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SERIAL: (U) IIR (b)(3):10 USC 424

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TEXT

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

COUNTRY: (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424

SUBJQCY: IIR (b)(3):10 USC 424] MILITARY REGION COMMANDERS
- INSTHYE EQUATION (U).

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT
- FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT
- CLASSIFIED ~~SECRET NOFORN~~.

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
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DOI: (U) 890616.

REQS: (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424

SOURCE: (U)

SUMMARY: ~~(S/NE)~~ MILITARY REGION COMMANDERS MAY
HAVE BEEN CRUCIAL IN THE POWER STRUGGLE. MAY BE AGAIN.

TEXT: 1. ~~(S/NE)~~ THE ROLE(S) PLAYED BY THE MILITARY
REGION COMMANDERS IN THE DRAMA THAT UNFOLDED DURING APRIL
AND MAY, AND WHICH CULMINATED IN THE DEBACLE OF 3/4 JUNE,
IS A QUESTION (b)(3):10 USC 424] CONTINUOUSLY SEEK TO
ILLUMINATE. CERTAINLY TROOPS BELONGING TO SEVERAL MILI-
TARY REGIONS WERE USED IN THE RECENT MILITARY OPERATIONS
AND STILL ARE INVOLVED IN SECURING THE CITY.

2. ~~(S/NE)~~ THERE HAVE BEEN STRONG, BUT UNCONFIRMED, RUMORS
THAT YANG SHANGKUN CALLED A MEETING OF MILITARY REGION
COMMANDERS IN BEIJING AROUND 31 MAY. HOWEVER, IT IS
TOTALLY UNCLEAR IF BUT A FEW, MANY OR ALL OF THE SEVEN
REFUSED TO ATTEND THIS RUMORED MEETING. IF IT IS TRUE
IN FACT THAT A MEETING WAS CALLED AND THAT SOME OR ALL
OF THE REGIONAL MILITARY COMMANDERS REFUSED TO ATTEND AS
ORDERED BY YANG, THEN SEVERAL CRITICAL SCENARIOS AND
QUESTIONS ARISE.

3. ~~(S/NE)~~ AFTER THE DECLARATION OF MARTIAL LAW ON 20 MAY
DENG REPORTEDLY TRAVELED OUTSIDE OF BEIJING AROUND 22-25
MAY, POSSIBLY TO WUHAN AND OTHER DESTINATIONS TO ENLIST
THE SUPPORT OF THE MILITARY REGION COMMANDERS. HE REPORT-
EDLY RECEIVED THAT SUPPORT. WE THINK THIS SUPPORT MAY
WELL HAVE BEEN SOUGHT PRIMARILY TO BACK DENG IN A POWER
STRUGGLE WITH ZHAO ZIYANG. DID THE MILITARY REGION
COMMANDERS ALSO SUPPORT THE USE OF THE PLA, INCLUDING
THEIR "OWN" TROOPS, TO PUT DOWN THE DEMONSTRATORS? WAS
THE QUESTION OF THE USE OF DEADLY FORCE EVER BROACHED?
IT COULD WELL BE THAT THEY WERE NOT CONSULTED, PARTICU-
LARLY ON THE LATTER QUESTION. AGAIN, IF DENG HAD LEFT

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BEIJING DURING THIS PERIOD OR BEEN INCAPACITATED BY ILL-
NESS (AS IT HAD BEEN RUMORED), THEN YANG WAS PROBABLY
CALLING THE SHOTS IN HIS ABSENCE.

4. ~~(S/NF)~~ YANG'S ROLE DURING THIS PERIOD WAS LARGELY
A SHADOW ROLE. YANG REPORTEDLY WAS OPPOSED TO THE USE OF
FORCE AGAINST THE DEMONSTRATORS SEE CITE IIR (b)(3):10 USC 424

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USC 424 [] HOWEVER, THAT IS FAR FROM CERTAIN. IF MILITARY
REGION COMMANDERS HAD REFUSED TO MEET IN BEIJING, IT MAY,
IN PART, HAVE BEEN A SRT NMJCT TH TETHEY WANTKQD NO ROLE
IN ANY POTENTIAL USE OF THE PLA USING FORCE AGAINST THE
POPULATION.

5. 7Q/QNW DLRLNGITHEIFNITIAL STAGES OF THE DEMONSTRATHOXN
YANG WAS ABLE TO STAY (RELATIVELY) ABOVE THE FRAY,
APPARENTLY LETTING DENG/LI PENG END ZGAJO FIGHT IT OUT.
W ITH Q AO AND DENG "TEMPORARILY" OUT OF THE WAY AND LI
PENG BEING PUBLICLY DISCREDIT D,QYANG WITH HIS MILITARY
PORTFOLIO EVEN WITHOUT THE SUPPORT OF SOME OF THE
REGIONAL COMMANDERS WAS IN THE DRIVER'S SEAT. YANG
HIMSELF (OR IN DENG'S NAME) REPORTEDLY MADE THE DECISION
TO REGAIN CONTROL OF BEIJING, USING DEADLY FORCE, DURING
THE HORRIFIC NIGHT OF 3/4 JUNE. HE MAY WELL HAVE BELIEVED
THAT THE SIZE AND TONE OF THE DEMONSTRATIONS DID IN
FACT POSE A CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER TO THE CONTINUED

/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 002 *****/
COUNTRY: (U) CHINA (CH).

