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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF  
DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING

18 FEB 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. GILPATRIC

SUBJECT: Some Items Concerning the NSA and the CIA

1. Preparation of the CCP.

Good progress has been made, in my opinion, in the formulation of the CCP. It is being put together this year on an entirely new basis. We have defined thirty-six "intelligence targets". Each of these is specified in considerable detail.

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Having defined these targets, the NSA is requiring the SCA's (Service Cryptologic Agencies) to indicate precisely the resources devoted at every station around the world to the acquisition of intelligence and its processing from each of these thirty-six targets. In addition, certain "overhead" activities have been carefully defined and the allocation of effort against them is being made at the same time.

We have formed a small informal group to participate in the formulation of the major procedural and substantive aspects of this CCP. It includes a CIA representative, [redacted]. It also includes a DIA representative, [redacted]. In addition, [redacted] is taking the lead in pulling together the efforts of these people, along with members of the Comptroller's office, to furnish an on-going review of all these activities. In this way, the CIA and the DIA are able not only to observe but to influence the manner in which this basic framework is being evolved.

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I had lunch with [redacted] a couple of weeks ago. [redacted] expressed their appreciation for these arrangements and their feeling that their ability to understand and to influence the formulation of NSA planning had enormously increased in the past year.

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NSA, OSD reviews completed

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I called Mr. McCone to ask him whether he felt that he was satisfied with this arrangement. While I am anxious to avoid creating a bureaucratic procedure that automatically involves large numbers of people in every activity, I have been equally anxious to permit key people in the affected agencies to have an effective voice in these matters. I believe we have accomplished that to a substantial degree. I found that Mr. McCone did not know much about it, but said that he would contact [redacted]

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2. Relations Between the NSA and the CIA.

I wanted to sound out Mr. McCone on his feelings concerning the functioning and adequacy of management within the NSA. In fact, I think General Blake would like to get that kind of feed-back, but I was not able to get it at the time I talked with McCone because he had to leave very suddenly. I think it would be useful, however, to solicit his feelings on this matter and specifically to ask if he has any concrete suggestions for areas of improvement. If, in particular, he has words of approbation for General Blake, it would be useful to have them and to pass them along to General Blake. ✓ It is my opinion that in most areas he has been doing a very outstanding job. Perhaps you will be able to sound him out on this.

3. Other Problems in the NSA. ✓

I have recently reviewed certain personnel matters with General Blake. Speaking generally, the NSA has cleaned up most of the difficulties that seemed so acute somewhat over a year ago. We still have about four cases that are held over from that period and as a result of our recent meeting we resolved to take positive action on each of these within thirty days.

4. Appraisal of [redacted] Space Results.

Following the [redacted] I got together with Bob Seamans and with Bud Wheelon of the CIA and established an Ad Hoc Subcommittee of the GMAIC Committee under Bud Wheelon for the express purpose of working out the details of that [redacted] exploit on a timely basis, utilizing all agencies at once. This Subcommittee included an NASA representative, Dr. Shea, who is very knowledgeable in the space

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field and formerly worked at STL. The Air Force furnished one of their best people from the Foreign Technology Division. We also had a DIA and a CIA representative, and the NSA cooperated by furnishing representation and permitting the group to physically work at the NSA when necessary.

The results of this were very useful. It was the first time that a report of this kind had been put together in this manner. If we had not done it this way, the NSA would have gradually acquired the data and when they had gotten most of it together they would have distributed it to a variety of agencies. Each of these would have made its analysis and finally the GMAIC Committee would probably have reviewed the independent analyses and ultimately come out with some kind of report.

As it was, the people worked very closely together even while much of the data was still coming in. They had the benefit of consultation from people who ordinarily don't get involved in this sort of activity, including [redacted] from our office, who is one of the country's authorities on space dynamics. The result was a comparatively quick analysis and virtually complete agreement among everybody concerning the principal features of that mission and even its implications for the future.

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On the other hand, the Committee which prepared the final report for distribution has made it clear that they cannot do this sort of thing on a continuing basis. The NSA feels the same way. A few weeks ago Jim Webb, Dr. Seamans and Dr. Dryden visited with Mr. McCone and expressed their willingness to set up an NASA group that would support a continuing, all source group effort of this kind for future use.

It is my opinion that this is a very good idea. A couple of people each from the Air Force, the DIA, the NASA, and the NSA, working under the auspices of the CIA, ought to be available to exploit the results of [redacted] exploits as quickly as they occur. The expertise and sources of information should be on hand and "matched". I think it is almost certain that other exploits will occur from time to time in coming years. I believe we must be in a position to analyze them accurately and swiftly. A group, as proposed by [redacted] makes sense. I have not been able to discuss this subject with Mr. McCone either, but perhaps you will wish to do so.

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*John H. Rubel*

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