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Your file: 3/88/1

Our file:

115/23/37

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FROM:	WELLINGTON	C24779/WN1	21-Jun-1994
TO:	NEW YORK		Immediate
CC:	BEIJING	BONN	Routine
	BRUSSELS	CANBERRA	Routine
	GENEVA	HARARE	Routine
	LONDON	MADRID	Routine
	MOSCOW	OTTAWA	Routine
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MFAT (MEA, LGL, UNC, HRU, ISAC, EUR, DP3, DSP3, EAB)

P/S MFA

DEFENCE HQNZDF (DSIA, OPS, DDI)

DEFENCE MOD (GENTLES)

Subject

U52265: SECURITY COUNCIL : RWANDA

Summary

- French re-emphasise in Wellington urgency and humanitarian focus of proposed intervention, and seek New Zealand support for consensus adoption of resolution tomorrow.
- We share French humanitarian objectives but repeat our concerns about the potentially negative impact on UNAMIR.
- That Boutros-Ghali has thrown his weight behind French initiative is undeniably significant and can be expected to affect public perceptions.
- Instruction for you to seek further clarifications but to go along with (amended) resolution if consensus unexpectedly emerges.

2 French Ambassador made a further demarche on instruction this afternoon to emphasise the importance France attached to urgent action in Rwanda, and to express the hope that NZ and France could reach a common position in the Council tomorrow.

3 He noted that the French position had been fully explained to Beeby. A divergence between French and New Zealand views had been evident in Keating's remarks in the

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Council yesterday. He stressed that France was under pressure to respond quickly because of the magnitude of the killings. Waiting for reinforcement of UNAMIR - even with the best of wills this would be at least two months away - would take too long. The French purpose was strictly humanitarian. France had no desire to become involved in the internal affairs of Rwanda nor to interpose itself between the two sides. The draft resolution made that very clear. It would withdraw as quickly as possible once the expanded UNAMIR was deployed. He hoped that NZ would be able to support consensus on the resolution tomorrow.

4 In response we emphasised that NZ shared France's concerns about the urgent need to protect people at risk in Rwanda and to end the killings. We understood the French desire to do something quickly. We had ourselves been pushing for a more robust and rapid UN response than it had been possible to obtain from the Council. Our primary concern was to ensure that the UN efforts and process that were already underway were not undermined.

5 The concerns we had expressed and the clarifications we sought related primarily to the impact of the proposed intervention on UNAMIR and its ability to continue to operate. We were concerned that with one of the parties openly hostile to the French proposed action, and perceiving it as partisan and provocative, there was a real risk that it would not serve as a bridge to an expanded UNAMIR but would jeopardise the UNAMIR operation. There had already been reports of immediate negative effects on the ground. Apart from the threat of the RPF withdrawing cooperation from UNAMIR, there was the real risk of troop contributors being diverted, and of an expanded UNAMIR deployment being confused and further delayed. We continued to favour French cooperation with and support of UNAMIR. de Bellescize said France had expressed willingness to support and equip forces in the framework of UNAMIR.

6 Ambassador inquired if our attitude would change if the RPF could be brought on side. The main purpose of the intervention was after all to save Tutsi lives. (He noted it had been possible to find some common ground with the RPF for a French truck convoy to be sent to Kigali.) We replied that would certainly ease our concerns.

7 He had no details of potential troop contributors to the French intervention apart from Senegal. He described the 21 June WEU meeting as crucial.

Instructions

8 In view of worrying information that France's proposal is already causing difficulties for UNAMIR, leading to Secretariat decision to withdraw Francophone personnel, we think it would be useful for Council to seek assessment of UNAMIR force commander of impact, both in terms of safety of

personnel and ability of UNAMIR to perform its tasks including efforts to promote ceasefire.

9 We also think Council should be urged to consult present and potential troop contributing countries to UNAMIR, before taking a step that could have significant implications for that operation.

10 We told de Bellescize that New Zealand expected further discussion in Council to clarify matters. We do not wish to see Council pushed precipitately. However, if France tables a text in blue, you should ask for delay while seeking instructions.

11 In the event that things steamroll ahead in the Council, and France pushes for a vote tomorrow, you have authority to seek the sorts of amendments outlined in your para 21. You might also try to ensure that arrangements for coordination and liaison between any new force and UNAMIR are better defined.

12 It seems unlikely that a consensus on the French proposal will suddenly emerge. If it did so, however, we would not want New Zealand to stand aside, particularly as Boutros-Ghali has thrown his weight behind the French. We would then look at expressing our reservations in an EOY.

13 The Minister has seen this message.

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End Message