AT THE CREATION
1961-1965

ORIGINATION DOCUMENTS
OF THE
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Edited by
Deane J. Allen and Brian G. Shellum

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Front Cover: General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, USA, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1960-62 (left); Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense, 1961-68 (center); Lieutenant General Joseph F. Carroll, USAF, Director, DIA, 1961-69 (right).

Back Cover: Meeting of the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) in the early 1960s. Lieutenant General Joseph F. Carroll, Director, DIA, is seated to the far right and John A. McCona. Director, CIA, is seated at the opposite end of the table.
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This year the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) celebrates the 40th anniversary of its establishment. Defense intelligence is America’s first line of defense. We are very proud of our accomplishments as the nation’s premier producer of foreign military intelligence. We are equally proud of our many contributions as a combat support agency and our support to the warfighter in the Department of Defense.

From the Berlin Crisis of 1961 and the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 - to the Gulf War in 1991 - to the global war on terrorism in 2001, DIA has excelled as the provider of timely and accurate intelligence to the decisionmaker and the warfighter. Good intelligence, delivered at the right time and place, can mean more than the difference between victory and defeat. It can also mean life or death for members of our Armed Forces who fight our wars on land, sea, in the air, and now in space. The future will present many complex intelligence challenges, and DIA is well poised to meet them.

This volume contains the basic documents that established and defined the Agency at its creation. The 104 specially selected documents tell our early story from 1961 to 1965 and provide the reasons for the Agency’s organization. DIA recognizes that it must organize and publicize formerly classified documents in accordance with Executive Order 12958. As DIA enters its fourth decade of preeminence in Defense intelligence support, we have an obligation to DIA employees, the public, and historians to unveil the previously classified materials on the origins and accomplishments of this Agency. We have done so in the form of this introductory volume. In the near future, we will publish additional volumes covering the years from 1965 to the present.

This volume should also provide Defense intelligence insight to national security planners and decisionmakers as they face new intelligence challenges and consider future Intelligence Community organizational and mission structuring. I hope the readers find this first installment as useful, informative, and interesting as I have.

L.E. Jacoby
Vice Admiral, USN
Director, DIA
FORWARD

During its first year, the Agency faced two issues that became icons of the Cold War, the building of the Berlin Wall and the placement of Soviet missiles in Cuba. Before the decade had ended, rumblings from around the globe embroiled the Agency in providing intelligence support to operational forces in Vietnam as well as crises in the Middle East, Latin America, Africa, Eastern Europe, and Asia. An extensive customer list ranged from the national-level policymaker to the warfighter. Concerns also included a wide array of other security issues such as arms control, building databases, and indications and warning systems. As DIA sought to take its place within the Intelligence Community in 1961 as a credible producer of foreign military intelligence, the necessity for a comprehensive and well-defined organization to meet these challenges was a challenge in itself.

Now in its 40th anniversary year, the organization has withstood the tests of many challenges and changes. It has steadfastly built a reputation for excellence by providing timely, accurate Defense intelligence of the highest quality. However, in the wake of the Cold War, an emerging global security environment very different from that of the last half of the previous century has required the Agency to reexamine its ability to respond as well as reshape its intelligence capability. The transition has focused on preparing for the asymmetrical threat—underscored by the 11 September 2001 attack on the Pentagon in Washington and the World Trade Center towers in New York, improving databases, enhancing interoperability, and revitalizing the workforce as a means of meeting future demands. These efforts utilize an understanding of the origins of the organization and its past successes. Such knowledge is the catalyst for conducting these changes.

Society today relies heavily on the flow of accurate and timely information. Although the documents enclosed in this introductory volume are not, in light of their sensitive nature, timely, they do serve as a critical guide to the origins of DIA. Moreover, in accordance with Executive Order 12958, DIA has an obligation to organize and publicize formally classified documents. As you will see from reading this volume, the rationale and arguments for the creation of a Defense Intelligence Agency in 1961 are as relevant today as they were 40 years ago.

Many assisted in writing, editing and producing this complex volume. Sandra L. Egler, Specialist Corey Jensen, USAR, Lieutenant Colonel Holly A. Mayer, USAR, and Mirlin S. Toomer, prepared many of the documents. Captain Michael S. Borders, USAR and Curtis A. Utz performed document research. Colonel Ronald Lutz, USAR, and Colonel Jonathan G. Mark, USAFR, edited and worked on preparing the layout of the book. Starr Lopaze and Bill Downey in the Publications Division helped ready the manuscript for printing. Brian G. Shellum researched documents, edited, and worked on the final layout of the book. As the principal researcher, writer, and editor, I began collecting and declassifying documents for this project in the late 1980s. It is gratifying to finally see the publication of this worthwhile edition of basic DIA origination documents.

Deane J. Allen
DIA Historian
2002
OVERVIEW OF THE ORIGINS OF DIA

In July 1961 Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara decided to establish a central Defense intelligence organization to correct longstanding problems in military intelligence. Even more, Mr. McNamara wanted to depart from the past by centralizing the traditional ways military intelligence was done throughout United States history.

From the end of World War II until the opening of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) in October 1961, management inefficiency and poor quality products afflicted much of U.S. military intelligence. New operations, organizations and leadership were top priorities of Mr. McNamara and the newly arrived Kennedy administration.

Regret over failure to warn U.S. forces of the December 7th, 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor fueled the long and difficult search for a centrally managed intelligence system. The next few paragraphs outline the portion of that search that produced the DIA. The basic documents of the DIA, which are collected in this publication, contain most of the important details.

Some have claimed that the DIA owes its existence to the post-Sputnik “missile gap” debate of the late 1950's. The debate was over the politically loaded question of whether the U.S. had fallen behind the Soviet Union in fielding large, intercontinental ballistic missiles.

The missile gap debate did not alone produce DIA. DIA was created to be the central, efficient Defense intelligence authority. It would closely monitor changing political, military, and social conditions overseas. It would respond effectively to intelligence requirements with intelligence collection, production, and resources.

One of the earliest U.S. examples of formal military intelligence cooperation was the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), created in 1941 as a coordinating mechanism of the fledgling Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) organization. The JIC was comprised of the directors and representatives of the intelligence organs of the Army, the Navy, the State Department, the Board of Economic Warfare, and the Coordinator of Information (COI).

In June 1942 the COI was renamed the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) by President Franklin Roosevelt. The OSS produced reliable, integrated, national intelligence information during the war, but was hampered by competition with the Military Services. When the OSS leader Major General William Donovan proposed that the President establish an independent intelligence agency responding directly to him, this was opposed by the Services.

After the war President Harry S. Truman disbanded the OSS. The Services and the State Department retained autonomy over their intelligence functions because each had independent needs. They allowed, however, that greater coordination was necessary.

In January 1946 President Truman established the Central Intelligence Group (CIG) for the coordination, planning, evaluation and dissemination of intelligence. The CIG’s budget and staff
were drawn from the Military Services and the Department of State. The position of Director, Central Intelligence was established to head the organization. But the Services and the State Department still had control over their own resources, influenced the CIG, and continued to directly advise the President.

Also during 1946, the Congressional Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack recommended integration of all Army and Navy intelligence organizations. "Operational and intelligence work required centralization of authority and clear-cut allocation of responsibility," the committee wrote. By 1947, Congress realized that increased integration of Service intelligence and improved joint operations were vital to U.S. global security interests and technological progress.

The National Security Act of 1947 took the first step toward reform. The 1947 Act consolidated the separate Military Services into the Department of Defense, created the National Security Council (NSC) as an advisory group to the President, and established the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The Act charged the Director, Central Intelligence with responsibility for "coordinating the intelligence activities of the several Government departments and agencies in the interest of national security."

Despite the powers rendered the CIA by the National Security Act of 1947, the institutional claims of the Military Services and the State Department continued to plague the CIA. The Services and State Department maintained control over their own resources by using the CIG as precedent for the CIA. The precedent resurfaced whenever centralized control of the fragmented military intelligence apparatus was considered.

The National Security Act of 1947 was deliberately vague in defining CIA's responsibilities. The Military and State Departments opposed centralized management, arguing that to be prepared to conduct wartime operations they must exercise control over peacetime intelligence activities. The CIA became a weak coordinator in a confederation of departmental intelligence organizations.

The 1947 Act left intact the Joint Intelligence Committee within the Organization of the Joint Staff. During World War II, the JIC's furnished "agreed military intelligence" to other agencies of the JCS and represented them on the Allied wartime Combined Intelligence Committee. The JIC did not unify the U.S. military intelligence components, nor did it produce composite national intelligence estimates. It did, however, provide the organizational basis of the DIA.

The working level of the JIC was called the Joint Intelligence Subcommittee Staff. Officers from the Military Services were assigned full-time to this body, later renamed the Joint Intelligence Staff. Subsequently, the Joint Intelligence Staff became the Joint Intelligence Group (JIG), or the J-2. Ultimately, the positions of Director, J-2 and Director, DIA were filled by the same senior-ranking military officer.

In 1948, President Truman appointed a commission under former President Herbert Hoover to assess the effectiveness of the Executive Branch of Government.
The Commission dispatched a task force to examine the national security apparatus, especially the intelligence network. Concerning the National Military Establishment, the Commission noted that it lacked "centralized authority" which "should be placed firmly in the Secretary of Defense."

Moreover, "...the continuance of intense interservice rivalries hampers and confuses sound policy at many points. One of our greatest needs is to elevate military thinking to a plane above individual service aims and ambitions." The JCS was described as "...too remote from related groups..." such as the National Security Council and the CIA. "...A spirit of teamwork must govern interagency intelligence relationships."

Wasteful duplication, personnel problems, unsatisfactory coordination, and conflicting intelligence estimates were also singled out as "disturbing inadequacies." The task force was convinced that too many disparate intelligence estimates have been made by the individual departmental intelligence services; that these separate estimates have often been subjective and biased; that the capabilities of potential enemies have frequently been misinterpreted as to their intentions, and that a more comprehensive collection system, better coordination and more mature experienced evaluation are imperative.

The task force suggested

...a better mechanism than now exists for coordinating the service intelligence agencies in the Secretary's office should be established...and that the Secretary must be...the coordinator of intelligence and all other activities within the military establishment.

By 1949, the Hoover Commission's findings had helped to produce several amendments to the 1947 National Security Act, as well as the Central Intelligence Act of 1949. Somewhat better coordination and control resulted and the intelligence responsibilities of the JCS were better defined. But the deficiencies the Hoover Commission identified in 1948 remained essentially in place until the Defense Intelligence Agency was established in 1961.

By 1949, the United States and the Soviet Union had commenced a vigorous competition in development of strategic weapons — including the atomic bomb (replicated by the Soviets in 1949). By the late 1950s ICBMs and space programs were also hotly competed. Remote-sensing and other technologies helped intelligence analysts complete the picture that was often left incomplete by traditional human-source intelligence.

But each Military Department continued to do intelligence according to its needs, often duplicating or competing against one another. There was keen competition for resources and bias in intelligence products as each Service sought to acquire and apply the new technologies. The bomber gap and missile gap theories of the 1950s perhaps best illustrate the phenomenon.

In 1949 the Defense Department formed the Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA) to administer strategic communications and intelligence functions, cryptology, code development and code breaking. AFSA also coordinated these jobs done by other Defense organizations.
On 4 November 1952 AFSA became the National Security Agency (NSA) by classified
Presidential directive. NSA assumed AFSA’s duties. It seemed the model of a jointly manned,
centralized Defense intelligence activity had finally been established.

By 1952, inter service rivalry over the control of targeting intelligence grew so intense, even the
JCS had to intervene. The Air Force Chief of Staff reportedly proposed to his colleagues that if the
Services could not agree on the control of intelligence, perhaps all intelligence activities should be
pooled and given to the Secretary of Defense to manage.

