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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 29, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER  
THROUGH: RICHARD A. CLARKE/JENNIFER WARD  
FROM: NICK RASMUSSEN *NR*  
SUBJECT: Rwanda Peacekeeping Operation

*\$200 Million*  
*\$60 million -  
US over  
2 years*

If approved, a UN peacekeeping operation for Rwanda stands a good chance of being a success. Both parties to the conflict want UN involvement and believe it is necessary for continued progress in implementing the Arusha peace accord (which we helped broker). The ceasefire has held for several months; its durability attests to a strong desire on both sides for a political solution. OAU and UN observers have been in country for several months and have not been harmed or threatened in any way.

The PRD-13 Factors. There are satisfactory answers to a number of the PRD factors that we have developed to guide our decisions on support for new UN operations.

- o There is an international community of interest for dealing with the problem on a multilateral basis. USUN reports that at least 10 UNSC members will vote in favor of a resolution.
- o There are clear objectives and a clear understanding that this a peacekeeping, not peace enforcement mission.
- o A ceasefire is in place; both parties want the UN to come in.
- o An end point to UN involvement has been identified. When an integrated armed force is created and elections produce a new government, the UN will leave. The UN estimates this will take 22-25 months.

Looking at some of the other guidelines, however, the picture is less favorable:

- o It is not clear that there are means available to support this mission. There is consensus that the OAU is overburdened and cannot take on the mission. While some UN member states have indicated that they are willing to consider stepping forward, we are a long way from having firm troop commitments. We can also assume that this operation would add to our UN arrearages.

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2

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- o The first guideline, that there be a threat to international peace and security, is met, but just barely. The most compelling rationale for UN involvement is to bring an end to a conflict which has displaced almost 1 million people, not to halt aggression.

Demobilization: Ambitious and Expensive. Beyond the PRD guidelines, we have some concerns which center around the UN's concept of operations. In the early stages of the mission, the UN would do what we know it can do successfully -- oversee a ceasefire so that a transitional government can take office in a climate of security. Later, however, the mission would be responsible for organizing demobilization of the two armed forces so that an integrated, national army could be created. Demobilization of two large armed forces (30,000 on one side, 20,000 on the other) is a complex and ambitious undertaking, made much more so by the UN's relative inexperience with disarmament. If there is any point at which this operation could break down, this would be it.

A demobilization component to the mission has significant cost implications as well. At its peak, the number of UN peacekeepers will climb to almost 2600. Though the UN has not yet provided cost estimates, we expect that it will be quite expensive. There have already been several attempts to scale down the size of the proposed operation, but given the ambitious mandate, this has not been possible.

Next Steps. If we are inclined to support this mission in the Security Council, we should nonetheless take the time to make sure our concerns about mission scope and costs are given a fair hearing and to scrub the text of the resolution. Given the President's clear statement on Monday, Security Council members and Boutros-Ghali should expect no less. Even if we end up supporting the mission in its current form, we will have established that we will exercise our right to scrutinize an operation in advance of a decision, regardless of time pressures from other members.

We understand that Secretary Christopher informed French PM Juppe in New York today that we want to delay the Security Council vote scheduled for Thursday. Ambassador Albright is following up through UN channels. State has also begun putting together comments on the draft resolution offered by the French. Most of the changes will involve being more precise about the mandate and end points. We will have their input early on Thursday.

E.O. 13526, 1.4(d)

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3

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E.O. 13526, 1.4(d) We have developed a preliminary draft of a response.

We believe that State will support a Rwanda resolution (USUN has already weighed in favor -- see Tab C). OSD and JCS would have to be convinced, but their concerns appear seem more tied up in the process (a hurried vote without good information) than with the substance. If we can slow the process down and demonstrate to them that we are faithfully applying the PRD guidelines, they will likely support a yes vote.

RECOMMENDATION

That you agree to schedule this week either a Deputies meeting or conference call involving State, DOD and NSC to develop a USG position on a Rwanda resolution.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove *md*

Attachments

Tab A Mitterand's Letter  
Tab B Draft Letter of Response  
Tab C USUN Cable

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