

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~NOFORN~~

DOCUMENT ID: 33622455  
INQNO: DOC12D 00526951  
DOCNO: (b)(3):10 USC 424  
PRODUCER: JCS  
SOURCE: DODIR  
DOCTYPE: (b)(3):10 USC 424  
DOR: 19890807  
TOR: 041604  
DOCPREC: R  
ORIGDATE: 198908070802  
MHFNO: 89 3674929  
DOCCLASS: ~~C~~  
CAVEATS: ~~NOFORN~~

CDS  
C 55566RUEHBJ 1570 070809ZMCR 89-3674929 F I  
MIDB  
S  
UPID  
/ /

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FRP: , , 3, , , , ,  
MILITARY



89 3674929 MCR PAGE 001 NC 3674929  
TOR: 070809Z AUG 89 RUEHBJ 1570

---  
HEADER  
RR RUEAIIA  
DE RUEHBJ #1570/01 2190807  
ZNY ~~CCCC~~  
R 070802Z AUG 89  
FM (b)(3):10 USC 424  
TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC

(b)(3):10 USC 424

RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC // (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(l)  
(b)(3):10 USC 424  
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC  
BT

CONTROLS  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 (b)(3):10 USC 424

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ~~NOFORN~~

SERIAL: (U) IIR (b)(3):10 USC 424

~~NOFORN~~  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~NOFORN~~

TEXT

/\*\*\*\*\* THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE \*\*\*\*\*/  
COUNTRY: (U) CHINA (CH); USSR (UR).

SUBJECT: IIR (b)(3):10 USC 424 DOMESTIC SITUATION IN CHINA  
AND SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS (U).

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN EVALUATION REPORT, NOT  
FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT  
CLASSIFIED ~~CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN~~

-----  
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
-----

DOI: (U) 890804.

REQS: (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424

SOURCE: (b)(1),1.4 (c)

SUMMARY: (C) THE PLA EXPRESSED ITS CONCERNS ABOUT THE  
USE OF FORCE, BUT SALUTED AND DID ITS JOB. SINO-SOVIET  
TIES WILL IMPROVE, BUT MISTRUST WILL NOT DISAPPEAR.  
(FANG) LIZHI IS A BURDEN OF THE U.S. THAT THE CHINESE  
ARE HAPPY TO LOSE.

TEXT: 1. (C/NE) PROVIDED HIS IMPRESSIONS OF THE  
STATUS OF THE PLA LEADERSHIP BASED ON MEDIA REPORTS OF  
PERSONS PRESENT AT CELEBRATIONS OF THE FOUNDING OF THE  
PLA (b)(1),1.4 (c) COMMENTED THAT THE MOST NOTABLE ABSENCE  
WAS THAT OF FORMER MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE ((ZHANG))  
AI PING. SAID THAT (b)(1),1.4 (c) HAD LEARNED  
THAT THE MAYOR OF YANTAI, EITHER ZHANG AIPING'S SON OR  
SON-IN-LAW, HAD BEEN REMOVED FROM HIS POST IN SHANDONG  
PROVINCE. HOWEVER, HAD NO INFORMATION ON THE  
STATUS OF ZHANG PIN, FROM THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS DEPT OF  
COSTIND. (b)(1), (b)(3):10 USC 424, (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i), 1.4 (c)

(b)(3):10 USC 424 THAT ZHANG PIN IS AT HIS POST). BELIEVED  
THAT THE ARRAY OF PERSONS PRESENT AT THE FUNCTIONS  
SEEMED TO REPRESENT A MORE UNIFIED VIEW OF THE LEADER-  
SHIP THAN THOSE OUTSIDE THE PRC MIGHT SUSPECT REMAINS  
PUZZLED BY THE PRESENCE OF THOSE PRESENT WHO  
REPORTEDLY OPPOSED MARTIAL LAW MIXED IN WITH THOSE WHO  
REPORTEDLY SUPPORTED THE CRACKDOWN. IN OPINION,  
THERE WAS NO SERIOUS LEADERSHIP BREAKDOWN. THE MILITARY  
LEADERSHIP MAY HAVE COMMENTED ON CENTRAL DECISIONS, BUT  
AS RHETORICALLY SUGGESTED, "HOW COULD THEY.  
(THE MILITARY) OPPOSE THE DECISIONS OF THE CENTRAL  
LEADERSHIP?"

