

The Diary of Anatoly S. Chernyaev

1974

Donated by A.S. Chernyaev to The National Security Archive

Translated by Anna Melyakova

<http://www.nsarchive.org>

January 3, 1974

Trukhanovsky (editor of *Questions of History*) stopped by. We talked about Khavinson (editor-in-chief of the journal *World Economy and International Relations*) and his deputy Kuzmin, who was assigned to write on anti-Zionism and pursued the subject with quite an anti-Semitic spirit. A certain Bolshakov from *Pravda* (deputy head) – an avid unmasker of Zionism – came to Khavinson with an article and was rejected. He then took it to *Questions of History*, where it was accepted despite the editorial board's opinion and Trukhanovsky's position, which was recorded in the minutes. Kuzmin took advantage of Trukhanovsky's absence and criticized Khavinson's journal in the article "for mistakes in the struggle against Zionism."

"I thought," Trukhanovsky said, "that it was just a simple case of lack of discipline or editorial mistakes. I certainly did not suspect that Kuzmin and Bolshakov are bosom buddies on very 'ideological' grounds. But Bolshakov's New Year's greeting card to Kuzmin explained everything. The secretary opened the card, which is standard procedure for almost all such greeting cards sent to the journal. It read: 'Dear (Kuzmin's first name)! I wish you new victories. All this scum is nothing against our Rus'!'" (Kuzmin works on Russian antiquity).

There you go!

Trukhanovsky proposed that we tell Ponomarev about this and ask him to suggest to Fedoseyev to find some "higher" position for Kuzmin, to transfer him to an institute or something like that.

January 5, 1974

Yurka Karyakin (my friend, we worked together in Prague, in the journal *Problems of Peace and Socialism*) with his intrinsic intellectual honesty continues to delve deeper and deeper into Chile (by inertia after my assignment). He already had three meetings with [Volodia] Teitelboim (one the leaders of the Chilean Communist Party). He found out the following: ten days after Allende's victory, Kissinger said at the National Security Council: "The main danger from Chile is in Western Europe. If it proves the possibility of a peaceful path to socialism, then our (i.e. U.S.) cause is lost for the future! Therefore, the task is to disrupt the Chilean experiment. That way, we will show that the peaceful way is impossible. And the average Westerner (including the so-called working class) will never want to take the armed revolutionary path! That will do the trick."

Right away, an operations center to eliminate the "Chilean case" was created in the U.S.

Yurka made the following conclusions and already gave them to Teitelboim:

1. To argue the correctness of the strategy of the peaceful way at every possible opportunity. Its failure is the result of a combination of accidental circumstances, not a defectiveness at the core. We need to make as much noise about this as possible.
2. We should not become apathetic, beat our chest, or look for shortcomings in the CPC's [Communist Party of Chile] course. Instead, we should argue that its strategic line was correct. We should not engage in intellectual drivel with allies in Unidad Popular (with socialists, and especially with MIR [Revolutionary Left Movement]) – although "your" general concept was not acceptable, in many ways you were right tactically. Keep in mind that this is an irresponsible public who will say anything, forgetting that those who want to remain grounded in real politics cannot afford to

open up their chest and publicly poke around their wounds. Remember that even when Marx and Lenin faced defeat, even if they were in the extreme minority, they always vehemently argued that their way was right. The only and exact way they showed before the events, during the events, and after the defeat! This revolutionary conviction is the secret of political success. Even if it appears thick-headed, there is no other way to do politics, which is itself a very rough thing. But internally, for yourself, you have to be very thorough and analyze everything very carefully, with no excuses or mercy to one's own ego. Consider every wrong move, every mistake, every oversight, and all stupidities. And make mental notes!

Solzhenitsyn's *The Gulag Archipelago* was released in the West. It's making a lot of noise. Looking at Solzhenitsyn, you really feel what class hatred is, and what could happen again (like in 1919-21 and 1929-31) if it was allowed to spread among the masses. He went so far as to declare the Vlasov Army – truly one of the most disgusting and ugly phenomena of the war, and not just the war – as ideological heroes. He celebrates their service to Nazism, admires their “heroic acts,” etc. He attributes the “idea” of concentration camps to Marx and Engels, and suggests that Lenin embodied it in politics, while Stalin was only an imitator who perfected it. The “Gulag” is presented as the norm of Soviet society, as the source of all of socialism's material achievements for the last half a century.

Many people “over there” tastelessly took the bait. They are afraid of us, afraid of themselves (no alternative), afraid of their own, especially right now amidst the energy, economic, and currency crisis. We appear as an organized society, i.e. the only kind of society that can in principle deal with the problems of the modern age, the kind of problems that are insurmountable even for the “state-monopoly democracy.”

And one more idea. Chile has not yet found its own Marx and Lenin...

The Paris Commune (just three months) was the first defeat of an armed path of proletarian revolution. But what a colossal amount of experience and lessons were taken from this defeat by the Marxists (Lenin first and foremost)! How fundamentally this defeat served the future revolution!

Chile (34 months) was the first defeat of the peaceful path of socialist revolution. And if we take the same kind of lessons and experience from this defeat as the Marxists were able to take from the Paris Commune – then Chile will join (in our lifetimes) the ranks of great events, such as the Commune.

So far, we have been underestimating the significance of this experience and this defeat.

Marx said (though in a slightly different sense): revolutions win, even when they fail.

This is why it is dangerous to doubt the strategy of the peaceful path based on Chile's experience. The history of the Paris Commune cries out against such an approach.

January 21, 1974

From the 6th through the 11th I was in Prague. Ponomarev, Rakhmanin, Tolkunov, and I. Plus Larisa, who was working with me in the editorial commission.

Teitelboim's sour reaction to “Ponomarev's teachings on the lessons of Chile.”

Jean Kanapa – member of the French CP’s Politburo. His outburst about the proposal for a “Karlovy Vary-2” and a European Conference of Communist Parties. The initiative is from PUWP [Polish United Workers Party].

[Hermann] Axen (SED Politburo member) – the chairman of the editorial commission. The “battle” in the editorial commission on the resolution and communiqué. Two confrontations (which took up about 18 hours) along the following lines: Romanian [representative]-Japanese-Italian-Spanish-me-Axen. Sometimes the Bulgarians. I made around 20 speeches. In the end, we achieved a “single communiqué” (Kanapa effectively supported it). This is a “victory of unity” as Kanapa assured me. The Bulgarian representative complained to his delegation head that the CPSU – Chernyaev – “made too many compromises.”

Reception in the Spanish Hall in Hradčany.

Prague. The streets, the shop windows. Well-fed Czech men, and gorgeous Czech women.

The Czechs’ jokes about themselves at the lunch with Ponomarev.

Overall, it was the first rehearsal for the new international conference.

Problems concerning the Brussels meeting of the Western European communist parties. The Italians, French, and especially the Spaniards are against mentioning that the “material base of communism is being built in the Soviet Union” in the document.

Return from Prague. Routine again: B.N.’s report on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of Lenin’s death. It took place on Friday, the 18th, at the Hall of Columns. We are getting congratulatory messages from everywhere. In general, based on the norms of our ideological work, maybe it really is pretty good. I’m exhausted again.

January 25, 1974

We finished two reports for Ponomarev: he is going to Nalchik to present the Order of Friendship to the people of Kabardino-Balkaria.

Zagladin is at the Congress of the Communist Party of Austria. His telegrams: the party has completely returned to the fold of the CPSU. Confessions of Party Chairman [Franz] Muhri (how he wavered during the events in Czechoslovakia, how he “reformed”!).

Reconciliation between Egypt and Israel on the basis of Kissinger. We were fooled. And no wonder: you cannot build a policy based on the expectation that Sadat et al. are representing a “national liberation” movement (or rather, that he will take into consideration the fact that we view him as a representative of this movement. In reality, he only speculates on our “obligation”). They represent nationalism, which under certain circumstances can easily turn into fascism. However, maybe it is a good thing that it did not work out: we will gradually get used to the fact that new categories are operating in the world, which can no longer be measured with the yardstick of Stalinist foreign policy. Because in this region we have been operating precisely like that: an imperialist strategy under the guise of ideology.

I had a conversation with B.N. He told me about an exchange of opinions at the Politburo. Brezhnev started by saying that it’s bad that there are almost no Jews left in leadership positions. There is only Dymshits (Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers), whom we parade everywhere for this. We need to change this. Why create an impression that we have

some kind of anti-Semitic views in these matters... Others supported him. B.N. thinks that this conversation was prepared in advance, probably not without Andropov's involvement in particular.

B.N. himself supposedly said during the "exchange" that he agreed, though of course at one time (!) we had the opposite extreme, when Kaganovich came to the International Department and the apparatus in general... He started putting Jews everywhere, and expelling Russians. That's why *uglanovshchina* was created, to accuse people of Trotskyism. While in reality, they were revolutionaries, real workers and Leninists...

I am reading Andre Maurois in *Inostrannaya Literatura* [Foreign Literature], his *To an Unknown Lady*. The concentration of the French style – from Pascal, through Anatole France, to Valerie. Delicious to read, and instructive, too.

January 29, 1974

Yesterday I arrived in Uspenka to spend my ten days of vacation that Ponomarev took from me last year.

In the morning I had a wonderful time skiing: three and a half hours at a very good speed. I could have kept going for at least two more hours. While I was skiing, I thought to myself that I couldn't ski as well 20 years ago, and I wasn't in such good physical shape, either. Right now I feel young, aired out by the fresh wind and doused with some kind of life-giving water.

I brought a heap of books and other "information," if only I had time to get into it. I am reading, once again, Lenin's "Reply to Kievsky" and "On Caricature of Marxism." When you think deeply about the text of these two wonderful works, Lenin's famous thoughts appear differently than they do in our customary ideological interpretation. The amazing diversity of Lenin. His phrases and images create such a polarity, like a magnetic field, which creates a multitude of associations and reflections built upon one's own political experience.

I am reading Herzen again. This time, "Russian Germans, and German Russians." It's amazing how many roots of our modern times you find in Herzen. Is it the nature of genius, or the nature of life, which does not really change at the core? The same with Andre Maurois: the basic laws of relations between a man and a woman do not change.

February 8, 1974

I'm back at work. Read the telegrams. Sadat threw out [Mohamed Hassanein] Heikal, apparently because he got in the way of leaning in the American direction. Heikal was a supporter of Nasser, and this is becoming a problem for Sadat. In a word, our "game" in Egypt is lost.

Sokolov (a consultant at the Department) returned from the U.S., from the Pugwash Conference. His Pugwash "colleagues" became tougher. They are positive that we are lying to them about everything (in trade, in military affairs, and in the Middle East). These intellectuals are practically demanding that an aircraft carrier to be sent to the shores of the oil sheiks. The average American motorist is tired of getting up at 6 a.m. to stand in line for gasoline.

The Presidium of the Academy of Sciences removed Volobuyev from the directorship of the Institute of History, without waiting for his resignation letter. I know how it happened. He called me twice, but lied about the main things. He should have left a long time ago, but he was

brought up in “the corridors of party committees and party bureaus.” He knows neither pride nor contempt, he is shallow and vain. He was removed for “revisionism,” but he will write a complaint to Suslov, saying that he was fighting against revisionism 15 years ago in the journal *Voprosy Istorii* (*Questions of History*). Although back then he was kicked out of the CC for “dogmatism,” because he did not understand the spirit of the XX Congress. At the time, he complained to the CC about Rummyantsev (Head of the Department at the time), who supposedly was not acting on principle.

It’s unpleasant for me to associate with Volobuyev, but of course not because of his downfall. He couldn’t have won, because as a small and unscrupulous man he ended up fighting for a just cause – against Trapeznikov & Co.

B.N. told me that we have to prepare a report for V.I. Lenin’s 104th anniversary!

Mochulsky died. For a second this was a *memento mori*, but I did not feel upset. In a way, he is also a “son of our time.”

I am reading [Natan] Eidelman, *The Secret Political History of Russia in XVIII-XIX Centuries and the Free Press*. The book is designed for the reader to draw parallels. But the material and execution are wonderful. By the way, it is one of the signs that our “historical science” is gradually going back to its original purpose, which is to tell about the past, as opposed to only extracting the “general laws” from every fact (which Soviet historical science has been doing for decades). Facts were losing their independent meaning; they were serving only as symbols of sociology, its shell.

February 10, 1974

In the morning I started working on the multi-volume set *The International Labor Movement*, the introduction to it, which will be B.N.’s.

Played tennis. Right now I’m leafing through *Vospominaniya o Gertzene* [Memories of Herzen].

In the afternoon I went to the Pushkin Museum, which held a memorial for 137 years since the poet’s death. Dez’ka (Samoilov) made a speech about Pushkin. The small hall was extremely overcrowded. Later, the museum director, who is by the way a cousin of our consultant Kozlov, said that the hall’s capacity is 200 people, but there were 300 people there, plus 150 more in the other rooms, listening through speakers. The public ranged from intelligentsia grannies to little kids, there were some famous people from the cultural sphere. About 50 percent of the people were Jewish. The most superficial reason for this is that they like all kinds of intellectual events. In the meantime, Dez’ka’s speech could have gone down in the history of social thought. He spoke for no more than 10 minutes. He had three powerful and clearly articulated ideas:

1. The image of a modern civilized person in our country is based on Pushkin. We do not notice it because Pushkin permeates the entirety of the cultural tradition in which we are raised.
2. Pushkin found and gave to us a measure of the relationship between our country and the rest of the world; he determined the place of the Russian people in the intellectual history of this multicultural world.

3. Pushkin is closer (must be closer) to us than the people of the XIX and the first half of the XX century. We inherited Russian literature – our spiritual tradition – from him. He is a man of honor, not conscience. Remember Lermontov, "...he's bound by honor." Dostoyevsky and others wrote about conscience, Pushkin never wrote about it. Conscience is when a person does something against his own rules, and then repents and often believes that he redeems himself through repentance.

Being bound by honor does not mean being a slave to honor. Honor is when you voluntarily adhere (not serve) to noble rules. A modern person should be guided precisely by that.

The director of the Pushkin Museum very delicately accompanied Dez'ka to his place on the stage, so those who don't know that he is practically blind would not have noticed. He was wearing glasses, but took them off before he started speaking. He was calm and confident from the start. He spoke sincerely, clearly, without a hint that the speech was memorized, even though he did not misspeak or say a single filler word during this conceptually complex speech.

Then there were musical arias, flute, harp, reading of letters and diaries of people who were near the dying Pushkin. Not particularly professionally done (one actress sticks in my mind, a woman with a long nose and big, Esenin-style eyes. She sang terribly... it was embarrassing). In the middle of this program, Dez'ka's guide made a scandalous amount of noise and pulled me out of the crowd, I had been stuck in the mass of people in hallways. The guide, Rafka, performs Dez'ka poems and is a former actor from Taganka Theater. He dragged me backstage, where Dez'ka and I kissed each other and embraced. Right off the bat, Dez'ka told me the hospital anecdotes of his own creation (I had heard them from him before). He told me that he is writing a book about rhyme (actually a brief history/theory of Russian poetry). He said he was given an apartment, 50 square meters with a 9 square meter kitchen in the Kolomensky district. He invited me over, "I will read my prose to you." He's hugely talented. I promised to visit him in Opalikh next Sunday.

February 15, 1974

Events of the week. I tried attending Mochulsky's memorial service, but the body was delayed for two hours on the way from the morgue, and I had to leave. This was at the old Moscow State University club on Herzen Street. It was wretched and poorly attended, mostly by people from the university. I saw all the same people who looked senile even 25 years ago. They have changed somewhat. Zastenker immediately rushed to reproach and lecture me about social democrats. The others – the people who were still graduate students when I was beginning to teach: Ado, Yazykov. Masha Orlova was there too, she is now a professor. Everything about them – their conversations, their looks, their boring, mundane attitude toward "the event" – reeks of such stale, intellectual provinciality, such oppressive melancholy, that all I could think when I was interacting with them was "Thank god that life pushed me out of this environment in time!"

They said that Mochulsky was sick all the time. He was all twisted from sciatica, then he got polyarthritis. Mashka commented: "You probably heard that his wife left him. And he needed to be on a special diet. He wouldn't eat anything for days because he couldn't have normal food, and there was nobody to make him special meals. His son would bring some beet salad from the cafeteria, and that would be his meal for the day." "He concealed his illness," Drobyshev continued, "even when he was hospitalized, he asked me not to mention it at the

university. Then he got worse, his kidneys failed. For ten days his screams filled the hospital ward, it was terrible. I was hospitalized there too at the time.”

So that’s that. He lived a dull life. Became a professor. All he produced during his entire academic career were a couple boring articles about England in the 1930s and a brochure based on his thesis. He did not love anybody, he was angry and spiteful. And nobody loved him. Most people despised him, some feared him. He was huge and ridiculous, somewhat square in shape and at one time very fat. And he died at 55. He did not leave anything to anyone, not even a trace in people’s memories.

On Wednesday Solzhenitsyn was deported to West Germany. The operation was cleverly, correctly, and elegantly done. I don’t know the details yet (Brandt’s agreement). Already (two days later) the serious Western newspapers acknowledge that he will inevitably burn out very soon. One more “flash” of noise, and then he will become boring for them pretty quickly.

We put together a plan for how to “arrive” at the European Conference of Communist Parties: first a telegram to the French, then to socialist countries and the ICP, then a four-way initiative (ICP, PUWP, PCF, CPSU) publicly – to convene a consultative meeting in May of this year.

We composed a telegram to all the CPs we have relations with, outlining our position on the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. But B.N. put it on hold for now, so as not to “devalue” the work of the European Conference.

Things are clearly moving toward a big crisis in the West and the capitalist world in general. This crisis will be very different from the crisis of 1929 in its economic characteristics, but it will probably lead to a shift to the right with incalculable consequences.

