

3415 – 21-06

After consulting with NAM members, France submitted its adapted draft resolution to send a “multinational force” (MF) to Rwanda. It added that a dialog with the RPF on their position in re: deploying the MF continues. It was suggested that there are differences between the RPF views in New York and in Rwanda (New York is more critical).

A long, at times heated debate followed, focusing on further modifying the draft. Against this background, the positions of various members on the French draft became clearer. The informal consultations resulted in a draft with further amendments, its submission “in blue” and a decision that it will be voted on on Wed 22 June am, at the earliest, pm that day at the latest.

The different views among SC members concerning the draft further diverged rather than converged. This was the result of the following warnings:

- The UN Secretariat’s: that if the RPF doesn’t change its negative view of the MF, UNAMIR might find itself in complications and difficulties (a “less friendly” attitude of the RPF to UNAMIR is allegedly already apparent) – some delegations pointed out informally the difference between this evaluation by the UNAMIR Commander and the SG’s letter of 19 June.
- Warning of the RPF itself, in its letter addressed to SC members (namely that if FR decides on the MF, then UNAMIR must withdraw because the RPF couldn’t guarantee its safety).

On top of that, in a meeting with the SC President on 21 June, the OAU representative also gave priority to UNAMIR over the MF.

Absent instructions of a number of SC members, one cannot anticipate the result of the voting. Currently known views, however, exclude it being adopted by consensus.

The most critical views are those of NZ. Its reservations in re: the MF were repeated again (emphasizing that this is the position of the Government). NZ repeated its preference for UNAMIR. Cast doubts, on basis of NGO reports in the country, that the MF would help resolve the humanitarian situation. Appealed to FR to offer its troops to UNAMIR.

In response, the FR Amb stated that FR would prefer an operation under UN command but not in the current situation. Incorporating FR soldiers into UNAMIR would expose that operation to mistrust of the RPF. Moreover, from the military point of view, the MF is expected to face a number of difficult and unexpected situations. This is why FR prefers a “national” command.

China recalled the need for agreement of the parties with the MF deployment. Nig and Br voiced similar positions. (Russia didn’t insist on this condition any more.) Nigeria stated that it will not stand in the way of adopting the resolution but clearly expressed its misgivings on the objectives and goals of the French proposal.

Delegation comments:

- a. France virtually forced the decision to vote on the draft on 22 June. NZ, Pak and Br indirectly warned that not only they themselves but even the SC as a whole are not yet ready to make a decision in so delicate a matter.
- b. We drew France's attention on 20 June to the discrepancy between their intention of completing the operation within two months and the SG's estimate that UNAMIR will not be in a position to fulfil its mandate sooner than in three months. France did not budge and a number of delegation therefore warned on 21 June of the "Somalia syndrome" (the withdrawal of UNITAF when UNOSOM II wasn't yet ready to assume responsibility for fulfilling its mandate).
- c. Discussions on Rwanda (but also on other points of the SC agenda) are particularly recently very time consuming. This is why, in the absence of Amb. Kovanda, the Delegation exceptionally requested HQ to provide a short presentation (not just speaking points).