In 1953 limited central control of intelligence emerged when the Secretary of Defense hired a new
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Special Operations. Among other things, the new
Assistant was expected to review the planning and programming of the Services’ intelligence
components, develop Defense positions on intelligence problems, provide intelligence staff
support to the Secretary of Defense in his role as a member of the National Security Council,
and improve coordination within the Defense intelligence community.

The office of the Secretary’s Assistant for Special Operations did not produce intelligence, of
course. It mainly coordinated Defense intelligence and provided intelligence community liaison.
It had no authority to manage Defense intelligence resources—a dilemma later faced by DIA.

The JIG, the small intelligence staff of the Joint Chiefs, could not effectively coordinate Service
intelligence efforts either. As a result, several problems developed:

Each Service prepared its own estimate of the threat to U.S. security. These estimates
were often self-serving because they supported the Service’s positions on roles,
missions, and weapon systems.

There was considerable duplication of effort—not only in what was being produced
—but also in the collection area.

Neither the JCS nor the Secretary of Defense had an accurate picture regarding the
total allocation of military intelligence resources.

In 1955 President Dwight D. Eisenhower created another commission headed by former President
Hoover to evaluate Government efficiency. A commission task force looked at the 22 Government
agencies directly or indirectly engaged in intelligence “in one form or another.”

The intelligence portion of the Commission’s report received much Congressional attention. The
report warned of the need to collect more intelligence information about Russia, her satellites, and
Communist China.

The report also noted the “apparent lack of accountability” in the intelligence community and the
need for better organization. The report concluded,
Our early philosophy of peace still prevails, but within our generation and for our own protection, organized intelligence has been forced upon us by the rapidly shrinking world of electronics, nuclear weapons, and planes which travel a supersonic speed.


The 1958 Reorganization Act removed much of the important decision-making from the Military Departments and placed it in the hands of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense. The legislation also aimed to strengthen the chain of command over U.S. combatant forces from the President to the Secretary of Defense — then through the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the commanders-in-chief of the Unified and Specified Commands.

Until 1958, each Military Department (the Army, the Navy and the Air Force) had a large organization collecting, producing and disseminating intelligence for its own intelligence headquarters and component commands.

Additionally, the Joint Chiefs of Staff provided jointly agreed intelligence to the Secretary of Defense and to the heads of the Unified and Specified Commands. But "joint intelligence" was just a synthesis of departmental intelligence. Neither the J-2 nor the Services could resolve the inevitable differences of the Military Departments. Important things suffered, such as the optimal design of the national military posture and the contribution of military intelligence to U.S. foreign policy.

By 1958 this much was clear: the intelligence support provided to the combatant commands was unsatisfactory. Defense intelligence assets were inherently duplicative, cumbersome, poorly distributed, costly, and did not provide for unified (or even coordinated) military intelligence estimates at any echelon. In practice the system was ineffective because it failed to provide timely and credible estimates.

The Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 continued the centralization process underway in the Department since 1947. The Act removed any lingering doubt about the Secretary's authority and placed the JCS in the chain of command for intelligence support to the Unified and Specified Commands. Department of Defense Directive 5100.1 (31 December 1958) assigned responsibility to the JCS and Military Departments for the provision of adequate, timely and reliable intelligence.

Also in 1958, the National Security Council created the United States Intelligence Board (USIB). The Board's members were the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Directors of the FBI, CIA, and NSA, representatives of the Military Services, and, representatives formerly responsible for communications intelligence.
Now, at the Nation’s highest level of intelligence deliberation the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Army, Navy, and Air Force, the Department of State, Central Intelligence Agency, Atomic Energy Commission and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, all had equal representation.

But the USIB’s procedures frequently required the Secretary of Defense to review the dissenting opinions of the Service intelligence chiefs to achieve a consensus. The perpetual question, “Who speaks for Defense?” remained as before.

The argument for centralized Defense intelligence grew even stronger in 1958. Secretary of Defense Thomas S. Gates underscored the urgency for Defense intelligence reform by noting that intelligence requirements of the Unified and Specified Commands, the JCS, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense had increased substantially.

By 1959 the Defense Department was seeking to put its house in order. The Secretary directed the JCS to study the intelligence requirements of the Military Departments to identify for elimination any duplication and establish the priority of those that remained.

Under the chairmanship of the Chief of Plans, J-2, a Joint Chiefs of Staff/Military Departments Task Force began work in December 1959. The Task Force determined, in part, that 37 separate intelligence products, all addressing substantially the same information but for different consumers, could not be justified. But before any remedies could be proposed by the JCS, the issue was placed out of reach of the JCS.

On 6 May 1960, the Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and the President’s Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities decided to establish a new and major Joint Study Group (JSG).

Lyman Kirkpatrick, formerly CIA Inspector General, chaired the Study Group. President Eisenhower appointed the members. They focused on fully revamping U.S. foreign intelligence. Of special concern to the JSG was military intelligence coordination:

United States intelligence must be a community effort in fact as well as name, which means that effective coordination of intelligence as a truly national effort must be achieved. By far the preponderant part of U.S. intelligence in terms of manpower and money is that undertaken by the Department of Defense. Great strides toward a more closely integrated community would result from improved intelligence coordination within the Department.

The Final Report of the JSG proposed a new intelligence organization with broad powers over the intelligence programs and activities of Defense components. The “Defense Intelligence Agency” was thus conceived. The JSG even considered recommending eliminating the Service’s intelligence programs.
It has been suggested...to establish one intelligence service for the whole Department, reporting directly to the Secretary of Defense. Although this proposal has considerable merit, it is our view that on balance it would be unwise to attempt such an integration of intelligence activities so long as there are three Military Services having specialized skills and knowledge.

Nonetheless, intelligence management within the Department must be organized in such a way as to provide adequately for intelligence as a coordinated system of highest priority... (T)here is need to establish and maintain cognizance of the over-all program in terms of resources of manpower and money allocated, and to eliminate waste, duplication, and inefficiency. For this there should be an authoritative focal point within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, which should also be the primary point of contact with the rest of the community.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff reacted strongly to several of the 43 recommendations in the JSG final report. Particularly unpalatable were portions:

...requiring the Joint Chiefs of Staff to coordinate the intelligence views on substantive intelligence matters within the Department of Defense, notably for estimates

...requiring the Joint Chiefs of Staff to coordinate the intelligence activities of the unified and specified commands and be the primary channel to these commands for guidance and direction of intelligence matters originating with the Department of Defense...

The JCS also objected to the resource guidance of the JSG, implying that no additional funding would be available to establish and operate the new Defense intelligence “authority.”

And the JCS seemed especially vexed that that the members of the JSG apparently wanted to empower the Unified commanders at the expense of the JCS:

Unified commanders should exercise control and command over the intelligence activities of their component commands and be the primary channel to them for guidance and direction (emphasis added) on intelligence matters including any instructions that originate in the Service departments.”

On 30 December 1960, the Joint Chiefs of Staff responded to the Secretary of Defense:

The (JCS) are gravely concerned over the far-reaching impact...of certain...recommendations...on the entire structure, operational methods and effectiveness of the military intelligence activities of the various elements of the Department of Defense.

The (JCS) agree that the military intelligence organization within the Department should be brought into full consonance with the concept of the Reorganization Act of 1958. The nature, timing, and scope of actions that are required to realize this should, of course, be the result of careful planning and of an evolutionary process.
The (JCS) therefore recommend that the Secretary of Defense support the principle...but...specific implementing suggestions...should not be decided upon until a detailed study is made and submitted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.”

Meanwhile, in January 1961, the Army and Air Force Chiefs of Staff submitted their own concept papers for the “control and coordination of military intelligence.” Since the Services held divergent views, the JCS moved to develop a unified concept paper.

All this was soon overtaken by events because the new Secretary of Defense, Robert S. McNamara, had already made his decision to establish a Defense Intelligence Agency. On 8 February 1961, the Secretary directed the JCS to submit within 30 days a concept for a Defense Intelligence Agency that extensively integrated all military intelligence efforts.

The Secretary’s vision would eliminate duplication in intelligence collection, processing, production, estimating, and publication. He also wanted to limit Service intelligence functions to training, personnel, and support responsibilities.

Secretary McNamara wanted Service headquarters levels to have no more than a small intelligence staff. He intended to prevent the policy and planning staff of the Joint Staff from assuming any intelligence function that could be handled by the new organization. Finally, the Secretary wanted to see a five-phase implementation schedule and a draft Directive for the organization’s authorization.

Upon learning the Secretary’s desires, the JCS Director of the J-2 recommended the “concept” be prepared within the Secretary’s guidelines, but include the following provisions:

(T)he Director for the Agency will be a military officer on active duty; and the Agency will be responsible to the (JCS).

In some specific areas of intelligence activity, such as counterintelligence and technical intelligence, it is possible that the (JCS) would desire to minimize the integration. Accordingly, the (JCS) may wish to submit a reclaim on certain aspects of the concept enunciated by the Secretary of Defense in his memorandum...

By 2 March 1961 the JCS had completed the concept paper requested by Mr. McNamara. They proposed a Military Intelligence Agency (MIA) to perform estimating, targeting, and basic intelligence functions “…in those areas where economies and increased efficiency can be achieved.”

But the JCS reserved for the Services the continuing right “to acquire, produce, and disseminate military intelligence and counterintelligence as required in fulfillment of their assigned departmental missions...” Moreover, the Military Departments would continue “...those elements of military intelligence and counterintelligence and security which have not been integrated into the Military Intelligence Agency.”
Use of "Military" instead of "Defense" by the JCS was intentional. The Joint Chiefs viewed the status and role of the new agency as military. A lengthy debate ensued over the name until Secretary McNamara insisted on using "Defense."

The deal was done. On 5 July 1961, the Secretary of Defense approved the DIA concept. On 1 August 1961, the Department of Defense announced that the Defense Intelligence Agency had been established. DIA became operational on 1 October 1961 upon approval of the new Agency's activation plan.

Deane J. Allen
DIA Historian
January 2001
DOCUMENTS SECTION ONE:

CREATION AND EARLY ORGANIZATIONAL ADJUSTMENTS
Section I  (Documents 1 to 29)

Creation and Early Organizational Adjustments

Introduction

This part of the collection includes most of the DIA-related correspondence in 1961-1963 between the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and the newly designated Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency. Much discussed was how DIA would be activated, how key intelligence functions would be transferred to DIA from the Intelligence Directorate of the Joint Staff, and how that directorate would be disestablished. Also much discussed was how the new DIA would respond to the recommendations of the "Joint Study Group Report on Foreign Intelligence Activities of the United States." Extracts from the Joint Study Group Report lead this section. The documents in Section I tell exactly why DIA was needed, how it was authorized, and how it was established.

DIA came about with the unenthusiastic cooperation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and powerful Congressional critics who doubted it would work. DIA’s formation also tested cooperation in the Defense intelligence community because key issues were undefined in the Agency’s operating concept. For example, the Director of DIA reported to the Secretary of Defense through the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This meant the Director responded to the JCS in providing intelligence to the Defense intelligence community and also to the Secretary in managing intelligence programs. A fine line separated the two responsibilities, demanding exceptional skill from the Director. Nevertheless, in the fall of 1961, the new DIA responded effectively during the Berlin Crisis with the Soviet Union. In November 1962, DIA also effectively led the nation’s military intelligence response to the Cuban Missile Crisis. This was remarkable for an agency facing so many challenges to get established — so few months before.
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TOP SECRET

THE JOINT STUDY GROUP REPORT ON FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT 12 December 1960

Declassified with redactions by DIA/SDVI-1 6 Dec 2000

UNCLASSIFIED

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15 December 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

We present herewith the report of the Joint Study Group on Foreign Intelligence Activities of the United States Government. In conducting this study we have been guided by the attached terms of reference. We would note, however, that we inevitably came across matters of national security interest in the foreign intelligence field not specifically covered in the terms of reference and that we felt obligated to comment on these.

