

CUBAN CONTINGENCIES

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CUBAN CONTINGENCIES

I. General Considerations

Cuban Soviet intervention in Angola raises some serious issues for the United States. The US is already on record at authoritative levels that it will react should Cuban-Soviet actions be repeated in another conflict. The assumption of this study is that such action is at least a possibility, and three general problems are examined:

(1) Those political-economic or other non-military actions that might be taken, either now or over the next few months to dissuade Castro from further intervention. In general, none of these actions, in themselves, are thought to be decisive; they do, however, constitute a pattern of measures, either unilateral or multilateral, that would be intended to isolate Castro and to exert pressures on both Cuba and the Soviets so that our warnings will be taken seriously.

(2) There are also some intermediate actions, to be taken prior to the actual fact of a Cuban intervention, but that foreshadow a military course of action -- such as redeployment in the Caribbean, reinforcement of Guantanamo, opening of a new base in Puerto Rico, etc. These would be intended to give more credence to our warnings; since implementing some of these actions would require lead times of several months, their effect would not be immediately manifest.

(3) We have examined a set of possible military options: They are predicated on the assumptions that the Cubans have already taken, or are in the process of taking, an interventionist action. Thus the further assumption is that various deterrent actions have been unsuccessful, and the US has reached a point where it would have to seriously consider whether to take retaliatory military actions. The military options, ranging from limited quarantines of Cubans to direct air strikes and mining have been examined primarily to highlight what forces would be required, within what time period and what implications would follow from implementation of various actions.

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It is obvious that the risks in taking military action could be extremely high if only because they lead to a confrontation with the Soviet Union. In this connection the 1962 crisis can be a misleading analogy: world conditions and power relations are vastly different now; a new Cuban crisis would not necessarily lead to a Soviet retreat.

A. US Objectives

In dealing with the implications of Soviet and Cuban intervention, the US has several objectives.

Our basic aim is to prevent the creation of a pattern of international conduct in which Cuba and the USSR arrogate to themselves the right to intervene with combat forces in local or regional conflicts. We are already engaged in such an effort, through public warnings, signals to the USSR, and changes in our African policy.

If, however, we cannot deter such intervention we have to consider a different set of aims:

-- We could concentrate on actions that are intended to make the Soviets and Cubans pay a political price, e. g., condemnation, economic sanctions, but which in the short term, at least, do not decisively affect the situation where Cuban forces are involved.

-- Or, we could have as an objective the termination of Cuban action, through measures involving different levels of force -- for example, a limited measure to block outgoing Cuban ships carrying troops or war material; or much more severe action such as punitive airstrikes against Cuban bases or airfields.

In general, we will have the problem of deciding whether our actions are geared to forcing the Cubans to withdraw or are designed to punish them for what has occurred. In addition, we have the problem of how to deal with the Soviet Union.

It can be argued that Cuba is obviously the more vulnerable, the weaker partner, and located in an area where the US has extremely strong advantages. It would be easier for Castro to lose face or retreat. Isolating Castro, therefore, would enhance our chances of achieving our objective. But it can be also argued that

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we cannot leave US-Soviet relations relatively untouched, while putting pressures only on Cuba. If there is, in fact, a second Cuban Soviet intervention it would almost certainly signal a Soviet willingness to run high risks of a crisis with the US. Therefore, the US would have to decide whether to invoke Soviet American relations, by threatening or adopting sever action with long term effects such as terminating the grain sales agreement, breaking off SALT, etc.

In sum, a major US decision would be whether broadening the crisis would be likely to achieve an objective as compared to limiting our action to Cuba.

B. Level of Provocation

It is difficult to determine in advance, a precise threshold which would determine our response to a Cuban provocation. The threshold would obviously be low in the case of a Cuban action directed against the US or our territories (Puerto Rico); higher in the Caribbean area (Guyana or Jamaica) or Latin America where the Rio Pact applies; and highest in Africa. In Latin America, intervention has been characterized less by support of revolutionary movement than by direct approaches to specific governments, (i. e., Guyana and Jamaica). Involvement extends from economic advisers to military training, first in Cuba and then in the nation concerned, infiltration into the power apparatus of the target nation and eventually perhaps the stationing of Cuban troops. Cubans are now training Guyana defense force elements

There is some possibility that the Cubans will attempt to involve Guyanan troops in southern Africa.

Cuban provocation in Africa would present special problems. Cuban military intervention there can follow a continuum of actions from training of insurgents to shipments of small arms, use of

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advisers, commitment of military support personnel, small contingents of combat troops, or a large-scale commitment of military forces. Moreover, the beginning steps toward Cuban action in Africa which could result in commitment of combat troops in operations within Rhodesia have already been taken. Up to 100 Cuban advisers have been sent to Mozambique and are providing military training to Rhodesian insurgents.

-- In sum, there is a good chance the US will be confronted by an ambiguous situation, in which Cuban intervention is not clearly established.

-- There is also the contingency that Cuba will not be directly involved, but a flow of Soviet supplies, plus Cuban training amounts to a major indirect intervention -- but an ambiguous situation.

-- These ambiguities could be particularly troublesome if we are to marshal domestic and Congressional support for counteraction.

C. The Current Situation

We have already taken a number of actions to signal a tougher policy towards Cuba. We have:

-- tightened up issuance of visas to Cubans coming to the US for purposes other than attending international conferences;

-- refused to permit overflight through US airspace for Cuban regular-scheduled commercial and charter airflights;

-- informed the Japanese and British that we would continue to refuse to permit the import of stainless steel containing Cuban nickel.

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There have been some indications that Castro is taking the US warnings seriously. The most significant of these are the defensive tone of Castro's last public speech on April 19, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] frequent Cuban public statements that Cuban troops will not be used in Western Hemisphere countries, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez' assurance to the British Ambassador in Havana that Castro did not wish to exacerbate Cuban-US relations significantly, and Castro's own statement to the British that he favored peaceful solutions to South African problems and would withdraw from Angola when he could, but it would be slow.*


Other developments have occurred spontaneously or with indirect or low-key US encouragement which have revealed to Castro the diplomatic price he has had to pay for Angola. Among these are:

- The June Amphictyonic Congress of Latin American chiefs of state in Panama has been called off because Fidel's presence was unacceptable to others;
- A number of Latin American countries considering diplomatic relations with Cuba have decided not to proceed. Elements within the new Argentine junta are looking for a pretext to sever diplomatic relations with Havana;
- Iran has already broken off diplomatic ties over the issue of revolution;
- Panama's government-inspired press has become critical of Castro despite Fidel's lavish reception for Torrijos in January;
- Venezuela has suspended Cuban airline flights and oil supply discussions;

*In spite of these short-term observations, it should be noted, nevertheless, that the current intelligence estimate remains that it is likely that within six months the Cubans will be heavily involved in supporting the insurgents in Mozambique and some military personnel will be in combat with insurgents inside Rhodesia.