SUBJECT: IIR (b)(3):10 USC 424 /MILITARY REGION COMMANDERS

EXISTENCE OF THE CURRENT POLITICAL SYSTEM AND THAT THE
PLA WAS THE ONLY TOOL CAPABLE OF PRESERVING THE SYSTEM.
6. ~~(S/NF)~~ IF SOME OF THE MILITARY REGION COMMANDERS WERE
FIRMLY AGAINST THE USE OF DEADLY FORCE BY THE PLA
(PARTICULARLY THEIR "OWN" UNITS) AGAINST THE DEMONSTRA-
TORS, THEN THE TENSION/VACILLATION WITHIN THE MILITARY
AND BETWEEN MILITARY UNITS WHICH WE HAVE SEEN MAY BE A
MANIFESTATION OF THESE MILITARY LEADERSHIP DIFFERENCES.
FOR INSTANCE, THE CONTINUING RUMORS OF A POTENTIAL
SQUARE-OFF BETWEEN UNITS LIKE THE BEIJING MR'S 38TH ARMY
AND THE 27TH ARMY WHICH ENTERED TIANANMEN SQUARE MAY HAVE
BEEN ILLUSTRATIVE.

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7. (U) THERE HAS BEEN SOME OPEN-SOURCE EVIDENCE OF UNEVEN SUPPORT FROM THE MILITARY REGION COMMANDERS, EVEN AFTER 890603-890604. IN THE 890609 PEOPLE'S DAILY, THERE WERE STATEMENTS FROM THE VARIOUS MILITARY REGIONS IN "SUPPORT" OF THE CRACKDOWN. JINAN APPARENTLY VOICED STRONG SUPPORT, WHILE GUANGZHOU APPEARED WEAK, AND THE IMPORTANT BEIJING MR APPEARED ALMOST RETICENTLY SUPPORTIVE. MOST LIKELY, SOME MILITARY REGION COMMANDER'S HEADS WILL ROLL IF THEY HAVEN'T ALREADY. THOSE THAT WILL MOST LIKELY NOT ONLY SURVIVE, BUT MAY MAY BE MOVED TO HIGHER POSITIONS, WOULD BE--

- A. ((FU)) QUANYOU OF CHENGDU -- A STRONG SUPPORTER OF THE CRACKDOWN AND DENG LOYALIST.

- B. ((LI)) JIULONG, OF JINAN, ANOTHER STRONG SUPPORTER OF THE CRACKDOWN.

- C. ((XIANG)) SHOZHUI, OF NANJING. EARLY STRONG SUPPORTER OF THE CRACKDOWN AND LOYAL TO DENG. THE ONLY FULL GENERAL AMONG THE MR COMMANDERS.

8. ~~(C)~~ THOSE THAT MAY BE IN JEOPARDY ARE--

- A. ((ZHOU)) YIBING, OF BEIJING, WHO REPORTEDLY WAS INITIALLY NAMED MARTIAL LAW COMMANDER, BUT HAS NOT BEEN HEARD FROM SINCE LATE MAY. THERE WERE REPORTS OF SOME OF HIS UNITS, SUCH AS THE 38TH ARMY WHICH MAY HAVE BALKED AT USING FORCE AGAINST THE DEMONSTRATORS. USE OF OTHER TROOPS USED IN THE BLOODY CRACKDOWN, SUCH AS THE "INFAMOUS" 27TH ARMY, ALTHOUGH NORMALLY SUBORDINATE TO BEIJING MR, WERE SUPPOSEDLY UNDER A TIGHT STRING PULLED BY THE YANG'S. HIS SUPPOSED CLOSE CONNECTION TO QIN JIWEI MAY WELL BE A DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD.

- B. ((ZHANG)) WANNIAN OF GUANGZHOU, A LATE AND LUKEWARM SUPPORTER OF MARTIAL LAW. NONE OF HIS TROOPS KNOWN TO HAVE BEEN SENT TO BEIJING DURING THE CRISIS. AGAIN, POSSIBLE TIES TO QIN JIWEI A DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD--

- C. ((LIU)) JINGSONG OF SHENYANG, HAS NOT SHOWN MUCH APPARENT SUPPORT FOR THE CRACKDOWN. A REPORT EARLY ON SAID THAT SHENYANG'S 39TH AND 40TH ARMY WERE BALKING AT BEING SENT TO BEIJING (THEY EVENTUALLY CAME AND HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IN THE CRACKDOWN, PARTICULARLY THE 39TH. SHENYANG'S 64TH GROUP ARMY HAS ALSO BEEN

/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 003 *****/

COUNTRY: (U) CHINA (CH).

SUBJECT: IIR (b)(3):10 USC 424 MILITARY REGION COMMANDERS INVOLVED.) LIU HAS NOT BEEN NOTED IN PUBLIC IN RECENT

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WEEKS. HIS STRONG CONNECTION TO NDU POLITICAL COMMISSAR
(LI) DESHENG, MAY WELL NOT BODE WELL FOR LIU'S
FUTURE.

- D. ((ZHAO)) XIANSHUN OF LANZHOU, ANOTHER LI DESHENG
PROTEGE. LAGGED IN HIS SUPPORT OF THE CRACKDOWN.

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- ~~RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS.~~

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
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WEEKS. HIS STRONG CONNECTION TO NDU POLITICAL COMMISSAR
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