In preparing this report we have earnestly endeavored to consider what is best for the nation. In submitting the report we recognize that in the time allotted it was impossible to cover in detail the vast foreign intelligence effort of the United States Government, but we have endeavored to identify the major problem areas and have recommended solutions.
Lyman B. Kirkpatrick (Chairman)
Inspector General, Central Intelligence Agency
Representing the Director of Central Intelligence

Allan Evans
Special Assistant to the Director of Intelligence & Research,
Department of State
Representing the Secretary of State

General Graves B. Erskine, USMC (Ret.)
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
for Special Operations
Representing the Secretary of Defense

Robert M. Macy
Chief of the International Division, Bureau of the Budget
Representing the Director, Bureau of the Budget

James S. Lay, Jr.
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
Representing the Special Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

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1. INTRODUCTION

A meeting on 6 May 1960 between the Director of Central Intelligence, the Secretary of Defense, the Director of the Bureau of Budget, the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities resulted in a decision to establish an ad hoc Joint Study Group to review specified aspects of the foreign intelligence effort of the United States Government. By 12 July 1960 the terms of reference had been agreed upon by the principals and approved by the President of the United States.

The terms of reference provided that the membership of the Study Group would consist of representatives of the Director of Central Intelligence (who would provide the Chairman), the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and the Director of the Bureau of Budget. In addition, the terms of reference provided that the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities would have a representative sit as an observer with the Group and that the
President's Board would be given an opportunity to comment on the Group's report following its submission. By general agreement of the members of the Study Group, the Assistant to the Director of Central Intelligence for Coordination was invited to participate with the Group in an observer capacity.

The Group's terms of reference provided that the attention of the Study Group would be focused primarily on the organizational and management aspects of the foreign intelligence effort.

More specifically, the Study Group was directed to examine requirements, which are the means by which intelligence producers or researchers request collection; the adaptation of collection assets to changing needs; the method by which the intelligence community periodically evaluates its efforts; the military intelligence coordinating machinery, particularly as related to the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958; the implementation of intelligence directives, particularly as related to providing intelligence support to field commanders; and the coordination of the research and development effort of the intelligence community.

Commencing 10 July 1960, the Study Group met 90 times, for periods ranging from two to nine hours each, and received briefings or presentations or engaged in discussions with 51 organizations. A total of 320 individuals appeared before the Study Group.
While the majority of the meetings of the Study Group were held in Washington, the Study Group traveled to Fort Meade to visit the National Security Agency on two different occasions; to San Antonio, Texas, Air Force Security Service; to Omaha, Nebraska, Strategic Air Command; to Dayton, Ohio, Air Technical Intelligence Center; to London, England, the United States Embassy; Commander-in-Chief United States Navy Europe, and Commander-in-Chief Near East Lebanon Mission; to Paris, France, the United States Embassy and Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe and United States European Command; to Bonn, Germany, the United States Embassy to Wiesbaden, Germany, the United States Air Forces Europe; to Heidelberg, Germany, the United States Army Europe; to Frankfurt, Germany, the Consul General, Berlin representatives, and representatives of the intelligence community by meeting with each of the members of the United States Intelligence Board, except the
representatives of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and
the Atomic Energy Commission. In these meetings the Study
Group had the opportunity to solicit views on the major pro-
posals incorporated in this report.

The Joint Study Group has made a conscientious effort
to meet as a body each time so that all members would have
the benefit of hearing the same presentations. Each of the
members contributed at least one staff assistant to the Group
who indispensably assisted in arranging meetings, doing re-
search and drafting and redrafting many sections to expedite
the preparation of this report.

The Joint Study Group has tried to examine the problems
of the intelligence community from a national point of view
without reference to personalities or parochial interests. Within
this over-all approach it has made every effort fully to appre-
ciate departmental interests in the fields of intelligence collection,
processing and production. We have endeavored to understand
the history and evolution of U. S. foreign intelligence activities,
and have found in this history both advantageous and disadvanta-
geous aspects. We have tried to capitalize in our recommenda-
tions on the advantages the community has gained from its often
effective, spontaneous response to the demands of events and circumstances. We have sought corrective measures for these deficiencies in the community that reflect lack of explicitly planned development.

We have reviewed the National Security Act of 1947 (as amended) and other applicable statutes. We have examined those provisions of each National Security Council Intelligence Directive and Director of Central Intelligence Directive within our terms of reference both to determine their appropriateness and their degree of implementation. We have also studied the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958.

Finally, the Joint Study Group has paid particular attention to the future, and carefully examined the extent of long-term planning within the intelligence community.

We particularly want to thank those many members of the intelligence community who spent long hours preparing helpful briefing material for the Study Group. In addition, their very frank discussions of problems and ideas for improvements were invaluable to us in preparing this report.
SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The Secretary of Defense take appropriate action to bring the military intelligence organization within the Department of Defense into full consonance with the concept of the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958. Toward this end: .......................... Page 31

   a. there should be established within the Office of the Secretary of Defense a focal point for exerting broad management review authority over military intelligence programs, and providing over-all coordination of all foreign intelligence activities conducted by various Defense components. ........ Page 32

   b. the authority of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in intelligence coordination and operations should be strengthened in support of their assigned mission by such means as: ......................... Page 32

       (1) placing under Joint Chiefs of Staff contro increased intelligence resources to support its strengthened authority; ........ Page 32

       (2) requiring the Joint Chiefs of Staff to coordinate the intelligence views on substantive intelligence matters within the Department of Defense, notably for estimates; ... Page 32

       (3) requiring the Joint Chiefs of Staff to coordinate military intelligence requirements (see recommendation no. 26 of Section VI); .................. Page 32

       (4) requiring the Joint Chiefs of Staff to coordinate the intelligence activities of the unified and specified commands and be the primary channel to these commands for guidance and direction of intelligence matters originating with the Department of Defense (see additional discussion and recommendations on Section VIII); ........ Page 32

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c. National Security Council Intelligence Directives, Department of Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff directives should be revised in accordance with the above. Page 32

2. The increased intelligence resources required by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the unified commands should be drawn from the existing resources of the military departments and component commands as appropriate. Page 32

3. Budgeting procedures for intelligence operations and activities should be brought more closely under the control of the Secretary of Defense, including clear identification of the total intelligence costs throughout all of the echelons and elements of the Department of Defense. Page 33

4. Policies should be initiated that would permit more rigorous selection and training of personnel assigned to intelligence activities and operations and personnel so assigned should be given position and rank comparable to their operational counterparts. Page 33

5. The military services should be encouraged to maintain and develop a capability for clandestine intelligence collection which would be carried out under the coordination of the Director of Central Intelligence. Page 33

6. The Special Security Officer systems should:

   a. avoid duplication of channels to non-military consumers;

   b. be staffed by personnel of rank commensurate with a courier function;

   c. avoid placing their own interpretation on material transmitted by the Special Security Officer systems. Page 33
7. The Department of Defense re-examine the assignment of Defense electronics intelligence resources to unified and specified commands to determine the feasibility of placing more of these particular resources under the operational and technical control of the Director, National Security Agency. Page 42

8. The Department of Defense review the National Security Agency concept of partnership with the service cryptologic agencies in communications intelligence and electronics intelligence activities with a view to strengthening the control of the Director of the National Security Agency over the service cryptologic agencies. Page 42

9. The Department of Defense reappraise the adequacy of research and development programs for electronic intelligence purposes with the objectives of developing more adequate electronics intelligence equipment at the earliest feasible time. Page 42

10. The United States Intelligence Board reappraise the security clearance standards for foreign born translators to determine whether the current shortage of translators can be alleviated by modified security procedures and practices. Page 42

11. The Department of State place greater emphasis on intelligence responsibilities in the indoctrination of its personnel. Page 60

12. Military departments should concentrate more effort on career management by developing programs of constantly broadening assignments in intelligence for qualified and specifically designated officers, which will gain the benefit of a career intelligence service without isolating the officer from contact with the general mission of his service and its operations. Page 60

13. The Central Intelligence Agency should open its clandestine training facilities to other agencies as a service of common concern. Page 6
14. The United States Intelligence Board should review existing compartmentation of sensitive information with a view to achieving more uniform practices and ensuring that essential security safeguards do not result in vital information being withheld from officials and organizations with urgent national security responsibilities.

15. The United States Intelligence Board should review the situation in the National Indications Center to determine the adequacy and level of its staffing and to assure that all information pertinent to the National Indications Center's mission (including highly classified and sensitive information now withheld) will be transmitted to the Center promptly on its receipt.

16. The Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence should consult preparatory to the early preparation of a new National Security Council Intelligence Directive designed to provide authority and assign responsibility for the establishment of a National Photographic Intelligence Center (NPIC).

17. The Central Intelligence Agency should place more emphasis on the establishment of unofficial cover throughout the world.

18. The Director of Central Intelligence should focus community attention on the important area of counterintelligence and security of overseas personnel and installations and assign responsibility for periodic reports to the United States Intelligence Board.

19. The Joint Chiefs of Staff should continue to encourage the exploitation of intelligence opportunities in close coordination with the military attaches.
20. The Central Intelligence Agency should increase intelligence support to unified and component commanders by direct dissemination of all information reports from pertinent field stations. . . . . . . . . . . Page 62

21. The United States Intelligence Board establish a central requirements facility, initially to coordinate all requirements levied for clandestine and signal intelligence collection, and if successful, subsequently expand its operations to other types of requirements. Personnel assigned to this facility should be drawn from existing requirements personnel of the member agencies. Page 85

22. The new central requirements facility use the Central Intelligence Agency's Office of Central Reference as its reference facility. . . . . . . . . . . Page 85

23. The United States Intelligence Board establish a program for the integration of all collection requirements manuals into a compatible series of coordinated guides; likewise, the creation of integrated requirements guides on a country-to-country basis setting forth the specific collection requirements and responsibilities of each department and agency concerned. . . . . . . . . . . . Page 85

24. The chief of mission or principal officer in each overseas area should be given affirmative responsibility for coordination of all overt and clandestine intelligence requirements concerning that area. . . . . . Page 86

25. The United States Intelligence Board in its annual evaluation of community effort prepared for the National Security Council pay specific attention to collection and request similar evaluation from each chief of mission and military command. . . . . . . . . . . . Page 86

26. All military requirements at the Washington level be coordinated by the Department of Defense so as to prevent duplication or concentration on low priority targets. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 86
27. Chiefs of mission and the Central Intelligence Agency chiefs of station arrange for political information overtly acquired to be transferred to the mission's political section for transmission as appropriate to Washington. Page 86

28. The Director of Central Intelligence should take action to achieve more effective coordination within the intelligence community using the normal command channels, as distinct from staff channels, of the departments and agencies concerned. Page 113

29. The Director of Central Intelligence should be supported in taking leadership and initiative to develop solutions for the problems of coordination by the establishment of a coordination staff, under his personal supervision and separate from any operational responsibility of the Central Intelligence Agency or other department or agency. This staff should seek to identify at the earliest possible time and promptly recommend solutions to coordination problems, especially through surveys of intelligence activities as authorized by National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 1. * Page 114

30. In phase with the organizational changes in the Department of Defense recommended in Section III, the membership of the United States Intelligence Board should be reduced to four members who shall be the Director of Central Intelligence (Chairman), and representatives of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with ad hoc representation from the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Atomic Energy Commission. Page 114