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- At least eleven hemisphere countries have expressed public disapproval of foreign intervention in the context of Cuban action in Angola.

In order to consider Cuban matters requiring decisions as they come up, we have formed a small interagency group which will continue to meet when necessary. The group will keep a watching brief on problems of a military, commercial, political, and diplomatic nature as they arise and will attempt to provide coordination and coherence to the decision-making process relating to Cuba.

II. Courses of Action

In this section, four categories of actions are examined:

- (1) Political measures, both immediate ones and longer range and economic pressures, bilateral and multilateral, affecting Cuba;
- (2) actions against the USSR;
- (3) a scenario of actions, including military deployments and changes in basing in the Caribbean, designed as a preventive measures to deter Castro, and,
- (4) four aspects of military action:
 - (a) quarantines/blockade;
 - (b) air quarantine;
 - (c) mining; and
 - (d) punitive strikes.

These are not necessarily discrete choices, some political action could be preparatory to eventual military action, and, conversely, the failure to take political measures do not preclude military actions.

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A. Political: Cuba


The most effective political and economic pressures would be those that involve concerted action with the major European and Latin American countries, primarily because the US has little bilateral economic leverage which it can exert on Cuba, and because in the event of a serious crisis US counteraction would be strengthened if we moved as a result of strong support from the hemisphere and NATO countries.

Thus, a major political objective is to lay the groundwork through various consultative mechanisms, and bilaterally, for taking action in the future, including action involving the use of US armed forces.

Immediate Actions.

There are a number of actions we could take right away and at little cost with the hope of deterring Castro. We could:

- Reconfine the Cuban UN diplomats to a radius of 25 miles from the center of New York City. This would be a symbol of the deterioration of US-Cuban bilateral relations, cut down Cuban lobbying activities on Capitol Hill, and hamper Cuban intelligence gathering. This could be implemented by a note from USUN to the Cuban UN Mission.



- Reactivate USIA "Con Cuba" broadcasts from Florida. These were terminated in 1974 for cost-effective reasons but were interpreted as a gesture toward Cuba. This kind of action would be primarily psychological.
- Mobilize US public and Congressional opinion - encourage Congressional resolutions against Cuban intervention and expand our efforts with the press on background, not public.

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-- Diplomatic Offensive. The Secretary could send letters to his colleagues in all NATO countries and Japan, plus Sweden, appropriate African countries, and Spain on the threat of further Cuban military adventures in Africa. Similar messages oriented toward this hemisphere could go to Brazil, Venezuela, Colombia, Costa Rica, and perhaps Argentina, Trinidad-Tobago, Guatemala and Peru.

-- Send a State Department official to visit Caribbean countries to brief them on Cuban intervention.

More Serious Actions

If the Cubans show evidence of positioning themselves to use regular troops to intervene in the internal affairs of another country we could warn Castro of specific retaliation, combining this with bilateral and multilateral diplomatic actions. If the military intervention was in Africa, the UN would be the appropriate multilateral forum; if in the Western Hemisphere, we would want to take action in the first instance under the Rio Treaty.

a) Bilateral Approach to Cuba

We could send a message to Castro stating that we have evidence that Cuban regular forces are about to be employed overseas and that carrying out such a step would have grave consequences including the possible imposition of a quarantine to prevent the shipment from Cuba of military manpower or equipment or of military equipment to Cuba.

b) UN - We could raise the issue of Cuban military intervention in an African country in the United Nations as a violation of the UN Charter and as a threat to peace.

The chances of success of this kind of initiative would be conditioned by the nature and place of the Cuban involvement. Any effort to censure Cuba for action in support of liberation movements in either the Namibian or Rhodesian case would have practically no chance of succeeding. If the Cuban intervention were to be in the Spanish Sahara or in some other part of Africa where there were contending points of view among the African countries, the result could be different, particularly if a government from the area involved takes the initiative.

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Alternatively to asking for formal UN action, we could send a letter to the President of the Security Council - for circulation to all members - which cited Cuban actions and expressed our concern at their implications for peace and security. It would invite a response by Cuba, but could set the stage for any future formal action we might decide to take, if Cuba proceeded to send its regular forces into another African country.

c) Rio Treaty. If the Cuban intervention takes place in this hemisphere, we could seek agreement by parties to the Rio Treaty that Cuban military intervention is endangering the peace of America. We could seek to impose sanctions calling for terminating trade relations and diplomatic ties. If Cuban troops were invited by a duly constituted government, the provisions of the Rio Treaty would not provide for the application of sanctions unless the situation was adjudged under Article 6 as endangering the "peace of America" which "affected" the "integrity of the territory or the sovereignty ... of any American state." Obtaining the necessary two-thirds vote to impose sanctions would be difficult but not impossible.

d) NATO. We could brief the NATO Council in Brussels about imminent Cuban military intervention in another country and on the measures we intend to take and call for parallel and supportive action by our allies. (Parallel bilateral approaches to Japan and Spain should be made.)

France, following its tradition, might raise procedural objections to discussing sanctions against a country outside the NATO area. But many NATO countries have greater economic interests in Africa than we do and would respond individually if not collectively.

e) EC 9. Encourage the EC (through its current President from Luxembourg) to issue a statement expressing concern over any further foreign intervention by Cuba.

The EC issued a similar statement on February 23 regarding foreign intervention in South Africa and a new statement could be pinpointed at Cuban intervention with Soviet backing.

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f) Public Posture. It is essential that the application of graduated pressures on Cuba have broad public and Congressional support. This will require increased Administration lobbying with Congress and public disclosure of some, but not all of the measures as we go along.

We should continue to hit the points we already have been making publicly regarding the implications for world order and peace of further Soviet-Cuban interventions. We would attempt to overcome the prevalent editorial skepticism regarding our ability to apply meaningful pressure on the Soviet Union and Cuba.

g) Relationship of Political and Economic to Military Options

The initiation of military measures, not risking imminent involvement in hostilities (see below II D), would lend credibility to the political and economic measures at the stage of threatened Cuban intervention.

B. Economic: Cuba

The US economic leverage against Cuba is very limited. The US began restricting trade with Cuba on October 19, 1960 and the restrictions remain in force. US trade with Cuba is virtually nil; that of US subsidiaries is marginal; and Cuba gets practically no funding from international organizations of which the US is a member.

