

West. In part this is true because the army itself believes these policies to be correct, and in part because to reach an accommodation with the West would expose the army leaders to charges of "selling out to the neocolonialists" from leftist Indonesian elements independent of the PKI. Specifically, the army is deeply involved in confrontation with Malaysia and, despite some indications that its leaders are having second thoughts about this policy, it is unlikely that they can stand down on confrontation without a considerable loss of face. Furthermore, the army leadership, like Sukarno, would probably find confrontation a useful symbol around which to unify the many divisive forces at work in the archipelago.

179. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State¹

Djakarta, December 2, 1965.

1628. For Assist. Sec. Bundy from Amb Green. Ref: Deptel 708, Dec 1, 1965.²

1. This is to confirm my earlier concurrence that we provide Malik with fifty million rupiahs requested by him for the activities of the Kap-Gestapu movement. [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

2. The Kap-Gestapu activities to date have been important factor in the army's program, and judging from results, I would say highly successful. This army-inspired but civilian-staffed action group is still carrying burden of current repressive efforts targeted against PKI, particularly in Central Java.

A. Malik is not in charge of the Kap-Gestapu movement. He is, however, one of the key civilian advisers and promoters of the movement. There is no doubt whatsoever that Kap-Gestapu's activity is fully

¹ Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Indonesia, 1963-1965. Secret; Priority; Roger Channel; Special Handling.

² [text not declassified] (Ibid.)

consonant with and coordinated by the army. We have had substantial intelligence reporting to support this.

B. I view this contribution as a means of enhancing Malik's position within the movement. As one of the key civilians, he is responsible for finding funds to finance its activities. Without our contribution Kap-Gestapu will of course continue. On the other hand, there is no doubt that they need money. The latter, despite inflation, is in tight supply, and the comparatively small sum proposed will help considerably.

C. [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] Our willingness to assist him in this manner will, I think, represent in Malik's mind our endorsement of his present role in the army's anti-PKI efforts, and will promote good cooperating relations between him and army.

D. The chances of detection or subsequent revelation of our support in this instance are as minimal as any black bag operation can be. [2 lines of source text not declassified]

Green

180. Memorandum From the Chief, Far East Division, Directorate of Operations, Central Intelligence Agency (Colby) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy)

Washington, December 3, 1965.

[Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files: Job 78-00061R, Indonesia 2/2—State Department Liaison (1959-1966); Secret. 4 pages of source text not declassified.]