We composed B.N.’s speech in the Hall of Columns – today he presented the Order of Friendship to Soviet women.

Started preparing his report for Lenin’s 104th anniversary. Zhilin suggested to put the following idea at the center of the report – the transformations of the recent years are just as important to the victory of communism as the analogous (equal) transformations in the 1920-30s were to the victory of socialism...

February 21, 1974

On Sunday I visited Dez’ka in Opalikha. He is not weak or melancholy (even though he can barely see anything). He is cheerful, cracking jokes, and exudes confidence and activity.

Why is that? For two reasons, it seems. He has talent, which must strengthen self-confidence and build resilience. “I am a master of my craft,” so to speak, “I excel at what I do, so I will never perish.” And secondly, apparently it’s the “environment.” An environment of kind and selfless camaraderie based on a common “social status” and worldview, as well as, of course, personal affection for each other (and in this case also respect and love for Dez’ka, and admiration of his poetry). This environment is outside the system. That is how it views itself; it opposes itself to the system. And some of its representatives may even be hostile towards the system. For example, they helped Solzhenitsyn and *Samizdat*, supplied various materials for the *Chronicle of Current Events*. Of course, I can only guess about these things.

This community is probably united by (alongside the listed emotional circumstances) a sense of hostility toward the socio-political situation in the country. For a while, one part of the intelligentsia expressed its alienation from the authorities and the entire so-called public life through nostalgia for our revolutionary past and the revolutionary purity of the youth of entire generations. Hence the enormous popularity (incomprehensible to today's youth and mass audience) of movies such as "No Path Through Fire," "Bumbarash" and "The White Sun of the Desert," in which this audience saw the natural, selfless internationalism of a regular Russian person, internationalism of the crystal idealism of the Soviet "Grenada," instead of the banal Soviet ideology.

... But this wave passed. They grew tired and realized that this is just helpless nostalgia for a past one cannot bring back. And one part of them budded off into complete rejection of the entirety of our Soviet past – in a somewhat Solzhenitsyn-like style – "Everything was wrong from the very beginning." Of course, in most cases this was done without Solzhenitsyn's class hatred towards everything Soviet... It was more a state of detachment "above the fray," a semi-contemptuous belief that the present regime does not have the power or the desire to maintain society at the level it deserves.

Superimposed on this is the "Jewish problem." Of course, people like Dez'ka will never leave (although who could have thought that Korzhavin would leave). But the anti-Semitism that became the inevitable companion of the "Israeli problem" as a whole, struck these people in the heart and completely destroyed their intellectual connection with the "system." When it comes to each specific instance, I think Dez'ka with his wisdom and intellect rises above the narrow-minded reactions and assessments. But I doubt that he is not hurt deep down!

Meanwhile, Vad'ka Babichkov (school friend) asked what happened with Daniel (the one who together with Sinyavsky was sentenced in 1965 and now came back from the gulag). Dez'ka explained to me that he is living in Moscow, he refused to follow Sinyavsky (who is now a professor at the Sorbonne), told his wife to go to hell (after he was sentenced, she distinguished herself by fanatical anti-Soviet Jewish activity and would up in prison herself, though she's been released) and married a pretty young creature. He is being published, mostly translations. Under a pseudonym, of course. He built a house near Moscow. Did he build it by himself? No, of course not. People helped...

This element of "helped" seems to shine a light on the inner life of the "commune" I was talking about, this special community that is ready for great sacrifice and a level of devotion to each other that is unusual for today's social norms.

This week... Yevtushenko. An open letter "to the Soviet people" in the Milan newspaper *Il Giorno*. His concert in the Hall of Columns (on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of his creative work) was cancelled after he sent Brezhnev a telegram protesting Solzhenitsyn's arrest. I was disgusted by this letter. I cannot accept that this show-off has the right to speak "on behalf of the people" and to "show concern about the fate and prestige of his Motherland." Every line reeks of petty vanity, of undeserved claims, and of political infantilism... And one more thing that really rubs me the wrong way – his appeals to Western public opinion against his own government, which supposedly would not dare to touch such a figure if it is backed by "such forces." Solzhenitsyn barely finished taking advantage of this, and here is another one.

However, this really makes me sad. If you look deeper, all of this is happening because of the state of our ideology, because it lost all sense of clarity, not to mention its appeal, in the hands of people like Demichev (Minister of Culture).

By the way, the other day I read a letter sent by Suvorov, the Party Bureau secretary of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Philosophy, to Kirilenko. Kirilenko had ordered Grishin and Yagodkin (i.e. the First Secretary of the Moscow City Committee and the Moscow Secretary of Ideology) to meet with Suvorov. They met with him. And attached an explanation to the letter.

According to Suvorov, our entire “philosophical front” is infested with revisionism, and not only the philosophical front. He names historians, economists, sociologists, even mathematicians and natural scientists who, supposedly, are out of control. They say and even write whatever they want, which is all sheer “positivism” and worse. He lists dozens of names, starting with Academician Kedrov, the director of the Institute of Philosophy, and finishing with authors of “some articles.” Here we have Zamoshkin (Head of the Lenin School), and Frolov (editor of *Problems of Philosophy*, former assistant to Demichev), and Kelle (my former philosophy teacher), and others from Moscow State University. The ranks of genuine Marxists have grown so thin, Suvorov says, that if we were to immediately remove the revisionists from all the key positions they’ve assumed, there would be nobody to replace them. Fedoseyev is mentioned several times as a centrist, who, Suvorov says, condones all of this and looks the other way.

The specific nature of these people’s revisionism is not explained. There are only hints: one of them supposedly believes that a new age of biology will come and it won’t take orders from our philosophy; others are increasingly reducing historical materialism and dialectical materialism to a “philosophy of man”; the third group does not consider it necessary to quote Marx and Lenin in their books at all. This just about sums up his claims.

At the bottom of the page there is a list of about twelve people on whose behalf Suvorov makes his appeal and asks to accept the entire group into the Central Committee. At the head of all this is Academician Mitin – a scumbag who was an informer in the 1930s, a plagiarist who stole the work of people under him. The next in line are Rutkevich, Kovalchuk, Oduyev and a couple other mediocrities whom Kedrov removed from the Institute due to incompetence.

So what is being done about this case?

Instead of shaming the scoundrel, Grishin and Yagodkin talked with him for several hours and then made a report along the following lines: the Moscow City Committee has been taking measures since 1969 to correct the ideological situation in Moscow. They listened to such and such institutes in the Moscow Committee, adopted such and such resolutions, inspected such and such units, and removed five directors. However, when the Kievan passed away, nobody asked the Moscow City Committee and appointed Kedrov as the new director of the Institute of Philosophy. So now the CC should figure this mess out themselves. The report ends with this point. It seems it went to Kirilenko and the CC Secretariat in this format, along with Suvorov’s letter.

Annensky, *Vospominaniya o Gertzene*. Belinsky, “Letter to Gogol” (re-read it in a completely different light).

Started reading Faulkner – sandwich prose in which you drown.

March 10, 1974

Increasingly there are gaps in the diary. This is partially due to late nights at work, and partially because in my spare time I have to read and prepare the publication of a multi-volume edition on the labor movement. By the way, yesterday at the dacha in Uspenka I finished editing the 90-page introduction, most of which was put together by Galkin by means of clever and creative compiling of Ponomarev's reports and articles. It successfully uses the majority of his own (B.N.'s) and our thoughts and ideas.

From the week's events: the Labour party is in power [in England]. A minority government. They settled the miners' strike. But what will they be able to do?

Today Brezhnev flew to Pitsunda to meet with Pompidou. The game with France continues (for example, we support its extravagance in the energy issue: their refusal to participate in the Washington initiative to coordinate the capitalist countries on this matter). But the "pettiness" of the moves we're making (supporting those who aggravate "inter-imperialist" tensions) is clear to everybody. We will not be able to achieve anything realistic, because (as Raymond Aron correctly wrote) France will make noise about independence and such through the lips of Jobert and even Pompidou, but quietly it will do almost the same thing as everyone else (FRG, UK) because there is nothing else they can do. This is what it does in NATO, and the same thing will happen in energy matters.

In front of the whole world Kissinger (his trips to Egypt and Syria) is robbing us of the fruits of many years of Ponomarev's Middle East policies. He and Sadat publicly show their embraces – they are best friends. Our bet on the "progressiveness of the regimes" did not yield dividends, because we thought up this progressiveness ourselves. And we can't compete with the Americans' deep pockets – we come up short.

Somehow I can't get into writing today... I'll just outline the major events.

O'Riordan broke his ribs. Conversation with him on Plotnikov Street.

Timofeyev's message that Trapeznikov will read our multi-volume publication on the labor movement himself (the drafts). I am not sure whether to tell B.N. I'm afraid that he will get scared and delay the publication. I saw this Trapeznikov on a road in Uspenka. I wanted to get out of the car and kick that gnome into a ditch.

Volobuyev has already been "removed" by the CC Secretariat. B.N. told me about Kirilenko's move. Kirilenko proposed to consider the matter with "utmost strictness," using the note from the Science Department, which included [accusations of] revisionist mistakes, departure from Leninism, and even political factionalism. By the way, Suslov agreed with the note, even though Volobuyev had previously written him a long letter (that he is being persecuted, etc.). Demichev and others also agreed with the note. That means they either did not read his letter, or they ignored it. Kirilenko seemed to be hearing about Volobuyev for the first time, and had the expected reaction: if a person is such a revisionist, why be liberal with him (he said as much to Ponomarev). I don't know what B.N. did, but in the end the reason behind Volobuyev's removal was boiled down to the formula: "Unable to perform the duties of a director."

Of course, Volobuyev as a leader of Soviet historical science is a joke. It was a joke when he was appointed. But the story of his removal has its own significance, and a very instructive one.

I did a good deal of skiing. I would get up at 6 a.m. and go to the ski-track while it was still dark outside, and watch the sunrise. The morning temperatures dropped below negative ten degrees Celsius, the ski-track would be squeaky-crisp and breezy. I would ski at sprinter speeds. It was beautiful – Levitan's March. I would come home around 11 a.m., completely "spent."

I went to the Mayakovsky museum – the place where he shot himself in the former Lubyansky alley. An informative museum. And what an era it was! What spiritual wealth our Revolution and Soviet Republic had! There was never anything like it, and there couldn't be. A great nation. By the way, after visiting the museum you start to understand what Dez'ka was talking about when I visited him in Opalikha: the "literary community" is moving farther away from Mayakovsky, some are even irritated by him... Of course, partially this is due to the anti-Soviet snobbery of the current "literary community." But there is also an objective element at play: the people and the times Mayakovsky depicted with his supreme genius were absolutely unique. That era had temporarily broken away from the so-called "eternal human nature." Pushkin, on the other hand, is timeless because he is tuned into this human nature.

Arbatov stopped by with a problem – a woman was fired from the Institute of US and Canada for marrying an Italian, even though he is a communist. This is the kind of problems our authorities have, while they hold the fate of the country in their hands!

April 3, 1974

There is a gap in the diary because from March 15th-April 2nd I was at the "dacha" in Volynskoe-2. We were writing B.N.'s report for Lenin's 104th anniversary.

Intriguing ideas that he wants to include in this text:

- Leninism is spreading around the world;
- To reflect on the 50 years since Lenin's death;
- No other teaching has met with such obstacles;
- The "foundation" left by Lenin – ranging from the science of building socialism, to the experience of the ruling party, to the "framework" of international socialism;
- The work done by Lenin's "disciples and followers" has multiplied his heritage 100-fold (including B.N. himself, of course);
- The Party of the 20th century (new type) as Lenin's great discovery that determined the subsequent course of events;
- Lenin created the science of building socialism, the CPSU right now is creating the science of building communism, and on this basis builds communism step-by-step.

The last point calls for comment: as it turned out from our phone conversation (B.N. left for Gagra, to spend the remainder of the two week vacation he gets as a candidate member of the CC) his concern about the building of communism and the theory behind it is brought about by his desire to indirectly remind people about the Party program. He had been hinting at this to me for a while now, but I had no idea. He explained it like this: "Do you remember when the program was accepted, there was a big fuss about it. Then a lot of things happened. Now it is rarely mentioned. At one point there was even a suggestion to reexamine it, etc." In the meantime, B.N. considers himself the creator of the "Third Party Program," and to some extent

this is justified. He really knows it inside out, it contains some of his favorite pet ideas, which he tries to carefully position in his articles and reports.

April 5, 1974

We've been preparing the Lenin report and B.N. expressed his dissatisfaction three times with how the theoretical work of the party is portrayed, namely – the way it deals with the problems and challenges of the transition to communism. As I said, for a long time I did not understand what he wanted, because I couldn't imagine that he believed our theoretical thought is up to par. He talked about it with disdain on many occasions, but then he was talking about the "theoretical thought" of others! Finally, I realized that we have to talk about "his" – Ponomarev's – Party Program.

Another challenge is (Brezhnev's) "personal contribution." At first B.N. wanted to be reserved about it. I told him that it might be misunderstood, and that the General Secretary had in fact often made bold decisions. If it wasn't for him, we wouldn't have made any progress.

"This is true," B.N. responded, "If we did not have the history that we have, there would be no question about it. But you know..."

In the meantime, his edits of the draft versions we kept sending him while he was on vacation in the South showed that his common sense prevailed. The name appeared in the text more and more often, and assessments assumed a grander scale.

He made the "fight for peace" the underlying theme of the report; the fulfillment of this "world-historical task of saving humanity" that is fitting for Lenin's motherland. He wants us to write about it with flourish. I was always surprised by his insistence in this matter. It seemed to me to be somewhat incompatible with his "Bolshevism" and his 1920s-kind of revolutionary mentality. Now I'm gradually beginning to understand. The old man is wise and informed. He knows that nobody believes in our "revolutionary example" anymore. But as a superpower, we have to maintain our ideological character – partly for the outside world and partly for the communists. Therefore, we have to have a global humanist mission. Peace is such a mission. And our ability to carry out such a mission comes from the Great Revolution. Plus, this is not just ideological trickery; there is a real logic and a real problem here.

Nobody thought in 1920 that capitalism would last so long and have such a powerful ability for unprecedented economic transformation. In these circumstances, the problem of "world revolution" changes its emphasis and becomes the "peace revolution."¹ B.N. is trying to adjust the leading revolutionary role of Lenin's motherland to precisely this shift (of meaning).

Secretly, he, as an old Bolshevik, is waiting for the universal crisis of capitalism, similar to, or even worse than, the crisis of 1929-33. In every one of his speeches and articles he tries to use the tools of propaganda to blow any sign of a crisis completely out of proportion to the point of absurdity. We are always doing the best we can to temper this passion of his, so he does not look ridiculous and nonsensical.

The same thing is happening now (especially in light of the real crisis in the West). He is pressuring us with "unprecedented force" (to use one of his favorite phrases).

¹ In the Russian, Chernyaev uses a play on the words *mirovaya revoliutsiya* [мировая революция], which can mean either "world revolution" or "peace revolution." [trans.]

We are currently laboring over the issue of “Karlovy Vary-2.” On the one hand, by delaying it we are giving up our leadership in the European communist movement little by little. Our fraternal parties are simply drifting away from us, from our influence. On the other hand, we can’t force it because the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe is in progress. And, considering that it is barely moving right now, if we set it off against the communist conference it will fail completely. And it is “realpolitik” in contrast to the ideology of “Karlovy Vary-2.”

April 13, 1974

The week flew by very quickly, the most painful period of the Lenin report preparation. After returning from Gagra, B.N. spoke with me confidentially three times. He trusts almost no one in “this matter.” He even asked me about Zhilin: “What does he think about the ‘personal contribution?’ I recall we were in Berlin together at a conference for the 125th anniversary of the ‘Communist Manifesto.’ I would ask him to add something, and he (Zhilin) would produce a paragraph or two with the General Secretary’s name all over. Just try to remove it, when so many eyes had already seen it!” I explained that Zhilin is just doing his job and trying to make sure that there wouldn’t be problems for B.N.

It is a completely different story with Zagladin. B.N. asked me to show him the text. Then he forgot that he asked me and gave his own copy to Zagladin, but with edited pages that talked about the “personal contribution.” When B.N. found out that Zagladin wound up with both copies and could compare them, he became terribly upset and started instructing me how to “seize” them both, and the sooner the better. But Zagladin did not compare anything (he is above that). Instead, he wrote two inserts based on the December Plenum, personalizing everything to the extreme. He cannot even imagine that this issue is causing B.N. so much suffering and doubt. Zagladin just accepts it as it is, as a natural process that everyone understands.

I did not show B.N. the inserts; I only used the thoughts on the transformation of “the entire national economic mechanism.”

In connection to this, B.N. is also worried about what to do about the “other two” (Podgorny and Kosygin), whether to mention them in the report. He told me to re-read Podgorny’s ciphered telegrams from Paris, where he was at Pompidou’s funeral and where he (as he said at the PB) barely managed to fend off the “suplicants” – heads of state and governments who wanted to demonstrate their “contact” with the high representative of the Soviet Union. According to B.N., Podgorny was amazed to see that at the reception (the wake) Nixon was standing as if he was in a vacuum, touching the shoulder of the Crown Prince of Morocco – the boy was the only one to approach the U.S. President and linger near him. The others tried to take a bow from a distance, and Nixon was clearly agitated, he was looking around and waiting for a crowd to finally form around him. Podgorny, on the other hand, had a line of twenty people waiting to say hello and chat.

After telling me about this and asking my impression of the ciphered telegrams, B.N. said: “In these circumstances, how can I say just one name in the report? Look at your draft, take page 21 for example... one, two, three times [Brezhnev’s name is mentioned]... It’s enough to make one question who’s the subject of the report (i.e. Lenin or Brezhnev). Think about how we could reflect this better.”