Occasionally small shipments of medical supplies unavailable elsewhere than the US and contraceptives have been licensed. Gift parcels containing food, clothing and medicine under \$100 in value to individual Cubans totaled \$8,000,000 in the period January 1, 1975 to April 13, 1976. Prohibiting these humanitarian exceptions would do minimal damage to the Cuban economy and would leave us vulnerable to the distracting public charge that we were focusing on the wrong target.

Economic pressures on Cuba would have to be brought to bear through third countries -- Latin America and our allies and other western countries having an interest in a stable world order. We could:

-- Try to persuade a number of countries (UK, Sweden, Norway, Finland, Canada and France) to terminate their assistance programs to Cuba.

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-- Encourage Argentina and Spain to slow down further extension of credits to Cuba. Cuba has access to over \$3 billion in credits from these two countries and a few others, little of which has yet been drawn down.

-- Seek to persuade Cuba's Western and Japanese trading partners to restrict trade. Forty percent of Cuba's imports originate in non-Communist countries.

C. Political and Economic: Soviet Union

Soviet-Cuban ties are an interwoven fabric of economic dependence, ideological interaction, and geo-political partnership. The Soviets provide the commercial, military, financial goods and technology in return for Cuba's communist orthodoxy and support in the Third World. Cuba, however, is not subject to ultimate Soviet military discipline as are the Eastern Europeans and its dependency is of a more flexible economic nature. However, Soviet leverage over Cuban adventures in military intervention is nearly absolute. Thus, we can assume that if the Cubans embark on a military adventure they have Soviet guarantee of logistic support. However, there may be a level of Cuban involvement abroad which is independent of Soviet design or urging.

In short, confronting Cuba -- the weaker partner -- is an obvious step toward confronting the USSR.

In the US-Soviet understanding of 1962 between Kennedy and Khrushchev, our non-invasion pledge was given in return for withdrawal of Soviet missiles under UN verification. Failure of the Cubans to permit UN supervision renders the US pledge technically inoperative. The Soviets indicated on March 25, 1976 that they regard the 1962 understanding as still in force. We have used the understanding as a basis for limiting Soviet military assistance to Cuba to non-strategic/offensive weaponry.

Direct military action against or a quarantine of Cuba would be regarded by the Soviets as a major challenge to their prestige and could lead to a Soviet riposte elsewhere, such as re-opening the question of Berlin access. (In the ensuing global political/military crisis, we could count on PRC support.) Before getting into such a confrontation there are a number of bilateral measures of mounting seriousness we could take to impress the Soviets of the need to exert restraint on Cuba. We could:

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- Postpone low substance exchanges and high visibility contacts.
- Delay the process of opening consulates in Kiev and New York.
- Pull back from planning of bilateral high-substance contacts.
- Cease licenses for computers.
- Postpone implementation of the 11 US-Soviet bilateral cooperation agreements in fields ranging from artificial heart research to outer space, or selectively renounce some of these agreements.
- Denounce the 1972 joint US-Soviet Statement on peaceful coexistence.
- Delay additional grain purchases.
- Discourage private US economic projects.

Finally, we could break off SALT and MBFR negotiations and terminate grain sales.

Conversely, we could deliberately choose not to take action against Soviet-American relations as an effort to localize our confrontation with Cuba. Thus, continuing with grain sales, or SALT, etc., could signal that we had limited objectives -- forcing a Cuban retreat rather than inflicting a defeat on the USSR.

In either case before we undertook measures affecting US-Soviet relations, a Presidential message to Brezhnev, specifying our precise objectives and soliciting Soviet restraints on Cuba might be desirable.

D. Preventive Actions

1. Description: General Objective

This option seeks to influence Cuban behavior to prevent Cuban intervention elsewhere in the world, but particularly in Latin America.

Political and economic measures, combined with certain preventive military actions not requiring the use of force, may be all that is necessary to accomplish our objectives. However, such actions would draw fire from certain sectors of Congress which might claim we were on a slippery slope requiring consultations under the War Powers Act. A strategy for

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consultations with the leaderships and key senators and members of Congress would be required. Though preventive measures would not require formal consultations with our allies, close communication should be maintained.

The set of preventive actions outlined culminate in the permanent rebasing of US forces in the Caribbean. They have a logical stopping point short of hostilities. These preventive actions, while confined to the hemisphere where US action is most supportable, may possibly also contribute to the African problem by giving Castro the justification for withdrawal he will need in defending his actions to his audience.

2. Major Steps

The principal action is the permanent establishment of increased US force presence in the Caribbean. Prior to that, however, there are short-term operations of a non-combat nature available to increase Cuban perception of threat.

b. Reinforce Guantanamo with one battalion of Marines and one Marine attack squadron. (A minimum of 36 hours would be required for deploying forces if they are airlifted, or 9 days if surface lifted. Would disrupt LANTCOM forces and affect our commitment to NATO.) This action is designed only to indicate concern and demonstrate resolve.

c. Engage in electronic warfare by jamming communications, navigation aids, etc. (Would require CINCLANT electronic warfare assets, support aircraft and equipment from CINCPAC and CINCSAC, and Air National Guard aircraft.)

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e. Temporary increase in force presence in the Caribbean. (Deploy Carrier Task Group and service ships to the Caribbean. Requires 6 to 7 days.)

f. Permanent reposturing of forces:

(1) Announcement of a joint command headquartered in Puerto Rico (no forces required, effective immediately).

(2) Reopening of Ramey Air Force Base in Puerto Rico; basing of a Tactical Fighter Wing at Ramey; rebasing an Army infantry brigade or equivalent Marine unit in Puerto Rico; basing a destroyer squadron at Roosevelt Roads; creating an Inter-American training establishment. (Reopening of Ramey would take six to nine months as would repositioning a destroyer squadron at Roosevelt Roads. Other repositioning would follow reopening of the base. A rough-estimate cost for reopening the base would be under \$50 million, for establishing the destroyer squadron an estimated \$70 million, and for repositioning of other forces estimated at \$10 million each.) Additional study is needed to refine these estimates.

(3) Reopen Naval Base Key West Florida

(a) Reopening of Key West Naval Station; rebasing a destroyer squadron and basing a Patrol Gun Boat (PG) squadron at NAVSTA Key West; creating an Inter-American training establishment. The harbor can accommodate, using existing wharf and pier facilities, 15 escort type ships (DDs, DEs). Major facility rehabilitation, particularly for the piers, would be required. No cost estimates or times are currently available. Construction for new piers to support the destroyers and PGs is estimated at \$20 million.