31. To strengthen its role in management of the intelligence community, the United States Intelligence Board should establish a management group which would analyze and propose solutions to non-substantive community problems of an administrative or management type. This group would be composed of one senior representative of each member of the United States Intelligence Board. Page 114

* - See page 91 for dissent regarding separation of Director of Central Intelligence from Central Intelligence Agency.
32. The United States Intelligence Board, through the recommended management group, should review the future plans and programs of each member of the intelligence community for consistency and proper allocation of effort at the beginning of each annual budget cycle. Its views should service as a basis for guidance and coordination to the intelligence community and for reporting to the National Security Council annually. Page 114

33. The management group referred to above should review the functions and activities of the several committees and sub-committees of the United States Intelligence Board. This review should include consideration of possible changes in the committee structure and improved reporting procedures. Page 115

34. Intelligence guidance and instructions to components of unified commands originating in military departments should be transmitted to these commands through the Joint Chiefs of Staff (J-2). Page 115

35. Unified commanders should exercise control and command over the intelligence activities of their component commands and be the primary channel to them for guidance and direction on intelligence matters including any instructions that originate in the service departments. Page 115

36. Chiefs of diplomatic and consular missions abroad should take positive steps to effectively coordinate all overt intelligence collection and reporting activities within their assigned areas of responsibility. Page 115

37. The Central Intelligence Agency's stations and bases should continue day to day coordination of clandestine activities at the case officer level. The Director of Central Intelligence should relieve them of the authority to veto another agency's proposed operation. Before a proposed operation or activity is rejected, it should be referred to the Director of Central Intelligence. Page 115
38. In order to achieve a more effective system for utilizing cost and manpower data in the entire foreign intelligence effort, the United States Intelligence Board should refine and improve its process for preparing and appraising such data by the following means: . . . . . . . . Page 121

(a) the United States Intelligence Board's making a clear and specific determination as to those activities which properly are foreign intelligence and thus subject to the coordination of the Director of Central Intelligence and the guidance of the United States Intelligence Board. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 121

(b) based on this determination, the United States Intelligence Board should continue to evolve an improving pattern for the development of cost and manpower data so that the resulting figures will be comparable and will permit the United States Intelligence Board to review and coordinate the effort expended on foreign intelligence activities by the several departments and agencies, especially through the review referred to in Section VII, recommendation no. 32. . . . . Page 121

39. The Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency should seek means to effect better coordination of their respective research and development activities for intelligence purposes. . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 128

40. The United States Intelligence Board should monitor efforts to develop automatic systems to store and retrieve intelligence information and the extent to which compatibility of systems is assured. . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 128

41. The Central Intelligence Agency should direct additional attention to foreign developments in agent communications. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 128

42. The United States Intelligence Board should strongly support the efforts initiated in the counter-audio surveillance field by the National Security Council Special Committee on Technical Surveillance Countermeasures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 128
43. The Group's last recommendation urges upon the intelligence community that, to a markedly greater extent than it has done, it should establish specific arrangements for planning its work, and anticipating its problems.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Establishment of a Defense Intelligence Agency

1. The National Security Council action on the recommendations of the Joint Study Group on Foreign Intelligence Activities of the United States Government requires the Department of Defense to effect a wide variety of organizational and procedural changes in its military intelligence activities. The full scope of these changes is so broad that their implementation will require a positive response on the part of almost every major organizational entity in the Department of Defense.

2. It appears that the most effective means to accomplish the recommendations of the Joint Study Group would be the establishment of a Defense Intelligence Agency which may include the existing National Security Agency, the Intelligence and Counter Intelligence functions now handled by the military departments, and the responsibilities of the Office of the Assistant to the Secretary, Special Operations. The Defense Intelligence Agency would service all consumers of military intelligence in the Department of Defense and other government agencies and would provide representatives to United States Intelligence Board subcommittees.

3. Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are requested to submit to me within 30 days a concept for such an integrated defense intelligence agency, a draft DoD directive for its authorization, and a time-phased implementation schedule. I cannot emphasize too strongly the priority nature of this project. In the development of these requirements, close attention should be given to military departmental policies, DoD directives, and other established procedures which may have to be changed to accommodate the establishment of a Defense Intelligence Agency and full implementation of the approved recommendations of the Joint Study Group report.

4. Upon approval of the concept and plan of a Defense Intelligence Agency, all agencies of the Department of Defense will be requested to develop whatever new policies will be required to support the establishment of the Intelligence Agency and other approved Joint Study Group recommendations.
5. Because of the vital importance of the DoD intelligence function to national security, the accomplishment of organizational and procedural improvements should be characterized by a sense of urgency which the critical national importance of military intelligence activities demand, and at the same time should be carried out so as not to disrupt the effective management of any DoD intelligence resource.

6. Careful consideration must be given as to where a Defense Intelligence Agency should be located in the Department of Defense.

7. I suggest the following preliminary guidelines as criteria for developing a concept and plan of a Defense Intelligence Agency:

a. The establishment of the Agency must not require new legislation, such as increasing the size of the Joint Staff.

b. The basic concept and charter of the Defense Intelligence Agency should be so comprehensive that there is no question as to its full responsibilities, authority, functions, and facilities.

c. Provision should be made for the complete integration of all defense intelligence requirements and the assignment of priorities thereto with specification as to the responsible collection resource.

d. Present duplication in intelligence collection, processing, production, estimating, publication, and so forth, should be eliminated.

e. Provision must be made for furnishing all elements of the Department of Defense, including the Office of the Secretary of Defense, with necessary intelligence information which are needed for the fulfillment of assigned responsibilities.

f. Careful attention should be given to the command and control relationships between the unified/specified commands and whatever organizational entity is suggested for the communications and electronics intelligence. However, strong centralised direction over all COMINT and ELINT functions is highly desired as outlined in the Joint Study Group report.
g. The participation of the unified commands in the overall DoD intelligence function should be increased with commensurate reduction in respective component command intelligence staffs.

h. No organizational or procedural suggestion should impair or disrupt fulfillment of the assigned responsibilities of the Director of Strategic Target Planning for development of the NSTI, and the SIOP, or the discharge of any unified or specified commander's responsibilities.

i. In the spirit of these changes, military department intelligence functions should be limited to training, personnel, and support responsibilities in the intelligence area. Furthermore, at the Service headquarters levels there should be no more than a small intelligence staff.

j. Consideration should be given to assigning responsibility for specialized types of intelligence training to one Service (e.g., one Service would provide cryptological training, another professional intelligence training, etc.).

k. Consideration should be given to integrating the attaché functions of the Services under the Agency.

l. Provision should be made for identification of total intelligence and counter intelligence costs in the Department of Defense irrespective of where such expenditures might be made.

m. If the Director, Deputy Director, and Chief of Staff of the Defense Intelligence Agency are military officers, they should be from different Services. This principle of inter-Service representation should be reflected in subordinate field and Washington area organizations.

n. If the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency is a military officer, the J-2 should be from a different Service.

o. The Director of the Agency should be one of the two representatives of the Department of Defense on the United States Intelligence Board.
P. As the principal policy and planning staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Staff should not assume any intelligence function which should be handled by the Defense Intelligence Agency.

Robert S. McNamara

Copies to:
Secretary of the Army
Secretary of the Navy
Secretary of the Air Force
Director of Defense Research and Engineering
Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations and Logistics)
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower)
General Counsel
Assistant to the Secretary, Atomic Energy
Assistant to the Secretary, Special Operations
Director, National Security Agency
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE


1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are gravely concerned over the impact that some of the recommendations of subject report would have on military intelligence and the security of the United States.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will submit their views on the subject report at an early date. It is recommended that these views be considered prior to taking action to approve or implement the study group recommendations.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

/Lt. Col. E. L. Berthelot
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

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Declassified by DIA/TV-1 on 8 Jan 2001.

Page 3
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF
for the
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

ON
ESTABLISHMENT OF A DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (DIA)

Referenced:
- JCS 311/37
- JCS 311/39
- JCS 311/43

1. Problem. To respond to memorandum* by the Secretary of Defense on the above subject dated 3 April 1961.

2. Information. On 3 March 1961, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in response to a request of the Secretary of Defense, forwarded to the Secretary of Defense recommendations** including an organizational*** concept for the establishment of a Military Intelligence Agency (MIA) under the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

3. On 3 April 1961, in a memorandum to the Chairman, JCS, the Secretary of Defense requested advice on several basic issues concerning the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) including the JCS rationale therefor. (The Defense Intelligence Agency is the title used by the Secretary of Defense for the Military Intelligence Agency proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.) In addition to several specific questions, the Secretary of Defense indicated his requirement for the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the following basic issues:

DISTRIBUTION

Gen. Lemnitzer (JCS)
Gen. Dozier (CHA)
Adm. Burke (CMO)
Gen. White (CIA)
Gen. Craig (CNO)
Gen. Harkins (AG/3, OFS)
Adm. Sharp (JCS-PLF)
Gen. Berhart (AG/5-P, OFS)
Gen. Vanaman (AG/5-P, OFS)
Gen. Wheeler (JCS-16)
Adm. Wells (JCS-16)

Gen. Westmoreland (JCS)
Gen. Brown (JCS)
Adm. Parcell (JCS)
Gen. Williams (MCS, USA)
Adm. Lawrence (JCS)
Gen. Walsh (APOL, USA)
Col. Carey (ACF, G-2, NC)
Gen. Campbell (JCS Rep)
Adm. Blowin (JCS)

* Enclosure to JCS 311/166
** Enclosures A to JCS 311/199
** Appendix and Annexes to JCS 311/199

UNCLASSIFIED
Declassified by DIA/SVI-1 on 8 Jan 2001.
a. Placing the DIA within the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

b. A possible distinction between national intelligence and military intelligence.

c. The concept of the DIA itself, and the intelligence assets it will control and the functions which it will perform. The Secretary of Defense requested a reply within ten days and desired that his memorandum be given very limited distribution.

d. In essence, the enclosed memorandum to the Secretary of Defense provides background on the national intelligence activity of the government and concludes that national intelligence and military intelligence are indivisible in practice. It reinforces the previous recommendation that the DIA should be placed under the control of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, primarily by pointing out the essential support rendered by military intelligence to military strategic planning and the operational direction of the armed forces. The memorandum then provides amplifying information with respect to the functional responsibilities and authority of the Director of the Military Intelligence Agency.

e. Recommended Action. It is recommended that:

a. The memorandum in the Enclosure be forwarded to the Secretary of Defense as an adequate response to his memorandum of 3 April.

b. This paper NOT be forwarded to the commanders of unified or specified commands.

c. This paper NOT be forwarded to US officers assigned to NATO activities.

d. This paper NOT be forwarded to the Chairman, US Delegation, United Nations Military Staff Committee.
UNCLASSIFIED

ENCLOSURE

SUBJECT: Establishment of a Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) (U)

1. Your memorandum of 3 April requested the advice and rationale of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on certain issues regarding the Defense Intelligence Agency concept forwarded to you on 2 March 1961. The central and decisive issue in the second of the three contained in your memorandum. For this reason, it will be addressed first.

2. Fundamentally, intelligence provides the basis for the formulation of national strategy, and is essential to the conduct of this strategy. Each category of national intelligence—whether political, economic, scientific, or military—directly or indirectly influences the assigned national strategy tasks of each Executive Department or Agency. However, the sum_total of the national intelligence effort provides the framework for the entire spectrum of national strategy.

3. In considering the military portion of national intelligence, it must be recognized that military intelligence covers a vast field of interest, significance, and application—ranging from its relationship to the formulation and implementation of national strategy to the conduct of military activities at the lowest level. Thus, military intelligence interests, as they apply at any level of purely military endeavor, can be distinguished from national intelligence interests. However, since military intelligence is an integral part of national intelligence, it follows that the two are indivisible.

