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The
US and the Genocide in Rwanda 1994
Evidence
of Inaction
William
Ferroggiaro, Editor
August
20, 2001 |
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On April 6, 1994, Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana’s personal
plane, a gift from French president Francois Mitterand, was shot
down as it returned to Rwanda, killing Habyarimana, Burundian
president Cyprien Ntarymira, and members of their entourages.
The two presidents were returning from Tanzania, where they’d
met with regional leaders concerning events in Burundi.
Habyarimana himself was pressed to implement the power-sharing
Arusha Accord his government had concluded with the rebel Rwandan
Patriotic Front (RPF) in August 1993, which capped three years
of war, cease-fires and negotiations. To do so, however,
would mean the effective end of his 20-year, one-party rule over
Rwandan politics and society. Extremists in the military
and government bitterly opposed the accord; they are the likely
culprits in his assassination. Within an hour of the plane
crash, the Presidential Guard, elements of the Rwandan armed forces
(FAR) and extremist militia (Interahamwe and Impuzamugambi)
set up roadblocks and barricades and began the organized slaughter,
starting in the capital Kigali, of nearly one million Rwandans
in 100 days time. Their first targets were those most likely
to resist the plan of genocide: the opposition Prime Minister,
the president of the constitutional court, priests, leaders of
the Liberal Party and Social Democratic Party, the Information
Minister, and tellingly, the negotiator of the Arusha Accord.
Those who hesitated to join the campaign, such as the governor
of a southern province, were quickly removed from positions of
influence or killed. As a US intelligence analyst noted
in late April,
“The plan appears to have been to wipe out any RPF ally
or potential ally, and thus raise the costs and limit the possibility
of an RPF/Tutsi takeover… No end to the unprecedented bloodshed
is yet in sight.” (US Department of State,
Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Intelligence Assessment,
"Roots of the Violence in Rwanda”, April 29, 1994)
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As the killing intensified, the international community deserted
Rwanda. Western nations landed troops in Rwanda or Burundi in
the first week to evacuate their citizens, did so, and left.
The UN mission (UNAMIR), created in October 1993 to keep the peace
and assist the governmental transition in Rwanda, sought to intervene
between the killers and civilians. It also tried to mediate
between the RPF and the Rwandan army after the RPF struck from Rwanda
to protect Tutsi and rescue their battalion encamped in Kigali as
part of the Accord. On April 21, 1994, the United Nations Security
Council, at the behest of the United States—which had no troops in
Rwanda—Belgium, and others, voted to withdraw all but a remnant of
UNAMIR. The Security Council took this vote and others concerning
Rwanda even as the representative of the genocidal regime sat amongst
them as a non-permanent member. After human rights, media, and
diplomatic reports of the carnage mounted, the UN met and debated
and finally arrived at a compromise response on May 16. UNAMIR
II, as it was to be known, would be a more robust force of 5,500 troops.
Again, however, the world failed to deliver, as the full complement
of troops and materiel would not arrive in Rwanda until months after
the genocide ended. Faced with the UN’s delay, but also concerned
about its image as a former patron and arms supplier of the Habyarimana
regime, France announced on June 15 that it would intervene to stop
the killing. In a June 22 vote, the UN Security Council gave
its blessing to this intervention; that same day, French troops entered
Rwanda from Zaire. While intending a wider intervention, confronted
with the RPF’s rapid advance across Rwanda, the French set up a “humanitarian
zone” in the southwest corner of Rwanda. Their intervention
succeeded in saving tens of thousands of Tutsi lives; it also facilitated
the safe exit of many of the genocide’s plotters, who were allies
of the French.
On July 4, the RPF took the capital, Kigali; two weeks later, it
announced a new government comprised of RPF leaders and ministers
previously selected for the transition government called for in the
Arusha Accord. With the RPF’s takeover, and with the encouragement
of extremist radio, Rwandans implicated in the slaughter, their relatives
and those who feared the arrival of the RPF, fled to neighboring countries.
In the end, the extremists killed nearly one million Rwandans, approximately
one-tenth of the population. Were it not for the RPF’s military
prowess, the genocide would have continued.