(b) Rebase one air wing at Naval Air Station Key West (approximately 70 aircraft). The Air Station support facility is in usable condition and currently operational. (Realignment study underway to relocate all air squadrons and reduce support functions.) Cost estimates for rebasing estimated at \$20 million. Additional study

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is needed to refine this estimate. Air Wing can commence initial operations at Key West NAS 48 hours after notification to reposition.

g. Multi-National Force. Create multi-national naval force from Latin American navies to operate in the Caribbean. A multi-national air force could operate out of Puerto Rico or Key West. (This step would indicate hemispheric solidarity.)

3. Implications

a. Rebasing forces would not significantly degrade their availability for NATO commitments. Rebasing would not foreclose other options, but would demonstrate US concern over Cuban intervention in Latin America. Increasing US military presence in the Caribbean without other political or military actions is unlikely to provide a sufficient threat to deter further overt Cuban intervention in southern Africa, although it might deter military intervention in Latin America. Additional US military activity in the Caribbean would increase the probability of a US-Cuban "incident". OAS support for US actions is unlikely until member nations publicly acknowledge the perceived Cuban threat to Latin America. Certain elements in Puerto Rico would be expected to oppose repositioning US military forces in Puerto Rico.

b. US military services would require additional detailed study of costs and force posturing implications before any course of action involving permanent rebasing is adopted.

4. Expected Results. If successful, Castro would refrain from intervention elsewhere in the world and would withdraw his troops from Africa to defend Cuba against the increased threat.

5. Risks. Could stimulate threats or action against the vulnerable Guantanamo facility. Could stimulate vocal criticism and action by nationalist elements in Puerto Rico. Could stimulate exile organizations to initiate actual paramilitary operations against Cuba.

E. Military Actions

General Observations

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Possible Soviet Military Responses in the Cuban Area

The Soviets have the capability of a wide range of military responses to a US military action against Cuba. One of the more logical considerations would be military pressure in another area of the world, such as Berlin. There is a potential for direct, though limited, involvement in the Cuban area.

Soviet naval forces might escort merchant ships and confront a US strike force. The Soviets have demonstrated the capability to deploy major surface and submarine forces at great distances from Russia. A force of 30 to 50 surface combatants and 10-20 submarines could be deployed to Cuba within 15 days. As few as six to eight surface escorts could provide continuous escort of the [] Soviet/Pact merchant ships that arrive in Cuba each day.

There is the possibility that Soviet piloted MIGs would be engaging US aircraft. There are possibly as many as 20 Soviet MIG pilots in Cuba as advisors and instructors. These pilots could fly operational missions for the Cubans in which case there exists the possibility of a Soviet piloted Cuban MIG engaging US aircraft. MIG forces could engage ships or aircraft at distances of 500 nm with minimum reaction time.

Pressure on Guantanamo by Cuba

The Cubans could apply heavy pressure on the Guantanamo Naval Base. The current plan can defend against the regular Cuban army. If Cuba ordered mobilization, by M+30 they could have 700,000 men under arms. Defending the Guantanamo enclave against such a force would require a major commitment of US forces as discussed below (see III A and Tab A).

Impact on US Military Forces and Contingency Planning Worldwide

The majority of the military forces allocated to CINCLANT for planning by the JCS are committed in support of the Cuban contingency options. Upon implementation of the Cuban contingency

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options, CINCLANT would be unable to conduct other contingency operations with his remaining forces.

All scheduled training and exercises, such as those with NATO in the Atlantic or Latin America, would be cancelled. Atlantic Amphibious Fleet and the bulk of the entire East Coast Marine Amphibious Force would be committed to Cuban operations.

There would be immediate and serious disruption of ship and aircraft overhaul and modernization schedules which would begin immediately. This deferral of overhauls would exacerbate the existing backlog of ship overhauls and further degrade fleet material readiness.

It is not anticipated that there would be an initial impact on the Sixth Fleet. However, rotation of Sixth Fleet units would be severely affected as their projected reliefs would be committed in Cuba. Within about three months, it is highly likely that deployed fleet commitments would require relief.

Amphibious task force units and Marines of the Pacific Fleet are earmarked to support the Cuban contingency operations and the drawdown on these forces would severely limit CINCPAC's flexibility to respond to contingency plans for operations in the Western Pacific.

The forces earmarked for the Cuban contingency are in large part the same forces that would be required for any US involvement in the Middle East. Different contingency situations throughout the world are competing for the same resources, manpower, equipment, and materiel. There are no uncommitted forces assigned to the CINCs. All have assigned missions with competing priorities.

The execution of the Cuban contingency would involve a substantial portion of the Tactical Air Force of AFLANT, and the Infantry Forces of ARLANT; these forces have competing contingency assignments in the Middle East.

US military involvement with Cuba could provoke a similar response from the USSR, either in Cuba or in other distant parts of the world. The United States would be hard pressed if called upon to

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confront the Soviets or any other opposing force militarily elsewhere in the world, while engaged at the same time in military operations in Cuba. In this event mobilization would become an absolute requirement.

Possible Adverse Outcome of Any Options

The selection of any of the following options could result in a reasonable chance of attaining the desired result. However, the inability of the United States to control the Cuban and/or Soviet response could lead to resistance, opposition, and escalation. Examples might be:

- Cuba decides to use force to drive the US military force out of Guantanamo. A major land war could result, requiring either evacuation of Guantanamo or invasion of Cuba and destruction of the Castro Government.
- Soviet ships do not honor the blockade/quarantine leading to seizure or sinking of ships. Escalation to general war could result.
- Soviets provide naval escort for shipping to Cuba. The US forces could overcome this response, but such action could again escalate to general war.
- Soviets/Cubans attempt to bypass a maritime quarantine/blockade by utilizing air transport. The US effort to enforce an air quarantine/blockade could result in destruction of a Soviet or Cuban transport aircraft. Such action could elicit retaliation against US aircraft worldwide.
- Soviets mistake US intentions in Cuba as an attempt to destroy a communist state to which they have made major commitments and escalate the conflict to general war.

All of the options are envisioned as low intensity combat with a low level of direct combat engagement. A Cuban/Soviet response could escalate in areas that would maximize US casualties and thus provoke stronger response. The circumstances that could lead the United States to select a military option against Cuba should be serious enough to warrant further action in preparation for general war.

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Precautionary Legal Considerations

War Powers

Any alternative selected would require a report under the War Powers Act, which applies to any case in which US forces are introduced:

Into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances;

Into the territory, airspace or waters of a foreign nation while equipped for combat.

Substantive Considerations

Any of the following alternatives chosen would be characterized by the Cubans/Soviets as an act of war, classically defined as a hostile contention by means of armed forces carried out between states.

Article 2 of the United Nations Charter provides for the undertaking of all members to "refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purpose of the United Nations."