(b)(3):10 USC 424, 1.4 (c)

~~NOFORN~~  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC 424,1.4 (c)

(b)(1),(b)(3):50  
USC 403-1(i),1.4  
(c)

NOTE-ACCORDING TO (b)(1),(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i),1.4 (c)  
THERE IS NO TRUTH TO THE STORY ABOUT THE  
YANTAI MAYOR BEING RELATED TO ZHAO ZIYANG. THE ONLY  
RELATION OF ZHAO THAT WAS IN A LEADERSHIP POSITION WAS  
THE SON FROM HAINAN.

(b)(1),(b)(3):50  
USC 403-1(i),1.4  
(c)

2. ~~(C/NF)~~ MID-LEVEL PURGES. (b)(1),1.4 (c)  
GOVERNMENT TO GOVERNMENT MEETINGS IN BEIJING  
THAT HAVE TAKEN PLACE BEFORE AND AFTER 3/4 JUNE. [REDACTED]  
SAYS THAT THE MOST RECENT OF THE MEETINGS HAVE TAKEN  
PLACE IN A CORDIAL ATMOSPHERE. ALL OF THE CHINESE  
PARTICIPANTS IN THE EARLIER MEETINGS WERE STILL PRESENT.

(b)(1),(b)(3):50  
USC 403-1(i),1.4  
(c)

(b)(1),(b)(3):50  
USC 403-1(i),1.4  
(c)

HOWEVER, [REDACTED] NOTED THAT THERE WERE ALSO NEW FACES  
IN ADDITION TO THOSE HE HAD WORKED WITH BEFORE. [REDACTED]  
WAS SURPRISED THAT THESE NEW FACES WERE INTRODUCED  
AS LONG TIME EMPLOYEES, EVEN THOUGH IN ABOUT A YEAR OF  
DEALINGS (b)(1),1.4 (c) ON AN ISSUE, [REDACTED]  
HAD NEVER MET THESE PEOPLE.

(b)(1),(b)(3):50  
USC 403-1(i),1.4  
(c)

(b)(1),(b)(3):50  
USC 403-1(i),1.4  
(c)

(b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)(3):50 USC 403-  
1(i),1.4 (c)

[REDACTED] IMPLIED THAT RATHER THAN  
PURGING PEOPLE IMMEDIATELY THE NEW PEOPLE WERE EITHER  
THERE TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE AND SUPERVISION,  
OR WERE BEING GROOMED TO REPLACE THE ORIGINAL WORKING  
GROUP.)

/\*\*\*\*\* BEGINNING OF SECTION 002 \*\*\*\*\*/

(b)(1),(b)(3):50  
USC 403-1(i),1.4  
(c)

3. ~~(C/NF)~~ ACTS AGAINST THE PLA. [REDACTED] COULD NOT CONFIRM  
BY EITHER FIRST OR SECOND HAND OBSERVATION THE STORIES  
THAT PLA SOLDIERS WERE BEING KILLED BY LOCAL CITIZENS  
IN RETRIBUTION FOR THE EVENTS OF 3/4 JUNE. [REDACTED] WAS  
ALSO UNABLE TO CONFIRM, [REDACTED]  
THAT EXECUTIONS OR PURGES IN PLA UNITS WERE OCCURING.

