THE WHITE HOUSE

April 16, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

FROM:

JAMES A. WILDEROTTER

SUBJECT:

Meeting with David W. Belin,

April 15, 1975

I met yesterday with Dave Belin, Executive Director of the Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States, in connection with the Church Committee's request to the CIA for a series of materials relating to Director Colby's January 15, 1975 testimony before the Senate Appropriations Committee. A copy of the Select Committee's request is attached. The materials requested largely parallel the various items discussed in the "Colby Report."

Mr. Belin indicated that the Commission would complete its work by June 6, and that its report and recommendations -- although intended in the first instance for the President -- were being written with a view toward eventual publication. He also indicated that the staff has been sanitizing the transcripts of the Commission's proceedings and the various affidavits it has received.

Mr. Belin also indicated that the Commission is working on a special preliminary report -- expected to be completed on or shortly after April 30 -- on the allegations concerning "assassination plots." According to Mr. Belin, this preliminary report is also being drafted with a view toward its being provided to the Select Committee.



Mr. Belin stated that his only concern with respect to providing the Select Committee immediately with the materials it requested from the CIA is that leaks or premature public disclosures by the Committee -- before the Commission completes its work on June 6 -- would hinder the work of the Commission, impair its ability to meet the June 6 deadline and destroy the morale of the Commission staff. Only a few categories of materials present these problems.

Mr. Belin said he would have no problem with providing the Committee documents responding to items 1-8 of its request, and items 13, 15, 16, 19, 24, and 25.

Mr. Belin also had no problem with item 17 insofar as it relates only to the May 9, 1973 memorandum by former CIA Director Schlesinger to Agency employees directing them to report activities which, in their judgment, were "outside the CIA's charter." With respect to the rest of item 17 -- the actual employee responses -- I indicated that I had had preliminary discussions with Messrs. Miller and Schwarz in which I indicated my personal view that it is inappropriate to provide the actual employee responses because of their widely differing degrees of sophistication, accuracy, maturity, etc., and that the Committee staff had generally agreed with this view. I also told Mr. Belin that Mr. Schwarz had indicated that in certain limited areas, the Select Committee would want to go beyond summaries or other such documents and review the actual employee responses. I told Mr. Belin that I had told Schwarz that we would attempt to be flexible in these kinds of extraordinary situations.

Mr. Belin and I also discussed item 18, which requested the CIA Inspector General's summary report of May 21, 1973. I told Mr. Belin that, as to this item, the CIA proposes to provide a sanitized version of the I.G.'s summary which omits materials relating to the "assassination plots." Mr. Belin had no objection to providing the sanitized summary, but suggested that the "sanitization notice" be changed.

Mr. Belin also had no objection to item 23 being provided to the Select Committee insofar as it related to "all directives subsequent to the Directive of January 9, 1973, which similarly requested employees to report questionable activities." The Select Committee also requested under item 23 "all written

responses and all other documents reflecting oral responses to such directives," but both of us are unaware that any such documents in fact exist.

With respect to the remaining items -- as to which the risk of leaks or premature disclosure by the Select Committee is more substantial -- we agreed to seek either deferment or a special understanding with the Committee that would avoid any impairment of the Commission's work. These matters include items 9 through 12, relating to Project MPLODESTAR (inserting individuals into dissident groups to establish credentials for operations abroad); item 14, relating to Project MERRIMAC (monitoring of dissident groups in the D.C. area to protect CIA installations, personnel and information); items 20 and 21, relating to Project SRPOINTER (mail inspection); and item 22, relating to CIA assistance to other Federal, State and local government components.

Attachment