Chapter V of the Organization of American States Charter commits all members to "peaceful settlement of disputes". The use of armed force in collective action is authorized only in cases of aggression or threats to the security of the Americas.

Announcements Necessary

A Presidential proclamation would be required for implementation of a quarantine blockade or mining.

Quarantine, blockade, or mining would require notice to neutral shipping.

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Conditions Relative to the 1962 Cuban Missile Quarantine

The 1962 quarantine was based on justification provided by OAS support consistent with the UN Charter; and an immediate threat of offensive missiles against security of the Americas.

At that time, measures stronger than quarantine against importation of offensive strategic missiles were considered and discarded in favor of a "measured response".

1. Quarantine/Blockade

This action is designed to isolate Cuba from the outside world and thus bring strong pressure to bear by denying it essential military and/or economic support. The heavy dependence on imports are a major Cuban vulnerability. Cuba's foreign trade moves almost exclusively by sea. Total trade during the 1970s has averaged 15 to 20 million tons a year, two-thirds of which is import.

Nearly all (95%) of Cuba's trade moves on foreign ships; the small Cuban Merchant Marine handles only a minor share of total trade. Communist shipping accounts for the major (70%) portion of total Cuban seaborne trade.

In implementing a sea quarantine/blockade, an area would be defined by proclamation. In the 1962 Cuban quarantine, the outer limit of this area was approximately 500 miles from Cuba. With current force levels, the intercept line would be much closer to Cuba with primary coverage on the ports of Havana and Santiago de Cuba.

Three alternatives are considered under a quarantine/blockade:

- (a) Quarantine outgoing and incoming selected war materiel.
- (b) Quarantine of all oil entering Cuba.
- (c) Maritime blockade of Cuba to prevent the import or export into or out of Cuba of all material except for food and medical supplies.

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These three possibilities have the following in common:

Concurrent with the announcement of a maritime quarantine/blockade by the President, if not previously ordered, the Ground Defense Force at NAVBASEGTMO will be reinforced and the evacuation of dependents and nonessential personnel will be accomplished.

Sufficient combat and reconnaissance ships and aircraft will be employed to identify, track, intercept, inspect, and clear, divert, or detain those ships or aircraft designated by CINCLANT that are known or suspected to be attempting to run the quarantine or blockade.

Forces Required: See Tab B.

Time Required to Commence Operations

Maritime quarantine/blockade can commence within 6 days after receipt of execute order, providing 48 hours advance warning has been given.

The critical element is the time required to get the carrier forces underway. Some air reconnaissance and surface units could commence operations within 12 hours. The number of available ships would depend upon disposition and assigned mission at the time this option was ordered. Within 12 hours, it would become apparent that the United States was preparing for other than routine action. As units proceeded to blockade stations, it could be determined that a Cuban quarantine was intended. Implementation of a quarantine could not commence prior to a Presidential proclamation.

Operations to be Conducted

All ships, including warships designated by CINCLANT on the basis of information available to him will be intercepted by US ships. Ships not so designated are not to be interfered with. Any ship, boat, or small craft which is known to have taken aboard personnel or cargo from a designated ship, whether outside or within the quarantine area, will be considered a designated ship. Such a vessel shall then be treated as any other designated ship while in the quarantine/blockade area.

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If it is suspected that the intercepted ship may be carrying contraband to or from Cuba, a visit and search will be made to verify the suspicion.

Any ship which is determined by the commander of the intercepting ship to be carrying no contraband shall be permitted to proceed.

Ships which are to be visited will be stopped. In signifying his intent to stop a ship, the commander of the intercepting ship will use all available communications, including international code signals, flag hoist, blinking lights, radio, loud speakers, and other appropriate means. Should these measures be ignored, warning shots across the bow should be fired, or, in the case of submarines, equivalent warning action should be taken. If the ship fails to halt as a result of these measures, minimum force may be used, attempting to damage only nonvital parts of the intercepted ship, such as the rudder, and attempting to avoid injury or loss of life.

Visit and search of a stopped ship shall consist of examining the manifest and inspecting the cargo. In the event the visit is refused, the ship may be taken into custody. A boarding party shall be placed on board. Forceful boarding and control of the ship's operation may be necessary. If boarding meets with active and organized resistance, the ship will be disabled or destroyed as necessary to prevent the transport of contraband to and from Cuba. Destruction action, if required, will be taken only on order from CINCLANT.

If it becomes necessary to destroy or disable a ship, ample warning should be given of intentions in order to permit sufficient time for debarkation of the passengers and crew. Assistance shall be given to the maximum extent permitted by the operational conditions.

A ship suspected of carrying contraband shall be directed to proceed to such non-Cuban ports, if inbound, as the owners or master may elect or return to Cuba, if outbound. Surveillance of the suspected ship during this transit will be maintained. Any ship which attempts to continue, or which fails to proceed as elected or directed, will be handled as detailed in paragraph above.

If a ship is visited but search is refused, the commander of the intercepting ship will take the intercepted ship into custody if he has reasonable grounds for suspecting that it is carrying contraband. It will then be diverted to a designated US port for disposition.

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Any ship, including warships or any aircraft which interferes with a US ship engaged in visit and search, will be treated as hostile and may be engaged to the extent required to terminate the interference. Any ship or aircraft which takes action that clearly threatens a US ship engaged in visit and search may be subjected to attack to the extent required to terminate the threat.

a. Quarantine - Selected War Material

The Atlantic Command will conduct military operations in Cuba to defend NAVBASEGTMO; and establish a maritime quarantine in order to prevent the import or export of military logistic support and troops. (Currently most Cuban troops are deployed by air. The aerial quarantine problem is addressed later.)


Implication. A quarantine of incoming or outgoing merchant ships would apply direct US pressure on Cuba. A quarantine would not totally preclude Cuban worldwide adventurism, as Cuban troops have and can continue to leave Cuba by air and USSR/Soviet bloc ships can logistically support these troops directly from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

Expected Results. This action would be ineffective in a military sense in halting the flow of war material if the Communists provided alternative maritime or air transportation. The option would be as expensive as a full blockade, with only a limited possibility of having a deterrent or punitive affect on Cuba. The major impact would be felt within Cuba's on-island military forces.

Risk. A serious risk of losing Guantanamo through Cuban reprisal action. High risk of Soviet retaliation in support of Cuba. There is some risk in confronting Soviet piloted Cuban MIGs or Soviet naval units if the USSR strongly supports Cuba.

b. Quarantine - Pol Imports

Mission. The Atlantic Command will conduct military operations in Cuba to defend NAVBASEGTMO; and to establish a maritime quarantine in order to prevent importation into Cuba of crude oil and oil products.