Naturally I thought about it and came up with an idea. I am not sure if he'll like it. For the last two days he was busy with Assad: the Syrian President is visiting, he is our "last hope" in the Middle East.

By the way, I read the draft version of Brezhnev's upcoming speech at the PCC [Political Consultative Committee] in Warsaw on April 18th, a copy was sent around the PB. It's a well-made speech, you can really feel Aleksandrov's hand in it. It is more reminiscent of a diplomatic report (with evaluations and accents, of course) than an outline of a new Program. I did not notice any new big ideas for the future. But that is not the point.

I drew B.N.'s attention to how the Middle East is presented in the speech. Aleksandrov must have gotten so carried away outlining the details that he didn't notice (although this is just his style) that we are essentially admitting to our friends (plus Romania) that we were defeated, that the Americans beat us. Egypt is essentially out of our control and Sadat drags us through the mud in his public speeches over the last couple of weeks. He lies shamelessly, distorts the facts, and denies having cried "Help! Save me! Secure a ceasefire!" when Israel broke through to the western bank of the Canal, etc.

It's one thing that I, for example, think it's time for us to change our policies in this region. It doesn't look like this will happen. But we also can't do what Aleksandrov does in the speech – to essentially admit that the policy has reached a dead end without offering any alternative except a hope that Assad will be more honest than Sadat and will secure our participation in the Geneva Conference!

I told all this to Ponomarev, he got worried. The next day he told me that he talked with Aleksandrov, who supposedly agreed to "lighten the pessimistic tone." I doubt that Aleksandrov will change anything unless he gets an order directly from Brezhnev. I can't help but wonder about another thing: B.N. told me that Brezhnev sent him the text personally and asked for his opinion. Why then does he need to discuss such things with an adviser, instead of going to Leonid Ilyich himself?

I heard about enforcers-activists chasing after students who were brought into the streets to demonstrate Soviet-Syrian friendship (Assad was leaving Moscow). Wet, heavy snow was falling, so the students took cover in apartment building stairwells and the metro. The kids made a game out of it, it was entertaining for them. They don't give a damn about Assad. Sometimes our "establishment" flashes an idiotic grimace. The mechanism has reached a point where the end that gives orders doesn't see or hear what comes out of the other end. In fact, it would be indecent and unacceptable if these ends converged.

May 12, 1974

From April 23rd I was in Volynskoe-2. Brezhnev's election speech. The team was led by Tsukanov ("Tsu-Ka,"² as Arganovsky dubbed him; I think he even wrote a hymn about it). Arganovsky is our most outstanding journalist from *Izvestia*. Bovin made up a bunch of nicknames for him, including "Nonpartisan Jew," "Golden Pen," and others. He is a man of great charm and diverse talents. He draws (he drew a profile of Bovin staring at a naked girl who vaguely looks like our typist Valya), he composes, sings and plays guitar, and he tells great

² In Russian, the sounds "Tsu-Ka" are similar to the word *suka* [cyka] – bitch. [trans.]

stories and hilarious jokes. He is calm and natural, without a trace of the servility complex that would be understandable in his position.

Others: Inozemtsev and Arbatov, who are now also candidates for the Supreme Soviet. One from Georgia (but at least [he is a candidate] to the Council of the Union), the other – Arbatov – from Azerbaijan – to the Council of Nationalities. Here you have our entire electoral system at a glance.

There were also Shakhnazarov and the aforementioned Bovin, who acts as if nothing ever happened to him.

I was the outcast [*ушиботник*]. The others were all addressing each other in the familiar form, and only on a first-name basis. Everyone there doubted my abilities. Why then did Tsukanov plead with Ponomarev to let me come? He clearly flattered him to get me, saying that Aleksandrov has his team and we'll have ours, and our texts will be no worse than his. Since I was the “unskilled labor,” the following routine developed: Bovin would make small cosmetic changes to my text and read it aloud at the “general assembly.” At this point it would be deemed ready and “good.” The same text with minor adjustments based on commentary from the first reading, but without Bovin’s touch, would be read aloud by Inozemtsev and deemed worthless. Then Bovin would be assigned to remake it!

All of this depresses me, I have to say. After such a turn of events I have an intense urge to run away from here.

In any case, whatever we come up with for the international section of the speech is going into the trash can, which became clear after the following episode. On the morning of the 8th there was a call on the direct phone line. I answered.

“This is Aleksandrov. Whom am I speaking to?”

“Chernyaev. Hello, Andrey Mikhailovich!”

“Hello, Anatoly Sergeyeovich (sourness in his voice). Could you please ask Georgiy Emmanuilovich to the phone.”

(The rest of the conversation is based on Tsukanov’s words, he later told us what happened.)

“Georgiy! Are you writing the entire speech?”

“Yes.”

“Including the international section?”

“Yes.”

“Why didn’t you say something to me? That is disloyal. How can you do that? You know that I am supposed to be preparing it. You are acting like a real pig!”

“Oh yeah? If I’m a pig, why don’t you go to hell!”

And Tsukanov slammed the phone down and went into his room.

Bovin, like the others who were present, commented as follows: “Member of the Central Auditing Commission of the CPSU, Adviser to the General Secretary of our Leninist Party, called Member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, First

Adviser of the General Secretary of the Central Committee of our Leninist Party a pig, for which he was instructed to go to hell by the latter..." And more (again by Bovin): "Earl! Now you can write your international section at the level of Marx, Engels, and even Lenin, but 'Sparrow' will still peck it apart and smear it in shit."

There are real issues, besides our vanity. It is an election speech. We need a platform, even if it is within the framework of the "Peace Program" (such a document was adopted at the XXIV Congress of the CPSU). We have to say something. In politics, you cannot stand still. The change is really almost unbelievable if you consider where we were at the turn of the 1970s.

Right now this is the situation: the words (by the logic of the struggle and for other reasons) go beyond what we are actually prepared to do. We already achieved what we hoped to achieve when we started the "peace offensive." We cannot and do not want to go further. If we go any further we will come up against the ideological "class" boundary. (Europe is a case in point. We already have détente and security in Europe. But in response they launched a counterattack. They demand an ideological détente. This is unthinkable for us.) Since this is the case, we should cease with the flowery language. We should not make fools of ourselves or open ourselves to blows from our partners. We need to calmly solidify what we achieved already. This is my position.

Arbatov and Bovin, on the other hand, believe that we should continue and intensify our rhetoric. Because by doing so, we constrain ourselves; we put ourselves into a bad position and then we are forced to take some real measures (to get out of this situation), such as disarmament, or relaxation of our ideology.

This is all nonsense, of course. Arabesques of a geek-romantic (i.e. Arbatov), who can't sleep at night because of Kissinger's laurels.

May 13, 1974

I got up early to write.

It's getting even worse with disarmament (Arbatov thinks that he knows some secrets). The whole world sees that we have become the obstacle in this process. We've reduced military tension. We do not want war and we will not provoke it. But there's also no real disarmament. For completely different reasons.

The same thing with the blocs. The reason we need the Warsaw Pact is not because we need to counteract NATO (and the same with why the Americans need NATO – not because of us). The entire world has known this for a long time. Why make noise about this? Why do we need a "Cold War" of words?! Therefore, I suggest a pragmatic platform: to solidify what we have and to direct all our attention to economic ties. Inozemtsev (who is well-informed) says that our foreign trade is a terrible mess. It's not just that we don't have enough goods to export. The main problem is our system of dealing with the capitalist world; and the complete lack of authority at the expert level (authority in the sense of being able to make decisions). And, consequently, the reverse – lack of expertise at the decision-making levels.

Telegram from London. Our ambassador talked with [John] Gollan (General Secretary of the Communist Party of Great Britain) on the subjects we assigned. Gollan is still hissing about the international Conference. He says we only consult with those whose opinions we know in advance, and then we present it as if many of our fraternal parties support our idea. And in

general, there is no point to these meetings because you can't really talk; all you do is read out prepared speeches...

So I thought, what has our ICM come to; what does it look like nowadays. For example: Portugal. Fascism is ousted after fifty years of domination. Toppled by an army coup. A real "February 1917" is unfolding. It's a huge deal. The next day [Álvaro] Cunhal returned to the country and was received at the airport like Lenin at Finland station. But that's not my point. A week hadn't passed after the coup before the leader of the Socialist Party of Portugal [Mário] Soares visited the countries of Europe. He met with his friends from the Socialist International, attended the Congress of Socialist Parties of Northern Countries. And everywhere there were public resolutions in support of Portugal, promises of political and material support for the democratic development of Portugal. Is this not true internationalism, in the style of social democracy? In the meantime, the resolutions are adopted at the initiative of the **ruling** social democratic parties. They are not afraid of diplomatic scandals; they don't feel any inconvenience from their collective actions. Just imagine if the communist movement tried something like that! If someone suggested a conference on Portugal or something along those lines – everyone would scatter and run away.

All of this is easy to understand. And nevertheless, it's sad!

May 17, 1974

Yesterday I came back from Volynskoe-2. My suitcase is still there and I'll have to go back and work in short visits. Tsukanov, Arbatov, and Inozemtsev took our "material" to Brezhnev and read it to him. Tsukanov assures us that Brezhnev was impressed ("I've known him for 15 years and I'm sure about this"). There are only a few comments, it would be a matter of hours to incorporate them. We did that yesterday.

The version presented to Brezhnev was closer to my point of view than Arbatov's or Inozemtsev's regarding how we should conduct ourselves in the future (against "illusionism"). Brezhnev asked to personally mention Brandt and Pompidou.

In general, the end of April and beginning of May was an eventful time:

- Brandt resigned (the case of Guillaume, the GDR spy);
- The Mitterrand-Giscard d'Estaing battle in France (Chervonenko's visit to Giscard; scandal – statement by the PFC PB in *L'Humanite*);
- Portugal, where the government just formed and Cunhal (Minister without portfolio) is one of its main figures;
- In Israel three Palestinians occupied a school and demanded the release of their murderer associates from prison. This was followed by a storming of the school – 20 dead, 70 injured, mostly children. Commentary in our newspapers: Israel is to blame!
- In Italy, in a referendum on divorce the communists' line received an unexpected (even to themselves) majority – 60 percent;
- The "Common Market" is cracking: Italy and Denmark imposed tariffs. Right now there is a stream of assessments – pessimism and disappointment from everyone who saw Europe's future in the Common Market. Personally, I always thought, was convinced, and argued that the "Common Market" is rooted in Europe's way of life more strongly and irreversibly than turned out in reality;

- In connection with the Portuguese Revolution, the last colonial empire in Africa has collapsed.

In a word, everything is changing and fermenting.

The European Conference of Communist Parties is hanging in limbo. Our insistence to conclude it “at the highest level” is becoming meaningless since the widely recognized creators of détente (except Brezhnev) have left the political scene, and Nixon’s presence in his current situation is unlikely to add credibility to this “highest level.”

Both at home and abroad you hear concerns about the future of détente. I think it is not threatened by anything. Nobody will get into a big fight over the Middle East; Southeast Asia – even less so. We are all busy with our own affairs; we all have our hands full trying to keep abreast with “consumer society.” And people are getting used to détente, just as they once got used to the “Cold War.”

The solidifying new reality is that there are no grounds for a major war. If war happens, it will be because of ideological myths, i.e. human stupidity, which is inexcusable in our day and age because it is not justified by history. Earlier societies and governments had no alternative to war (due to material underdevelopment). War was inherent in the very laws of objective development. This is no longer the case. Now war would happen only if the global Trapeznikovs take center stage.

Brezhnev’s unpublished speech from his meeting with veterans of the 18th Army. I read the transcript in Volynskoe. Navy pants with 36cm-wide leg; for some reason he got upset when he was talking about how we shook world capitalism with our Peace Program... He spoke without notes.

Volume II of Khrushchev’s memoirs was published in the West. This time the material was taken from tapes stored at Harvard, anyone can come and listen to them. Nikita [Khrushchev’s] meetings with [Pyotr] Kapitsa and [Andrei] Sakharov regarding the hydrogen bomb. His regret over the “police action” against Pasternak and the treatment of Yevtushenko; regret over his attitude towards the “new schools” in art. He comes off as such a nice guy, who is sorry *post factum* for the misunderstandings with intelligentsia, and sad that it took him too long to understand the meaning of “creative freedom,” etc.

And yet, Nikita is directly responsible for the fact that for the last ten years we have Demichev and Trapeznikov in their positions. Although the roots of these figures go back to Stalinism.

June 11, 1974

In late May I flew to Switzerland, for the X Congress of the SPL (CP of Switzerland, which is officially called the Swiss Party of Labour) and a trip around the country. Kozyr’ was the head of our delegation, he is the First Secretary of the Odessa Regional Committee. Later Pankov and Yakukhin joined us from France.

In the evening in Zurich we met Igor’ Mel’nikov, a correspondent for *Pravda* in Vienna. A modern hotel on the outskirts of Zurich, by the hillside.

On the morning of the 31st we made a trip to Rhine Falls. Lunch on the banks of the Rhine in Shaffhausen – the town where Lenin departed from Switzerland.

By evening we were in Basel. Dinner in a restaurant with Vincent, Hoffer, Dafflon, Ediger (the hope of the party). The careful first contacts: Ediger looked at me with suspicion, made snarky comments. I think he only started to respect me after the delegation's meeting with the new Politburo in Lausanne, and especially after my speech at the meeting in Geneva that same evening. Before that, at the congress, he was dry and hostile. Same with Magnin. It was only in Lausanne that Vincent appreciated that we came with serious intentions and that I was the one sent there to take care of these serious intentions.

The Congress was from June 1st-3rd. Vincent's report – not a word about the USSR, but everything else evidenced their “return to the family.” Kozyr's speech. Practically 80 percent of the audience “did not hear” him. But when he walked onto and off the podium there was rousing applause, a standing ovation. The only other two people who got that kind of welcome were the Spaniards (most likely because there were a good number of Spanish immigrants in the audience) and, of course, Vladimir Teitelboim from Chile. His speech was very powerful. It was mostly about “the lessons,” clearly prepared by Karyakin for me (for Ponomarev), which already became one of B.N.'s doctrines “on the lessons of Chile.”

Walks around the city. Basel trams. Solzhenitsyn's book in shop windows. Italians in the empty city streets on Sunday as if they were in their Neapolitan or Sicilian village: playing, tinkering, joking with their girls... The sleek, haughty Swiss (Germans) who look down with contempt on this “inferior” race, which, however, makes up a sixth of the country's population. In some factories, as many as 80 percent of the workers are foreigners. Forty-fifty percent is the norm.

In the evening – a meeting with the activists. My first big speech, most of the time was spent on Q&A.

June 12, 1974

A young woman with a question about inflation in the USSR. Gray-haired man of letters, who asked me at the Congress whether he could talk to me about “creative freedom.” He asked the following question: how do new ideas form in your society?

I talked a lot, though I did not always sound convincing to myself. Kozyr's explanations about the occasional price difference for potatoes and strawberries in Odessa in the spring (stores vs. farmers markets) caused bewilderment and ironic smiles.

We met with the new Politburo in the People's House in Lausanne. I did most of the talking. Vincent said something along the lines of, “We said everything at the Congress, you heard everything, now you talk about what you think is necessary.” The problems of China, Watergate, the European Conference of Communist Parties and the international Conference.³

June 15, 1974

The next morning we went to Bern. A dirty hotel in the city center. I wandered around the city for three hours. A student demonstration on bicycles.

In the evening there was a reception at the embassy – the entire Politburo. The splendor of Vincent as a host (he is a lawyer, well known even outside Switzerland). He and his guests had a European dimension to them, and Kozyr looked like such a mediocrity in comparison.

³ CSCE

They received the CC CPSU greetings to Vincent solemnly and ironically (on the occasion of his election as Chairman of the SPL). Vincent's recollections about his participation in the French Resistance, a pleasant reverie, chatting about trifles, like the kind of bread they had back then, or an umbrella in Karlovy Vary in 1945 – but all of this elegantly presented. This is the skill of filling dead time with conventionalities that weave into politics.

Toward the end of the evening he called Pankov aside and said the following: “The Party is on the verge of a serious scandal. Our newspaper is going under because of inflation. In order to cover a deficit of 200,000 franks, we dipped into the insurance cash of our typographical workers. If people find out, the newspaper will be confiscated and there may even be a court case, i.e. a political scandal that would embarrass the party for a long time. We need your urgent help.”

In the morning, Pankov and I stopped by the embassy and sent a ciphered telegram to Moscow through the resident (the Ambassador does not have access to such information). We asked Moscow to help. When we returned to Moscow I found out that the issue was resolved: they are getting \$12,000 above their normal annual rate, immediately.

B.N. was with voters at the time. When he returned, he asked as a matter of formality how things are going with SPL. Maybe he didn't even need more than the information we sent in the two ciphered telegrams? For his politics!

Today he is in a state of euphoria again; he is getting ready to go to France as the head of a delegation to discuss the conference of European CPs. I found out that he asked Zagladin to tell me, as soon as I returned, to start working on materials for “the Six” (a meeting of CP CC Secretaries of the Warsaw Pact countries), which will take place on June 26th. I was supposed to head Zhilin's group in Serebryanyi Bor. However, Zagladin did not tell me this. This “appointment” of Zhilin came up when both of us, Zagladin and I, were sitting in B.N.'s office. B.N. got angry; he understood that “unprincipled considerations” were behind this (i.e. behind Zagladin's maneuver). B.N. said to me, “Don't hesitate to take things into your own hands.”

