

115/23/37

Your file:

Our file: 161/1/1

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FROM: WASHINGTON	C02734/WSH	04-Apr-1994
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TO: WELLINGTON NEW YORK	WGTV UNSC	Immediate Immediate
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CC: HARARE	PARIS	Priority
CANBERRA	TOKYO	Routine
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TO: Defence		Immediate
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MFAT (MEA, UNC, AMER, EUR, DSP1, EAB)

DEFENCE HQNZDF (DSIA, OPS, DDI)
DEFENCE MOD (GENTLES)

Subject

U04000: SECURITY COUNCIL: NEW ZEALAND PRESIDENCY: RWANDA

Paris' C01742. Your C21388.

Summary

2 US position is to keep Rwanda on a "short leash" with a 2-2.5 month review, pending the formation of a transitional government (TG) in Kilgali. US draft resolution will stress that responsibility for progress lies with the Rwandans themselves. The parties have moved some distance towards compromise but the situation remains tense. Key issue is participation of a (militant Hutu) CDR representative in TG over RPF objections. State does not rule out progress before 5 April mandate renewal. If matter is settled US would move to a six month renewal. US is sympathetic to SG's Report request for more police observers.

Action

3 For information.

Report

4 We spoke to IO (Zelle) and Africa Bureau (Aiston) on 30 March and again on 4 April. Both told us essentially the same story. US policy on mandate renewal is to make clear to the parties in Rwanda that it is up to them to make progress and to keep pressure on for agreement on the composition of the transitional government. If no agreement is reached on a transitional government before 5 April only a brief ("2 to 2.5

month") mandate renewal is preferred by the US. Zelle told us today that France now appears to be willing to accept this.

5 The Administration is also very reluctant to agree to the request for 45 extra police observers. While the US wishes to "maintain a strong force", the additional 45 personnel will not make a crucial difference to the outcome, and their deployment at this time would contradict the point that it is up to the parties on the ground to make progress in the negotiations. An additional consideration for the Administration as they have not yet notified Congress of this possible additional deployment, as it has informally agreed to do with all UN PKOs. (Comment: we sense that financial considerations also play a part on the US position).

6 In the (now unlikely) event that agreement is reached on a transitional government before the vote, the US would support a longer ("six month") renewal and would be prepared to assist, including with additional police monitors. (Comment: There is clearly an element of carrot and stick in this position). State does expect the mandate renewal to go to a vote tomorrow 5 April.

7 Aiston provided a comprehensive review of recent developments in Rwanda. We assume much of the background will be known to you. He stressed that there has been progress in the direction of a transitional government in recent weeks, but that there are still obstacles to be overcome. Tension and sporadic violence continue. As you will recall, the process of forming a transitional government (composed of the MRND party of President Habyarimana and the four opposition parties, plus the RPF) had earlier been complicated by the emergence of splits in some of the coalition partners:

- The MDR (predominantly Hutu successor to the pre-secession government) has split into a hardline and a moderate wing, of which only the latter has been willing to deal with the RPF;
- The Liberal Party (PL) had also split: Commerce Minister Mugenzi leads a Hutu wing; Tutsi Minister of Labour and Social Affairs Lando Ndasingwa leads a breakaway Tutsi group;
- The Social Democratic Party (PSD) led by Hutu Public Works Minister Gatabazi remains willing to deal with Tutsi and provides a stabilising influence. No change is reported in the position of the Christian Democratic Party (PDC).

7 The splits in the MDR and LP had complicated the implementation of the Arusha Accord when factions had put up competing lists of deputies for seats and portfolios allocated under the Accord. In particular Lando's contesting of the Justice portfolio threatened to upset the balance of power between Tutsi and Hutu (the Tutsi RPF already had the Interior

Ministry and Gendarmerie). That dispute had been resolved during the past month: of the eleven LP deputy slots, the Mugenzi faction got 5 and the Lando faction 6. Mugenzi and Lando were confirmed by the PM in their old portfolios and a neutral third person, a Tutsi, was named to the Justice portfolio. The problem of overlapping lists arising from the split in the MDR was resolved through local caucuses.

8 The remaining issue is the question of CDR membership of the transitional assembly. (Only one seat was allocated to this militant Hutu faction under the Arusha Accord.) The PM has publicly committed himself to the full implementation of the Accord, but the RPF has so far opposed CDR participation when the assembly is convened. The RPF has said it would accept the subsequent admission of the CDR member if a majority of deputies agreed (as is likely), but this remains unacceptable to the CDR. The US is also opposed to this "compromise" as it violates the integrity of the Arusha settlement. State notes that the Accord provides for the subsequent expulsion of any member which violates the assembly's code of ethics.

9 Aiston commented that despite the detailed and precise nature of the Arusha Accord, it is not always easy to tell which problems are the result of a real clash of interests and which are the product of negotiating tactics by the players. He did not rule out the possibility that even if the CDR deputy is admitted to the transitional assembly, other problems might surface. (Comment: this perception underlies US determination to sheet home responsibility for progress to the parties themselves).

End Message