Despite overwhelming evidence of genocide and knowledge as to its
perpetrators, United States officials decided against taking a leading
role in confronting the slaughter in Rwanda. Rather, US officials
confined themselves to public statements,
diplomatic demarches, initiatives for a ceasefire, and attempts
to contact both the interim government perpetrating the killing and
the RPF. The US did use its influence, however, at the
United Nations, but did so to discourage a robust UN response (Document
4 and Document 13). In late
July, however, with the evidence of genocide littering the ground
in Rwanda, the US did launch substantial operations—again, in a supporting
role—to assist humanitarian relief efforts for those displaced by
the genocide.
Note: The following documents are in PDF format.
You will need to download and install the free Adobe
Acrobat Reader to view.
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Document
1 |
| Facsimile from Maj. Gen. Romeo Dallaire, Force Commander,
United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda, to Maj. Gen. Maurice
Baril, United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, “Request
for Protection for Informant”, January 11, 1994. |
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| Source: US House
of Representatives, Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee
on International Operations and Human Rights, “Hearing: Rwanda:
Genocide and the Continuing Cycle of Violence”, May 5, 1998 |
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In this notorious “genocide fax” (originally published in The
New Yorker), Gen. Dallaire warns UN peacekeeping officials—Maj.
Gen. Maurice Baril, the military adviser to Secretary General Boutros
Boutros-Ghali, and Kofi Annan, who at the time was Under Secretary
General for PKO (peacekeeping operations) and is now UN Secretary
General—of the existence of arms caches, a plot to assassinate Belgian
UN peacekeepers and Rwandan members of parliament, and the existence
of lists of Tutsis to be killed. Dallaire informs New York
of his intention to raid the caches, but foreshadowing later developments,
Annan and DPKO official Iqbal Riza refuse the request, citing UNAMIR’s
limited mandate. Instead, they order Dallaire to apprise the
president of Rwanda of the informant’s allegations, despite the
fact that the arms caches and assassination plan are the work of
those close to the president. On April 7, the day after the
shoot down of the President’s plane, members of the Presidential
Guard carry out this plan, torturing, killing, and mutilating 10
Belgian soldiers in the UN contingent protecting the Prime Minister,
who was also their target. As foreseen by the plan’s authors,
Belgium quickly withdrew their contingent from UNAMIR, breaking
the backbone of the force. Within two weeks, the UN Security
Council voted to reduce UNAMIR to a token presence, removing the
last impediment to the slaughter.
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Document
2 |
| Memorandum from Prudence Bushnell, Principal Deputy
Assistant Secretary, Bureau of African Affairs, through Peter Tarnoff,
Under Secretary for Political Affairs, to Secretary of State Warren
Christopher, “Death of Rwandan and Burundian Presidents in Plane
Crash Outside Kigali”, April 6, 1994. Limited Official Use |
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| Source: Freedom
of Information Act release by the US Department of State |
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Bushnell, the State Department’s number two official for Africa
matters, who would lead the State Department’s initial day-to-day
efforts during the genocide, advises Secretary of State Warren Christopher
of the assassination of Rwandan president Habyarimana and Burundian
president Ntaryamira. Bushnell alerts Christopher that “widespread
violence” is likely upon the death of the president. Ominously,
she reports that “the military intend(s) to take over power temporarily”,
and that they are “very resistant to working with the current (interim)
Prime Minister”. Indeed, the Prime Minister, Agathe Uwilingiyama,
a member of the opposition MDR party, will be assassinated by members
of the Presidential Guard the following day.
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Document
3 |
| Memorandum from Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Middle East/Africa, through Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs, to Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy, “Talking Points On Rwanda/Burundi”, April 11, 1994.
Confidential. |
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| Source: Freedom
of Information Act release by the Office of the Secretary of Defense |
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This document—apparently produced as a briefer for a dinner between
Under Secretary Frank Wisner, the third ranking official at the
Pentagon, and former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger—shows the
Pentagon’s candid assessment about events in Rwanda only five days
after the shoot down of the Rwandan president’s plane. Pentagon
Africa analysts conclude: if the peace process fails, “a massive
bloodbath (hundreds of thousands of deaths) will ensue”; the “UN
will likely withdraw all forces”; and the US will not get involved
“until peace is restored”. That these shocking details are
offered as dinner conversation reveals the extent to which Pentagon
analysts accepted it as inevitable.