Yesterday Brezhnev gave a speech to his constituents. I only managed to hear parts of it on the radio, because I had to work during the Kremlin meeting. There were some changes to the international section, on which I worked in Volynskoe-2, especially to the sections on Soviet-American relations and disarmament. But it seems “Sparrow” wasn't able to tear it apart at the core. Brezhnev's pronunciation is getting worse. He mangles the simplest words.

Brezhnev's meeting with constituents yesterday reminded me: two weeks ago, at the end of May, I was walking to work and ran into Khavinson (he takes a stroll in a certain direction and then a car picks him up). At the time I had just returned from Volynskoe. “Yes, I know,” the wise Khavinson⁴ said, “Kolya (Inozemtsev) told me... He, together with Arbatov and Tsukanov, had seen the General Secretary regarding ‘this work of yours’ in Volynskoe. Kolya once again came away with the impression that ‘nothing will happen.’ The General Secretary listens to the

⁴ In the beginning of the “Cold War,” Yakov Semyonovich Khavinson regularly wrote for *Pravda* under the pseudonym Marinin, brilliant articles on foreign affairs. During World War II he was in the leadership of the Soviet Information Bureau. He was knocked down during “cosmopolitanism” and was “exiled” to the Institute of Academician Varga, which in the 1950s was transformed into the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Khavinson became the editor-in-chief of the academic journal of the same name. He is a tall and handsome Jew, sarcastically intelligent. At the time [of the diary entry] he was around 70 years old.

arguments, agrees with the proposals, talks about his own concerns, etc... But you look at him and you see that nothing will be done. Inozemtsev told him several times that practically nothing has been done since the December Plenum, just like in 1972. The apparatus and the Council of Ministers are blocking everything. And once again – fitting words and sharp criticism just stir the air. The General Secretary knows this... but nothing will change. What do you think about this, Tolya?”

Once again there was a good speech. But Kosygin, Demichev, and others remain in their positions. Nothing will change.

June 18, 1974

Preparation for “the Six.” Visit to Serebryanyi Bor.

Yesterday I met the delegation from the Belgian Socialist Party (sixteen obkom secretaries) in Sheremetyevo airport. Since Zagladin is going to Paris, I’ll be busy with them. “A new quality of relations,” for the first time in history not with a fraternal party, but with socialist-democrats. I made a speech about how relations between the CPSU and the BSP represent a trend of the future.

A smart article on world economy by Ye. Pletnev in Khavinson’s journal.

Tadeusz Jaroszewski “Individual and Society” – for the first time something written sensibly about existentialism. And in general it is an unusual book against the background of our “philosophical” Talmudism.

June 20, 1974

Yesterday morning I went to see Ponomarev off to Paris. He asked me to come just to make a bigger crowd for himself, as he openly told me, “There’s nobody around from the CC Secretaries.”

Then I went to Serebryanyi Bor to finish up the document – directives for “The Six.”

In the evening I went to Bolshoi Theater to see La Scala’s *Norma* by Bellini. Beau monde. At times I was nearly choking with laughter. The actions on stage profane the music and the truly powerful voices. And even though at the end the artists were bombarded with flowers (literally, not figuratively), I left the theater convinced once and for all that opera is dead as an art form, or worse – it is laughable. Only a professional or a snob can seriously dispute this. You have to be a very primitive or limited person to truly enjoy this kind of art.

Today I was invited to SovExportFilm to see Fellini’s new picture *I remember*. A very characteristically Italian film. The personality of the city and way of life, expressed in a setting from the 1930s. Very precise analysis by purely cinematic means. Character types, situations. However, there is also a fair share of Fellini’s antics.

July 6, 1974

On June 26th, “the Six” met and decided everything: the dates, the schedule of preparation for the European Conference of CPs. Persuaded Axen (SED) to propose for the CPSU to prepare all the documents for the conference, and then coordinate everything with the five-six others.

[Gyula Horn, deputy at the International Department of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, the young man who was my interpreter in 1960 when we went from Prague to Lake Balaton for a vacation. He practically hasn't changed, even though it's been 15 years. Back then his translation was something like this: "A stallion's wife" (meaning a mare).]

Now the Poles are going to Rome to put together a confidential letter (already coordinated with us) from the Italian Communist Party and Polish United Worker's Party to all European CPs with an invitation to a consultative meeting in Warsaw in late September.

The PB made a resolution based on the results of "the Six." According to this resolution, we are supposed to prepare drafts of the conference Declaration (analytical document) and the "Appeal to the Peoples of Europe" over the next month and a half. Following B.N.'s orders we are moving to the Gorky dacha (B.N. lives nearby and will come visit us).

It makes me furious. When I took a closer look at the topic, I realized how much work needs to be done, how we need to get into the material, try at least a dozen versions, find the right words, combine the existing Brezhnev formulas with the West-Communist ones from Brussels, etc., etc. But the consultants couldn't care less. If I rub their nose in it – no problem, they'll do it how I tell them. But they couldn't be bothered to spend their own time and effort on it when they could be playing billiards, chess, or running down to the river. Why should they, Chernyaev will take care of it! What's the problem! Everything works out in the end.

The only other person who is worried about this decay is Brutents. He is truly a spiritually rich, remarkable guy. And he is probably the only one with whom I can talk openly about everything, knowing that I will be understood and that it is interesting to him. In other words, he is my friend, despite all the reservations over the fact that we have such vastly different personalities.

By the way, we had a "friendly" dinner in Volynskoe after we finished preparing the speech for Brezhnev. An episode took place that may have some consequences. Kolya (Inozemtsev, academician and Deputy of the Supreme Soviet, candidate member to the CC, etc.) was already tipsy and made his second toast "to the International Department," for its role in Party policies, in our social development, etc. Arbatov, Shaposhnikov and others quickly jumped in. They sensed that this could take the wrong turn and rushed to say that the International Department is just supporting the important work of the CC and so on. But it was already too late – Gavrilov was at the table, he is Demichev's adviser and close friend and drinking buddy, and at the same time Karen's friend. He immediately caught on and started getting ready to leave. People got him to stay and talked about the unity of international affairs and propaganda, trying to play down the awkwardness, knowing that "this topic" should not have been raised in the presence of this scumbag informer.

Returning to the European Conference, I have to mention the following. The original idea for the foundation of the conference was to combine détente and struggle for socialism in Europe. That's how we envisioned the difference between this new conference and Karvolý Vary. We wanted to use this to attract and interest the Western CPs. They keep suspiciously watching our peaceful coexistence with governments and leaders against whom they are waging a fierce political war. When B.N. was visiting Paris (before the meeting of "the Six"), he probed Marchais on the subject. And what happened? It turns out that they (French Communist Party) don't want to raise "social issues" at the pan-European conference at all. The moral of the story: do your détente, since there is really no alternative, but we will keep doing our thing, with a

long-term goal of our “own,” Western European, truly developed socialism. You, the socialist countries, should not meddle in this, you would only harm our relationship with our allies (the Social Democrats), and harm us in the eyes of public opinion, because we do not want the kind of socialism you have in the USSR and in the “people’s democracies,” and moreover, “our masses” do not want it either.

Nevertheless, B.N. thinks that we will not abandon the idea of combining peaceful coexistence with “social progress” and “class struggle.” It’s a matter of language!

Nixon’s visit from June 27th-July 3rd. There is less noise, but the condominium is emerging quite realistically. There was an episode with the draft PB resolution on the outcomes of the visit. As always, B.N. took it upon himself to prepare it, even though he did not have a direct connection to the talks. He assigned it to Kuskov. At the last moment, after editing it personally, he couldn’t resist and gave it to me to look at. I drew his attention to the fact that a Party document cannot repeat the formulas of a joint communiqué, making it look like the Politburo of the CPSU seriously believes that “American imperialism” will fight for the progress of humanity, for justice in the Middle East, for the interest of all peoples, etc. B.N. got wound up. He declared that he was also correcting “along these lines,” but didn’t get around to those parts... He swore at Kuskov, who huffs and puffs about a “class approach” to everything in the world, but missed something like this.

Yesterday a similar thing happened with preparation of information for the CPs on the outcomes of Nixon’s visit.

July 13, 1974

We are putting together a “draft of the outline of the plan of the prospectus of the Declaration” (this is how my consultants dubbed the task – five words in a row in the Genitive case) for the Pan-European Conference of Communist Parties, and it’s not even clear whether it will happen. Although according to Frelek, who was in Rome, the Italians agreed to send the PCI-PUWP letter to all the European CPs, but they smudged all the specifics.

B.N. visited us at the Gorky dacha. For two hours he talked about his idea, the gist of which was to show in the “document” the crucial role of socialism for Europe, and to “mobilize” everyone against anti-Sovietism.

However, when I visited him yesterday about other matters, he was already saying something different, that the Western CPs are a majority, and we keep talking about ourselves all the time... This is Katushev’s influence, B.N. met with him the day before. Shakhnazarov brought Katushev’s opinion to the dacha two days earlier. But Katushev has his own crazy ideas. For example, to show that we, the socialist countries, approve and support the Western CPs’ line for the “popular front” (as a prospect for revolution). I explained to Shakhnazarov that what these Western CPs are afraid of most is our “approval” of their domestic policies, since it immediately makes their “allies” and the general population suspect that it is “Moscow’s line.”

He is also suggesting to include an item into the Program for European Peace, which we are writing for the conference, on the creation of a Pan-European cultural center in West and East Berlin! (Like the CSCE “Third Basket” in Geneva!)

In general, this “theoretical” work reflects the growing “divergence” between real policies and ideology. It is very noticeable in the inner-Party document – the CC information on

the outcomes of Nixon's visit. The entire section dealing with the assessment of our policy towards the United States leads one to conclude that our constructive and improving relations with the U.S. are not only helping to avoid war, but contributing to the progress of mankind. Only at the end, in a four-line paragraph that feels like an afterthought, it says that we should remember that we continue to have fundamental differences. There is no mention of the necessity for ideological struggle.

By the way, during B.N.'s speech to us at the dacha, he remarked in passing and with obvious regret (but also with hopelessness in his voice) that we've stopped writing in the newspapers about our struggle against imperialism, but we should at least compensate by struggling against anti-Sovietism.

In this regard, Shishlin (a consultant in Katushev's Department) said an interesting thing yesterday when we were on the porch together, editing the "outline." "You know," he said, "what the General Secretary once said about your Ponomarev? That he keeps going on about imperialism this, imperialism that... While the times have changed. And imperialism looks different depending on who represents it"... something along those lines.

Yes. The real work that Brezhnev does every day will push us to tone down our ideology above all in our international relations. And our connection to the Communist Movement will feel more and more like an impediment. Our Marxist-Leninist didactics on how they, the Western CPs, should move towards socialism will become increasingly irrelevant, and our attempts to ideologically butt into their affairs will meet increasingly open resistance. The Italians understand this better than anyone, which is why they openly encourage our "realpolitik" (Berlinguer in his conversations with Frelek was most concerned that our European CP Conference should not interfere with Geneva!). We should be the ones concerned about it!

I very much fear that we will get into the preparatory work for the conference, and then Brezhnev-Gromyko will make a face and we'll be the ones to start wrapping it up.

August 3, 1974

From July 16th-25th I was in Finland. Meeting at the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Finland, [Arvo] Aalto is the General Secretary. My impression of him: smart, calm, unhurried like a Finn, handsome, strong, fairly young, knows his worth, self-assured. According to our official view of him – he is the leader of the right-leaning revisionist majority group; organizer of the "right-wing forces" in the Party. The apparatus and the press are in his hands.

For three days I traveled around various pretty towns and attractions of Finland, and was very well received. I've never danced so much or so well.

We spent the whole night over dinner with the ambassador, accompanied by adviser Andreyev. The ambassador is smart and efficient; he used to be our resident there. From our pointed and direct conversation it became clear that our consultants (from the International Department), who often worked in the embassy in Helsinki and formed personal ties to many politicians, conduct their "own" line towards the Communist Party of Finland. To a certain extent, our consultants have artificially constructed the notions of the right wing and left wing of the party. This division became a reality after it was internalized by Suslov, Ponomarev, Pelshe, and others (i.e., our Central Committee). The consultants inform the CC based on what they hear from the left. But the left-wing politicians happen to be dumb and stupid, and their influence

does not extend beyond Turku. And yet, they want to take over the Party with our help. The majority of communists are sick of the “ideological struggle” at the top. At the regional and local level there is no division between right and left, and it does not affect their work.

I agreed with the ambassador’s analysis and promised to do something to “correct” the situation. For example, by ignoring Aalto we embitter him and his followers, and we risk “losing the Party” because it is Aalto and his people who are getting things done and keeping everything in check. We have no facts or reasons to believe they are anti-Soviets. They are trying to do everything they can to show that they are our best friends. And they are not doing it quietly; they are willing to show it in front of the whole nation. If we keep pushing them away and pitting Kainulainen & Co. against them, we will turn them into Aarons’es (the vehemently anti-Soviet leader of the Communist Party of Australia) with our own hands.

I agreed with the ambassador and spoke with Shaposhnikov about this (he oversees Finland in our Department) when I got back. He listened to me with suspicion and made it clear that I should not have interfered in this whole affair, knowing how difficult it would be to overcome the “stereotypes” in the minds of the CC leadership. In particular, it would be difficult to get a positive reaction to the recent letter from the Finnish social democrats to the CC CPSU, containing a proposal to develop inter-party exchanges. (This letter wasn’t even shown to me, though I oversee social democrats in the Department).

The Cyprus crisis broke out while I was in Finland. Archbishop-President Makarios fled; there was a bloodless overthrow of fascism in Athens. Both events are very symptomatic of our time: the NATO imperialists (the British and Americans) prevent war between Turkey and Greece, overthrow the fascist coup (Samson) in Cyprus, and eliminate the fascist regime in Greece!!

August 5, 1974

Yesterday I met McLennan and [Jack] Woddis – members of the Communist Party of Great Britain – at Sheremetyevo airport. They are here to sort things out with the CPSU over “the idea of an international conference,” which we are supposedly (!) pushing on our fraternal parties. Dzhavad correctly assumed that Romanians had a hand in this. It seems after last year’s meeting in the Crimea they presented it like this: “Brezhnev demanded a conference, and of course everyone supported him. But we, Romanians and Ceausescu, we have principles! We stood our ground, we objected, we put down conditions. Now the CPSU is twisting arms of the Communist Parties of capitalist countries. Many are easily giving in. But you, the British, you also have principles, so you should not fall for their tricks, and especially do not give in to pressure. Stand your ground. The Russians need this conference to counter the Chinese. We can’t let them impose this line, it would be the end of our parties’ independence.” It seems the British and Romanians discussed something along these lines.

So here they are. B.N. refused to see them today, he is busy with the Syrian delegation. For three hours I talked to them in my office at the CC. I laid it all out regarding the conference of European CPs and the [preliminary] meeting, except, of course, “the Six,” the Gorky dacha, and the like. We talked about the Chinese and the Jews. I was extremely honest. Woddis could not find arguments to counter me, because really, if you want the ICM to exist and function as a unified body, there are no reasonable arguments. I think they were especially impressed by my openness on the European problem. We’ll see what happens. I’m afraid we may have some

“discrepancies” with Ponomarev, which is quite possible. He may try to be cunning and they will immediately catch on to his “tactics.”

August 10, 1974

Nixon resigned after all. Ponomarev is fussing more than necessary over the “propaganda support” for this event and for Brezhnev’s response to Ford (today the U.S. Ambassador visited Kirilenko and handed him Ford’s letter to Brezhnev). Because of this, B.N. has been keeping me on a leash since yesterday, even though the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is preparing and sending all these documents and does not plan on asking for Ponomarev’s advice. Gromyko is on vacation, but yesterday he showed some initiative – an editorial in *Pravda* that looks like a government statement. It was prepared by Zamyatin (TASS) and Afanasyev (*Pravda*), and was called, “The Events in the USA and Soviet Foreign Policy.” After reading the monstrosity, I called B.N., who was already at his dacha, and told him that we cannot print this. He called Kirilenko, who is “in charge” during Brezhnev’s and Suslov’s absence. We managed to interrupt the publication. If it had gone ahead, it would have revealed that we are in a state of panic and sorry to see Nixon go, that we are uncertain whether the CPSU’s policies are built on a solid foundation.

Still, Ponomarev is going to publish a big article in *Pravda*, and I will have to start working on it immediately, on top of Brezhnev’s response to Ford, which has to be made “less formal” and “with more humanity.”

Everything is fine with the British delegation. B.N. was in top form. He immediately dispelled their fears about the [preliminary] meeting by saying that it is a long-term project and only in the conceptual stages right now, first we have to finish the CSCE... They expected that we would twist their arm. Woddis, who had earlier assured us that they first heard about the conference from the joint PUWP-PCI letter the day they left London, on the spot developed a whole program for the conference. He made a very enthusiastic speech on behalf of the Executive Committee of the Communist Party of Great Britain regarding the CC CPSU’s foreign policy, the likes of which we haven’t heard from the Brits since Harry Pollitt, and not at all after Czechoslovakia. We haven’t heard anything like this from our closest friends, like the French...

The next day at Plotnikov Street we had a conversation about Ireland, and I saw them off at Sheremetyevo Airport.

Ponomarev was at the Gorky dacha in the evening of the 6th, the day when we received the Brits. He was complaining about the draft speech that was prepared for him for the Consultative meeting. He said that kind of speech would be appropriate at an assembly of pacifists, not at a meeting of Communists. At the core it contradicts the Marxist thesis that war is inevitable so long as capitalism exists. I immediately interjected – what about the other thesis, that it is possible to eliminate war even before the complete victory of socialism in the world? Everybody laughed and on this joke (i.e. consideration for the old man) we changed the subject.

