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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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has seen



August 2, 1993

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INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: R. RAND <sup>BE</sup>BEERS, Acting

FROM: SUSAN E. <sup>SM</sup>ICE

SUBJECT: Five Imminent New U.N. Peacekeeping Operations

Within the next two or three weeks, the UN Security Council will consider establishing five new peacekeeping operations: in Haiti, Liberia, Abkhazia, Rwanda, and Cambodia. The U.S. has some interest in resolving each of these conflicts; however, we do not have the funds to pay for them.

By the end of FY 94, the U.S. is expected to be over \$1 billion in debt to the UN for peacekeeping. This is before the establishment of any new or expanded missions. Thus, we have two choices: voting for missions for which we cannot pay, or; vetoing resolutions because we lack sufficient funds. The first course is irresponsible and eventually will cripple the UN's infrastructure so that operations will suffer or shut down. The latter course may result in a "snowball effect" since some other P-5 countries are in an equal or worse financial situation.

The reality is that the U.S. must begin immediately to make tough choices among new as well as existing operations, while we fight strenuously to obtain sufficient funds from Congress and support from the American public.

Haiti

The UNSC is expected to vote this week to establish the police and military presence in Haiti. Very rough U.S. estimates put the cost of the Haiti operation at least \$50-60 million annually. If the operation is assessed, which is probably the most economical option for the U.S., our share would be roughly \$20 million. We will, however, be able to reduce our overall costs by receiving reimbursement for our military contribution. No offsets have been identified to cover our assessed costs.

Liberia

Within two or three weeks the UNSC will be asked to send 250 military observers to Liberia to guarantee the neutrality of ECOMOG. Very rough (and probably inflated) estimates put the

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annual cost of the UN mission at \$42 million. No offsets have been identified for our assessed costs.

In addition, the UN is asking the US voluntarily to lift and equip the five additional ECOMOG battalions called for under the Gordon-Somers plan. Much of this cost could be offset by reprogramming already identified ESF funds. In informal consultations in Washington, Gordon-Somers also asked the U.S. to pay the lion's share of the stipends for the anticipated 16,000 ECOMOG troops. State/AF's estimate of the cost of this additional support is \$104 million.

Much of the draft Gordon-Somers plan needs clarification and rationalization before it is ripe for Security Council consideration. As currently constructed, the size of the force may be excessive and the costs exorbitant. Moreover, these costs do not include those for UN-sponsored elections due in seven months or for post-conflict reconstruction. Until the plan has been further vetted and refined, it is difficult to estimate the ultimate cost of the entire UN/ECOWAS operation, much of which may fall to the U.S.

#### Abkhazia

As a result of the signing of a ceasefire last week, the UNSC faces an immediate decision as to whether to send 50 military observers to Abkhazia. At the G-7 Conference, President Clinton and Secretary Christopher pledged U.S. support for UN action in the event of a ceasefire. Now President Shevardnadze and leaders of the Russian Federation are putting substantial pressure on the U.S. to support the rapid dispatch of observers. Failure to do so within a week's time could undo the fragile ceasefire, which in turn could lead to Shevardnadze's ouster.

The UN estimates the annual cost of the proposed observer mission to be \$18 million per year. No offsets have been identified.

#### Rwanda

In addition to the recently approved small observer mission on the Uganda-Rwanda border, the UNSC will soon be asked to authorize a joint UN-OAU Neutral Interpository Force as part of the anticipated settlement of the Rwandan civil war on August 4. France is pushing hard to secure UNSC support for ending this conflict, which has had serious humanitarian consequences. The force is likely to be 500 strong, but the size of its UN component remains to be determined. Its likely cost is unknown. No offsets been identified thus far for either Rwandan peacekeeping operation.

#### Cambodia

UNTAC's mandate expires on August 28. UNSC and Core Group countries are considering the optimal UN successor presence in Cambodia. If asked by the new Cambodian government, the UN will

likely supplement its planned human rights, development, and demining presence with a SYG's Special Representative (SRSG), a modest interim UN liaison office, and some quantity of military observers. The role of the observers could range from liaison and reporting to border monitoring or military training. Their numbers could vary from 20 to 500.

A small military observer presence (20-30) coupled with a UN coordinating office and SRSG could cost approximately \$25 million a year. Arguably, only the observer mission would be an assessed peacekeeping operation. The rest should be paid for through the UN's regular budget or through voluntary contributions to UN-affiliated organizations like UNDP, UNESCO, and UNICEF. No U.S. funds have been identified to offset the USG's potential peacekeeping assessment.

Additional Complications

Clearly, one important aspect of tackling this broad problem is finding offsets to pay for new operations since obtaining brand new money is obviously unlikely in the near term. Unfortunately, making use of offsets to pay for assessed peacekeeping operations is not as simple as transferring funds from ESF or FMF to another 150 account. The arcane Congressional committee structure and legal restrictions on the CIPA account (from which assessed peacekeeping operations are paid) require that Congress pass a budget amendment to enable such a transfer of funds. Given the current hostility among Congressional appropriators to peacekeeping, obtaining a budget amendment for new operations in regions of little public interest could be difficult and require, at a minimum, high-level Administration lobbying.

Concurrences by: *RF* Rosemarie Forsythe, Richard Feinberg,  
Jennifer Ward, Fervial Saeed