

series VI  
volume 5  
book II


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American Cryptology during the Cold War, 1945-1989 - Book II

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National Security Agency  
Central Security Service

UNITED STATES CRYPTOLOGIC HISTORY



# American Cryptology during the Cold War, 1945-1989

*Book II: Centralization Wins, 1960-1972*



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[Redacted]

RCNWAY

[Large Redacted Area]

As for the control issue, that was solved [Redacted] by moving tasking control to NSA. [Redacted] NSA set up a new facility called SSSC (SIGINT Satellite System Control) to provide technical support and tasking guidance to the program. Some non-NSA USIB members were less than pleased because SSSC amounted

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to a de facto delegation of tasking control to NSA. The direction was irreversible, however, and by 1972, representatives from the SOC in the Pentagon had moved to SSSC.<sup>198</sup>

The program was not popular downtown, and it came under repeated attack. When this happened, Admiral Gayler himself indicated that he wanted to attend the NRP Executive Committee meetings to defend the program. At his very first meeting, Gayler went on the attack, not just defending the money that had been put into the system to date, but demanding more money to launch more satellites and to buy more processing equipment.

[Redacted]

**RAINFALL**

The RUNWAY program was encountering such ferocious opposition in Washington partly because CIA already had a competitor. The CIA project had been initiated by Albert "Bud" Wheelon, who had come to CIA during the early years of the Kennedy administration. A brilliant and aggressive administrator, as well as a top-notch scientist, Wheelon had been newly installed as John McCone's director of science and technology when he read about the Syncom II geosynchronous satellite.

[Redacted] from Soviet missile tests was the number one U.S. intelligence priority, Wheelon wondered if a geosynchronous satellite could be placed in an orbit that would continuously look down on Tyuratam and Sary Shagan. Wheelon pressed his idea with McCone, who approved [Redacted] for a pilot study.<sup>199</sup>

The project was fraught with tremendous risk. It would be hideously expensive, the most costly intelligence system ever mounted.

[Redacted]

An immense antenna would be required - a scientist calculated that it would have to be at least seventy-five feet in diameter, the largest such object ever unfurled in space. The Department of Defense, wanting CIA out of the satellite business anyway, opposed it from the beginning.<sup>191</sup>



Albert "Bud" Wheelon

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CIA cleared no one at NSA. Thus, CIA knew about NSA's nascent plans for RUNWAY, but NSA did not know about CIA's plans for a similarly disposed geosynchronous satellite system, [redacted] This situation changed in the late summer of 1965, because General Marshall Carter migrated from the position of deputy DCI to director of NSA. When he arrived, he arranged to clear a handful of NSA people and sent them to CIA to learn about the RAINFALL program.<sup>192</sup>

The road proved rocky in the extreme. CIA wanted no NSA participation at all, and in the early months did a great deal to shut NSA out. But a breakthrough of sorts occurred in December of 1965, when [redacted]

[redacted] to clear the air. Through these high-level contacts, the two organizations began joint planning.<sup>193</sup>

NSA immediately suggested that COMINT become an ancillary mission. After a period of hesitation, CIA accepted the proposal and gave NSA the job of collecting what COMINT they could from a bird whose job was TELINT, not COMINT. Through the Director's Advisory Group for ELINT and Reconnaissance (DAGER), headed by Charles Tevis, NSA negotiated the details of their participation in the RAINFALL program. NSA got a COMINT processing subsystem and an ELINT subsystem [redacted] and when the money for those systems was cut from the budget, NSA allocated CCP funds. DAGER was also instrumental [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] Eventually NSA provided all the COMINT staff and about half of the TELINT crew.<sup>195</sup>

SIGINT satellites were the wave of the future, and they offered breathtaking new opportunities for access to the Soviet Union. [redacted]

[redacted] But it also offered a significant new battleground for the control of intelligence resources. CIA-Air Force conflicts over the control of imagery became well known to the American public through the publication of such books as William Burrows's *Deep Black*. Far more obscure, but just as fierce, was the competition between NSA and others (especially CIA) over the ownership and control of SIGINT payloads. It eventually settled down to a series of compromises based on the areas of respective technical competence. But the early years, when these compromises were still in the future, were not easy.

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**NSA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS**

They [Third Parties] should not be used for economy reasons to supplant vital U.S. capabilities. However, rapport with Third Parties should be developed as insurance against the loss of U.S. bases in the future.

Eaton Committee, 1968


With the cryptologic budget being cut back in practically every area except Southeast Asia, NSA in the mid-1960s gave a serious relook at what the Third Parties could do for the U.S. Every budget exercise resulted in an increased determination to bring foreign countries more fully into the process. By the late 1960s the budgeteers demanded that

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The Eaton panel in 1968 (see p. 479) backed NSA's contention and stated that Third Party collection should complement U.S. collection.<sup>196</sup>

General Carter, fresh from his stint at CIA, placed Third Party relationships on center stage, and he was reputedly the first NSA director to permit Third Party representatives into the NSA complex. But Carter's attention to foreign relationships brought NSA up against CIA's long-standing prerogatives in this area. Although NSA began to take a more active hand in several of the relationships, the disputes were not resolved during the decade, and resolution was put off until the late 1970s.<sup>197</sup>



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**Germany**

The Reinhard Gehlen organization (the BND) was one of NSA's most lucrative Third Party sources during the 1960s. But there were serious problems within the organization itself which limited its utility and caused the Agency to keep it at arm's length. Most of the problems revolved around security.

Basically the BND, like almost all West German governmental organizations, was penetrated and publicized. The problems began in 1952, when a leftist journalist named Sefton Delmer published a highly critical article in the *London Daily Mail* entitled "Hitler's General Now Spies for Dollars." Delmer appeared to get much of his material from one Otto John, who had headed the West German equivalent of the FBI until his defection to East Germany. John was, in 1952, engaged in a bitter bureaucratic struggle with Gehlen over the control of intelligence.<sup>200</sup>

Things just went from bad to worse. In 1953 one Hans Joachim Geyer, a member of the Gehlen organization, fled to East Germany with the names of Gehlen agents. Within hours more than 300 Gehlen agents had been rounded up, and East Germany exposed the "spy ring" in a resonating press conference. Geyer had been passing classified documents to the KGB for several years, although it appears that he was not involved in SIGINT.<sup>201</sup>

But the coup de grâce was not administered until 1961, with the exposure of Heinz Felfe. A rising star in the BND, Felfe had worked for the KGB since the early 1950s and had passed thousands of documents. He worked in counterintelligence, not SIGINT, but his

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access was very wide, and nothing in the BND was really safe. The exposure of Felte in November 1961 led to a prolonged and highly public spy scandal, during which it was revealed that the BND had been thoroughly compromised by the East Bloc. At the same time Gehlen himself was involved in a public row with Franz Josef Strauss, the minister of defense. His inflexibility in dealing with outsiders, and his lack of appetite to rid the BND of East Bloc agents, ended his effectiveness. Gehlen continued to head BND until 1968, but withdrew more and more from active management.<sup>202</sup>

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This did not stop NSA-CIA competition. However, it did lessen the points of friction and charted the way for a gradual CIA withdrawal from the day-to-day intricacies of Third Party SIGINT exchanges. As Third Party SIGINT became more important and more time-sensitive, this was a natural and evolutionary step.

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
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
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**NSA and CIA in the Third Party World**

By the end of the 1960s, the control of Third Party SIGINT relationships had become quite muddled. 



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**NSA and GCHQ**

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As for the American-British relationship, the two SIGINT operations had become virtually inseparable by 1970. 



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