

Rwanda


<DIST>SIT: MOZENA RICE VAX

<PREC>IMMEDIATE<CLAS>CONFIDENTIAL<OSRI>RUCNDT<DTG>151941Z APR 94
<ORIG>USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
<TO>RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 5733
INFO RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA IMMEDIATE 0177
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 1111
RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUSNMHS/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUTAKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA PRIORITY 0365
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 0444
RUEHDR/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM 0334
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 0888
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 1550

<SUBJ>TFRWOL: US DROPS BOMBSHELL ON SECURITY COUNCIL,
-- 4/15

<TEXT>

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 001588
DEPT FOR RWANDA TASK FORCE, ALSO IO/UNP, IO/PHO, AND AF/C
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR RICE AND MOZENA;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3;
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA
E.O.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MARR, PINS, PREL, MOPS, PGOV, RW, UNSC
SUBJECT: TFRWOL: US DROPS BOMBSHELL ON SECURITY COUNCIL,
-- 4/15
REF: STATE 99440
1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.



E.O. 13526, 1.4(b), E.O. 13526, 1.4(d)

ALTHOUGH SOME MEMBERS ADVISED WAITING, OTHERS STILL WANT TO TRY FOR A RESOLUTION TODAY. COUNCIL WILL RECONVENE AT 4:30 PM APRIL 15. END SUMMARY.

3. THE COUNCIL'S APRIL 15 MORNING INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS BEGAN WITH A READ-OUT FROM THE SECRETARIAT OF THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND. THE FORCE COMMANDER (FC) IS STILL TRYING TO GET TALKS GOING. UNAMIR IS MOVING INTO THE AIRPORT BEFORE THE DEPARTURE OF THE BELGIANS. FRENCH FORCES ARE ALMOST ENTIRELY OUT; BELGIAN NON-UN FORCES WILL BE OUT BY SATURDAY. BELGIAN UNAMIR FORCES WILL BE OUT WITHIN 48-72 HOURS. A SMALL ITALIAN COMPANY LANDED AT THE KIGALI AIRPORT WITHOUT NOTICE. THE FC ASKED THEM TO DEPART. THE FC HAD TWO REQUESTS OF THE COUNCIL: FIRST, GIVE THE FC THE FLEXIBILITY TO SET APPROPRIATE TIMEFRAME FOR A CEASEFIRE, NEGOTIATIONS, ETC. SECOND, DO NOT CAST BLAME ON ANY ONE PARTY, BUT ~~RECEIVE~~ ALL MESSAGES TO BOTH.

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

DOING OTHERWISE WOULD COMPLICATE THE NEGOTIATIONS.

4. NIGERIAN AMB GAMBARI LAID OUT ITS MAXIMALIST POSITION, ON BEHALF OF THE NAM CAUCUS. WHILE BELGIAN CONCERNS ARE UNDERSTANDABLE, THEY SHOULD NOT DICTATE TO THE COUNCIL ON THE FUTURE OF UNAMIR. UNAMIR SHOULD NOT RPT NOT WITHDRAW. BOTH SIDES WANT THE UN TO STAY, SINCE THEY ARE PROVIDING A MEASURE OF ORDER IN A CHAOTIC SITUATION. NO OTHER TROOPS CONTRIBUTORS INDICATED A WISH TO WITHDRAW. THE FIGHTING HAS DIMINISHED AND THE UN IS ENCOURAGING A CEASEFIRE. THE OAU WROTE TO SAY UNAMIR IS ESSENTIAL TO THE RESTORATION OF PEACE, AND TO APPEAL TO THE SC TO ENSURE THE CONTINUED EFFECTIVENESS OF UNAMIR. THE OAU ALSO OFFERED TO TAKE AN ACTIVE ROLE IN PROMOTING A CEASEFIRE, THROUGH THE GOOD OFFICES OF OAU SYG SALIM, OAU PRESIDENT MUBARAK, TANZANIAN PRESIDENT MWINYI AND UGANDAN PRESIDENT MUSEVENI. THE UN SYG AND SRSG WANT UNAMIR TO REMAIN. GIVEN ALL THE ABOVE FACTORS, NIGERIA ASSERTED THAT THE QUESTIONS TO BE ANSWERED WERE: WHAT TASKS ARE APPROPRIATE FOR THE UN, AND WHICH OF THE TWO OPTIONS BEST ENABLES THE UN TO CARRY OUT THOSE TASKS.