Expected Results. This action would have an immediate impact on the Cuban economy and military capability. Cuba maintains an estimated 2 month POL reserve, which could be extended to last from 5 to 7 months by austere measures. Such heavy pressure could force Cuba to halt intervention.

Risk. A serious risk of losing Guantanamo through Cuban reprisal action. Serious risk of escalation in confrontation between US Forces and Soviet tankers. High risk of direct US-Soviet military confrontation either with naval escorts or Soviet piloted Cuban MIGS.

c. Blockade

Mission. The Atlantic Command will conduct military operations in Cuba to defend NAVBASEGTMO; and establish a maritime blockade in order to prevent the import or export into or out of Cuba of all material except for food and medical supplies.



Expected Results. This action would halt most ships entering Cuba. There would be an immediate impact on all sectors of the Cuban economy and military capability. Such heavy pressure could force Cuba to halt its intervention.

Risk. A serious risk of losing Guantanamo through Cuban reprisal action. Serious risk of escalation in confrontation between US Forces and Soviet tankers. High risk of direct US-Soviet military confrontation with US Forces and either naval escorts or Soviet piloted Cuban MIGs.



2. Air Quarantine/Blockade

An air quarantine/blockade should not be considered as an effective military option unless exercised together with a maritime quarantine/blockade.

Cuba is served by seven airlines; three Communist and three Free World foreign carriers and the Cuban National Airlines. A total of 44 weekly international flights arrive and leave Havana. Cuba has 25 airfields capable of supporting Soviet AN-12 and AN-22 aircraft. These are the most likely aircraft that would be used to attempt any sustained airlift to Cuba.

The problem of air transits to and from Cuba in flying troops and critical war materials is common for either a quarantine or blockade. Neither the Cubans nor Soviets are capable of defeating an oil quarantine or total blockade by shifting to aerial resupply. The Cubans have the capability to support personnel and light logistic requirements by air. In addition, the Soviets have the capability to support Cuba with transport of over-size cargo in airlifts up to 80 tons.

This could provide limited priority military and economic support to Cuba by air; however, only 4 to 6 percent of Cuba's imports can be supplied by a sustained airlift. If an aerial quarantine or blockade is established, the following procedure would be utilized.

- A quarantine/blockade zone would be established by proclamation.
- Aircraft entering the zone would be intercepted and given radio instructions to proceed to a suitable airport and land.
- If these signals are ignored and upon specific authorization the interceptor would fire a warning signal in such a manner that the target aircraft is not endangered.
- If the target aircraft continues to ignore warning signals, it would be shot down on specific order of the control center designated by CINCLANT. No interceptor would attack without specific instructions.
- For a quarantine only, suspect aircraft would be designated by CINCLANT and only these would be intercepted.

The interdiction of Cuban airfields that are capable of supporting large aircraft would prevent such air movements; however, this should be considered as a direct action against Cuban territory. In this instance, the requirements and implications of the punitive strikes would apply.

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
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Forces and Time Required: As Noted for Maritime Quarantine/Blockade. (Tab B)

Implications. The most critical factor is the enforcement of an air quarantine/blockade. If the air carriers refuse to honor a US proclamation, the only choice is to permit passage or destroy the aircraft. It is considered highly unlikely that any civil carrier would accept this risk; however, it is not so clear for a Soviet military aircraft.

Risk. A serious risk of reprisal action by the Soviets could involve forcing down or destruction of US aircraft anywhere. High risk of escalation if a Soviet aircraft were destroyed.

3. Mining of Ports



Mission. The Atlantic Command will conduct military operations in Cuba to defend NAVBASEGTMO; and conduct naval mining operations in order to deny the use of Cuban ports to maritime shipping for a three-month period, with the option to extend this period.

Concept

Prior to the mining of selected Cuban harbors, the Ground Defense Force at NAVBASEGTMO will be reinforced and the evacuation of dependents and nonessential personnel will be accomplished.

Selected Cuban harbors will be targeted for mining by naval forces. Appropriate harbors are CIENFUEGOS, MARIEL, LA HABANA, SANTIAGO DE CUBA, BANES, CABANAS, BAHIA DE NIPE, NUEVITAS, MANTANZAS, and GUAYABAL.

Operations to be Conducted

CINCLANT will deliver mines in accordance with current plans utilizing naval aircraft from Carrier Task Groups and Marine aircraft, as available.

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Mine assets required to meet plans are as follows:

- 60 MK 55 2,000 lb, magnetic influence, bottom mine.
- 160 MK 56 2,000 lb, magnetic influence, moored mine.
- 300 DST 36/40 500 lb/1,000 lb, magnetic influence, bottom mine.

Mines are available at NAD Charleston or NAD Earle, ready for transport to Norfolk. Flight gear is available at NAD Earle (nose cones, tailfins, fuses, etc.). Delivery of mines will be by aircraft Carrier Task Groups and Marine aircraft, as available.

Air superiority must be achieved in the mining area prior and during the mining operation. Flak suppression fires will be required for local SAM and AA weapons. Interdiction of some airfields may be required in support of mining operations.

Forces Required to Conduct Mining Operations

One or two Carrier Task Groups depending on specific targets and the time available to conduct operations.

- 2 Carrier Task Groups (2 aircraft carriers and appropriate escorts)
- 2 Carrier Air Wings
 - 4 F4 Squadrons (48)
 - 4 Light Attack Squadrons A7 (48)
 - 2 ASW Squadrons S3 (18)
 - 2 ASW Squadrons: MCM Helicopter Detachment HH-2 (VAR)
 - 2 Medium Attack Squadrons A6 (30)
 - 2 Reconnaissance Detachments RF8/RA3 (VAR)
 - 2 AEW Squadrons E2 (VAR)
 - 2 ECM Detachments (8)

Marine aircraft as available.

Time to Commence Operations

Four to six days, depending on location of mines and number of targets mined.

It would be very difficult to conceal the fact that a mining campaign was under consideration once significant numbers of mines were shipped from depots to ships.

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Implications. Air dropped mines will cause Cuban MIG and SAM to respond with attendant direct US-Cuban military action.

Between 70 to 90 mine delivery sorties would be required to implement this option. Additional support, fighter and suppression sorties would bring the total number of sorties to between 140-180 for this option. Possible loss of one or two aircraft could be expected and a residual POW problem might result.

Mines can be set to activate at a preset time after planting and to deactivate at a preset day. Reseeding would commence after approximately three months or following Cuban sweep efforts (Cuba currently has no capability in this regard; however, the Soviets could supply minesweepers within 30 days).

Mined harbors will preclude movement of all ships in and out of designated mined ports and thus movement of material needed to support the Cuban economy, i. e., oil, etc.

