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	OIC-02	OMB-01	PA-01	PM-02	PRS-01	P-01	SIL-00
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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL MOPS MASS KDEM PHUM PGOV RW FR
SUBJECT: FRENCH EMBASSY WEIGHS IN WITH DEPARTMENT ON RWANDA NIF

1. CONFIDENTIAL--ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: FRENCH EMBASSY AFRICA-WATCHER DE LA BATIE
USED HIS SEPT. 10 MEETING WITH DAS BUSHNELL TO UNDERScore
HIS GOVERNMENT'S DESIRE TO PROCEED WITH ESTABLISHMENT OF
A NIF IN RWANDA. BUSHNELL CONFIRMED THAT THE U.S.
SUPPORTS SUCH A FORCE IN PRINCIPLE, BUT IS NOT YET IN A

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POSITION TO GIVE A FIRM COMMITMENT. DE LA BATIE DENIED ANY EXPLICIT LINKAGE BETWEEN THE FORMATION OF NIF'S IN RWANDA AND LIBERIA, BUT STRESSED THAT THE GOF DOES NOT WANT THE UN TO PAY MORE ATTENTION TO LIBERIA THAN TO RWANDA (WHICH PARIS REGARDS AS A HIGH-PRIORITY INITIATIVE). THE TWO SIDES AGREED TO CONTINUE EXCHANGING VIEWS AND INFORMATION ON RWANDA. END SUMMARY

3. FRENCH EMBASSY AFRICA-WATCHER HERVE DEJEAN DE LA BATIE CALLED ON DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY PRUDENCE BUSHNELL SEPT. 10 TO DISCUSS HIS GOVERNMENT'S PROPOSAL TO ESTABLISH A NEUTRAL MULTINATIONAL PEACEKEEPING FORCE (NIF) IN RWANDA TO MONITOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AUGUST 4 ARUSHA ACCORD. AF/C DIRECTOR ARLENE RENDER AND ACTING DESK OFFICER STEVE HONLEY (NOTETAKER) SAT IN ON THE MEETING.

4. USG VIEWS: DE LA BATIE ASKED WHETHER THE USG WAS PREPARED TO RESPOND TO THE FRENCH PROPOSAL. DAS BUSHNELL CONFIRMED THAT THE U.S. SUPPORTS SUCH A FORCE IN
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PRINCIPLE, BUT IS NOT YET IN A POSITION TO GIVE A FIRM COMMITMENT. WE HAVE VERY LIMITED RESOURCES TO DEVOTE TO PEACEKEEPING, AND THE INTERAGENCY GROUP WHICH LOOKS AT THE ISSUE STILL HAS MANY QUESTIONS ABOUT THE SCOPE AND COST OF THE OPERATION IN RWANDA.

5. UN RECONNAISSANCE TEAM REPORT: AT A MINIMUM, BUSHNELL CONTINUED, WE NEED TO SEE THE UN RECONNAISSANCE TEAM'S REPORT TO THE UN SYG (WHICH WE UNDERSTAND WILL SOON BE AVAILABLE), BEFORE WE CAN MAKE ANY DECISIONS. DE LA BATIE SAID HE, TOO, WAS EAGER TO READ THE REPORT, AND ASKED WHETHER WE HAD SEEN AN ADVANCE COPY. WE CONFIRMED THAT WE HAVE NOT, BUT INFORMED HIM THAT EMBASSY KIGALI HAD CONDUCTED A BRIEF TOUR D'HORIZON WITH THE UN TEAM LEADER BEFORE HE DEPARTED RWANDA LATE LAST MONTH.

6. FRENCH PROPOSAL: CITING THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 54 OF THE ARUSHA ACCORD, WHICH SPELL OUT THE MANDATE OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONITORING FORCE, DE LA BATIE STIPULATED THE STATIONING OF 500 UN-ONLY TROOPS IN KIGALI, AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE, AS A SINE QUA NON. PHASING IN WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTABLE. PARIS WOULD ALSO LIKE TO SEE AT LEAST ANOTHER 500 TROOPS ELSEWHERE IN THE COUNTRY, BUT IMPLIED THAT THERE IS SOME FLEXIBILITY IN THE TIMETABLE FOR THE

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PORTION OF THE FORCE OUTSIDE THE CAPITAL. HE SAID THAT THE FRENCH HAD PURPOSEFULLY KEPT TROOP LEVELS LOW TO DEMONSTRATE SENSITIVITY TO U.S. CONCERNS.

