the minister.

Many people are furious about this, especially MRND members who wonder whether MRND ministers are really committed to defending the interests of their party or whether some of them are not there only to defend their own interests.

I also noted the views of some officers who, without necessarily taking sides, are nevertheless saying that "if the President does not defend his people, if he does not stand up in time against the scheming of these pro-enemy parties, in other words if <sup>he</sup> is only defending his own interests while ignoring those of the Nation and bluntly abandoning those who have supported him so far; well, if he fails to react in time to these dramatic situations so as to save the Nation and honest people, he is going to find himself alone since no one wants to die for someone who will not recognize him".

"Ahubwo mazabimubwire abimenye", they added.

### 3 Personal views

( a ) The Arusha Accords were one-sided Accords to the benefit of the enemy who therefore feels that they could go further and demand more. The concessions thus made to the enemy may seriously mortgage the interests of the country.

Being aware of this, the people are protesting everywhere. Many members of even opposition political parties are denouncing certain aspects of the accords, especially those provisions relating to the formation of a new national army and the unilateral release of prisoners of war and acolytes of the enemy, which release was made to the detriment of Rwanda.

Soldiers, in general, do not at all approve of the accords, believing that the country has been betrayed to the enemy and that, consequently, it is no longer necessary to continue fighting, since all the war efforts are being negated by political leaders who are only out to defend their own interests.

( b ) I think that this situation is serious and should be examined more closely in order to redress the damage done, if that is still possible.

As concerns the military, I think it is still time to organize a broad-based discussion on the Accords, especially with respect to the formation of the "new army". Through such a discussion the feelings and concerns of soldiers, in other words the feelings and concerns of those who will be required to live with the INKONTANYI in the "New Army", will be known.

Inspiration could even be drawn from some of the views that would emanate from the discussion, instead of being subjected to decisions that cater for immediate political interests, whereas the consequences of

such decisions may seriously compromise the future of the Rwandan Armed Forces and that of the country.

The Head of State had promised to hold a second meeting with military leaders. Why not take advantage of that meeting where everyone will speak their mind without fear of being rapped over the knuckles? No longer being sure of their future as transfers seem to be controlled from a distance by circles outside the Rwandan Armed Forces, the officers are indeed beginning to harbour some obsessive fear. So, they fear to speak their minds in the presence of certain persons. This is the truth; it is pointless trying to run away from it. This obsessive fear now hounds some of them.

c. The uneasiness noticed among civilians is also noticed among soldiers. Everyone openly says that this country has been betrayed and that something must be done to save it. Civilians are counting on the Armed Forces and some of them are already approaching soldiers to tell them that the time has come to save the country from chaos. This is a dangerous situation and, under the circumstances, anything may happen, especially as people no longer hesitate to say that if the Head of State is not ready to assume his responsibility to save the country, he should hand over power. This is what people say openly.

d. The soldiers ARE NOT willing to live together with the INKONTANYI and do not at all understand why we are asking them to fight, since we release the INYENZI captured at the front as well as the recruiting agents who supply combatants to the enemy front. All this annoys the troops who are beginning to criticize severely both the civilian and military leaders. Officers are beginning to distrust more and more their superiors and they say so. This situation calls for reflection and a remedy.

e. The Arusha Accords have caused widespread turmoil and vexation. Yet, the war may continue, and if it does, we may face the following problems:

- soldiers becoming tired and demoralized;
- increasing economic hardship;
- the risk of partners abandoning us;
- the risk of politicians causing chaos, which will be to the advantage of the enemy, and so on and so forth.

Under such circumstances, this country may fall into the hands of the INKONTANYI, an eventuality fraught with dire consequences.

In order to prepare ourselves for the continuation of hostilities, which in the final analysis are inevitable, in my opinion the following measures must be taken:

- (1) - recruit and train enough soldiers whose morale would be less affected. They will be better equipped to face the enemy who has been perked up by a series of cheap victories and sustained propaganda.
- (2) - make sure we have enough ammunition because a new lack of ammunition may cause practically irreversible disaster.
- (3) - strive to stay in the good books of our friends and partners, especially France and the United States. In this regard, it is necessary to prepare their minds, making them understand that Rwanda is a unique case, that we are confronted with an enemy who wants to regain the power it lost and that any good intention it may display is only a subterfuge aimed solely at taking over power and thereafter proceeding to avenge

the victims of the 1959 Revolution and of the events that followed that revolution up to 1973. These friends and partners will thereby help us weaken the enemy who is still asking for more. After this, we could easily sell the concept of representation within the Rwandan Armed Forces, representation based on the proportion of each ethnic group in the Rwandan population, in lieu of a complete merger which, if it ever happens, will end up in the disaster of a more deadly civil war. Politicians must understand this;

(4) - Induce our friends and partners to give priority to the democratic process instead of getting bogged down in insidious considerations put forward by the enemy. Clearly, this calls for a national consensus so that we all speak the same language regarding the war;

Parties like the PL and others operating within its fold should listen to reason by giving priority to the interests of the Nation. In any case, if they fail to do so, the masses will react, now that they are becoming aware that they have been duped. Mob action is difficult to control.

(5) - the population and the Rwandan Armed Forces having been vexed by the actions of the Government which only engages in political scheming ( I am only repeating what is being said ), this Government may be compelled to resign. It would therefore be necessary to persuade our friends not to abandon us under the pretext that we are not showing any sign of goodwill.

To this end, the democratic process must be kept on course and, whenever necessary, shown to the world to prove that, in spite of our current difficulties, we are still committed to democracy or, rather, to the democratic process;

f. In my opinion, it is absolutely absurd that at a time when the enemy is threatening the country and swears to seize power in Kigali ( they are about 50 km away from the capital ) the people inside the country are tearing one another to pieces under the cover of political parties and with the blessings of the leaders of these parties. It is not in such circumstances that we will be able to unite against the enemy threatening us. These quarrels and the "KUBOHOZA" business that some officials wholeheartedly support must cease.

People, especially the *bourgmestres*, should feel secure, if we are asking them to ensure security inside the country.

Some officials ( e.g. bougmestre Gatete and others ) should be left alone, instead of being made victims of the zeal they have shown in the interest of the nation.

Government employees should not be victims of injustices stemming from political parties, otherwise they will become dissatisfied and swell the ranks of those who are against authority thereby worsening the climate of uneasiness prevailing in the country.

In passing, I should point out that the employment of many Tutsi and PL members by the government has greatly annoyed Hutu elements who have been laid off. Tension is high.

#### 4. Conclusions

( a ) The people are unhappy and have been demoralized by the government's action which favours the enemy. The soldiers are demoralized and apathetic. They are not willing to work together with the

INKONTANYI.

( b ) On the whole, the climate is unhealthy and many people are asking for change, going as far as appealing to the military to do something to save the country. The Arusha Accords which are criticized by many people have only added fuel to the flames.

( c ) Taking advantage of this situation which is in its favours, the enemy is putting pressure on the ground and politically and we may be overwhelmed.

( d ) Something must be done to resolve this imbroglio. However, we must also get ready to continue with the war - if the enemy opts for it - and make sure that our friends and partners are well disposed towards us. Diplomatic action, be it informal, is therefore a matter of absolute necessity.

( signed)

Lt. Col. Nsengiyumva Anatole

G2 Officer at the Staff Headquarters of the Rwandan Army

Copy to:

-H.E. the President of the Republic.

[CONFIDENTIAL]