4. In compliance with your memorandum of 8 February 1961, careful consideration was given to the placement of the proposed integrated intelligence agency within the DOD. The rationale applied by the JCS in arriving at their recommendations is

TOP SECRET

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directly related to the provisions of the DOD Reorganization Act of 1958 which specifically charge the JCS with the responsibility for strategic planning and operational direction of the armed forces. This responsibility includes the direction of operations conducted by the commanders of the unified and specified commands and the discharge of any other function of command for such commands as directed by the Secretary of Defense. Inherently, at any given level of military activity, intelligence and security responsibilities go hand-in-hand with the proper discharge of planning and operational responsibilities derived from the command mission. This is an important factor in the operational readiness of our armed forces.

5. Placement of the DIA under the Joint Chiefs of Staff ensures a chain of military command over all echelons of military intelligence activity and ensures responsiveness to the command needs of the military organization. However, the establishment of an integrated military intelligence agency at the DOD level would concentrate military intelligence assets at a level above, and isolated from, the organization charged with strategic planning and operational direction of the armed forces. Accordingly, integration of the military intelligence effort should be accomplished at a level which not only provides you with the most effective intelligence support, but also strengthens the role of the JCS in military intelligence, as recommended by the Joint Study Group.

6. As to the third issue—the concept for the DIA itself, and the authority of its Director—in developing the concept and plan for the establishment of a Defense Intelligence Agency, the Joint Chiefs of Staff carefully considered the approved recommendations of the Joint Study Group as well as the Secretary of Defense memorandum of 8 February 1961.

7. Specific answers to questions raised in your memorandum follow:

Enclosure
a. Query: For example, are NSA's responsibilities to do the entire national intelligence community of a character that these interests can best be satisfied only if NSA reports directly to the Secretary of Defense?

Answer: No. In recognition of the fact that NSA is manned and funded entirely from DOD resources, NUCID No. 6 provides that the Secretary of Defense will be the Executive Agent of the Government for the conduct of COMINT/ELINT activities and for the maintenance and operation of NCS. It is noteworthy, however, that NUCID No. 6 permits the Secretary of Defense to delegate, in whole or in part, his authority over the Director, NSA. The JCS concur in the soundness of the policy, also expressed in NUCID No. 6, that NSA will produce COMINT/ELINT information in accordance with the objectives, requirements, and priorities established by the UCMD. However, it is the judgment of the JCS that these interests can best be served if the Director, NSA, reports through the JCS. This move, without changing the current operational and technical control of the NCS/ON over the JCS/ELINT/ELINT activities of the Service cryptologic agencies, would place the DIA/NSA under the JCS, thus effectively bringing such COMINT/ELINT activities under a single military authority. In effecting a more closely integrated military intelligence effort under the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it is essential that the entire military intelligence structure, to include NSA, be embraced in the concept. This is essential to the successful accomplishment of the JCS wartime mission. Further, the placement of the NSA under the JCS now would preclude the necessity for precipitous reorganization of military intelligence activities at the initiation of hostilities.

b. Query: What is the significance of the JCS suggestion for a Military Intelligence Agency in lieu of a Defense Intelligence Agency? Does this represent a difference in concept?
Answer: The JCS recommendation for the title "Military Intelligence Agency", as opposed to a "Defense Intelligence Agency," does not represent a difference in concept. Either term could be used. The title, "Military Intelligence Agency" was selected because the product of DOD intelligence agencies is primarily military intelligence. Such a title would be more consistent with combining the strategic planning, operational, and intelligence responsibilities of the JCS at the same level.

Query: With the DIA placed under the JCS, would the Secretary of Defense be provided with adequate staff intelligence support necessary in the discharge of his responsibilities to the national intelligence community, the Cabinet, and the National Security Council? Similarly, would the staff assistants of the Secretary of Defense be provided adequate intelligence support?

Answer: Yes. The JCS concept for the Defense Intelligence Agency would, through a single point of contact, materially improve staff intelligence support to you and your assistants, fulfilling your needs for the discharge of your responsibilities to the intelligence community, the Cabinet and the NSC. As a matter of interest, preliminary planning has already been accomplished to provide you and the subordinate echelons of DOD a comprehensive joint military current intelligence product. We envisage that this product will also give the President and the NSC, for the first time, a single, authoritative daily military current intelligence summary—based on information received from the entire national intelligence community.

Query: How would an organization placed under the JCS manage, direct, or oversee those intelligence activities retained in the separate Services?
UNCLASSIFIED

Although the JCS concept recognizes that total integration of all military intelligence activities might not be sound, it charges the Agency's Director with monitoring closely those intelligence activities that would remain under the Services. This coordinating role of the Director would be directive in nature. He would have authority to eliminate duplication and waste of military intelligence resources. In addition, he would review all Service intelligence programs and budgets; review, validate, and assign priorities to military intelligence collection requirements; and consolidate and reallocate intelligence tasks.

**c. Query:** Would the Director of DIA have free and complete access to all components of the Department of Defense and other intelligence organizations and be permitted to respond directly to priority requests made by USIG?

**Answer:** Yes. Inherent in the responsibilities and authority invested in the Director of the Agency would be his free and complete access to all components of the DOD to include the unified and specified commands. As the principal intelligence representative of the JCS and the Secretary of Defense for matters within his purview, he would have maximum freedom in coordinating with the other intelligence and security organizations of the Government. He would also be directly responsive to priority requests levied upon him by USIG.

**f. Query:** A number of questions were raised which relate to the actual functions of the DIA and the authority of the Director. These questions covered a variety of topics but repeatedly stressed the possibility that under the JCS concept the groundwork was being laid for a...
"confederation" of the separate DOD intelligence activities rather than a "union."

Answer: In developing a concept for a Defense Intelligence Agency, the JCS approached the problem with the ultimate goal of achieving the maximum practicable integration of military intelligence activities, consistent with economy and efficiency. Except for those areas of intelligence responsibility that would remain with the military departments, the JCS concept would provide for a "confederation" of DOD intelligence and counterintelligence activities at the earliest feasible moment. A "confederation" would exist among those separate, but fully coordinated, intelligence activities supporting uni-service missions and functions.

G. Query: Is the authority of the Director, DIA, so limited, or restricted, under the JCS concept that he will be unable to manage effectively the intelligence resources transferred to the DIA?

Answer: No. Under the JCS concept, it is not envisaged that the Agency's Director would be limited or restricted in any sense, but rather that he would exercise positive operational command over assigned intelligence resources in such the same manner as commanders of unified and specified commands exercise their command authority over assigned forces.

H. Query: How long, under the JCS concept, will it take the DIA to assume control of the functions outlined in my memorandum of 8 February?

Answer: Although there is no intent in the JCS concept to prolong the process of integrating military intelligence and counterintelligence activities, a definite deadline for the achievement of this goal cannot be precisely

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determined. However, you can expect that the integration process would be completed within approximately two years after the concept has been approved, subject to the availability of funds and facilities. Further, you can expect that at the end of approximately one year, the Director of the Agency would have assumed full responsibility for the following functions:

1. **Integration** of military current intelligence production and related activities; military intelligence requirements, to include an operational central registry; intelligence exploitation of MAAG's and missions and correlation of their efforts with those of the attaché system.

2. **Coordination** of all residual service intelligence and counterintelligence activities.

3. **Review** of intelligence and counterintelligence programs and budgets; intelligence research and development support programs.

1. **Query**: Would it be more suitable to agree now on those intelligence resources which eventually will be transferred to DIA rather than holding such decisions in abeyance until after the DIA is established?

Answer: This question is partially answered in the time-phasing indicated in question h, above. The JCS intent is that integration should be implemented in all areas where an improved intelligence product or greater efficiency and economy can be achieved. The concept also provided for detailed studies to determine what these areas are, and the best methods to achieve such integration. Therefore, it is suitable that decisions be held in abeyance pending the completion of studies by the planning staff of the DIA.
UNCLASSIFIED

J. Query: How can a single budget for all DoD intelligence activities be developed under the JCS concept for the DIA?

Answer: A major managerial function of the Director would be in the critical area of programs and budgets. To provide positive central fiscal control, the Director would issue timely guidance for, and conduct the review of all military intelligence and counterintelligence programs and budgets of all elements of the DoD. Although current DoD budgetary procedures preclude the development of a single DoD intelligence budget, our proposed organization would facilitate the identification of total costs and would assure integrated programming.

K. Query: Similarly, questions were raised as to which military departments would assume responsibility for particular types of specialized intelligence training.

Answer: The JCS agree in principle with respect to cross-service arrangements for specialized intelligence training. As indicated in our concept, consolidation of effort could readily be accomplished in this area, although temporarily dependent upon current budget allocations. Currently, Army and Air Force have joined efforts in the conduct of basic attaché training at the Army-operated Strategic Intelligence School in Washington, D.C. This facility could readily be adapted to the training of all military attaché personnel. Similarly, the Army Language School at Monterey, California, could train all military intelligence personnel in requisite language proficiency. In addition to the types of specialized intelligence training previously indicated in our concept, the following areas, for example, are susceptible to consolidated training organized by one Service:

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(1) Security surveillance technique.
(2) Intelligence interrogation.
(3) Intelligence research, to include machine storage
and access systems.

Therefore, the military services will be directed to identify
those intelligence training areas which can be consolidated:
and to make recommendations to the JCS, to include budgeting,
funding, contracting and time-phasing for the assignment
of such training responsibilities to single services.

1. Query: What are the real functions of the proposed
Military Intelligence Board and how long will it remain
active?

Answer: In the JCS concept, the Military Intelligence
Board was proposed for the initial purpose of assisting the
Director in effecting a smooth transition from the current
system to a properly integrated DOD intelligence effort.
Orderly transition is essential. The Board would materially
assist the Director by making available to him the depth
and variety of intelligence experience of the Board members
and of the agencies under their control. In addition, it
would provide a convenient mechanism for advising the Director
in the exercise of his over-all coordination of those intelli-
gence resources not under his direct control. As the need
for Service participation on the USIB diminished, the
Military Intelligence Board would provide an increasingly
important forum that would permit Service intelligence chiefs
to contribute to the formulation of DOD positions on USIB
matters.

2. Query: How soon can DOD representation on USIB be
reduced from 6 to 2?

Enclosure
Answer: The JCS agree that, as effective integration of military intelligence activities progresses, Service participation on USIB, on a regular basis, will become less useful. However, it is our judgment that continuance of Service participation on USIB would, for the present, be in the best national interest. In light of the complexities and changes encompassed in this reorganization, we cannot predict at this time the date at which this USIB reduction should occur.

8. The JCS have approached this problem in a sincere effort to assure that contemplated organizational changes are undertaken in such a manner as to provide the most effective military intelligence effort and at the same time to ensure against the disruption of our present flow of vital intelligence information. We reiterate that such steps should be carefully taken in order to avoid a hastily conceived DOD intelligence structure which would fall short of providing adequate support to you, your assistants, and the JCS in time of war, or which would require repeated wasteful reorganization as experience dictated.

Enclosure

JCS 8031/166 (Nov. 4/22/61)
MEMORANDUM FOR The Secretaries of the Military Departments
   The Director of Defense Research and
   Engineering
   The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
   The Assistant Secretaries of Defense
   The General Counsel
   The Special Assistant and the Assistants
   to the Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT: Establishment of a Defense Intelligence Agency

1. After careful consideration of the issues and problems involved, Mr. McNamara and I have decided to establish a Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) reporting to the Secretary of Defense through the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Attached is a draft DoD Directive creating DIA.

2. The principal objectives in establishing a DIA are to obtain unity of effort among all components of the Department of Defense in developing military intelligence and a strengthening of the overall capacity of the Department of Defense for the collection, production, and dissemination of intelligence information.