(b)(1),(b)(3):50  
USC 403-1(i),1.4  
(c)

(b)(1),(b)(3):50  
USC 403-1(i),1.4  
(c)

[REDACTED] HAS HEARD GUNFIRE AT NIGHT IN BEIJING, BUT  
CANNOT DETERMINE THE REASON FOR THE GUNFIRE OR THE  
TARGET OF THE FIRE. (b)(1),1.4 (c)

[REDACTED] 10 (TEN) PLA  
SOLDIERS WERE KILLED BY SNIPERS THROUGH LATE JULY, NONE  
IN THE PAST COUPLE OF WEEKS. HOWEVER, (b)(1),1.4 (c)  
DID NOT GET THESE FIGURES FROM A FIRST HAND [REDACTED]

(b)(1),(b)(3):50  
USC 403-1(i),1.4  
(c)

(b)(1),(b)(3):50  
USC 403-1(i),1.4  
(c)

4. ~~(C/NF)~~ MILITARY SUPPORT FOR THE CRACKDOWN. [REDACTED]  
SAID THAT WHILE HE DOUBTED THAT ANY MILITARY REGION  
COULD ACTIVELY DISOBEY ORDERS FROM THE BEIJING OR CENTRAL  
LEADERSHIP, HE HAD HEARD FROM (b)(1),1.4 (c) THAT  
THERE WERE SOME MILITARY REGIONS THAT WERE RELUCTANT  
TO SEND TROOPS TO SUPPORT MARTIAL LAW. [REDACTED] POINTED  
OUT THAT RELUCTANCE DOES NOT MEAN DISOBEDIENCE. [REDACTED]  
BELIEVES THAT IF ANY MILITARY REGION DID NOT SEND  
FORCES TO BEIJING THE REASON WAS STRATEGIC. THAT IS,  
GUANGZHOU MILITARY REGION SENT ONLY ELEMENTS OF THE

(b)(1),(b)(3):50  
USC 403-1(i),1.4  
(c)

(b)(1),(b)(3):50  
USC 403-1(i),1.4  
(c)

(b)(1),(b)(3):50  
USC 403-1(i),1.4  
(c)

15TH AIRBORNE ARMY AND RETAINED OTHER FORCES FOR CONTINGENCY PURPOSES IN CASE OF REQUIREMENTS IN THE SPRATLY ISLANDS OR ON THE VIETNAM BORDER. THIS RELUCTANCE WAS NOT RESISTANCE TO THE DECISION TO USE FORCE TO CLEAR TIANANMEN SQUARE IN [REDACTED]

(b)(1),(b)(3):50  
USC 403-1(i),1.4  
(c)

[REDACTED] (b)(3):10 USC 424 - THIS COULD ALSO BE TRUE OF CHENGDU MR, WHICH WAS LIGHTLY REPRESENTED. GUANGZHOU MR ALSO SUPPLIED SOME OF THE AIRCRAFT USED TO MOVE THE AIRBORNE FORCES. THESE AIRCRAFT WERE SUPPLEMENTED BY BOEING 737'S AND TRIDENT'S SUBORDINATE TO THE MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE).

(b)(1),(b)(3):50 USC  
403-1(i),1.4 (c)

5. [REDACTED] (b)(1),1.4 (c) FANG LIZHI TO A BRIEFING AT THE CHINA DAILY EDITORIAL OFFICES. DURING THE BRIEFING [REDACTED] (b)(1),1.4 (c) REPONDED TO A QUESTION ON THE SHELTERING OF FANG LIZHI BY THE U.S. EMBASSY BY SAYING THAT FANG HAD COMMITTED CRIMINAL ACTS AND WOULD BE APPREHENDED ONCE HE STEPPED FOOT ON CHINESE TERRITORY. WHEN ASKED WHAT STEPS THE PRC GOVERNMENT WOULD TAKE TO RESOLVE THE PROBLEM, [REDACTED] (b)(1),1.4 (c) NOTED THAT FANG WAS A "BURDEN" ON THE UNITED STATES AND THAT THE PROBLEM MUST BE SOLVED BY THE UNITED STATES. THE CHINA DAILY OFFICIAL COMMENTED THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS "WELCOME TO ITS BURDEN."