Expected Results. This action would close the mined ports and serve as a total blockade. There would be an immediate impact on all sectors of the Cuban economy and military capability.

Risk. A serious risk of losing Guantanamo through Cuban reprisal action. High risk of direct US-Soviet military confrontation during mining operations between US aircraft and Soviet piloted Cuban MIGs. Some risk of reprisal in the form of mined US ports or ports strategic to the United States worldwide by USSR.

4. Punitive Strike. Selected Targets.

Mission. The Atlantic Command will conduct military operations in Cuba to defend NAVBASEGTMO; and to destroy selected high value Cuban military and military supporting targets which will have the maximum punitive impact in order to counter specific acts of Cuban aggression.

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Concept

Prior to any punitive air strikes against selected targets in Cuba, the Ground Defense Force at NAVBASEGTMO will be reinforced and dependents and nonessential personnel will be evacuated.

Punitive operations will be conducted to counter specific acts of Cuban aggression. These operations will be highly controlled and conducted against specific targets. While it is not intended that these operations destroy or neutralize the Cuban military order of battle, planning will provide for air strike against selected air defense, naval, and other military targets; and destruction or neutralization of specific military installations or facilities by air.

Punitive air strikes include the following operations: destruction of a single SAM site; attack on selected radar installations, attack on major Cuban military installations such as airfields, barracks and logistic facilities; attack on Cuban missile boat bases or missile boats at sea.

Forces required:

7 Fighter Squadrons (126 Aircraft: F4s and/or F-111s)
 1 Reconnaissance Element (8 RF4s)
 1 Fighter-interceptor Squadron (18 F-106s)
 2 Carrier Task Groups (150 F4, A6, A7 and support aircraft)
 4 EC-121 AEW&C aircraft (when mobilized)
 15 KC-135 Tankers

Command and control forces

Airlift

Marine aircraft

Time Required to Commence Operations. Four to six days.

Implications

The Cuban targets are all located within defended areas. The majority are located within the Havana area with MIG, SAM and AAA defenses. The aircraft sorties rate for the option of air attacks on major Cuban military installations would approximate 250 per day. The use of precision-guided munitions would increase Cuban damage expectancy per sortie.

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Loss rates would be expected to be three or four aircraft per 1,000 sorties or about one per day. This figure is based on current defenses and US readiness. There would be major damage to one or two aircraft per 1,000 sorties and minor damage (repairable) to an undetermined number.

Aircrew losses and a residual POW problem could be expected.

This option is not viewed as a sustained operation. The long-term impacts on force levels, other than Guantanamo reinforcement forces, would be minimal.

Expected Results. This action would be swift and known to the Cuban population. It would render the selected target militarily ineffective. This action would reflect USG displeasure with Cuban adventurism.

Risk. A serious risk of losing Guantanamo through Cuban reprisal action. Serious risk of Soviet reprisal action in some form worldwide. High risk of direct US-Soviet military confrontation during strike operations between US aircraft and Soviet piloted Cuban MIGs.

5. Complementary Political Actions

As noted in the introduction of this paper, the implications for our relations elsewhere of actions focused on Cuba could rapidly assume the proportions of a global crisis if we went to military measures involving the use of force. Surgical air strikes would be over rapidly and could cause less strain on our alliances than a blockade lasting months. Any of the military measures contemplated except a one-shot air strike would require the following complementary actions to provide legal justification and to mobilize domestic and foreign support:

-- Obtaining the votes in Congress to sustain prolonged action under the War Powers Act. If the votes were not there a constitutional confrontation could arise over the effect of a congressional veto. If the military action took place during the US election campaign, a bipartisan approach with the Democratic candidate would be mandatory for congressional support.

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-- Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers under Chapter XII of the OAS Charter to seek sanctions under Article 6 of the Rio Treaty if the Cubans intervene in this hemisphere.

-- Raising the issue of Cuban intervention in the UN as a violation of the UN Charter and a threat to the peace with a real prospect that a large majority of the UN would vote against us, particularly if we were retaliating against Cuban action in South Africa or Rhodesia--risking having the US branded as the aggressor.

-- Seeking supportive action by NATO and Japan. We could easily encounter the de Gaulle objection that the action is outside the NATO Treaty area and that the allies were being informed and not consulted. If we genuinely consulted our allies, they would probably take the position that Cuban intervention was not worth going to the brink.

-- Worldwide bilateral diplomatic approaches and high-level missions to explain and solicit support.

-- Special consultations with the UK, France, and FRG to consider possible Soviet retaliation on Berlin access.

-- Hot line communication--and possible summit conference-- to explain the limited nature of our objectives regarding Cuba and to manage the crisis.

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III. Strengths and Vulnerabilities

A. The Special Problem of Guantanamo

The U. S. Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba provides tactical opportunities to demonstrate the seriousness of our purpose, for example, by adjusting the size of our force there. However, its geographical position surrounded by a ring of hills makes it extremely vulnerable to attack. At the moment the base is lightly defended with slightly under 500 military personnel and about 4,000 dependents and nonessential employees. Therefore, any U. S. action that might then lead to a confrontation with Cuba would have to be preceded by evacuation of dependents and nonessential personnel and reinforcement of the defense force. The reinforcement necessary, by four Marine battalions (6,000 men) and an Army Airborne Infantry Brigade (1,600) would in itself generate a crisis atmosphere. Moreover, if attacked an adequate defense of Guantanamo would require seizure of key terrain located outside the base perimeter, and would involve significant commitment of U. S. forces. (See Tab A for list of forces required for Guantanamo defense)

B. Cuban Military and Logistic Position

The Cuban Army has an estimated strength of 160,000 of which 60,000 are reservists. These personnel are well trained and equipped and provide the major element of combat strength. They are concentrated around population centers of Havana and Holguin/Santiago de Cuba in the east. An addition 228,000 personnel are in police, security and other paramilitary organizations. The primary vulnerability derives from disposition of units.

The Cuban Navy consists of 9,200 men and 100 craft, of which 24 are guided missile patrol boats equipped with STYX missiles. It is primarily a coastal patrol defense force with only a limited offensive capability. Heavily dependent upon servicing from Cuba's three primary naval bases, the Navy is not equipped for, nor experienced with, prolonged operations at sea.

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The primary strength of the Cuban air force is its estimated 180 jet fighter aircraft of which 105 are the modern MIG 21. These are based at three principle military air fields; refueling and servicing facilities at secondary air fields are considerably more limited. Cuban fighter pilots are experienced in ground control interception and Cuba's network of ground control facilities extends into each of the air defense zones (West, Central and East). Cubans have no known in-flight refueling capability. Missile and jet fuel reserves in Cuba are unknown. Soviet pilots work with the Cuban Air Force.