3. Although perhaps of lesser priority, but certainly not of lesser importance, are the objectives of obtaining a more efficient allocation of scarce intelligence resources, more effective management of all DoD intelligence activities, and the elimination of all duplicating facilities, organizations, and tasks.

4. Mr. McNamara and I desire to emphasize our intent that DIA will fully integrate the intelligence resources and functions assigned to its control; it is not a "confederation." DIA will not be
an additional layer of administrative control superimposed upon the top of the existing DoD intelligence organizations.

5. The draft Directive does not put all DoD intelligence and related activities in one organization. Special operations will remain the responsibility of an Assistant to the Secretary of Defense and COMINT, ELINT and COMSEC will remain the responsibility of NSA. The Defense Intelligence Agency will assume control over certain DoD intelligence functions and will coordinate and supervise the execution of those DoD intelligence functions not transferred to DIA. It is envisaged that some DoD intelligence activities, such as personnel and industrial security and intelligence training, will probably be retained in the military departments. While other intelligence functions, such as technical intelligence and counter-intelligence may be transferred in whole or in part to DIA, for the time being they will continue to be conducted by the military departments. The draft Directive, of necessity, cannot treat how these and other details of DIA are to be implemented. At the time the Directive is signed, a mechanism will be provided for resolving such problems to the end that DIA may become fully operational as soon as possible. Mr. McNamara and I regard this objective as a matter of the highest priority.

6. The appointment and membership of a Military Intelligence Board (MIB), as outlined in the JCS concept and plan for a DIA, dated 2 March 1961, is approved on an interim basis to act only as an advisory body to the Director, DIA. The MIB will meet on the call of the Director, DIA. When DIA has become fully operational the desirability and utility of continuing the MIB will be reconsidered.

7. In light of the basic concepts and decisions outlined above, please submit your comments on the draft Directive to the General Counsel of the Department of Defense by 15 July 1961.
Department of Defense Directive

SUBJECT: Defense Intelligence Agency

References:
(a) DoD Directive 5148.4, "Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)"
(b) DoD Directive 5100.23, "Administrative Arrangements for the National Security Agency"
(c) DoD Directive 5100.1, "Functions of DoD and Its Major Components"
(d) DoD Directive C-2000.5
(e) DoD Directive S-5100.20
(f) DoD Directive C-5200.5
(g) DoD Directive S-315.2
(h) DoD Directive S-315.4

I. GENERAL

A. Pursuant to the authority vested in the Secretary of Defense and the provisions of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, a Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) is hereby established as an agency of the Department of Defense under the direction, authority and control of the Secretary of Defense.

B. Functions, Authorities, and Responsibilities assigned by references (b), (e), (f), (g), and (h) are excluded from the scope of this Directive.

II. ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND

The Defense Intelligence Agency shall consist of:

A. A Director, a Deputy Director, a Chief of Staff, a headquarters establishment, and such subordinate units, facilities, and activities as are
specifically assigned to the Agency by the Secretary of Defense or by the Joint Chiefs of Staff acting under the authority and direction of the Secretary of Defense.

B. Such subordinate organizations as are established by the Director, DIA, for the accomplishment of DIA's mission.

C. The chain of command shall run from the Secretary of Defense, through the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Director, DIA. Guidance to the Director, DIA, shall be furnished by the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff acting under the authority and direction of the Secretary of Defense, and the United States Intelligence Board.

III. RESPONSIBILITIES

The Defense Intelligence Agency, under the direction and operational control of its Director, shall be responsible for:

A. The organization, direction, management, and control of all Department of Defense intelligence resources assigned to or included within the DIA.

B. Review and coordination of those Department of Defense intelligence functions retained by or assigned to the military departments. Over-all guidance for the conduct and management of such functions will be developed by the Director, DIA, for review, approval, and promulgation by the Secretary of Defense.

C. Supervision of the execution of all approved plans, programs, policies, and procedures for intelligence functions not assigned to DIA.

D. Obtaining the maximum economy and efficiency in the allocation and management of Department of Defense intelligence resources. This includes analysis of those DoD intelligence activities and
facilities which can be fully integrated or collocated with non-DoD intelligence organizations.

E. Responding directly to priority requests levied upon the Defense Intelligence Agency by USIB.

F. Satisfying the intelligence requirements of the major components of the Department of Defense.

IV. FUNCTIONS

Under its Director, the Defense Intelligence Agency shall perform the following functions:

A. Develop and produce all DoD intelligence estimates and DoD information and contributions to National Estimates for the United States Intelligence Board. Such estimates and contributions may indicate differences in analysis and evaluation.

B. Provide for the assembly, integration, and validation of all Department of Defense intelligence requirements and the assignment of relative priorities thereto; assign specific requirements to Department of Defense collection resources; and originate requests, when necessary, to non-Department of Defense collection resources to fulfill DoD requirements.

C. Establish a single DoD Collection Requirements Registry and Facility which will be fully compatible with any National Requirements Registry and Facility.

D. Provide plans, programs, policies, and procedures for DoD collection activities.

E. Conduct such technical and counterintelligence functions as may be subsequently assigned to DIA.
F. Provide all Department of Defense current intelligence.

G. Establish and maintain the DoD Indications Center.

H. Conduct coordinating and planning activities to achieve the maximum economy and efficiency in the conduct and management of all Department of Defense intelligence activities.

I. Provide the Secretary of Defense, the staff assistants to the Secretary, the military departments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, specialized DoD agencies, the unified and specified commands, and other organizations in the national intelligence community with military intelligence.

J. Develop DoD intelligence research and development requirements.

K. Develop plans for the integration of DoD intelligence and counterintelligence training programs, career development programs for intelligence personnel, general support programs, and other intelligence activities of the military departments.

L. Cooperate with the Central Intelligence Agency and other intelligence organizations for mutual support; common and combined usage of facilities, resources, and training programs; and elimination of duplication.

M. Provide in the person of the Director, DIA, one of the Department of Defense representatives to the United States Intelligence Board.
N. Provide for DoD representation on USIB committees and on all other inter-governmental intelligence committees.

O. Provide guidance, in conformance with USIB policies, to the major components of the Department of Defense on the public release of Defense intelligence information.

P. Develop plans, programs, policies, and procedures for intelligence mapping and charting activities.

Q. Prepare and submit to the Secretary of Defense, under procedures approved by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), a consolidated DoD budget for intelligence activities covered by this Directive, together with recommendations pertaining thereto; and participate in the administration of the consolidated budget. The consolidated budget will include the estimates of the funds required to finance the intelligence activities organized within and directly managed by DIA, and the estimates of the military departments of the funds required to finance the intelligence activities which they conduct subject to review and coordination by DIA.

R. Integrate DoD intelligence automation and automatic data processing plans and programs, insuring that they complement each other and those of non-DoD intelligence agencies to the maximum extent practicable.

S. Discharge such other intelligence functions as the Secretary of Defense or the Joint Chiefs of Staff may assign.
V. RELATIONSHIPS

A. In the performance of its functions, the Defense Intelligence Agency shall:

1. Coordinate actions as appropriate with the other components of the Department of Defense and with those departments and agencies of government having collateral or related functions in its field of assigned responsibilities.

2. Maintain appropriate liaison with the other components of the DoD and with the necessary departments and agencies of the government for the exchange of information and findings in the field of its assigned responsibility.

B. The military departments and other DoD components shall provide support, within their respective fields of responsibility, to the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency as may be necessary to carry out the assigned responsibilities of the Agency.

VI. AUTHORITY

To discharge the responsibilities of the Agency, the Director, DIA, or his designee, are specifically delegated authority to:

A. Have free and unrestricted access to and direct communication with all elements of the Department of Defense as well as organizations in the national intelligence community.

B. Operate and control all organizations, activities, and resources assigned or attached to the Defense Intelligence Agency.
C. Establish DIA intelligence facilities, taking-over or using, wherever feasible, established facilities of the military departments.

D. Obtain such information from any component of the DoD as may be necessary for the performance of DIA's functions.

E. Supervise the execution of approved plans, programs, policies, and procedures for those DoD intelligence functions and activities not directly assigned to DIA.

F. Centralize or consolidate the functions for which DIA is responsible to the extent the Director deems feasible and desirable in consonance with the aims of maximum over-all efficiency, economy, and effectiveness.

VII. ADMINISTRATION

A. The Director, Deputy Director, and Chief of Staff of the Defense Intelligence Agency shall be appointed by the Secretary of Defense from commissioned officers of the Armed Forces on active duty who normally shall be from different Services. However, there shall be no established system of inter-Service rotation or designation for these key posts. The Director shall have at least three-star rank while serving in this position. His appointment shall be for a term of four years.

B. The appointment of other personnel, civilian and military, to the Agency will be subject to the approval of the Director, DIA.

C. The Defense Intelligence Agency will be authorized such personnel, facilities, funds, and other administrative support as the Secretary of Defense deems necessary for the performance of its functions. The military departments and other DoD components shall
provide support as necessary for the Agency. Budgeting and funding for the Agency will be in conformance with policies established by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller).

VIII. EFFECTIVE DATE

This Directive is effective 1 October 1961. Whenever the Defense Intelligence Agency assumes responsibility for an intelligence function assigned to DIA under the terms of this Directive, all components of the Department of Defense will review their existing directives, instructions, and regulations for conformity and submit necessary amendments thereto to the General Counsel of the Department of Defense within 90 days.

[Signature]
Deputy Secretary of Defense
# DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

## DIRECTIVES SYSTEM TRANSMITTAL

<table>
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### ATTACHMENTS

- Inclosure 1, Dec 14, 61, to DoD Directive 5105.21, Aug 1, 61.

### INSTRUCTIONS FOR RECIPIENTS

The following page additions and pen change to Department of Defense Directive 5105.21, "Defense Intelligence Agency," dated August 1, 1961, have been authorized:

### PAGE ADDITIONS

Add attached Inclosure 1, December 14, 1961.

### PEN CHANGE

Page 8 - Insert the following at the left-hand margin below the signature block:

"Inclosure - 1
Delegations of Authority"

[Signature]

MAURICE W. ROCHE
Administrative Secretary

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WHEN PRESCRIBED ACTION HAS BEEN TAKEN, THIS TRANSMITTAL SHOULD BE DESTROYED.
DELEGATIONS OF AUTHORITY

Pursuant to the authority vested in the Secretary of Defense, the Director, DIA, or, in the absence of the Director, the person acting for him is hereby delegated, subject to the direction, authority, and control of the Secretary of Defense, and in accordance with DoD policies, directives, and instructions, and pertinent OSD regulations, authority as required in the administration and operation of DIA to:

1. Exercise the powers vested in the Secretary of Defense by Section 204 of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended (5 USC 171d), and Section 12 of the Administrative Expenses Act of 1946, as amended (5 USC 22a), pertaining to the employment, direction and general administration of DIA civilian personnel.

2. Fix rates of pay for wage board employees exempted from the Classification Act by Section 202(7) of that Act on the basis of prevailing rates for comparable jobs in the locality where each installation is located. DIA, in fixing such rates, shall follow the wage schedule established by the local wage board.

3. Establish such advisory committees and employ such part-time advisers as approved by the Secretary of Defense for the performance of DIA functions pursuant to the provisions of 10 USC 173, 5 USC 55a, and the Agreement between the DoD and the Civil Service Commission on employment of experts and consultants, dated July 22, 1959.

4. Administer oaths of office incident to entrance into the Executive Branch of the Federal Government or any other oath required by law in connection with employment therein, in accordance with the provisions of the Act of June 26, 1943 (5 USC 16a) and designate in writing, as may be necessary, officers and employees of DIA to perform this function.