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Document
4 |
| US Department of State, cable number 099440, to US
Mission to the United Nations, New York, “Talking Points for UNAMIR
Withdrawal”, April 15, 1994. Confidential. |
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| Source: Freedom
of Information Act release by Department of State |
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This telegram forwards Department of State guidance to the US Mission
to the UN in New York instructing US diplomats there that “the international
community must give highest priority to full, orderly withdrawal
of all UNAMIR personnel as soon as possible.” Advising that
this withdrawal does not require a UN Security Council resolution—which
would have likely focused international criticism—the Department
instructs the mission “that we will oppose any effort at this time
to preserve a UNAMIR presence in Rwanda.” April 15 was the
first of two days of UN Security Council debate on next steps in
Rwanda—for which the Rwandan ambassador was present and about which
he reported back to the interim government in Rwanda. Over
that same weekend, aware the UN Security Council was in retreat,
the interim Council of Ministers, the genocide’s architects, met
in Kigali and decided to take the program of extermination to the
rest of the country.
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Document
5 |
| Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, The
White House, “Statement by the Press Secretary”, April 22, 1994.
Non-classified. |
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| Source: Freedom
of Information Act release by the Department of State |
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Many consider this statement by the White House—done at the urging
of Human Rights Watch—as the penultimate US initiative during the
genocide. In naming and calling on four Rwandan military leaders
to “end the violence”, it is probably the sole example of high-level
attention—however brief—trained on officials involved in the genocide.
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Document
6 |
| Discussion Paper, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Middle East/Africa Region, Department of Defense,
May 1, 1994. Secret. |
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| Source: Freedom
of Information Act release by Office of the Secretary of Defense |
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A product of an intra-agency process comprised of working level
Pentagon action officers with expertise in African affairs, humanitarian
and refugee affairs, public affairs, and special operations, and
also officials of the Joint Staff’s Strategic Plans and Policy division,
this memo for the record provides an inside glimpse at the various
goals, options and tactics discussed at a meeting of officials charged
with day-to-day responsibility for the Rwanda crisis. It is
filled with cautions against the US becoming committed to action.
Genocide comes up in the discussion: “Be Careful. Legal at
State was worried about this yesterday—Genocide finding could commit
USG to “do something”.
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Document
7 |
| US Department of State, cable number 113672, to US
Embassy Bujumbura and US Embassy Dar es Salaam, “DAS Bushnell Tells
Col. Bagosora to Stop the Killings”, April 29, 1994. Limited
Official Use. |
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| Source: Freedom
of Information Act release by the Department of State |
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State Department officials at the working level contacted Rwandan
officials regularly to urge an end to the killing—to little effect.
In this cable, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs
Prudence Bushnell challenges Col. Theoneste Bagosora, cabinet director
in Rwanda’s Ministry of Defense and the coordinator of the genocide,
as to who is responsible for the massacres. Ironically, his
call for a cease-fire echoes the US call for the same, albeit for
very different reasons. The telegram also highlights the US
government’s pre-occupation with returning to a “peace process”,
when much of Rwanda is littered with corpses.
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Document
8 |
| Memorandum for the Vice President, et. al., “PDD 25:
U.S. Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations”, May 3,
1994. Confidential with Secret attachment. |
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| Source: Mandatory
Declassification Review release by the National Security Council |
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Document
9 |
| White paper, Department of State, “The Clinton Administration’s
Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations”, May 1994.
Non-classified. |
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| Source: Mandatory
Declassification Review release by the National Security Council |
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Presidential Decision Directive 25 guides US government policy
on peacekeeping operations, setting forth criteria that must be
met before US participation can occur. The document stipulates
three different sets of criteria depending on the anticipated level
of engagement. One of the most controversial policy documents
of the Clinton Administration’s first term, this directive was under
development for more than a year, and during the review was the
subject of bureaucratic infighting, leaks to the press, and strong
Congressional criticism. While much information in the directive
itself remains classified, the State Department issued an executive
summary as a “white paper”, which spells out the thresholds and
criteria for US involvement in peace operations.