Cuba also possesses substantial amounts of conventional air defense artillery weapons.

Cuba is vulnerable from the sea approaches in all directions. The U. S. naval base at Guantanamo provides a limited military presence for U. S. forces on the eastern end of the island. There are 2,000 Soviet military advisors in Cuba working with all three Cuban services. A Soviet-operated facility in the Havana area gives Cuban forces a good SIGINT capability.


The primary vulnerability of the Cuban armed forces lies in its total dependence upon the Soviet Union and Soviet bloc countries for all POL, military equipment, spare parts, and ammunition supplies. At present all POL and repair parts are brought in by ship to the major Cuban ports. Most equipment enters the port of Mariel. While repair parts could be supplied by air, air supply of POL would present a more difficult problem.

C. The Cuban Economy

The Cuban economy is characterized by the dominance of the sugar monoculture and the heavy dependence upon international trade in Cuba which is as large as its total gross national product. One-third of the food

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supply is imported. Virtually all capital goods, and a substantial share of raw materials and intermediate goods and all energy needs are met by imports. Much of this is supplied by the Soviet Union which takes 60 percent of Cuba's exports and supplies 50 percent of its imports, including virtually all its petroleum and 60 percent of its foodstuffs. Trade with the non-communist world accounts for 36 percent of Cuba's total trade, largely with Western Europe, Japan and Canada. Cuban imports from non-communist countries have tripled since 1973 to the point where half of its manufactures and raw materials, 40 percent of its machinery and equipment, and 33 percent of its foodstuffs come from the West. Argentina and Spain have extended substantial credit lines to Cuba. A number of Western European countries have very small assistance programs with it.

Cuba's foreign trade is carried on almost exclusively by ocean traffic, 95 percent of which is in foreign ships and three-quarters Communist. Two-thirds of the tonnage is petroleum. Cuba is served by seven airlines besides its own, three are Communist and three are Western. Aeroflot flies an average of one flight a day. Cuba has one major international airport and ten others capable of handling larger modern planes. It is estimated that a Soviet airlift could deliver at best four percent of Cuba's total imports and six percent of its petroleum, and this capacity would quickly deteriorate.

Cuba is also entirely dependent on outside assistance to supply its armed forces.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Cuba's two largest ports, Havana and Santiago de Cuba, account for two-thirds of its total freight handling capacity. Nearly all of the oil imports landed at one or the other of these two ports.

D. Cuban Political Position

Castro is greatly concerned with his prestige and influence in Latin America and the Third World. He is extra sensitive to suggestions that he acted as Moscow's surrogate in Angola. One of Cuba's main foreign policy objectives has been to normalize relations with the countries of this

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hemisphere. There are growing signs that for the first time in recent years, Castro is encountering obstacles to this policy and has paid some diplomatic cost for the Angola venture. The Chiefs of States' meeting which was to be held in Panama next June was cancelled because Castro's presence was unacceptable to a number of them. Cuba has been criticized directly and indirectly by many Latin American leaders in public and its relations have been deteriorated with a number of them.

An important gauge of the success of Castro's Southern African ventures will be the way they are treated at the forthcoming Non-Aligned Summit Conference in Sri Lanka this August. The Cubans will work for an endorsement of their Angola action. A number of countries will be working against that, like Saudi Arabia and Indonesia, but the key will lie with the African states. The more moderate ones which are more directly involved in the Rhodesia situation may be able to prevail over their more radical colleagues to prevent an endorsement. A call for non-intervention seems less likely.

Western Europe, Japan, and Canada are important to Cuba because the achievement of the goals of its five-year economic plan is not possible without credits from them as well as Spain and Argentina. While these countries consider their trade with Cuba to be of importance to them, further substantial Cuban intervention might provide a basis to consider restricting their trade and credit with Cuba.

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Forces Required for Guantanamo Defense

LANTFLT

1 Marine Regimental Landing Team (6,000)
1 Amphibious Task Group with a MAB embarked (on-call) (5,500)
2/9 Division/Wing Team (on-call) (4,000)
22 Amphibious ships
Screen and gunfire support ships as required. Could be composed of:

1 Aircraft carrier and 15 surface combatants
Service ships as required. Could be composed of:
4 Service ships (AO, AE, etc)
ASW forces as required. Could be composed of:
Previously designated screen ships plus:
4 Nuclear Attack Submarines

ARLANT (Army)

1 Infantry Brigade (ABN) (1,600)
1 Infantry Division (Minus) (on-call) (9,000)
1 Ranger Battalion (on-call) (600)

AFLANT (Air Force)

C-130 aircraft (on-call)

PACOM

1 Amphibious Task Group with a MAB embarked (6,000 men, 36 aircraft)
3/9 Marine Division/Wing Team (MAB) (on-call) (6,000)
18 Amphibious ships
Service ships as required

Total involvement approximately 50,000.

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Forces Required to Enforce Quarantine/Blockade

Atlantic Fleet

- 2 Carrier Task Groups (2 aircraft carriers with appropriate escorts)
- 2 Carrier Air Wings
 - 4 F4 Squadrons (48)
 - 4 Light Attack Squadrons A7 (48)
 - 2 ASW Squadrons S3 (18)
 - 2 ASW Squadrons; MCM Helicopter Detachment HH-2 (VAR)
 - 2 Medium Attack Squadrons A6 (30)
 - 2 Reconnaissance Detachments RF8/RA3 (VAR)
 - 2 AEW Squadrons E2 (VAR)
 - 2 ECM Detachments EA 6 (8)
- 18 DD Destroyer
- 9 DDG Guided Missile Destroyer
- 18 FF Frigate
 - 9 FFG Guided Missile Frigate
 - 3 Patrol Gun Boat PG
 - 1 Flagship (CG) Guided Missile Cruiser
 - 9 CG Guided Missile Cruiser
 - 8 SSN Nuclear Attack Submarine
 - *3 MSO Ocean Minesweeper

Service ships as required. Could be composed of:

- 8 Oilers
- 4 Store ships

AFLANT

- 7 Tactical Fighter Squadrons (126)
 - 10 Tactical Fighter Squadrons (on-call) (180)
 - 1 Tactical Reconnaissance Element (6)
 - * 4 EC-121 TEWS aircraft (when mobilized)
- Required command, control, and support forces

~~SECRET~~-NOFORN (XGDS)

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Antilles Defense Command

*Puerto Rico ANG Fighter Group (when mobilized)

Strategic Air Command

15 KC 135 tankers

CINCAD

*1 Fighter Interceptor Squadron

*4 EC-121 AEW&C aircraft (when mobilized)

*These units would require mobilization (2,500 personnel)