5. Establish a DIA Incentive Awards Board and pay cash awards to and incur necessary expenses for the honorary recognition of civilian employees of the Government whose suggestions, inventions, superior accomplishments, or other personal efforts, including special acts or services, benefit or affect DIA or its subordinate activities in accordance with the provisions of the Act of September 1954 (5 USC 2123) and Civil Service Regulations.
6. In accordance with the provisions of the Act of August 26, 1950, as amended (5 USC 22-1); Executive Order 10450, dated April 27, 1953, as amended; and DoD Directive 5210.7, dated August 12, 1953 (as revised):

a. Designate any position in DIA as a "sensitive" position;

b. Authorize, in case of an emergency, the appointment of a person to a sensitive position in the Agency for a limited period of time for whom a full field investigation or other appropriate investigation, including the National Agency Check, has not been completed; and

c. Authorize the suspension, but not to terminate the services of an employee in the interest of national security in positions within DIA.

7. Clear DIA personnel and such other individuals as may be appropriate for access to classified Defense material and information in accordance with the provisions of DoD Directive 5210.8, dated June 29, 1955 (as revised), "Policy on Investigation and Clearance of Defense Personnel for Access to Classified Defense Information" and of Executive Order 10501, dated November 5, 1953, as amended.

8. Act as agent for the collection and payment of employment taxes imposed by Chapter 21 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 and, as such agent, make all determinations and certifications required or provided for under Section 3122 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 and Section 205(p)1 and (2) of the Social Security Act, as amended (42 USC 405(p)1 and (2)) with respect to DIA employees.

9. Authorize and approve overtime work for DIA civilian officers and employees in accordance with the provisions of Section 25.221 of the Federal Employee Pay Regulations.

10. Authorize and approve:

a. Travel for DIA civilian officers and employees in accordance with the Standardized Government Travel Regulations, as amended (BOB Circular A-7, Revised);
b. Temporary duty travel only for military personnel assigned or detailed to DIA in accordance with Joint Travel Regulations for the Uniformed Services, dated April 1, 1951, as amended;

c. Invitational travel to persons serving without compensation whose consultive, advisory, or other highly specialized technical services are required in a capacity that is directly related to or in connection with DIA activities, pursuant to the provisions of Section 5 of the Administrative Expenses Act of 1946, as amended (5 USC 73b-2).

II. Approve the expenditure of funds available for travel by military personnel assigned or detailed to DIA for expenses incident to attendance at meetings of technical, scientific, professional or other similar organizations in such instances where the approval of the Secretary of Defense or his designee is required by law (5 USC 174a). This authority cannot be redelegated.

12. Develop, establish, and maintain an active and continuing Records Management Program, pursuant to the provisions of Section 506(b) of the Federal Records Act of 1950 (44 USC 396(b)).

13. Establish and use Imprint Funds for making small purchases of material and services other than personal for DIA when it is determined more advantageous and consistent with the best interests of the Government, in accordance with the provisions of DoD Instruction 7280.1, dated October 28, 1957, and the Joint Regulation of the General Services Administration -- Treasury Department -- General Accounting Office, entitled "For Small Purchases Utilizing Imprint Funds".

14. Authorize the publication of advertisements, notices, or proposals in newspapers, magazines, or other public periodicals as required for the effective administration and operation of DIA (44 USC 324).

15. a. Establish and maintain appropriate Property Accounts for DIA.

b. Appoint Boards of Survey, approve reports of survey, relieve personal liability, and drop accountability for DIA property contained in the authorized Property Accounts that has been lost, damaged, stolen, destroyed, or otherwise rendered unserviceable, in accordance with applicable laws and regulations.
16. Promulgate the necessary security regulations for the protection of property and places under the jurisdiction of the Director, DIA, pursuant to paragraph III.A. and V.B. of DoD Directive 5200.8, dated August 20, 1954.

17. Establish and maintain, for the functions assigned, an appropriate publications system for the promulgation of regulations, instructions, and reference documents, and changes thereto, pursuant to the policies and procedures prescribed in DoD Directive 5025.1, dated March 7, 1961.

18. Enter into support and service agreements with the military departments, other DoD agencies, or other Government agencies as required for the effective performance of responsibilities and functions assigned to DIA.

19. Exercise the authority delegated to the Secretary of Defense by the Administrator of the General Services Administration with respect to the disposal of surplus personal property.

The Director, DIA, may redelegate these authorities, as appropriate, and in writing, except as otherwise specifically indicated above or as otherwise provided by law or regulation.

This delegation of authorities is effective immediately.

[Signature]
Deputy Secretary of Defense
MEMORANDUM FOR The Secretaries of the Military Departments The Director of Defense Research and Engineering The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff The Assistant Secretaries of Defense The General Counsel The Special Assistant and the Assistants to the Secretary of Defense The Director, National Security Agency The Director of Organizational and Management Planning Studies

SUBJECT: Administrative Requirements for the Establishment of a Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)

1. In establishing the new Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) under the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it is essential that all components of the Department give whatever assistance is required by its Director to the end that DIA may be effectively and expeditiously activated. The relationship of the intelligence activities of the Department of Defense to the national intelligence community is of critical importance. The Secretary of Defense and I expect full cooperation from all elements of the Department of Defense in the establishment of DIA.

2. Upon his appointment, Mr. McNamara and I shall charge the Director, DIA, with the development of all activation plans necessary to the establishment of the Agency on October 1, 1961, and with their expeditious implementation. These plans will be submitted to the Secretary of Defense for approval through the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Secretary and I shall also charge the Director, DIA, with submitting periodic progress reports on the status of his organization.

3. The assumption of full responsibility by DIA of the specific intelligence functions assigned to the Agency will be on a graduated basis. As DIA develops a capacity for handling specific intelligence functions, adjustments will be necessary in the intelligence activities of other DoD components. Acting under...
the direction, authority, and control of the Secretary of Defense, the Director, DIA, will schedule such transfers and adjustments in all DoD intelligence functions which come under the terms of his Directive.

4. Until provision is made for the separate funding of DIA, Mr. McNamara and I direct all components of the Department of Defense to continue to budget for all intelligence personnel, activities, and facilities transferred to DIA from their existing intelligence organizations. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) will carefully monitor all financial considerations incidental to the establishment of the Agency.

5. The Secretary of Defense and I shall also designate the Director, DIA, as our agent to monitor DoD's full compliance with all approved Joint Study Group recommendations applicable to the Department, other than those which fall within the National Security Agency's area of responsibility.

6. The Director of the Office of Organizational and Management Planning Studies is designated my principal staff advisor to monitor the establishment of DIA. He will work closely with the Director, DIA.

7. In addition, the Director of the Office of Organizational and Management Planning Studies will submit to me within 90 days:

a. Recommendations for the assignment of DoD-wide responsibility for specialized types of intelligence training. Such recommendations will include consideration of those specialized intelligence training programs which can be provided to the DoD by the Central Intelligence Agency.

b. Recommendations as to what elements of the following intelligence functions should be transferred to DIA:
(1) Technical intelligence,
(2) Counterintelligence,
(3) Intelligence mapping and charting.

CC:
The Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (Attention: Mr. J. Patrick Coyne)
THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Washington 25, D. C.

August 1, 1961

Dear Allen:

The Directive establishing the Defense Intelligence Agency has been issued today and I enclose a copy for your information, together with a copy of a memorandum dealing with the administrative requirements of the new agency. You will note that the Directive incorporates the change suggested in the memorandum which you sent me on July 13, 1961. We will also take into account your other comments as the new agency is activated.

As to your comment regarding the maintenance of two indications centers in the Pentagon, we have decided for the time being to maintain here both the National Indications Center and the new DIA Warning and Indications Center (which probably will be an expansion of existing Air Force Warning Center). Although it is desirable to collocate the two centers, it is our judgment that their functions are clearly separable and that they should not be merged until experience demonstrates the advisability of such a step.

Sincerely,

/s/
ROSWELL L. GILPATRIC
Deputy Secretary of Defense

Enclosures

Mr. Allen W. Dulles
Director
Central Intelligence Agency

SecDef Cont. No. _______
Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell L. Gilpatric today announced the establishment of a new military intelligence organization, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). This new Defense Agency will report through the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense and will combine a number of intelligence functions heretofore carried out independently by the separate military departments. Consolidation of certain intelligence functions under the Joint Chiefs of Staff is in full consonance with the concepts embodied in the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, and particularly the provisions of the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958.

Mr. Gilpatric emphasized that this significant change in the organization and management of Defense intelligence functions has been made with the approval of President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.

Mr. Gilpatric characterized the principal objectives in establishing the DIA as obtaining greater unity of effort among all components of the Department of Defense in developing military intelligence and as strengthening the overall capacity of the Department for collection, production and dissemination of Defense intelligence information.

Mr. Gilpatric also stated that Secretary of Defense McNamara and he expected that this new Defense Agency would result in more efficient allocation of critical intelligence resources, more effective management of all Department of Defense intelligence activities, and the elimination of duplicating facilities, organizations and tasks.

The establishment of the Defense Intelligence Agency was based primarily on a concept and plan developed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the request of Secretary McNamara. It represents the culmination of intensive studies on Defense intelligence activities conducted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other components of the DoD over the last six months.

Mr. Gilpatric said that the new Defense Intelligence Agency will follow a carefully planned, time-phased schedule of implementation, and that it would take a period of time to become fully operational. He emphasized that the implementation schedule will be carefully arranged so that there will be no disruption of vital DoD intelligence activities or capabilities during the activation period.

It is anticipated that the Director of the new agency will be a three star general or flag officer on active duty. His term of office will be for four years and his appointment will be announced shortly.

END
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY DESIGNATE

SUBJECT: Specific Responsibilities of the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)

1. I expect the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) to become fully operational as quickly as possible. The DIA will fully integrate the intelligence resources and functions assigned to it; it is not a "confederation." I am holding you personally responsible for the expeditious establishment of DIA and for the development of all plans necessary to its activation. Such plans will be submitted to me for approval through the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

2. Since DIA will assume full responsibility for the specific functions assigned to the Agency on a time-phased basis, I request that you submit to me through the Joint Chiefs of Staff periodic progress reports. These reports should be submitted at all important steps in DIA's activation and should be prepared in a format suitable for submission to the President.

3. I have reserved to myself the power to appoint the Deputy Director and the Chief of Staff of DIA. I am charging you with the responsibility of filling other key billets in DIA with the best qualified officers regardless of their Service affiliation. You may request nominees for these positions from the military departments. The assignment of military personnel to key positions in DIA must be made for varying terms of appointment so that continuity in all DIA offices may be obtained.

4. With the establishment of DIA, implementation of many of the approved Joint Study Group Report recommendations applicable to the Department of Defense will be facilitated. I am charging you with the responsibility of expediting all of those recommendations other than those for which NSA is responsible. I wish a monthly report of the current status of each specific recommendation, together with an estimated completion date for each recommendation.

/s/ Roswell Gilpatrick

Over for cc: SandDef Cont. No. S-34h.
cc:  The Secretary of the Army  
The Secretary of the Navy  
The Secretary of the Air Force  
The Director, Defense Research and Engineering  
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff  
The Assistant Secretaries of Defense  
The General Counsel  
The Special Assistant and Assistants to the  
Secretary of Defense  
The Director, National Security Agency  
The Special Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs  
The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory  
Board (Attn: Mr. J. Patrick Coyne)
Dear Mr. President:

To determine how the Department of Defense could best implement the approved recommendations of the Joint Study Group Report on Foreign Intelligence Activities of the United States Government applicable to the Department, I initiated an intensive analysis of the organization and management of defense intelligence activities last January. This analysis is continuing in specialized areas of defense intelligence activities with participation by all major components of the Department, and, where appropriate, by other organizations in the national intelligence community.