5. GAMBARI SUGGESTED THE FOLLOWING FOUR TASKS WERE APPROPRIATE FOR THE UN: (A) LEND A HELPING HAND IN SAVING INNOCENT CIVILIAN LIVES, WITHOUT GUARANTEEING SAFETY OF CIVILIANS, (B) HELP BRING ABOUT A CEASEFIRE, (C) PROMOTE THE POLITICAL CLIMATE NEEDED FOR A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT, AND (D) ESTABLISH A LIAISON FOR THE OAU'S DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS, ONCE THOSE GET OFF THE GROUND. HE DECLARED THAT THE NAM PREFERRED OPTION ONE, BUT WITH A FORCE OF THE SIZE OF UNAMIR PRIOR TO BELGIAN WITHDRAWAL.

E.O. 13526, 1.4(b), E.O. 13526, 1.4(d)

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 001588
DEPT FOR RWANDA TASK FORCE, ALSO IO/UNP, IO/PHO, AND AF/C
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR RICE AND MOZENA;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3;
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA
E.O.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MARR, PINS, PREL, MOPS, PGOV, RW, UNSC
SUBJECT: TFRWOL: US DROPS BOMBSHELL ON SECURITY COUNCIL,
-- 4/15

E.O. 13526, 1.4(b), E.O. 13526, 1.4(d)

7. THE SC PRESIDENT POINTED OUT THAT BY NOT TAKING A DECISION TO WITHDRAW, THE COUNCIL WAS ACTUALLY DECIDING TO KEEP THE FORCE IN PLACE, ALTHOUGH THE DECISION WAS NOT ON PAPER.

E.O. 13526, 1.4(b), E.O. 13526, 1.4(d) WANTED TO HOLD OFF FOR NOW. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] SAID A FAILURE TO TAKE A DECISION WAS UNSATISFACTORY. IT WOULD LEAVE UNAMIR IN PLACE, BUT WITHOUT ANY SENSE OF [REDACTED], AND WITH A MANDATE IT

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

CANNOT POSSIBLY FULFIL. HE ACKNOWLEDGED HOW HARD IT WOULD BE TO GET A DECISION TODAY WITH THE NAM AND THE U.S. SO FAR APART. UK LEANS TOWARDS OPTION 2, SINCE IT HAS NO TIME LIMIT. THERE DOES NOT NEED TO BE A LARGE NUMBER OF MILITARY LEFT IN RWANDA. SOME MILITARY STAFF ARE NEEDED TO PROVIDE THEIR EXPERT OPINIONS ON THE TALKS ABOUT CEASEFIRE. THE LIMITED UN PRESENCE LEFT TO FACILITATE PEACE TALKS COULD BE CALLED SOMETHING OTHER THAN "UNAMIR", IF THAT WOULD BE HELPFUL. THEN UNAMIR COULD BE SUSPENDED.

E.O. 13526, 1.4(b), E.O. 13526, 1.4(d) URGED A SC DECISION ASAP. HE FEARED A WEAKENED UNAMIR COULD BE OPEN TO ATTACK, IN WHICH CASE THE COUNCIL MEMBERS WOULD HAVE THE NEW CASUALTIES ON THEIR CONSCIENCES- HE ALSO LEANED TOWARDS OPTION TWO, WITHOUT NECESSARILY THAT NUMBER OF MILITARY PERSONNEL.

10. COUNCIL PRESIDENT WILL MEET WITH U.S., FRANCE, NIGERIA AND BELGIUM AT 3:30 4/15. COUNCIL WILL RESUME INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS AT 4:30 4/15.

ALBRIGHT

NNNN

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 02<SSN>1588<STOR>940415160517 M0996759

<SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02<SSN>1588<STOR>940415160518 M0996760

<TOR>940415162121