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Document
10 |
| Memorandum from Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
to Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security, National
Security Council, “Rwanda: Jamming Civilian Radio Broadcasts”, May
5, 1994. Confidential. |
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| Source: Freedom
of Information Act release by the Office of the Secretary of Defense |
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As the carnage continued and a robust response by the US or others
was not forthcoming, human rights groups, members of Congress, and
others urged the Clinton Administration to counter or “jam” extremist
radio broadcasts in Rwanda. These broadcasts spread fear amongst
the Rwandan populace, urged participation in the killing, shamed
those who sought not to participate, and in many cases, specifically
named and provided the whereabouts of those to be killed.
As such, the radio broadcasts were essential to the fulfillment
of the program of extermination. In this memo, Frank Wisner,
the number three official at the Pentagon, acknowledges internal
discussions about the feasibility of countering the hate radio.
He replies to Sandy Berger, the deputy to National Security Adviser
Tony Lake, that undertaking the initiative to “jam” the radio would
be “ineffective and expensive”; a “wiser” activity would be to assist
the “relief effort”.
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Document
11 |
| Defense Intelligence Report, Defense Intelligence
Agency, “Rwanda: The Rwandan Patriotic Front’s Offensive”, May 9,
1994. Secret/NOFORN (not releasable to foreign nationals). |
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| Source: Freedom
of Information Act release by the Defense Intelligence Agency |
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Produced one month into the genocide, this report declares that
“Almost immediately after President Habyarimana was killed, in Kigali
the Presidential Guard began the systematic execution of prominent
Tutsi and moderate Hutu” and that the violence is “directed by high-level
officials within the interim government”. It identifies the
army as pursuing a “genocide …to destroy the leadership of the Tutsi
community.” In contrast to many of the public statements of
US officials at the time, this analysis shows that the government
did discern between the planned slaughter of civilians and the renewed
warfare between the Rwandan armed forces and the rebel RPF.
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Document
12 |
| Memorandum of Conversation, Office of the Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Middle East/Africa Region, Department of
Defense, “Rwanda Interagency Telecon”, drafted by Lt. Col. Michael
Harvin, circa May 11, 1994. Secret. |
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| Source: Freedom
of Information Act release by the Office of the Secretary of Defense |
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This memorandum serves as a vivid account of the differing perspectives
and postures of the players engaged in the response to the crisis
in Rwanda, complete with exclamation marks indicating the memo drafter’s
incredulity at a participant’s remarks. The interagency teleconference
on Rwanda occurred daily, serving an information exchange function
and an option vetting function. Attending from the Pentagon
side at this meeting are officials from the Middle East/Africa office,
the peacekeeping/peace enforcement office, and the office of the
Assistant Secretary for Special Operations & Low Intensity Conflict,
in addition to military members of the Joint Staff. This report
demonstrates the gulf between the views of the State Department
and National Security Council officials and the views of Pentagon
and military officials: “the meeting degenerated into a NSC/State
attempt to sign-up the Principals to support a Chapter VII operation
wearing Chapter VI sheep’s clothing, with OSD and Joint Staff in
stiff opposition.” In translation, this refers to NSC and
State representatives’ efforts to persuade senior Pentagon officials
and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to agree to “peace enforcement” (read
possible combat operations) in Rwanda, rather than waiting in vain
for a ceasefire that will not come in order to do “peacekeeping”.
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Document
13 |
| US Department of State, cable number 127262, to US
Mission to the United Nations, New York, “Rwanda: Security Council
Discussions”, May 13, 1994. Confidential. |
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| Source: Freedom
of Information Act release by the Department of State |
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Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Peter Tarnoff and
senior officials, including the Director of the Joint Staff, drafted
and approved this cable delivering instructions to the US Mission
in New York for Security Council debate over replenishing UNAMIR.
With much of the killing completed and most of the remaining armed
forces fleeing the RPF’s countrywide advance, US officials argue
against a UN plan for a robust effort launched into Kigali to protect
surviving Rwandans, rescue others, and deliver assistance.
