NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON D.C. 20006

CALPRISOTYMOS

)ecember

NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION DIRECTIVE NUMBER 254

> UNITED STATES LAUNCH PACE

Introduction

This directive establishes U.S. national policy for restoration of the capability to launch satellites and missions into space to support U.S. national security, civil, and commercial goals using It is essential that U.S. space launch operations be reconstituted as efficiently as possible consistent with available funding and safety concerns; and that the reconstituted U.S. space launch assets provide a balanced, robust, flexible space launch capability which can function independently of failures in any single launch vehicle system allow a return to gularly scheduled launch operations met continuing requirements, help make up for lost launch op ort nities and respect velocal space leadership. (U)

This directive supers (es. SDD 164. Prolous directives which nolude NSDDs 42, 80, 44, and 181 remainded out are odified accordingly. (U)

National Space Launch Capalilay

The U.S. national space lanch capability will be ased on a balanced mix of launchers isting of the Transportation System (STS) and expendable launch vehicles (ELVs). The elements of this mix will be defined to best support the mission needs of the national security, civil government and commercial sectors of U.S. space activities. Critical mission needs will be supported, whenever necessary, by both the STS and ELVs so as to provide added assurance that payloads can be launched regardless of specific launch vehicle availabilities.

a. National Security Frice Transportation. The national security space sector will be both the AS and A is as determined by specific mission requirements. Selected critical payloads will be designed for dual-compatibility, i.e. cloable f being launched by either the AS or the ELVs. Produce will be made for additional ELV lanche actities nested to support the full range of orbits require the national security missions. (c)

Implementation: The Department of Definse (DOD) will procure additional ELVs to mai tain a alabed dayne capability and to provide access to pace. The Do will implement procedures assure payload/launch which a compatibility as scheduling, and

CONFIDENTIAL Declassify on: OADR

CONFIDENTIAL

the Win Leary to Alley weinstein 4 w/05 "List"


maintain a launch capability for ELVs at both the Bast and West Coast launch sites. DOD and Not will join ablish a revised price for national security process that ise the 'S. (U)

b. Civil Government Space Transportation. The unique STS (Shuttle) capability to rovide manned acres space will be exploited in those area that offer the restest national return. The STS fleet will main in the Nation' capabilities. WASA will use the Shuttl where the unique STS capabilities of the STS are required to support vil research and development programs. (U)

Implementation: Will procure structural spares and other necessary lost equipment needed to sustain the existing three-orbiter fleet and will do so in an expeditious and cost-effective manner. Funding for procurement of a replacement fourth orbiter will begin in FY 1987 based on an OMB-approved program. NASA will establish sustainable STS flight rates to provide for planning and budgeting of Government space programs. The recommendations of the President's Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident will be considered and incorporated as appropriate. The STS will be chased out the position of launch services for commercial and traign payl ids that do not require a manned presence or the unit of the STS. In there is a need for additional NASA capacit for overnment launchs, then NASA is authorized to contract for necessary EL launch savices. (U)

policy of domestic exploit tich of spice or contercal purposes are enunciated in NSDD 94 dated May 1, 83. Those principles and policies remain valid (

Implementation: shall no rovide launch services for commercial and foreign payloads unless those spacecraft have unique, specific reasons to be launched aboard the Shuttle. Those reasons are: the spacecraft must be man-tended or the spacecraft is important for national security or foreign policy purposes. Satellite manufacturers whose spacecraft do not meet those criteria will be provided as realistic an appraisal as possible by NASA of when they could be scheduled on the Shuttle launch manifest prior to the 1995 commercial contract mandatory termination date. (U)



Confedendial