

Notes from a Politburo session, November 13, 1986

About discussions between Shevardnadze and Shultz in Vienna.

Shevardnadze. When I proposed to discuss what is allowed and what is not allowed under the ABM Treaty, he did not want to talk about it. At the press conference, he did not even mention that he was presented with a draft of a framework agreement.

Gorbachev. What we proposed in Reykjavik is a powerful idea. It has a global character. And now we should move forward, without wasting time, but also without haste, and not letting ourselves to be swayed under pressure. That would be our defeat.

The same on issues of disarmament. [We should] not stir shit--and other things. This is not in our interest--neither in terms of real disarmament, nor even [in terms of] propaganda. The Americans feel this, and are continuing to circumvent Reykjavik.

We have not yet truly understood what Reykjavik means. And nobody should be impatient or make haste: give us more, something more! Nonsense!

That we proposed a package was a powerful idea. It has world-wide relevance. Therefore--[we should] expose everything that was left behind, and what is being imposed on us. [We should] not bend under the pressure.

But we should not haste, not like cannons before a breakthrough, this is still only a preparation for a breakthrough.

Now they want to present the situation in such a way that the routine in Vienna is a continuation of Reykjavik. It is good that Shevardnadze exposed it at the press conference. Now let them think.

If we see that something is getting weaker in our pressure, we will give them something else. Let Akhromeyev think it up.

Note this: the U.S. did not expect that the talks with Shultz in Vienna would go like this. Eduard Amvrosievich conducted them wonderfully. He led them to the main point. They were waiting for concessions. And we did not give them any! So they got stuck. And they don't know what to do now. We have an opportunity to press them a little more.

Put more pressure on the European wing. There is disquiet, confusion in Western Europe. The FRG is shifting to the right. We are going to issue a harsh judgment of Kohl's actions.

Mitterrand is skeptical about SDI.

The Europeans want meetings with us--both to visit us and to invite us to visit. They have their roles assigned. Some of them intentionally inspire discontent with America in Western Europe, because [America] is to blame for the Soviet "package."

There are many issues coming up to the surface in Western Europe, for example about conventional weapons, [and] about relations between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization.

We almost forgot about the moratorium. It would be difficult to exit the moratorium. The entire world will put pressure on us. It is very difficult. We should raise interest toward the moratorium. I am going to talk about it in India. Because in doing this we are blocking the [efforts to] undermine the ABM [regime].

[On human rights] We need to think it all through seriously, to work out a conception on human rights, both at home and abroad.

And to put an end to the routine. It only produces dissidents. Somebody wants to go abroad for three months, and we allow him only one, and that's it. After all, if he wants to run away, let him run away. It is not a loss, it is a gain if all kinds of trash got out of the country [abroad]. What, essentially, did we have to give up? [Yuri] Orlov and [Anatoly] Shcharansky? Let us sweep out with a broom everyone whom we can, and send them abroad without hurting our security!

[Source: Archive of the Gorbachev Foundation. Translated by Svetlana Savranskaya for the National Security Archive.]