Such a plan, “in current circumstances, would require a Chapter
VII mandate”, and the US “is not prepared at this point to lift
heavy equipment and troops into Kigali”. It is however, willing
to consider its own plan, “outside-in”, by which protective zones
would be established on Rwanda’s borders. Even this plan,
however, is likely to be “an active protection operation requiring
the use of lethal force.” As for the several thousand Rwandans
in Kigali under deteriorating UN protection, “we recommend that
these ad hoc protective efforts should continue until a suitable
alternative arrangement can be ensured.” Even when a plan
for 5,500 troops with a protection mandate is finally approved on
May 17, the troops would not all be in place until September, two
months after the RPF captures the country and one month after Gen.
Dallaire completed his service in Rwanda.
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Document
14 |
| Action memorandum from Assistant Secretary of State
for African Affairs George E. Moose, Assistant Secretary of State
for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor John Shattuck, Assistant Secretary
of State for International Organization Affairs Douglas J. Bennet,
and Department of State Legal Adviser Conrad K. Harper, through
Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Peter Tarnoff and
Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs Tim Wirth, to Secretary
of State Warren Christopher, “Has Genocide Occurred in Rwanda?”,
May 21, 1994. Secret. |
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| Source: Freedom
of Information Act release by the Department of State |
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The internal debate over whether genocide was occurring in Rwanda
in 1994 and US officials’ use of the term began nearly as soon as
the killing began. Nevertheless, Department of State officials
refrained from characterizing it as such for weeks. While
on June 10 Secretary of State Warren Christopher finally publicly
called the Rwandan slaughter “genocide”, on May 21 he had authorized
Department officials—“in light of the stark facts in Rwanda”—to
use the formulation “acts of genocide have occurred” and authorized
delegations to agree to resolutions using various formulations of
the term. The memo argues for consistency with the use of
the term with relation to Bosnia. A previous memo dated May
16, sought approval to use the term “genocide has occurred”, but
this formulation didn’t hold. Interestingly, the principal
officials here find no legal obligation in the use of either formulation;
but in avoiding use of the “genocide label”, US “credibility will
be undermined with human rights groups and the general public”.
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Document
15 |
| Memorandum from Assistant Secretary for Intelligence
and Research Toby T. Gati to Assistant Secretary of State for African
Affairs George Moose and Department of State Legal Adviser Conrad
Harper, “Rwanda – Geneva Convention Violations”, circa May 18, 1994.
Secret/ORCON (originator controlled). |
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| Source: Freedom
of Information Act release by the Department of State |
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This intelligence analysis, prepared for Secretary Christopher’s
decision as to use of the genocide label, finds “substantial, circumstantial
evidence implicating senior Rwandan government and military officials
in the widespread, systematic killing” of Tutsis and moderate Hutus.
The RPF, “unlike government forces”, “does not appear to have committed
Geneva Convention defined genocidal atrocities.” The analysts
report that between “200,000 to 500,000” are dead. It also
finds it credible that “Hutu elements in the military” “killed Habyarimana
in order to block” the power-sharing Arusha Accords and “eliminate
the Tutsi-dominated RPF and sympathetic Hutus”.
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Document
16 |
| Draft Legal Analysis, Office of the Legal Adviser,
Department of State, drafted by Assistant Legal Adviser for African
Affairs Joan Donoghue, May 16, 1994. Secret. |
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| Source: Freedom
of Information Act release by the Department of State |
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This legal analysis, like the preceding intelligence analysis,
was prepared for Secretary of State Christopher’s decision concerning
the public use of the term “genocide” to describe events in Rwanda.
In analyzing the applicability of definitions from the Genocide
Convention of 1948 to the events in Rwanda, the assistant legal
adviser finds that there is “little question” that genocidal acts
have occurred in Rwanda; finds that “most of those killed in Rwanda
have been Tutsi civilians”; and finds that “acts have apparently
been committed with the requisite intent to destroy, in whole or
in part, the Tutsi group”. She also argues that ascertaining
an accurate figure for numbers of deaths “is not critical to this
analysis” that genocide has occurred.
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