However, it’s an ongoing problem with the Comintern-minded Ponomarev: how to reconcile his deeply-rooted class nature, his vocal vigilance over NATO’s machinations and the arms race – with Brezhnev’s line. With Aleksandrov-Agentov’s help, Brezhnev states in every one of his speeches that the main trend of modern development is the tendency to peace and security, and that it is possible to create a world order that would exclude war. In a word, here we go with the “accordion” again, back and forth.

B.N. is demanding that I give him a draft speech for Brezhnev for the European Conference of Communist Parties (even though it will take place in February-March of 1975, i.e. after Brezhnev will make many more speeches, including at the CSCE). B.N. needs it now so he can put his best foot forward when he goes on vacation and will be somewhere near Brezhnev.

Balmashnov went off his rocker, he was Ponomarev's assistant. Krasin found him in the service stairwell, one leg already over the rails. He was sent to a psychiatric hospital.

August 18, 1974

The week was very busy. Before Ponomarev left for vacation I had to finish the drafts for the Consultative meeting (declaration, Appeal to the People of Europe, B.N.'s speech at the meeting, and a "script" outlining with whom to meet from which parties, whom to pressure, whom to persuade, who can take an "assignment," how to distribute between the parties the issues that we do not feel comfortable raising ourselves, etc.).

Brutents was taken from our team to Serebryanyi Bor to work with Shishlin and Shakhnazarov on Brezhnev's speech for the 25th anniversary of the GDR.

I had to meet one more time with [William] Kashtan (General Secretary of the Communist Party of Canada) on his return trip from Bulgaria to finish telling him everything he wanted to hear but did not have a chance to at the official meeting with B.N.

Yesterday (Saturday) I also had to meet with O'Riordan, who is returning to Ireland today, and explain to him about the Consultative meeting, about the Conference, the Romanians, Yugoslavs, etc.

B.N. stopped by the Gorky dacha, after asking me beforehand to invite Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Tolya Kovalyov, who recently returned from the talks in Geneva. We had a big discussion about the prospects of the European state consultations. Tolya laid everything out very clearly: if we want to finish it this year, and to complete this whole undertaking (the Helsinki Conference) successfully, we have to take some steps. For example, nobody can accept or even understand our position on confidence-building measures. We do not agree to notify about troop maneuvers at a distance greater than 100km from the border, and even this we only want to tell our neighbors. However, for practically the majority of European nations, 100km is their entire territory. And what does it mean to only notify the neighbors? Poland, for example, will only do it for its allies in the Warsaw Pact, who will know about these maneuvers long beforehand even without this notification. It's obviously absurd. But B.N. told us how this issue was discussed at the Politburo. Grechko (Minister of Defense) strongly rejected the proposals of the "Geneva negotiators" to notify about maneuvers at a distance of 500km from the border, because that way, he said, "they" will know everything about us. Meanwhile, Tolya told us about the following episode. In Geneva, two Americans from the U.S. delegation approached him and asked, "What was going on in Ryazan three days ago?" "I don't know," Tolya said, "Why do you ask?" "There were surprisingly many *Chaika* cars standing on the square by the regional committee, and they didn't have Ryazan tags." "How do you know this?" Tolya asked. "What do you mean, how do we know? Don't you know that the photos you can obtain from satellites can be as detailed as license plates, or the pattern of someone's tie?"

On the "third point" (the exchange of people and ideas) it's also pretty bad. "We," Tolya told us, "are following our directives and emphatically objecting to the creation of various cultural centers in the USSR; centers where people could freely read literature from France,

England, the FRG, etc.; where people could buy any newspaper they liked, watch movies, etc. We are alone in our stubbornness. Our brothers and allies in the negotiations just sit quietly, because these kinds of centers already exist in Poland, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, not to mention Yugoslavia.”

To make a long story short, what Ponomarev took away from the conversation with Kovalyov, as I understood from his meeting with deputies before going on vacation, was the following: it’s unlikely that the Helsinki Conference will end this year. “And in general, it’s not clear yet how it will go, since they are demanding such things from us...”

After Solzhenitsyn was expelled from the country, Yura Karyakin again requested to go to Prague. I am sure that it will not happen. Zarodov (editor-in-chief of the journal *Problems of Peace and Socialism*) and others who would make the decision about Yura’s candidacy know him inside out. When I talked about it with Zarodov, he did not object directly, but said, “Send him for a review. We’ll see how it goes... I am sure that he is involved in the Solzhenitsyn affair and other such things.” (A review is a request sent to the KGB for information from their files on whether there are “questionable” elements in the file. The review is accompanied by a recommendation on whether the person can be allowed to go abroad). I did not send a review request; I didn’t want to draw the KGB’s attention to Yura for this. I think they have something along these lines on him, even though Karyakin carefully hides his connections from me. That’s the fate of an official: you can be someone’s friend a thousand times over, but he still won’t trust you! In any case, now any connection he had with Solzhenitsyn is history, same as his friendship with Korzhavin, Maksimov, Yakir and the others – they all emigrated.

Yura told me that Erik Neizvestnyi is also planning to “go.” I made a speech about this. Karyakin agreed with me, even though he initially intended to justify Neizvestnyi. I don’t know, maybe the latter changed his mind already. It would be a great loss for us.

September 29, 1974

B.N. decided to school our fraternal parties in economic policies in case they come to power. He was inspired to do this on his trip to Italy. And before that, the story with Allende in Chile, then the Portuguese revolution. He remembered Lenin’s works, *Impending Catastrophe and How to Fight It*, and *Can the Bolsheviks Retain State Power*. B.N. decided to follow Lenin’s example and publish an article based on the current crisis in the West. Back when we were at the Gorky dacha, Diligensky (scholar from IMEMO) and I, and partially Lesha Kozlov wrote about forty pages on the subject, with references to the Communist Party’s economic programs. I sent it to B.N. [while he was on vacation] in the South. Yesterday he responded: “No good.” His tactlessness is incredible. We wrote an article for him, even if it is “no good,” he doesn’t even try to pretend that he is co-authoring it with us, that he will edit it to his liking. He just demands that we make it “good.” After talking to him, I realized that he has an old-fashioned conception of a crisis, in the spirit of the exertions of the Red Professors of the 1930s. He doesn’t even know that Communist Parties have been developing this line thoroughly; many things have been reconsidered from the former models. He wants to present his “teachings” on the modern crisis but he doesn’t have a clue about Keynesian economics. He thinks it is some apologia for capitalism and only has to do with the struggle against Marxism, but no relation to the very real policies of state-monopoly capitalism through which the West and Japan rapidly developed over the last quarter of a century, at more powerful rates than socialism ever achieved.

I am writing this down to remind myself once again of the intellectual and moral atmosphere I work in.

And this is not even the worst of it. I believe I wrote earlier about the story with Volume V of the “History of the CPSU” and the consequences for our Zaitsev, who was the editor of that volume. B.N. was a member of the editorial board of the whole publication. Well, Zaitsev has been in a psychiatric hospital for three months now. In the meantime, a new team of authors prepared a new text. Fedoseyev sent it to B.N. The latter told me to take a look at it. Krasin and I looked at it... There is no mention of VASKhNIL [All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences of the Soviet Union] and Lysenko, no “Muddle Instead of Music” (about Shostakovich), no philosophical discussion with Aleksandrov, no linguistics, no “economic problems of socialism” with Stalin, and of course no Cosmopolitanism, the “doctors’ plot,” or the Leningrad affair. It doesn’t even mention the Agricultural Plenum of 1963. No changes are reflected since Stalin’s death, and the time is counted in Five-Year Plans (1946-50, 1950-55). Everything is nice and smooth. The Party anticipated everything and did everything right, including in ideology.

I told B.N. about this. But the point I stressed was not that there’s not a shred of scholarship in the volume, but that it could end up like the recent story with Soviet abstract artists. I wanted to warn B.N. of what could happen when all of this reaches the General Secretary.

Last Sunday eleven artists got the idea to give a preview of their works on some vacant lot on the outskirts of Moscow. Among these artists were people who had their works exhibited for sale (to benefit the State, of course) in New York and London at the direction of the Ministry of Culture. Before exhibiting in the vacant lot, they applied for permission from the Moscow City Council. They did not get a response and decided that silence was a form of consent. Their exhibition was ruthlessly broken up with fire hoses and bulldozers. The paintings were confiscated, some destroyed. Two people were arrested and jailed for five days, while foreign journalists and one diplomat were harassed. This affair instantly received international publicity. Newspapers and “voices” raised a huge fuss. Fraternal newspapers *L’Humanité*, *L’Unità*, *Morning Star*, and even *Land og Folk* condemned the actions, and announced that their communist parties would follow a “completely different cultural policy” if they came to power.

A few days later, the paintings were returned to the artists. Apologies were issued. An exhibit was allowed in Izmailovo Park. It turns out that Aleksandrov-Agentov sent Brezhnev a note expressing outrage about the situation. The gist of it was: “How much longer can we keep shitting in our own pockets?” Right away there was an order to allow the exhibition and punish those responsible, who will probably end up being... the bulldozer drivers.

So, I reminded B.N. of this story and said, “When all these ‘voices’ will start laughing at this version of the CPSU history, our communist friends will not dare to stand up for us. On the contrary, they will have to support, in their own way, the campaigns against the USSR. In short, we are shitting in our pockets again.”

B.N. heard me out, and then changed the subject. But I started on a similar topic again. In August there was a congress of sociologists in Toronto. A consultant from our Department, philosopher Krasin, went there. The [Soviet] delegation was headed by Academician Konstantinov and Institute Director Rutkevich. Yura (Krasin) told us it was a disgrace of unprecedented proportions. Not only the Americans, but even our Poles could not understand what was happening – it seemed like for a number of years we had been moving in the direction

of common sense, closer to science. And suddenly we were singing psalms of the “Short Course” again. People like Zamoshkin tried to save face in their speeches and especially in informal conversations, which, by the way, they were able to hold in the foreign language of their interlocutor. But in the report that was sent to the CC CPSU there is no word about these guys, only Rutkevich & Co. are lauded. I suggested informing Fedoseyev. Yura visited him. He said Fedoseyev was at a loss about Rutkevich in general, whom he once pushed against me in the debate on “who makes up the working class.” “I,” Krasin said, “took that to mean that Yagodkin (Secretary of the Moscow City Committee) is behind Rutkevich, and Demichev (CC CPSU Secretary of Ideology) is backing them at the top. People in Moscow know that this gang is targeting Fedoseyev and accusing him of protecting various revisionists.

In mid-September the city of Novorossiysk was awarded the title of Hero City. Brezhnev bestowed the award. There was the expected media coverage: emotional visit to “Malaya Zemlya,” tears and embraces, appropriate words... and then articles equating Novorossiysk, which secured the entire left flank of the Soviet-German front, to Stalingrad. Brezhnev is portrayed as having played a decisive role as a colonel and chief of the Army’s political section. A week later, when Grechko was bestowing the same award on Kerch, Shcherbitsky called Brezhnev “a great soldier and outstanding commander” in his speech.

A film has been released on the award of the Hero Star to Novorossiysk.

By the way, in the aforementioned Volume V of “History of the CPSU,” the country’s industry was restored because Zaporozhstal was restored, where Brezhnev was the Party organizer. And new lands were developed because Brezhnev was sent as second secretary to Kazakhstan.

On October 11th he will be making a speech in Kishinev on the 50th anniversary of the Moldavian Autonomous (!) Republic.

Almost every day there is something in the newspapers and on radio and television about Brezhnev: letters to Brezhnev, or his speeches on the opening of some factory, power plant, construction site, or some initiative, or the victory of some collective in the socialist competition. Not to mention that practically every day Brezhnev welcomes some kind of international conference, and of course they are “very impressed” by these greetings, and then give reciprocal greetings.

Also not a week goes by without someone being awarded the Hero of Socialist Labor. Last week it was Grishin, a PB member, for his 60th birthday. This week it’s a dozen writers, among them Simonov, Katayev, Boris Polevoi, Georgiy Markov, and other such mediocrities.

Kanapa arrived to prepare the Consultative meeting and the European Conference of Communist Parties. Lunch at Plotnikov Street. His smugness.

A lot of small tasks. Social democrats. Guyla Horn (Hungarian Socialist Workers Party).

Yuri Ivanov (Zionism) – a pathological anti-Semite as a consultant in our International Department.

I am reading the manuscript of Volume I of the history (and theory) of the International Communist Movement. High level. Even the familiar things are well written. Will it be possible to publish it?

October 3, 1974

Half the day with Guyla Horn. He is very active and ready to implement the decisions of “the Six.” I tried to restrain him, since we will be the ones to essentially implement them, i.e. to write the final collective texts.

Yesterday B.N. called Zagladin and me to tell us about Suslov’s comments on the draft Declaration for the European Conference of Communist Parties. Earlier I wrote about Ponomarev’s tendencies, but compared to Suslov even Ponomarev looks like a liberal.

Suslov ordered to remove words like “cooperation,” “good neighborly relations,” “a system of European peace.” He crossed out (and cursed for a long time, B.N. said) the proposal to create a pan-European energy and transport system (even though Brezhnev talked about this repeatedly). He drew a thick line striking out the points on troop disengagement, the liquidation of bases on foreign territories, and prevention of confrontation on the seas. In his view, all of this is not Party language and not the Party approach. B.N. conveyed Suslov’s words, “Of course, we say these things for propaganda purposes. But we only do it because we are certain that the imperialists will never agree to military détente. These measures we are clamoring for are not advantageous for us. Our troops play a very important role in foreign countries, they provide... (and he showed a clenched fist).”

I tried to object, saying that we did not include anything in the draft that was not in the documents from the Congress, the CC Plenums, and Brezhnev’s speeches. But at this point B.N. said on his own behalf, “Do not overestimate détente, Anatoly Sergeevich!” Of course, we fixed everything like we were told.

Today Frelek arrived (Deputy of the International Department of PUWP) to coordinate the final positions before the Consultative Meeting in Poland. I was not invited to these meetings. It seems the people who will go to Warsaw will not be the people who worked on the drafts and ideas.

October 4, 1974

To continue regarding my conjecture from yesterday.

In the morning Ponomarev summoned me to his office. I came.

“I need to speak with you.”

“Here I am.”

“Why weren’t you at our meeting with the Poles yesterday?”

“Because nobody asked me to be there!”

Silence... then he went on.

“Yesterday Zagladin proposed to include himself and Shakhnazarov in the delegation to the Warsaw Consultative Meeting. He said other parties are sending 4-5 people and that’s a good idea, because there will be various committees and such...”

“Boris Nikolaevich, I understand. You are uncomfortable adding two of your deputies to the delegation. Out of the two of us, Zagladin is the obvious choice. But I will not go as an adviser, I hope you can understand that.”

“So you will not go to Warsaw at all?”

“No, I will not. It’s good that Shakhnazarov is going. In connection with this whole issue, I would ask that you allow me to distance myself from this conference and everything related to it. I won’t pretend that I did not invest a great deal into this project... But it seems to me the issue of prestige is not as important as to some others. I have plenty of work to do besides: the social democrats with Hungarians and “the Six;” the economic policies of Western European Communist Parties; the multi-volume publication on the Labor Movement; and now your article on the role of socialism in the revolutionary process (for the 25th anniversary of the socialist system). Plus, there has to be some kind of concentration of responsibility. What have we had so far? Today I am in charge, tomorrow Zagladin. We crowd each other, interrupt each other... this is unnecessary. So far it has worked out alright, but it is time to make a decision. So I ask you to release me from this issue.”

“Why do you put it like that, Anatoly Sergeevich! Your participation is important for the cause. On the other hand, you are right. After all, Zhilin is also working on this subject. (I kept my mouth shut!) Alright, I will think about it... But I wanted to have a comradely talk about it with you...”

I turned around and left.

This is all nonsense, of course. The only unpleasant part here is that Zhilin (with Zagladin) will feel victorious: how they smacked Chernyaev, despite all his huffing and puffing, trying to act like he is in charge of this whole thing!

When Brutents found out about what happened, that’s exactly how he saw it.

Just now a reception is starting at the “Arbat” restaurant on the occasion of the GDR’s 25th anniversary. I didn’t go.

I spent the day with Gyula Horn again, going over social democrat issues. We had lunch on Plotnikov Street.

October 7, 1974

Volobuyev visited me today, he’s a retired director of the Institute of History. Told me all kinds of things about our academic world. Scenes from meetings of senile academicians, how they nominate candidates for the next election to the Academy of Sciences. Ass-kissing and swindling completely in the open. Nobody is ashamed anymore, because they all know that this is the only way to get in. Trapeznikov exploits this readiness of scholars of all levels to sell their soul and publicly grovel. It gives him the opportunity to organize any kind of witch hunt for revisionism that he wants. Not only decent people, but even those who allowed themselves the liberty of staying neutral are expelled from academic councils, from their positions, and sometimes from whole Institutes. It’s a vulgar mess of carping along the lines of 1949 in historical publications, in reports, in everything... People are so scared they are losing their humanity.

Volobuyev whines, rails against everything, he's dissatisfied with everything. It's unpleasant to look at him in this role because he built his whole career on the things he is outraged by now – unscrupulousness, cynicism, demagoguery, anti-Semitism, “what can I do for you,” and so on. And now, what do you know, it turns out he is a good guy. But his discontent is not just the grumbling of someone who was thrown off the cart. It goes deeper... and one feels afraid – not for him, not for yourself, or the people around you, but for the country.

In the meantime we see our General Secretary on TV kissing Honecker, giving speeches, hanging new medals on his breast, waving his hand to the organized German crowds, etc.

October 8, 1974

It was 21 years after Lenin's death in 1945. In 1974 it is 21 years since Stalin's death. By 1945, what was left of Lenin? Only the general things – that if it hadn't been for Lenin, history after 1917 would have taken a different course. What is left of Stalin after the same amount of time? Everything! With the exception of mass repressions of anybody and everybody. This is the continuity of the “structure.” This is self-propagation of mediocrity, once it seized power!