7. COMMENT: IN A PREVIOUS CONVERSATION WITH DAS BUSHNELL, DE LA BATIE WAS SIMILARLY SYMPATHETIC--THOUGH NON-COMMITTAL---TO THE CONCERN THAT THE UN RECONNAISSANCE
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TEAM MIGHT RECOMMEND A SIGNIFICANTLY HIGHER LEVEL OF UN TROOP DEPLOYMENT TO RWANDA, WHICH WOULD INCREASE THE OPERATION'S COSTS. END COMMENT

8. OAU ROLE: AMB. RENDER ASKED DE LA BATIE WHY HIS GOVERNMENT WAS SO RESISTANT TO THE IDEA OF ALLOWING THE OAU TO PARTICIPATE IN THE RWANDA NIF, ESPECIALLY SINCE THAT WOULD GIVE NMOG PERSONNEL HANDS-ON EXPERIENCE. DE LA BATIE EXPLAINED THAT THE NMOG'S REACTION DURING THE FEBRUARY 1993 RPF OFFENSIVE HAD ALARMED THE GOF, WHICH DID NOT WANT TO RISK SIMILAR PROBLEMS WITH THE FRAGILE PEACE AGREEMENT. HE CONCEDED THAT PERHAPS NMOG COULD BE INCORPORATED INTO THE FORCE OUTSIDE KIGALI.

9. FINANCING: DE LA BATIE DID NOT HAVE A SPECIFIC COST ESTIMATE TO OFFER, BUT ASSURED BUSHNELL THAT FRANCE SHARES U.S. CONCERNS ABOUT THE COST OF PEACEKEEPING. NEVERTHELESS, THE GOF ANTICIPATES "A LOT OF COSTLY PROBLEMS" IN RWANDA IF THE NIF DOESN'T COME OFF. HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT FRANCE BELIEVES UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS SHOULD BE FINANCED BY ASSESSMENTS, NOT VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS.

10. LINKAGE: DAS BUSHNELL ALLUDED TO SIGNALS WE HAVE BEEN GETTING THAT PARIS WANTS TO LINK ESTABLISHMENT OF THE UN'S RWANDA AND LIBERIA PEACEKEEPING FORCES. DE LA BATIE CONFIRMED THAT THE GOF IS NOT PREPARED TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE LIBERIA OPERATION RIGHT NOW, BUT DENIED ANY EXPLICIT LINKAGE BETWEEN THE TWO CASES. AT THE SAME TIME, HE COMMENTED, THE GOF IS CONCERNED THAT LIBERIA NOT RECEIVE ANY MORE ATTENTION AT THE UN THAN RWANDA, WHICH
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HAS "HIGH PRIORITY."

11. CONSULTATIONS: BUSHNELL ASKED WHETHER PARIS HAD CONSULTED WITH LONDON AND MOSCOW. SO FAR AS DE LA BATIE KNEW, IT HAD NOT, THOUGH HE PRESUMED THEIR RESPECTIVE UN MISSIONS WERE DOING SO.

12. NEXT STEPS: BOTH SIDES AGREED THAT OBTAINING THE UN TEAM'S REPORT IS ESSENTIAL; MEANWHILE, THEY PROMISED TO CONTINUE THE DIALOGUE. DE LA BATIE REITERATED HIS GOVERNMENT'S VIEW THAT UN TROOPS NEED TO GET ON THE GROUND AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO ENSURE THAT THEIR MISSION REMAINS PEACEKEEPING.

13. COMMENT: DE LA BATIE BROUGHT US RELATIVELY LITTLE NEW INFORMATION ON THE FRENCH PROPOSAL, BUT MADE A STRONG PITCH FOR OUR SUPPORT. HE WAS SENSITIVE TO USG CONCERNS AND UNDERSTOOD THE NEED TO DEFINE THE MISSION AND ATTENDANT COSTS OF THE NIF. END COMMEN
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