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

(b)(1),(b)(3):50 USC  
403-1(i),1.4 (c)

6. [REDACTED] (b)(1),1.4 (c) SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS. [REDACTED] THAT IN HIS OPINION, GORBACHEV WILL BE MUCH MORE COMFORTABLE AFTER THE DEATH OF DENG XIAOPING. AT PRESENT, CHINA AND THE SOVIET UNION ARE TAKING TWO APPROACHES TO UNBENDING PARTY RULE. CHINA FIRST TRIED THE OPEN APPROACH WHICH IN THE PRESENT INSTANCE WAS UNSUCCESSFUL [REDACTED] (b)(1),1.4 (c) CHARACTERIZED IT AS THE "SOFT APPROACH") AND HAD NOW USED A FIRM, OR HARD APPROACH. THE SOVIET UNION, WITH GLASNOST, IS NOW USING A "SOFT" APPROACH AFTER HAVING USED THE HARD APPROACH FOR YEARS. THEREFORE, IN [REDACTED] (b)(1),1.4 (c) JUDGEMENT, GORBACHEV MUST BE QUITE CONCERNED ABOUT EVENTS IN CHINA. [REDACTED] (b)(1),1.4 (c) COMMENTED THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS NOW FACING SERIOUS ETHNIC AND LABOR UNREST, AND THAT CONSERVATIVE FORCES IN THE SOVIET UNION WILL USE THESE PROBLEMS TO SEEK A RETURN TO THE "HARD" APPROACH, POINTING TO EVENTS IN CHINA AS JUSTIFICATION.

(b)(1),(b)(3):50  
USC 403-1(i),1.4  
(c)

(b)(1),(b)(3):50 USC  
403-1(i),1.4 (c)

[REDACTED] (b)(1),1.4 (c) ON SINO-SOVIET TRADE ISSUES, [REDACTED] (b)(1),1.4 (c) THAT THERE WAS A GREAT OPPORTUNITY FOR MID-LEVEL TECHNICAL TRADE, FOR THE UPGRADING OF OLD SOVIET FACTORIES, AND FOR BETTER BORDER TRADE (THERE WERE COMPATIBLE TECHNOLOGIES AND RESOURCES THAT COMPLEMENTED EACH OTHER). HOWEVER, IN BOTH CHINA AND THE SOVIET UNION THE REAL NEED WAS FOR HIGH TECHNOLOGY, AND THE ONLY [REDACTED] (b)(1),1.4 (c) TO

(b)(1),(b)(3):50 USC  
403-1(i),1.4 (c)

(b)(1),(b)(3):50 USC  
403-1(i),1.4 (c)

/\*\*\*\*\* BEGINNING OF SECTION 003 \*\*\*\*\*/  
FILL THAT NEED WAS THE WEST, ESPECIALLY THE UNITED STATES. [REDACTED] (b)(3):50 USC 403-1 (i),1.4 (c) THAT THE CHINESE AND THE SOVIETS WOULD GROW CLOSER, ESPECIALLY IDEOLOGICALLY, BUT THAT THE MILITARY REALITY OF HAVING FOUGHT EACH OTHER HAD

(b)(1),(b)(3):50 USC  
403-1(i),1.4 (c)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~NOFORN~~

NOT CHANGED. THE TWO COUNTRIES REMAIN TRADITIONAL ENEMIES AND THERE IS STILL MISTRUST ON BOTH SIDES.

(b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i),1.4 (c)

(b)(3):10 USC 424

ADMIN

PROJ: (U)

COLL: (U)

INSTR: (U)

PREP: (U)

-

ACQ: (U)

DISSEM: (U)

WARNING: (U)

-

~~DECL:OADR~~

(b)(3):10 USC 424

REPORT CLASSIFIED ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ NOT  
~~RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS.~~

END OF MESSAGE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~NOFORN~~  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~