In the morning, B.N. summoned me to his office and silently handed me the CC decision regarding Warsaw. My name was there. He looked at me triumphantly, as if presenting me with a dime. I already knew about it, so I indifferently handed the paper back to him. Right away he showered me with comments on papers (related to Warsaw) from which I had consciously distanced myself over the last few days.

Meeting with Galkin. Circulation of the manuscript of Volume I of the “History of the Labor Movement”. I was the only one who signed it.

Meeting with Butenko (specialist on the socialist system at the Academy of Sciences). B.N. assigned him to prepare an article for *PSS* on the role of world socialism in the world revolutionary process (the 30th anniversary of the socialist system). This is what he is most interested in right now.

Tomorrow “the Six” deputies of International Departments are meeting in a secret apartment on Sivtsev Vrazhek Lane to work on a script for Warsaw. Today there is a meeting with Suika (Deputy Head of PUWP) at Zagladin's to coordinate the Poles' “own” proposal!

I am reading a very thick book by Giorgio Bocca, *Palmiro Togliatti* – facts about the life of a man who adapted to Stalin out of necessity in order to become a great man and oppose Stalin's legacy.

October 13, 1974

Thirty years ago, we were taking Riga under battalion commander Tolmachev. On the radio I heard that this date is being celebrated.

Yesterday was the anniversary of Moldavia (it was also presented like a “50th anniversary,” even though it is the 50th anniversary of Moldavian ASSR, without Bessarabia). Once again the General Secretary did not leave the TV screen and newspaper pages. All the first secretaries of the republics were there. Like they have nothing better to do at home right now. As far as I can tell, the main political point of this is to formally make a statement (addressed to Ceausescu, of course) to the whole world, in the presence of such (!) a group of people, that:

- 1) In 1918, the imperialists used Romania's reactionary regime to steal Bessarabia from the motherland;
- 2) In 1940, justice had finally been done and all of Moldovan people together with Bessarabia voluntarily joined the Soviet Union **forever**.

This should interest the big press in the West. Ceausescu will be furious. On top of everything, a grand military parade was organized (for extra confirmation) in Kishinev.

However, the public does not see any point in these performances [sic, *performances* is written in English], except the wish to demonstrate again and again the "personal contribution." All that people notice are the speech defects, the absurdities of the "protocol," etc. In other words, from the perspective of building authority, all these countless anniversaries and speeches are backfiring.

Tomorrow I am going to Poland for the Consultative Meeting of the 28 European Communist Parties.

October 26, 1974

From the 14th-19th I was in Warsaw.

A separate lounge train car for Ponomarev and Katushev. Dinners there till 2am. Zhilin in the role of arrogant buffoon. Familiarity with Katushev.

"The Six" in Warsaw, at the villa assigned to Ponomarev.

"Swedish" hotel where everyone else lived, including people from other countries.

Behind the scenes work together with the Poles on the problem of the two Greek parties. We knew that at the minimum, the Romanians may raise the issue of inviting the "internal" Communist Party of Greece and that the Italians may support them. A phone call was intercepted from Sergi (ICP) to Athens, he advised the "interiors" to send a telegram to Warsaw. In response, an urgent analogous request from Líster⁵ in Paris was organized, as well as an interview in Rome of a representative of the "Manifesto" Party⁶ by a "neutral" reporter, saying that "Manifesto" supposedly also had some "interest" in Warsaw. Both of these things were "subtly" brought to the attention of Romanians, Italians, and Spaniards. They backed off...

However, Andrei (Secretary of the Communist Party of Romania) could not resist and mentioned the problem of the "united delegation of the Communists from Greece." In response the Greek delegation circulated a very rude written protest. And at the closing session Kanapa made a brief remark to say that the party that is teaching us here about independence and non-interference (i.e. Romanians) is the only one among those present to interfere in the affairs of another party.

In general the Romanians look quite comical and trigger mild contempt by their annoying repetition about non-intervention and independence. Indeed, the atmosphere of the relations between the parties has changed so much that nobody really feels any interference or pressure from us. Moreover, everybody knows that they may disagree with us on any question, and "nothing will happen." For our part, we refrain from raising issues that can meet with

⁵ Enrique Líster – hero of the Spanish Civil War – created a small pro-Soviet party to counterbalance the official Communist Party of Spain, which had become revisionist.

⁶ A small group that split from the ICP and held leftist views.

“disagreement.” For example, when we were still in Moscow before the trip, B.N. offered to remove the paragraph about the Chinese from his speech. And that was wise. It immediately disarmed all potential opposition and brought a sigh of relief from the people who would have considered it their duty to follow us and speak on the subject (mainly the socialist countries).

We did not expect anything unexpected from the Yugoslavs. But their very presence aroused curiosity. They made their usual incantations: against blocs, about grounds for non-alignment as a condition of independence, about the movement itself as the main international force, etc. Nevertheless, they are here and they agree to stay.

Looking at the participants you can physically sense the inexpressible craving to demonstrate themselves as an international movement. Explanation: hard and uncertain times are coming, and it's better to “stick together” to be on the safe side; or at least not to offend Moscow, whose help might be necessary at any moment. The small fry, the ones who are almost unnoticed at home, have a demonstrative need to appear as a part of an international whole. The loyal ones from the small fry, like the Luxembourgger Urbany or the West German Schroeder and others, directly asked Zagladin for talking points. In other words, they don't really need this whole affair. But if the CPSU needs it, you are welcome, they are ready to do whatever is necessary because “the CPSU knows what it is doing,” and a lot depends on it everywhere.

For our part, we need a demonstration of unity to remain an ideological superpower: it is both our external and internal capital.

The immediate political significance of the forthcoming conference is zero. It will not change anything and will not influence anything, same as the European Conference of States (in Geneva). Ponomarev tells us, his team, about that almost every day. Everyone understands this.

Even on the theoretical front... At a communist meeting we can't openly say everything about the current situation in the world and in Europe. Because we cannot politically oppose ourselves to our “class enemies” to the extent that is conceivable in terms of our Marxist-Leninist theory, and to the extent that our fraternal parties from capitalist countries would like us to. We need a real economic peace that does not depend on the communists. The other day I read some materials on our economic ties with capitalist countries. There are some very impressive things there; we are integrally tied to the capitalist economy.

Next to this you have problems that no Communist movement can solve. A week ago Kissinger gave a philosophical interview to Reston. Kissinger appears there as an “historian,” not as a government official. He starts by saying that all civilizations eventually died after exhausting their ideological resources and historical imagination. His task, as he sees it, is to push back the end of the present civilization. It is threatened by hunger and limited energy resources. The food problem will become catastrophic. (By the way, recently Krishnan – one of the leaders of the Indian CP – met with B.N. He said there are already cases of starvation. There is a rising wave of right-wing reaction on these grounds and Indira faces the very real threat of a coup. Krishnan asked for 2 million tons of grain to save the situation. Indira asked Brezhnev the same thing a month ago. Alas, they were refused both times).

Inflation hovers above all of this (inflation is the result of the exhaustion of Keynesian capitalist development) and threatens complete chaos.

We, the USSR, are operating on the assumption that we can “sit it out” when it comes to these disasters. But Kissinger thinks we will not be able to do that. To some extent he is right.

For example, we already told our socialist friends that we will not be able to continue selling them oil at 16 rubles per ton when the prices on the global market are 80-120 rubles per ton. But if we raise the price of oil and other raw materials then the economies of our fraternal countries, which were developed under our influence and pressure, will collapse in a few months. The political implications of this are clear!

A new fascism is looming over us worldwide, it grows out of the crisis. There may also be a new war, or several small wars to start.

With the rise of the crisis, communists are gaining points and their advance toward the government sphere is becoming more noticeable. But the ruling circles not only see it, they are beginning to openly say that the army is now necessary for internal purposes.

Interesting times are coming in general. I haven't seen anything sensible in all the material I read regarding what may happen in the short term. And who would dare to make such predictions.

Warsaw is an impressive modern city. Even though the Poles say that they rebuilt the historic part of the city from old blueprints (which they probably did), there are some modern additions: blocks of high-rise buildings, highways with intertwined junctions, passages and galleries of shopping centers, "Swedish" hotels and so on. Warsaw no longer has a provincial feel like Prague, Berlin, and even Budapest. It is a Western city, which in places reminds one of Dutch cities.

Striptease in the "House of Science and Culture" – a high-rise building similar to the one we have on Kotelnicheskaya Embankment, which was built by Stalin as a gift to Warsaw! Beautiful girls. One was particularly good, she shook her stuff two meters away from Ponomarev, who naturally was sitting together with other members of PUWP in the place of honor. I noticed a while ago that B.N. has a taste for such Western entertainment. I wonder how his orthodox mind squares with the fact that this is a normal type of evening or holiday entertainment for leaders of our fraternal socialist countries; and that in the "developing" socialism in Poland and Hungary this business is becoming more and more common.

Warsaw stores, unlike ours, have everything! Any quality you wish – from mass consumer goods of the sort you find in our stores, to the best quality products you can find in the West, including things made in Poland. But these are fantastically expensive. Maybe not more expensive than at home... but at home these things are only available in a section of GUM that is closed to the public.

November 3, 1974

On Friday B.N. invited me to a conversation with Cunhal. History is being made in front of our eyes. A great deal depends on this person right now, and not just in Portugal. Cunhal spoke quickly and with some embarrassment, as if he was at confession. He told Ponomarev what was happening, who is who, what he plans to do and what he expects.

Rather inarticulately, B.N. schooled Cunhal on how to save and advance the revolution: know what's going on in the army; have your own intelligence (under the Party's Central Committee); ensure the security of the leaders (we can provide you with five-six people and the necessary weapons); and, of course, keep an eye on the CIA.

I remember how in 1962 the late Tereshkin invited me to a conversation with Cunhal when the latter had just escaped from prison and came to Moscow. Could I imagine then how things would turn out? I probably thought about the hopelessness of his cause and his personal heroism. He made a big impression on me back then, but he was crushed. And now he is leading a revolution.

November 8, 1974

Boring day. Yesterday I was at the parade. The whole time a mixture of rain and snow was coming down, I got drenched and of course was not wearing a hat. And in general... even compared to our consultants I must look pretty shabby in my old gray coat and cheap shoes. I make up for it by my ability to wear clothes well. But I am always puzzled by how people (even these consultants) whose salary is at least 70 rubles below mine, always manage to dress nicer and look better-off than me. If it wasn't for my trips abroad, I wouldn't have any decent clothes! Where do people get the extra money? Or rather – why don't I ever have any extra money?

The stands were unusually crowded. I don't remember the last time there were so many people, you could barely squeeze through the crowd. For the first time, Grechko's speech didn't have the famous line, "but the forces of imperialism are still a threat, so we will continue on..." This theme was presented more elegantly. Moreover, he went beyond his usual subject and said for the first time at this level that in the conditions of détente, the class struggle is intensifying.

The parade ended and everyone waited for the demonstrators. But time went on, and they were nowhere to be seen. Then street cleaning machines appeared from behind the Museum of History. The demonstration was cancelled, but only after the demonstrators waited outside in the rain since 7 a.m., and had already started moving towards the Red Square. The cancellation was probably presented as "concern for the people."

Then there was a reception at the Palace of Congresses. I usually don't go to these events, but this time Dzhavad talked me into it, saying that I could meet with the Australians (Clancy, the Chairman of the Socialist Party of Australia, is here) and be done with them for the rest of the holidays. I did get a chance to talk to Clancy. Podgorny made a boring speech. All our leadership actually left within half an hour. Noteworthy: Martha Bushman, an Austrian beauty from the FRG; Arbatov with his wife, who shone among the academics. Elections are coming up soon, and Arbatov is one of the chief contenders. Aleksandrov-Agentov, dressed up in his diplomatic uniform with all the medals and the Order of Lenin. Nesmeyanov, the former rector of Moscow State University, former president of the Academy of Sciences. He became ill and was carried out, which, however, made no impression on the others.

In the evening I visited my school friend Felix. Our other school friends were there too. It's amazing – we've gone in such different directions in life, and had so many opportunities to find new interesting friends and environments. And many times we did. Nevertheless, something remains that irresistibly draws us to each other.

November 15, 1974

A very busy week. Poles and Hungarians came over to "coordinate" the plan of the Preparatory meeting in Budapest. The work took us two-three hours in Zagladin's office. In the evening, B.N. received them, but it was just protocol.

The meeting is scheduled for December 16-19th.

On Monday, Suika and Horn are going to Rome, they will coordinate the invitation letter and things will get moving.

Today B.N. agreed to let me go to London for 2-3 days to work with Woddis, whom we promised to include in the Working group to prepare the conference documents. But B.N. edited my telegram to such an extent that haughty Brits will not want to host me.

Pleasant meetings with Poles and Hungarians when we were seeing them off. They are a young and smart bunch, for example Beretz, Head of department of HSWP CC, is 44 years old. The Poles and the Hungarians (unlike the Czechs and Bulgarians) don't have a trace of servility or flattery. And at the same time we have "complete mutual understanding," as they say in the language of "internationalism." They are proud. The Hungarians are sometimes even arrogant in business, and at the same time they are very friendly, although sarcastic in conversation.

B.N. gave me a dressing down for an article I wrote for him before the holidays. The article is on the 30th anniversary of the socialist system and was meant to be published in *PSS*. As is usually the case with B.N., he "forgot" what he told me to write and "scolded" me precisely for the things I wrote directly on his orders. Plus, he has his basic rules:

- Always reject the first draft, so we "rework" it and don't think too highly of our abilities;
- Show that all we are capable of producing without his personal involvement is shit.

But because I react to him as a person with whom I've had a generally pretty friendly relationship for years, my blood boiled. Mainly because he is losing all shame and openly yells at people who wrote **his own opinion piece for him**. He does not ask for advice and participation, does not ask for help or say that he is very busy (i.e. indirectly apologizing). No, he demands this as if it were an official paper. In his mind, it is part of our duties to write his articles and reports. He sincerely believes that our zeal in this work is a manifestation of our Party spirit, our service to the Party.

I managed to cool down because he took so much time to say this nonsense. Nevertheless, I was rather rude and very direct in my response.

Later (a day later) he let me know that he went "too far." But we did make a new version for him. Right now in the elevator (we ran into each other on our way out, and he invited me to take his personal elevator) he said: "This one is much better"...

So this week consisted of two major events (the work with Hungarians and Poles, and Ponomarev's article), which is characteristic of my life situation in general: almost simultaneously I feel on the one hand like a political figure who can make decisions relatively freely and independently, who can discuss and promote his views on an international level. On the other hand, I am a scribbler, a petty official who is scolded for a poorly prepared opinion piece (!) for his boss.

Demichev has been removed! Ponomarev informed me with sheer joy and joked, "Throw some candidates my way!" Demichev was appointed Minister of Culture, it was published in *Pravda* today. The way it happened was even "worse" than with Polyansky (in the 1960s and early '70s he was a member of the Politburo and Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers). Suslov chaired the Politburo. At the end of the meeting he said, "Comrades, there is one more

question. There is a proposal to approve the decree of the Supreme Soviet Presidium to appoint P.N. Demichev as Minister of Culture.” Everyone nods or voices approval. “Very well, it is approved.” But Demichev asked to speak, stunned by this surprise. He mumbles something pathetically about how much he did for “our ideology,” for some reason mentions the number of students in schools of economic self-education. He says that he has been “doing Party work for a long time,” and this appointment is unexpected for him, but that he is a “soldier of the Party,” etc. B.N. told me all of this mockingly and with undisguised malicious joy.

I also replied jokingly, “This is good for our politics and certainly for the CC, but I doubt it’s very good for our culture.”

There are two people in Moscow who would qualify for his position: Zimyanin and Abrasimov. I personally prefer the former and we have a good relationship, but he is hot-headed and not very independent, he would try to adapt himself to everyone and everything.

So, Brezhnev did not move away from the principle of “stability,” and he “kept” Demichev until Furtseva died. Now [the demotion] does not look like an act of political discontent with Demichev (he will remain in a leadership role of the ideology sector), but as a removal of an employee who did not meet the technical challenges of the job.

How does it look in the so-called “public opinion”? Some think that it is a continuation of the policy to appoint members and candidate members of the PB as ministers (Polyansky, Gromyko, Grechko). Others are like my son-in-law, who asked me upon hearing these news, “Who is Demichev?”

I am reading Fejtő *Lenin’s Legacy* – he is a former Hungarian communist who fled to the U.S.

Marquis de Custine, *Nicholas’ Russia*. Written in 1839. Published here in 1930. Endless allusions and associations.

November 21, 1974

I’m going to England in early December to discuss with Woddis our “joint actions” at the Budapest preparatory meeting.

Today I worked nonstop on “perfecting” the draft Declaration based on materials from the Warsaw Consultative Meeting. The goal is to let many parties (or at least the important ones) recognize themselves in the draft, but the spirit of it has to remain “ours.” I have to say, this is much more interesting than writing articles for Ponomarev.

Yet another vulgar bacchanalia of elections to the Academy of Sciences. In the Department of Science, Pilipenko (head of the philosophy sector) openly summoned corresponding members and academicians to his office and told them to vote for certain people, including himself. The corresponding members and academicians then went to Kuzmin (an intellectual whom they trusted) and complained, they were at a loss how to react. Kuzmin called Krasin and eventually this matter reached B.N. He was outraged and said, “Maybe this Kuzmin, or what’s his name, he could go to Suslov and explain what is happening?” Krasin replied, “I don’t know... You see, he still has to go through the Higher Attestation Commission to defend his Doctorate...”

