

CONFIDENTIAL

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FROM:	NEW YORK	C04348/NYK	20-Apr-1994
TO:	WELLINGTON	WGTN UNSC	Immediate
CC:	BEIJING	CANBERRA	Priority
	LONDON	WASHINGTON	Priority
	MOSCOW	OTTAWA	Priority
	PARIS	HARARE	Priority
	BRUSSELS		Priority

MFAT (MEA, EUR, UNC, DP1, DSP1, EAB)

Subject

SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

Summary

- No recommendation yet from Sec Gen about UNAMIR future
- President underscores difficulty of Council not expressing any formal views on one of the most horrific tragedies and need for a decision by end of the week

Action

For information only

Report

2 In fact the secretariat did not come up with a recommendation from the Sec Gen on the future of UNAMIR today. The situation is evolving to the extent that it has been difficult to arrive at a clear recommendation. Our guess is that this is likely to be a result of a number of factors ie the force commander may be reviewing his own recommendations in light of the situation on the ground, the politics of making what would be a very difficult recommendation (if one were to be made to withdraw UNAMIR on safety grounds) for the Africans in light of the UN's activism and absorption with the question of Bosnia, and signs that at least some of the troop contributors may be getting cold feet. (In latter respect secretariat deny Reuters reports about troop departures. Only personnel to leave have been "non-essentials" is the unarmed observers)

3 Secretariat (Garekhan) provided a briefing however in which the situation was characterised as remaining tense. Fighting was intense yesterday morning (Tues) but had declined toward the end of the afternoon. The ICRC had

CONFIDENTIAL

evacuated the wounded refugees from the stadium, the shelling of which by the "government forces" had left 40 dead and 100 seriously wounded. There had been heavy fighting at provincial centres outside Kigali.

4 UNAMIR is continuing with its efforts to get the parties to agree to a cease-fire and while the RPF still have difficulty with direct contacts with the "government forces" they were prepared to continue the discussions with UNAMIR to this end.

5 The Belge contingent of UNAMIR has completely departed, together with some 264 non-essential UNAMIR personnel. At present there are 1707 UNAMIR personnel left in Rwanda, mostly in Kigali. All but 87 of the personnel assigned to the DMZ in the north have already been relocated to Kigali with the remainder scheduled to have gone to Kigali today.

6 The humanitarian situation continues to deteriorate, especially the sanitary conditions at the stadium and hospital where the refugees are located. UNAMIR escorted some 18 ICRC trucks to deliver food to those in the stadium yesterday.

7 There is no change at the airport, both "government forces" and UNAMIR personnel are present. The RPF is not far away but not actually at the airport. There had been no progress in attempting to have it recognised as a neutral area. There is no deliberate hostility toward UNAMIR. The danger to them primarily comes from the risks of getting caught in the cross-fire or being caught in the "government" shelling of the stadium.

8 The UK reiterated the necessity to have a decision before the end of the week, noting that if the troop contributors decided (unilaterally) to pull out that would look "worse" than if the Council stayed "one step ahead" and decided to withdraw the force first.

9 At the conclusion of discussion President observed that it was becoming increasingly difficult to explain credibly why in the face of the most horrific killings the Council could remain formally silent. It is becoming difficult to explain why the Council is not pointing the finger at those responsible given that it was quite clear from the secretariat and from UNHCR reports that it was one particular party which was responsible. President also emphasised the importance of making a decision as soon as possible and that one merit of the NAM draft resolution (our fax 2438 of 14 April) was that it did address this issue.

Comment

10 President also had the opportunity to talk with the RPF representative and to impress on him the need for RPF to reach a cease-fire, though it is not difficult to see their

CONFIDENTIAL

C04348/NYK

Page 3

point about not wanting to enter formal negotiations with Rwandese "government forces" while those same forces are engaged in the current butchery.

End Message

CONFIDENTIAL