Arbatov received a passing grade in the Department of Economics and is almost an academician. He's had a fantastic career: in 1962 Ponomarev offered him the position of junior consultant in our Department... and now he is a deputy of the Supreme Council, member of the Auditing Commission of the CPSU, academician, and in the General Secretary's close circle. It's not that I'm jealous. Considering the general depravity of our ranks, Arbatov is much better than most. The others are hardened scoundrels and brokers with some distant relationship to scholarship, and in their dirty heap there are some "individual, real" scholars who get their 2-3 points in the first round and leave the game...

I had the following conversation with B.N.:

"I wanted to discuss something else," he said, talking about "his" article. "I would like your advice. What should I do? It's likely that Zimyanin will be nominated for Demichev's position. I am for it. But who will go to *Pravda* instead of him? The position may be offered to Zagladin. Of course, I can't object. But let us consider this from the point of view of the Department. Would it be good for us?"

"I have no doubt that Zagladin would do the job well," I said, "And there is no doubt that he will accept the position. But firstly, why do you think that Zimyanin will be proposed for the CC Secretariat. Why not Abrasimov? As you know, he is coming from Paris specifically for this. He has some pretty strong backing."

"What are you talking about! He is a complete ignoramus. Even Zimyanin is not all that competent. But Abrasimov is just too much. Although he is very self-assured, cocky and pretentious. But not everybody wants him. For example, I know three PB members who are strongly opposed to him (and he started counting on his fingers, but not out loud)."

"I would not worry about Zagladin's ability to succeed," I went on, "He has become enough of an authority figure that he would not have to adapt, people would adapt to him. Plus, despite his external determination, he is very cautious on the main issues."

"What about his health?"

"His phenomenal capacity for work and his love to 'get things done,' as well as his ability to do everything quickly and without delay overrides [his poor health]. He is worth a dozen Zimyanins for his knowledge, education, and ability to write. And even if he stumbles, he has someone to lean on: Andrei Mikhailovich (Aleksandrov-Agentov)."

"Very true!"

"However, this is also his weakness. When you talk with Zagladin, he seems to have decent views. But the moment Aleksandrov gets involved, Zagladin will write 'whatever necessary' without taking the time to think – his pen will fly ahead of his thoughts."

"Also true!"

"And for the Department," I went on, "Zagladin's departure would be an irreparable loss. Nobody can replace him. Nobody has his reputation with our fraternal parties, nobody has his connections, or his ability to work with 'our friends,' or his multilingualism and ability to influence interlocutors, or his ability to find the right approach to anyone."

"What about Zhilin?"

At this point I let out everything I thought about Zhilin. I said that I had kept my silence for a long time for fear of being misunderstood. I said how for the last two years he's barely done any work, that he doesn't write anything himself (he made a whole theory out of it) but rants to the consultants, who submit half-finished work or plain raw material to the deputies. Zagladin loves Zhilin so much that he is ready to do the work for him not to let him down. Zhilin has no authority left with the consultants, both because of his drinking and because of his cynical idleness. We used to be friends. But our relationship permanently soured on these grounds. I am even thinking about giving up the consultant group because I physically can't stand Zhilin. He is repulsive to me.

B.N. listened to me silently. Sometimes he would nod his head or make a questioning expression.

The "explanation" was interrupted when Aleksandrov called and B.N. rushed, as I understood, to tell him about Davidson's book on Brezhnev.

I am re-reading Dostoyevsky's *Demons* for the second time. Thirty years later. The first time I read it I was still in school. I was stunned. Now I am intoxicated by the language more than the plot. What language, my god! Every phrase you want to re-read a dozen times and memorize. I think this is the most venomous of Dostoyevsky's works. Every phrase revolves on endless mockery and irony.

December 5, 1974

From November 29th-December 3rd I was in London. It was as I had thought about and imagined for decades, since the time in my childhood when I found a portrait of Byron in an old, pre-revolutionary copy of the journal *Niva* and could not figure out why his name was spelled with a "y." Even then, at the level of the Roshchinsko-aristocratic governess I "knew" French, but I wouldn't have a clue about English until I entered the university.

Trip to the CP of Great Britain to "coordinate" position for the Budapest meeting. I was given a visa only late in the evening on the 28th, and in the morning we flew out of Sheremetyevo.

Below I will give a condensed outline of the trip, because to write out everything in detail would take a week.

Dzhavad convinced the CC Administrative Department to get us first-class seats, thinking that there would be a red carpet rolled out for us at Heathrow. But there was not only no carpet, there wasn't even a meeting party. They were not expecting us (because of the visas), but just in case they sent Misha Sobolev to the airport (he works on inter-party relations at the embassy). He is a very nice guy.

Driving into London – first encounter with the unique design of the streets – blocks of houses spanning the whole street, separated into sections of private two-three story apartments. And no two identical "rows." Astonishing variety in the uniformity.

Hotel on Queen's terrace [sic] in Hyde Park, a ten-minute walk from the embassy, which is located on a "private" street.

We were asked to pay in advance for the hotel. Sixty pounds for the two of us for four days. But we only had money for three days (I underestimated in my note to the CC). We had to borrow from the embassy.

At the embassy: meeting and conversation with Deputy Ambassador V.M. Semenov (the Ambassador was summoned to Moscow that morning). He is a handsome, smart, and (as rarely happens) modest MFA official. He brought us up to date and called Woddis. The latter's reaction, "What's the rush?" But he still invited us to visit him at the CC at 3 p.m.

First drive through the city. First impressions: London is a power in its own right. Its whole appearance – the monuments, palaces, parks, architecture (which carries the mythology of British imperial power and omnipresence) – carries the history of the centuries that I know so well. Even driving on the left, when you are always confused about which way to look when crossing the street. The red double-decker busses and uniquely shaped black cabs.

At 3:00 p.m. we arrived to the building of the Central Committee. It is a regular provincial building, about six floors, on the border of Soho. In the lobby we were met by a careless young man with his feet up on some counter. He was quite indifferent to us. An elderly lady rushed to Dzhavad and led us to Woddis' empty office. The office was cold, had shabby furniture and folders, books, and piles of newspapers lying everywhere. Woddis walked in as if we lived across the street. He seated us across from him, took out a piece of paper and without any introductions gave me a look that said, "I'm listening."

I started throwing out our "considerations," just barely revealing the script we developed with the Poles and Hungarians. Every now and then Woddis would smile spitefully and make some notes. After an hour he asked me to stop and expressed his "agreement with everything." He said that he cannot go himself. Doctors allowed him only two airplane trips per year, and he's already met that quota. I was disappointed at this news, because he knows the internal workings and knows when it is hopeless to resist our initiatives, so he would not strain our nerves needlessly. A new person will be guided by "pure principles" and push for his rights.

Woddis had a very reserved reaction to our proposals on ties between the Labour Party-CPSU. He reminded me of what he told me in Moscow ("Although I could tell by the look in your eye that you did not really believe me: we cannot communicate regularly not because of some political considerations, but because we do not have the people or the time for it."). He added that they are a small Party with the responsibilities of a big Party like the PCI or PCF. Moreover, their executive committee believes that the main goal of his International Department is to develop internationalist campaigns within the country (Chile, Vietnam, Portugal, Greece, Cuba). And even though Woddis is the head of the International Department, the only person he is in charge of is himself.

As if apologizing for the shabbiness of the surroundings, he joked: this building is the headquarters [of the organization that aims] to overthrow British imperialism.

Five minutes into our conversation, John Gollan walked into the room as if by chance. Feigned surprise and even more feigned happiness to see us. He said hello, made some joke, stayed under a minute and left. It was an orchestrated scene – to show us that they have more important things to do than dance to our tune at European meetings. The same thing happened five minutes later when Falber (Deputy General Secretary of the Party) walked in. He led the delegation in Warsaw.

Woddis walked us to the door, where the young man continued to sit with his feet propped up. In the four hours we were there, he did not offer us tea, did not invite us to tour the building (a common ritual), and even though he knew we would be in London for almost three more days, he did not suggest to meet again.

Towards the end of our meeting I told him that Hayward (General Secretary of the Labour Party) knows that we are here. Of course I did not say that we were instructed to meet with him. Woddis once again spoke well of Hayward, saying that right now their relations with the Labour Party are better than ever. He reminded us that Hayward is probably very busy right now with the Labour conference and expressed “some doubt” whether he would be able to meet with us. (If he only knew how enthusiastic Hayward was about the possibility of our visit; how he called the embassy every day to ask when we could meet; how he boasted that he was the one who made Callaghan get visas for us and forced the Foreign Office in London and the consul in Moscow stay at work for four extra hours to make sure we would get our visas; that he invited us to the closing session of the conference, which is unprecedented! And that we had a meeting already scheduled for Saturday night!)

After leaving the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Great Britain, for a long time I could not shake the feeling that there was something Dickensian and miserably hopeless in all of this “activity” of theirs, that their communist aspirations were doomed.

We got back to the embassy. Kubeykin (Cultural Attaché, but actually the resident) told us what was going on at the Labour conference after turning on the “jammer”: the embassy is “shot through” by listening antennas on all sides. We agreed that in the morning he would “confirm with Hayward.” We would stay in the city, so as not to lose time, and periodically would call the embassy [to check on the details].

Dinner at an “Austrian” restaurant. We brought vodka with us, got the waiter and the musician tipsy, talked, and then went to see a movie in Soho.

On the morning of the 30th, after breakfast at the hotel, Misha and I went to see the city, Oxford Street. The splendor of the city center, mansions, clubs. Trafalgar square. Nelson. We stopped by a bunch of shops to note down some “objects” to buy, so we don’t spend too much time when we go to spend our meager pounds. The shops have a staggering abundance, variety, and class of products. At the same time, people say that London is the “cheapest” capital of Europe. The French, Belgians, Dutch, and even Swedes and Norwegians come here for a weekend to find a bargain. Though it costs six pounds to have a modest meal for three at one of the pubs, and books run from 2.5-5 pounds and more. The Press Attaché’s wife told us that their family spends 100 pounds per month on food, while the salary is 300 pounds. The apartment costs 60-70 pounds.

From this it follows (given free medical care, including prescription drugs, and even eyeglasses and dental; free textbooks and school breakfasts; free museums and other public places) that their standard of living is much higher than ours. And most importantly you don’t have the humiliating worry about where you are going to find decent clothes to buy, what hoops you’ll need to jump through to dress nicely, etc. [In Great Britain,] shopping is fun, entertaining, and relaxing as opposed to our irritating crowded lines that usually end in disappointment.

Around 11 a.m. Misha called the embassy. It turned out that Kubeykin was already waiting for us by the entrance to the Labour conference. Ten minutes later we were by the former church that is now a conference hall, next to Westminster Abbey and the Parliament.

There were police by the entrance and a couple dozen young people with banners: they were waiting for the arrival of Schmidt, the German Chancellor. There were some very rude banners. (The newspapers were full of expectation of a scandal: Schmidt was coming to persuade the British to stay in the Common Market.) We passed through the gates and I asked to see Kubeykin. He rushed over. I told him about my doubts: the day before he gave us two invitations that he got “under the table.” I wanted to get invitations from Hayward. Otherwise we could run into a big scandal: Moscow communists from the CC CPSU at a Labour Conference! Unheard of!

Kubeykin ran off, found Hayward’s secretary, she found the man himself (he was sitting in the middle of the presidium table) and he said, “But of course!” And told her to give us the invitations right away.

At the entrance we were thoroughly checked (for explosives). Not long before this, a bomb went off in Birmingham, it was probably an Irish attack. Seventeen people were killed and one hundred injured. In addition, several mailboxes exploded in London itself. Later we saw the police examine people’s handbags and briefcases at the entrance to the National Gallery and British Museum.

Wilson (Prime Minister) was standing downstairs in the lobby, he was also waiting for Schmidt’s arrival. On the stairs we ran into Short (Deputy leader of the Party, Chairman of the Parliamentary faction, he was in Moscow in 1973 as part of the Labour delegation). He stared, but a moment later pretended he didn’t see us. This is very British. He probably immediately figured out that this is Hayward’s “doings.” To say hello would have meant to “respond,” either now or later.

A circular room, amphitheater on all sides. Resolutions were under discussion (when we got there they were discussing number 42 out of 62). The atmosphere is like nothing we have at home. “For” and “against” a project: a noisy, active reaction in the room if the chairman (Callaghan) tried to impose a vote by show of hands (the left knows that they will be in the minority and rush to the presidium table to demand a vote “by mandate.”) In three cases they were able to force Callaghan.

Sincere and great enthusiasm when discussing the resolution on Chile.

A rousing cheer when unexpectedly (for us) Golda Meir appeared in the room. I later brought it up in the conversation with Hayward. He quickly came up with an explanation – it’s not that the Labour Party loves Israel so much, or especially its policies. They just like this old woman, who keeps pushing her line so persistently. The British are impressed by this.

When we entered, Schmidt was already seated at the presidium between Hayward and Wilson. He got a very warm welcome. Then he spoke – he was the only one of the foreign guests to speak. It was probably the first time that I saw the art of political oratory in person; until then I’d only read about it in books. Firstly, he spoke pure “Oxford” English with English stylistics. He would make sharp jokes then turn serious; he subtly suggested compelling arguments in aphorismic format; he would speak ironically about the common truths of politics and how it’s done. And so on. He spoke for 40 minutes. The audience was on their toes the entire time and

had the “right” reactions to all his “moves.” He got an ovation, even though he was calling a “fraternal party” and “fraternal government” to solidarity within the framework of the Common Market in these difficult times for Europe and the entire industrialized world.

He is elegant and handsome, and he conducts himself freely and confidently.

When I later went over everything in my mind, I understood that England will never leave the Common Market, and the “fraternal alliance” of the two major social democratic parties is an enormous political force in Europe, and this force is democratic. If we truly wish prosperity and peace for Europe, if we want “social progress” on the continent, we have to take both of these factors into account in our policies (and, alas, in our ideological struggle).

In the evening we were at the embassy waiting for Hayward. Kubeykin brought him over. Right away he started talking about the conference and their success in pressuring the right and the government. Once again, same as in Moscow, he repeated his credo: as he sees it, the goal of his time as General Secretary is to finally give Great Britain “a real socialist government.” To do this, it is necessary to break the tradition of the Labour government and Parliamentary faction allowing themselves to ignore the decisions of the Labour conference and not recognizing the authority of the Executive Committee. He has already done a great deal to raise the role and authority of the Executive Committee by using the surge on the left in the Labour party, which this time was unusually long-lasting. On these grounds, his conflict with Wilson is growing, though they have been friends since their youth. (During the first session Wilson left the room as soon as Hayward started speaking, and came back as soon as he was finished.)

He made a stake to develop relations with the CPSU for the same reason. I don’t think he has any ideological affinity for us. But he is unprejudiced and operates from positions of “common sense.” The Soviet Union is not only a real and lasting factor in world politics, it is a superpower and a clear guarantor of peace. He does not see any threat to England from the Soviet Union, just as he does not see a communist threat in his country in general. In the meantime, good relations with such a country (i.e. if the Soviet Union views him, Hayward, as a major political figure) can provide big dividends in terms of popularity and domestic perspectives. Plus, he is a plebeian by nature and sincerely hates the British aristocratic style and capitalism. And even though he knows the worth of our “plebeians,” it seems he likes us as a people. With us one can be “candid” and behave naturally. Although maybe he is deliberately playing this card, taking us at our word so to speak: since we declare ourselves to be such big democrats, then we should behave with each other accordingly, since he is also a democrat.

We talked at length about a reciprocal delegation from the CPSU. He wants to have it at the “highest level,” I think ideally he would love to have Suslov lead it. But they sent the invitation through Inozemtsev’s Institute, i.e. the same way as they were invited in 1973, and they insisted on this. The right wing of the Labour Party doesn’t want direct contacts with the CPSU for now, even though they visited at a very high level and promised a reciprocal reception at the highest level – openly and publicly. There is an element of pride, prestige, and most importantly a real reluctance among many to get too close to us.

Hayward assured us that the “masses” would welcome the delegation. In general, he said, do not judge our relationship with you by what’s written in our press. The people are no longer anti-Soviet.

But he “cannot be a loser in this” (his words), because it would mean total defeat for him. If he made every effort but the Soviets did not want any serious relations with him, this would be used to crush him.

He said he has to act with caution. He has a 1-2 voice majority in the Executive Committee right now, and if one of these people is sick or absent, any question could be turned against him. Although he is preparing a young generation and putting them in key places, he helps them to get noticed (quite a Leninist personnel policy). However, they have a long way to go until they reach key positions, it takes time.

We talked like this for over three hours, interspersing “business” with digressions. I nonchalantly paid him several big compliments. For example, when he began to prove what a socialist he is, I interrupted him and said something like: “You don’t need to prove it to us. In Moscow we saw that your actions are not a matter of tactics or favorable conditions, they are a matter of conviction. We believe in your devotion to your ideas and the labor cause.” He even blushed, though it would seem what does he care about my praise. Then again, I was speaking with the “voice of Moscow.”

We reminisced about the war. He was a pilot. I said to him, “It is my first time in England. When we were flying up to London yesterday morning, I was struck by its immense size. It is literally full of life. Millions of homes and tens of millions of people. And I thought, what courage, dedication, and devotion it must have taken to defend this city from the Nazis. You did it. And the world will always be grateful for that. We held out against the enemy in 1941. You held out in 1940. This is our common contribution to the salvation of civilization.”

My Hayward nearly wept.

We talked about their relationship with the communists [Communist Party of Great Britain]. He got a little agitated: “I am the first person in the history of the Labour Party who does not hesitate to speak on the same platform with the Communists. There are some activists among them whom I consider to be the best fighters for socialism and the interests of the working class. I would gladly welcome them to the Labour Party.” He named McGehee (member of CPGB Politburo, Vice President of the Union of Mineworkers). “Twice I even spoke at meetings with John Gollan. And at the meeting dedicated to the 50th anniversary of Anglo-Soviet diplomatic relations I gave a better speech than he did!” He pointed to Kubeykin and Misha and added, “Isn’t that true?! But in politics and elections they are our opponents.” Then he criticized them for their behavior at the last elections: they put their candidates in the places where every vote mattered for the Labour Party, and as a result Tories and Liberals won some of the seats.

I did not argue with him. And how can one argue? The CPGB has around 30 thousand members (though as they say, who counted them!), while Hayward represents 10 million people. To argue with him that the communists are better and bigger fighters for socialism would be pointless and... insulting. He sincerely believes that he is better than them in this sense; he is more needed, more reliable, and stronger. The CP of Great Britain does not help him in any way. Right now he is preparing to go to Cuba at the invitation of Dorticos; he got Mikardo (leftist Labourist) to go as an observer to the Congress of the Romanian Communist Party. He met with Berlinguer when the latter visited Gollan. In other words, he wants to deal with real political players. He has no time for anything less.

He said that his parents left him a farm in Kent, he made it into a dacha. He invited us to come visit him next time we are in England.

He told us about his visit to Chile (when it was still under Allende), and cursed at the British embassy in Santiago and the British diplomatic service in general, which he promised to purge completely when he comes to power.

He is fierce and a little reckless, but the cunning Englishman in his personality does not let go for a second. He looks for an advantage in everything, otherwise it's "not serious." He never allows familiarity (we Soviets are inclined to it as soon as the atmosphere takes a friendly tone). But he is natural and doesn't have any automatic prejudices. He has a fast and practical intellect... with his parted red hair and his untraditional English face.

The relationship we have with him is something quite unusual and seemingly unthinkable between Communists and Social Democrats. How far we've come in the recent years from Stalinist taboos... But alas! Even though this is real politics, it is behind the scenes. For millions of our Party activists and "scholars" (like Trapeznikov) nothing has changed. Look at any "solid" book on social democracy published in 1974.

Sunday, December 1st, was a full day off. Misha and I started early: City, Fleet Street, dragon boundary marks on the boundary of London City where the Queen still pays a one-penny tariff when she passes through; the cathedral of St. Paul by Sir Christopher Wren, we went inside to listen to the service; outskirts of London; the old train station; on a deserted little square the Karl Marx library where Lenin worked, next to it a stone trough for horses from the XVI century. Sunday fair.

Greenwich – entrance to that village, a huge green lawn with one branchy tree in the middle and rows of colorful peaked houses surrounding it. Like a postcard. Park leading up to the observatory. The old building of the observatory. And most importantly – the meridian! And a clock with 24 divisions, the clock that is the reference for the entire world, Greenwich Mean Time! This is England!

The observatory stands on a hill. There is a wide lawn going down to the Thames. On top of the hill there is a monument to General Wolfe, the conqueror of Canada: "From the grateful nation of Canada." This is also England.

At the bottom of the hill stands the Old Royal Naval College – palace.

We went down. To the left of the College, *Cutty Sark* is permanently dry-docked. *Cutty Sark* is the last sailing clipper, the fastest sailing vessel in history with a distinguished military history, dozens of victories and other service "For God and the Empire." This creature (it feels like a living organism) is extraordinarily beautiful in the harmony and expediency of its forms, and the agility and energy of its whole look, with the keel the size of its own mast. A magnificent work of art.

This is England too.

We returned to the city by the Tower Bridge, past the Tower itself, past the last World War II cruiser that is permanently docked, past the monument to the "rescue" from the 1666 Great Fire that burned down most of London.

We rushed to the National Gallery. It is not as rich as the Louvre, the Roman or Florentine ones, but more varied than the last two. It is more like the Hermitage. It has many of the most famous paintings. Many Italians, French, Flemish, Dutch. And only two small rooms of British artists. They are “clever,” they keep their best [British works of art] in their country estates and private collections. Reynolds, Lawrence, Gainsborough, Hogarth... stunning portraits. Especially Gainsborough’s “Mrs. Siddons” – a beautiful thoroughbred Englishwoman, long-nosed and buxom, a refined noblewoman.

The British Museum. We had an hour before closing, but even if you run through it, it is still tremendous compared to our pitiful pottery shards and spears. Yes, they really robbed the whole world. But it resulted in an incomparable gain for the civilization. And note: beginning from the XVII-XVIII centuries, their conquerors were followed by scholars to every corner of the world. Scholars who collected, extracted, brought home, studied, systematized and preserved. If it wasn’t for the British Museum with its looting, over half of the things there would have disappeared without a trace over the last two centuries. They would have been lost to world culture and to the self-knowledge of humanity, and, by the way, to the nations that have now become (or are becoming) civilized.

In the evening we saw “Emmanuelle” – a film by the same author and in the same style as “Last Tango in Paris.” I fell asleep!

Monday, December 2nd. First stop at the embassy. I composed a ciphered telegram. It was going to the “top level,” so I wrote six pages of pretty candid conclusions and observations.

The next morning they saw us off. To make up for our botched arrival, Semenov made the departing delegation extra nice. On the day of our return to Moscow, I was back to writing reports and articles for Ponomarev. Once again nothing was ready, I came back to find things exactly as I had left them.

December 14, 1974

On the 9th we went to Budapest for “the Six”: myself, Shishlin, Veber, Ivanov. Zagladin joined us the next day, he just got back from Paris (he was on Brezhnev’s team with Giscard d’Estaing).

We were housed on “Lenin Hills” in Rákosi’s mansions on the hill, on the outskirts of the city. It was a luxurious place with a royal “level of service.”

Meeting with Beretz (Head of the International Department) in the CC HSWP.

Then there were two days of meetings with the Bulgarians (Ivan Ganey), Czechs (Vladimir Iancu), Poles (Bogush Suyka), Germans (Bruno Mahlow). A “secret Communist meeting” to go over the internal workings of the future meeting and a number of other matters.

- Scenario of the Preparatory meeting. Distribution of roles amongst us and other “faithful” ones. Draft documents, order of initiatives.
- Problems of modern social democracy: exchange of information on contacts, exchange of other materials on social democracy, coordination of policies of “the Six” towards social democrats.
- Ideological questions tied to the 200th anniversary of the United States. Coordination.
- The problems of repatriation of Greeks from our countries.

- Financing the Peace Council, the World Federation of Trade Unions and others, because every year they have a deficit that almost exceeds the original budget. They burn it on their mistresses, various “events,” trips and a lavish lifestyle – these professional fighters for peace.
- Discussion of the participation in the congress of the ruling party “New Iran.”

The discussion of all these issues was frank, sharp, sometimes even smart. This is how it must have been in the early stages of the Comintern’s existence.

Zagladin and I acted as the authorized representatives of our Central Committee, and that is how we were perceived, too. Even though we had directives (not from the CC, only from B.N.) only on the first question.

Dinner on the first day. Toasts. My toast to internationalism and our many individual differences, to the pioneers of the modern revolutionary movement, whose style and tradition we are reviving at this meeting.

High political culture and good business-like manner of the Hungarians.

The city is magnificent. It must be in the top five great European centers.

Zagladin was only present at the discussion of the first two questions; he had to return to Moscow because he and Aleksandrov were assigned to write Brezhnev’s speech for the upcoming 16th CC Plenum (on the visits – Ford, Schmidt, Giscard).

On the 12th we returned to Moscow and faced the task of bringing Ponomarev up to date on the materials from Budapest.

Yesterday I heard that Brezhnev was angry because soon he will have to “travel” again – Egypt, Syria, Iraq. “Why am I going there? What’s the point? Gromyko imposed these visits on me back then... And I was not thinking. Now the more I think about it, the more convinced I am that is not necessary.”

Indeed, they are unnecessary and harmful. The International Department with B.N. in the lead always thought so. Unfortunately, we did not dare to speak up about this in time. Now the whole world knows about these visits, which will of course be “historic.”

But I think the real motives for his discontent are not related to foreign policy. More likely he sensed that the people and the Party are sick of his constant trips and tongue-tied appearances on TV. Plus the Plenum on the economy and the Five Year Plan is coming up, and the situation there is quite woeful. He is probably hearing reports (if not from his advisers then from Andropov) that, for example, in Perm (a big city with defense industry) meat is only available through vouchers once a week on Fridays. It’s no longer being distributed through stores but through the workplace. It would seem the people in Perm are not at all interested in watching endless TV broadcasts of theatrical appearances on the international stage, led by the man who ought to think about more pressing matters. World peace is really in our pocket already, if we don’t blow it.

December 16, 1974

The CC Plenum was held (Gosplan for 1975, the “completing year”). It took just one day, 5-6 hours. Overall we did not have many Plenums this year. Both of them were pre-sessional to the Supreme Council. And why have them?

This one was terribly boring. The same shortcomings, inconsistencies, and bottlenecks. Same problems. A languid and unemotional Baibakov presented the situation perfunctorily and monotonously. The subtext, and even the text itself: “Things haven’t moved an inch.” In other words, all of this was already discussed at the December 1973 Plenum.

The only burst of energy came from the Georgian Shevardnadze, who reported on his struggle against bribery, toadying, dishonesty, self-seeking, etc. Of course it’s a sexy topic [*malinka*], but at the same time it stirred something pure in the hardened hearts and minds of these high-ranking bureaucrats – to see a fighter who is taking risks like they once did and who carries the moral charge that they left long ago in their past.

However, following Shevardnadze’s passionate and honest speech, Lomakin (Primorski Krai Secretary) openly engaged in toadying, to the applause of the audience. He dedicated his speech to the Vladivostok meeting between Brezhnev and Ford, and accompanied it with unbelievable praise, citing the Americans themselves.

Brezhnev gave a multipage report. Bovin told me the following story: Arbatov, Inozemtsev, Tsukanov, Sukharevsky, Bovin, and somebody else, spent two months at Volynskoe-2 preparing Brezhnev’s CC Plenum report. They wrote 42 pages of a “beautiful” text by studying a pile of various classified materials. But the writers themselves came to the conclusion that they did not come up with anything new as compared to the last years’ December Plenum. Bovin suggested to give an exemplary punishment to two ministers and announce their immediate removal. This idea did not go through. The whole 42-page text did not go through. They were ordered to condense it to 5-8 pages. I think the gist of it could be boiled down to the facts presented by Ryabov (Sverdlovsk Secretary): in 1968 construction started on a pipe plant in Sverdlovsk, in 1970 the construction was suspended; that same year construction started on a similar plant in Chelyabinsk, in 1972 it was suspended. In 1974 it became clear that despite the import of pipes, there is a shortage. But instead of re-opening the existing construction sites (though they were already rusty), a new plant was started in another city.

The audience was listless during Brezhnev’s report. Everyone is already used to beautiful speeches. They know that nothing will happen and even at a closed Plenum nobody will dare to offer a radical action that may look scandalous and blacken the “new grand successes.”

The Plenum resolution was to continue “to be guided by Brezhnev’s remarks on this issue.”

Bovin said there was a moment when it seemed like Brezhnev would not attend the Plenum – he said he was not well, he was exhausted after Ford, Tsedenbal, Giscard, and in general. Bovin winked and said you could feel that “something was happening” behind all of this.

The procedure with Demichev was consistent with this atmosphere of fatigue and lush inactivity. He remained a candidate member of the Politburo, but was stripped of the position of Secretary of the CC. Indeed, why disturb the public and raise all kinds of talk? Things will take care of themselves by the time of the Congress.

It seems my version of the draft Plenum resolution that Ponomarev fussed so much about went into the trash bin, as could be expected. I don’t know how and to whom B.N. presented it, but I did not see a trace of my work in the final resolution.

December 29, 1974

I asked for eight days off to spend my vacation in Pushkino.

Naturally, I wrote a lot about various things.

Here is one of my thoughts. We seem to live in an atmosphere of “public order and peace,” unlike other countries. Other countries have inflation, unemployment, strikes, social hatred, attacks and kidnappings, bombings in shops and cafes, or even outright military actions like gunfire and bombs in Vietnam and the Middle East. Or the trials and executions in Ethiopia. Is it too peaceful here? Have we become numb in our apparent well-being, which must really be widespread? Two weeks ago it was rumored that on January 1st the price of coffee and linen fabrics would go up. The stores were literally cleared out. People were snapping up everything – duvet covers, sheets, pillowcases and other linens, hundreds of rubles’ worth per person! As for coffee, people bought even the kind that’s been on the shelves for years and was probably completely stale.

On December 19-21st the Preparatory meeting for the European Conference of Communist Parties took place in Budapest. Before the meeting there were some rumors of serious complications with Honecker, that he is seriously deceiving us – making obsequious speeches to us while integrating with the FRG. As the result of the meeting we got what we wanted – the right working group. Now, the behind the scenes preparation begins based on the texts we composed at the Gorky dacha. After that, we will distribute it to those who fully support us.

Then again, fraternal parties outside the working group see everything quite well. The Englishman Falber told me frankly, “Everyone I talked to has the feeling that everything is happening behind their back. But nobody wants to take on the part of *enfant terrible*, though there were some timid attempts from the Yugoslavs, the Romanians, the Spaniards and Italians.” Nobody wants to be left out, to step off this old ship that is called the International Communist Movement. Since this is the case, they have to put up with the rejection of this immense democratic procedure: after all, it is impossible to write one or two documents with twenty-eight hands.

The Romanian made a speech with a subtext that was directed at us. He said roughly the following: “There is no real and genuine détente and never will be until the blocs are dissolved, the troops are withdrawn from other countries, nuclear weapons are destroyed, and the arms race is stopped... It’s time to move from words to action, from declarations to real measures.” Etc. I included this in the ciphered telegram to Moscow, for the Politburo. Ponomarev supported me. But Katushev, who supervises our socialist fraternal parties, was enraged: “It is always the Romanians and the Yugoslavs who are bad,” he said, “while your Spaniards and Italians are always great, even though they say the same things.” Katushev crossed out my paragraph. But then B.N. got mad and wrote in something similar. Katushev crossed it out again and declared that he will not sign the ciphered telegram otherwise.

When I returned to Moscow I found out from Rakhmanin (Katushev’s first deputy) that Katushev spoke about me indignantly when he was informing his Department about the meetings in Budapest.

Why does all of this happen? Because even within the Politburo things are not done in the open. People are reticent and “unwilling to trouble” their superiors. It’s fine if you don’t want to

strain relations with Romania, maybe this is wise. But then you should work to make this a common policy instead of trying to push your line from under the table, deceiving your friends and pulling wool over the Politburo's eyes. It's not just about the moral aspect of it. It is also because cowardice is always punished... in big-time politics, of course.

Postscript to 1974

This year's entries are a "Chronicle of Current Events." From the present-day vantage point, we see a trend. The mixed observations, reflections, and information (usually not publicly available) paint a picture with dismally hopeless colors and subject matter.

The peaceful Chilean Revolution collapsed, the Portuguese Revolution was victorious. In their experience we wanted to see an opening for movement along the path created in 1917 in Russia.

Contacts with Social Democrats and the Labour Party also encouraged us to think there was a second wind for the anti-capitalist process.

However, it was depressing to see that our allied, "fraternal" parties and the Left in general were growing disappointed in Soviet socialism. Against this background, our attempts to revive the "ideological" unity of the International Communist Movement looked increasingly hopeless and even ridiculous.

The rapid erosion of the socialist image of the Soviet Union, its loss of the "ideological superpower" role was evidenced and aggravated by the persecution of dissidents, the suppression of artistic freedom, the vulgar mini-cult of Brezhnev, forced lies in our propaganda, and the cynical falsification of the past and present in our social "sciences." Many people found disgusting the flagrant "divergence" between the Marxist-Leninist creed and reality, which had already plunged into a deep crisis.

The defeat of the Soviet Union's policy in the Arab world, where we masked our superpower ambitions behind support for the "national liberation movements," was yet another affirmation of the fact that the Soviet Union lost its revolutionary momentum and potential. This loss happened a long time ago, but was not yet completely apparent to our opponents in the "Cold War." This was the reason the USSR initiated détente in international relations; with the additional hidden agenda to deceive its partners in the "Helsinki process" and buy time.

Intellectual party apparatchiks who had access to classified information were beginning to understand that the world around them was rapidly changing, and that our policies were inadequate, deadlocked, and dangerous. The General Secretary himself, who was not a "quick wit" but was knowledgeable, would inadvertently admit that "imperialism is not what it once was" while we keep "harping on" about it like we did 20-30 years ago.

However, whatever reasonable statements were made, whatever beautiful and peace-loving speeches the increasingly tongue-tied CC CPSU General Secretary made (and sometimes even took steps in line with common sense), the system and its mechanisms ruled out the possibility of changing the strategic course that was defined by outdated ideology.

This "volume" has a great deal on the CPSU's practice of paternalistic interaction with foreign communist parties; on the attempts by some CC officials to somehow smooth out the imbalances in the communist movement – by their demeanor, by "smart" speeches, by their ability to listen and hold a discussion. The parties themselves tried to break out of the vicious circle into which they were forced by the Great Russian Revolution and the logic of the Soviet Union's development, especially after the XX Congress of the CPSU. They were torn between the "attraction and rejection" to one of the superpowers, the bastion of their original meaning and the very material possibility (!) of their existence.

It seems the factual landscape of this “volume” will also prove interesting: the inertial performance of official duties (and concerns regarding the inertia), the petty intrigues and vain ambitions, the hierarchical order and Pharisaical rules of the game of Party duty, the doublethink and ambiguity of the work done by thoughtful and educated officials close to the highest leadership.

Today, this way of life may arouse surprise mixed with contempt... though partially from people who deserve even greater contempt. But some day, this rare source of information about a unique period in the history of a great country will be of interest.