The major product of the first six months of study has been the creation of the Defense Intelligence Agency, or DIA, which will be activated on October 1, 1961, and whose first Director, Lieutenant General Joseph F. Carroll, USAF, was appointed on August 12, 1961.

Fundamental to the decision to establish this new Defense Agency was the conclusion that only through the establishment of such an organization could the majority of the Joint Study Group recommendations applicable to the Department be most effectively achieved. Furthermore, we concluded that only through a DIA would the over-all capacity of the Department of Defense to collect, produce, and disseminate military intelligence information be greatly strengthened and greater unity of effort achieved among all components of the Department in the development of military intelligence information.

In determining the specific intelligence functions which will be directly controlled by DIA, we were guided by the Joint Study Group recommendations. Similarly, the Joint Study Group recommendations were carefully considered in ascertaining what intelligence functions should be retained in the military departments but made subject to DIA's supervision (as distinguished from DIA's direct control).
The Defense Intelligence Agency will also achieve a more efficient allocation and management of defense intelligence resources as it becomes operational. The assumption of specific intelligence functions by DIA, however, will be on a graduated basis with each step carefully planned and executed so as not to degrade any existing defense intelligence capability. It probably will take at least two years for the DIA to become fully operational.

One of the principal recommendations of the Joint Study Group was that the intelligence functions of the Department be brought into consonance with the Defense Reorganisation Act of 1958. The integration of defense intelligence activities under DIA will, we believe, obtain this objective. Through the establishment of DIA the Department of Defense will be able to provide better intelligence support not only to you but also to the national intelligence community as a whole.

With the exception of those Joint Study Group recommendations applicable to the activities of the National Security Agency, I have specifically charged General Carroll with the expeditious implementation of all Joint Study Group recommendations falling within the functional responsibilities of his new Agency and with monitoring all other recommendations applicable to the Department. Furthermore, I have directed General Carroll to develop all activation plans necessary for the establishment of DIA.

A far reaching reorganisation of the National Security Agency (NSA) was approved by me and is now being put into effect. This will facilitate accomplishment of the Joint Study Group recommendations relating to that Agency, in particular those which strengthen the control of the Director, NSA, over Defense ELINT and cryptologic resources. Detailed steps to implement these recommendations are now being examined by the Director, NSA.

Implementation of those Joint Study Group recommendations jointly applicable to the Department of Defense and to other organisations in the national intelligence community must await completion of studies now under way, and, in some cases, the activation of DIA.
Finally, for certain specific intelligence problems incident not only to the establishment of DIA but also to full implementation of all Joint Study Group recommendations applicable to the Department, I have appointed one of my civilian staff advisers to prepare within 90 days recommendations thereon and to monitor for me, on a continuing basis, the establishment of DIA.

For your information, I am enclosing three attachments to this report. The first is the Department of Defense Directive establishing DIA, and the second and third are memoranda detailing procedures and assigning responsibilities for implementing the reorganization of defense intelligence activities.

As the Defense Intelligence Agency becomes operational, I shall keep the Director of Central Intelligence and your Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board continually abreast of the status of implementation of DIA and of all approved Joint Study Group recommendations.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

ROSWell GILPATRIC
Deputy

3 Encls.

bcc: Mr. McGeorge Bundy

The President

The White House
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Secretary of Defense  
THROUGH: The Joint Chiefs of Staff  
SUBJECT: Establishment of the Defense Intelligence Agency  
REFERENCES:
   a. DoD Directive 5105.21, dated 1 August 1961
   b. Memorandum from the Under Secretary of Defense, Subject: Establishment of a Defense Intelligence Agency, dated 5 July 1961
   c. Memorandum from the Under Secretary of Defense, Subject: Administrative Requirements for the Establishment of a Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), dated 1 August 1961
   d. Memorandum from the Under Secretary of Defense, Subject: Specific Responsibilities of the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, (DIA), dated 12 August 1961

1. Pursuant to the provisions of references a, b, c and d, a plan for the activation, on 1 October 1961, of the Defense Intelligence Agency is enclosed.

2. It should be noted that in order to assist and advise the Director, DIA, in the establishment of the Agency, and in consonance with the provisions of reference b, a Military Intelligence Board (MIB) is established coincident with the establishment of the DIA. Terms of reference for the MIB are contained in Annex A to the Enclosure. During the period 15 August 1961 to date, the Military Intelligence Board, operating on an ad hoc basis, has been of material assistance in developing the activation plans of the DIA, and in providing highly qualified personnel, on a loan basis, to accomplish the planning necessary.

3. The attached plan is considered adequate for the activation of the DIA, and to initiate action in all areas which, at this time, are clearly the responsibility of the Director, DIA.

4. Pursuant to the provisions of reference a, a budget for the remainder of FY 62, and an initial Table of Distribution to support the enclosed DIA Organization Plan through 1 November 1961, will be

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ON: 4 Nov 94

Upon approval of attachments, this document becomes CONGIDENT

UNCLASSIFIED

Copy  

64
SUBJECT: Establishment of the Defense Intelligence Agency

submitted to appropriate staff elements of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Subsequent interim Tables of Distribution will be submitted to provide for phased increases in personnel as the DIA assumes additional functions and responsibilities.

JOSEPH F. CARROLL
Lt. General, USAF
Director Designate, DIA
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Plan for the Activation of the Defense Intelligence Agency (U)

1. Reference is made to the memorandum by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, dated 1 August 1961, subject: "Administrative Requirements for the Establishment of a Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)".

2. Attached as Appendix B is the forwarding memorandum by the Director/Designate, DIA, together with his Plan for the Activation of the Defense Intelligence Agency.

3. The plan provides for a feasible initial integration of military intelligence resources and functions for the activation of the DIA.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff reserve comment on the concept for the establishment of the DIA Production Center pending results of studies preparatory to its activation and subsequent proposals for centralization of production in specific intelligence areas.

5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff note an urgent requirement for the preparation of Joint Tables of Distribution with precise identification of functions, in order to confirm specific personnel requirements which appear excessive and to facilitate personnel assignments. The Joint Tables of Distribution should also provide for an equitable distribution of personnel among departmental representatives at each level throughout the Agency structure.

6. The possibility of temporary degradation of the established intelligence base during the present period of heightened world tension is a cause of concern. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize the necessity for
the exercise of prudence in the implementation of the plan in order to obviate this possibility.

7. It is noted that the Plan for the Activation of the DIA provides for taking over and utilizing resources of the Military Departments and/or the Joint Staff, wherever feasible. This approach, as it pertains to manpower resources of the Military Services, is strongly concurred in. Each Service is confronted with increased manpower requirements to support joint activities at the same time requirements for operational forces are increasing. Careful adherence to a time phasing schedule in which Service functions are reduced, or eliminated in advance of, or concomitant with, absorption of functions by the DIA will diminish the burden on the Services from a personnel standpoint.

8. We recommend that you approve the broad framework of the plan subject to modifications which will:

a. Insure a more integrated intelligence operation in the DIA.

b. Reduce the personnel requirements of the Agency.

c. Provide for careful and evolutionary transfer of elements of the Service production bases to the Agency, and simplify the processing of intelligence requirements.

Suggested changes to the plan are listed in Appendix A.

Distr:
Chairman, JCS (2)
CMC (2)
DGSOPS
Sacy to CNO (JCS)
Dir/Plans, AF
MarCorps L/O
Dir J/S (3)
J-2
DIA

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

SIGNED
L. L. Lemnitzer
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Attachment
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Washington

SEP 28 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: FY 1963 Budget Guidelines for Defense Intelligence Activities

My memorandum of 22 September 1961 provided tentative guidance to the military departments and the Joint Chiefs of Staff relative to the preparation of the FY 1963 budget. In the case of intelligence activities the data contained in Program Package VII (Service Wide Support) were insufficient for the purpose of arriving at appropriate guidance.

I am therefore requesting you to review and evaluate the departmental proposals within the areas of your responsibility and to furnish your comments on these to me directly by 1 November 1961 with an information copy to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In your review specific evaluation should be made of each of the noncryptologic intelligence elements with particular reference to the magnitude of the service proposals in relation to current or anticipated plans of the Defense Intelligence Agency. Although certain areas of intelligence activities have not as yet been definitely assigned to the DIA (attaches, mapping technical intelligence, and counter-intelligence), these are so closely related to the presently defined responsibilities that I feel they should be included in your evaluation.

/s/ ROBERT S. McNAMARA

Copy
MEMORANDUM FOR The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)

THROUGH: The Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Activation Plan for the Defense Intelligence Agency

1. The Plan for the activation of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), dated 18 September 1961, is approved subject to the following modifications:

   a. The Joint Chiefs of Staff specific recommendations for change, numbers "a", "b", "a", "c-1" and "a-2" of Appendix A to JCSM-668-61, dated 25 September 1961, are to be incorporated in the final edition of the Plan. (I have used the designators "c-1" and "a-2" since the letter "a" was used twice in Appendix A.)

   b. As to specific recommendation "r", neither the original language of the Plan or the recommended change in wording is entirely satisfactory. Therefore, I believe the last sentence in paragraph 5, page 8, of the Plan should be changed as follows:

   "In addition, he will perform such duties as relate to the monitoring, coordinating, and supervisory responsibilities of the Director, DIA, as the Director, DIA, requires."

2. Your concept of a DIA Production Center is approved. I would appreciate receipt of your detailed plan for the Center as soon as practicable.

3. I do not expect a final Table of Distribution (T/D) for the entire Agency to be submitted until DIA approaches full operational status. I do expect interim T/D’s to be submitted for DIA organizational elements as they are activated and as DIA progressively assumes full responsibility for various intelligence functions.

4. In approving the manpower spaces for DIA utilized in your activation Plan, I realize that the expeditious provisioning of qualified personnel by the military departments and the Joint Staff may create...
many difficult adjustments. The same can be said of providing DIA with adequate working and office space. I am confident, however, that all components of the Department will provide you with whatever assistance you require.

5. Should a question arise as to the priority between meeting a planned activation date and the possible disruption of an intelligence function, in no case will the planning date take priority. Throughout DIA's activation period great care must be exercised to avoid disruption or degradation of vital intelligence efforts.

6. Approval of the activation Plan does not prohibit you from making any internal DIA organizational changes you deem necessary, as provided by DoD Directive 5105.1, to meet the objectives of your Plan.

/s/
BOSWELL L. GILPATRIC
Deputy Secretary of Defense

cc:
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
Plan for the Activation of the DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Unclassified

Declassified Per E.O. 12958
Defense Intelligence Agency
By: [Signature] Date [Date]
NOT Reviewed for Public Release

Approved by the SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
29 September 1961
Plan for the Activation of the Defense Intelligence Agency

Approved by the Secretary of Defense

29 September 1961
SECRET

PLAN FOR THE ACTIVATION OF THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

I. GENERAL

To accomplish the objectives for the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) as specified by the Secretary of Defense, this plan provides for the initiation of action in all areas which are clearly the responsibility of the Director, DIA. The plan is aimed at achieving:

a. The full integration of intelligence resources and functions assigned to the control of the Director, DIA, on a graduated basis;

b. Immediate assumption of planning, coordinating and management responsibilities of all Department of Defense intelligence activities within the purview of the Director, DIA, to achieve maximum economy and efficiency.

Full recognition is given to the necessity to avoid disruption or degradation of these vital intelligence efforts.

In order to preserve the continuity of operations throughout the consolidation process, the plan provides for the taking over and utilization of existing facilities, functions and resources of an individual military department and/or the Joint Staff, wherever feasible. Following this, related activities, resources and functions of the other departments and the Joint Staff are integrated into those facilities under the operational control of the Director, DIA. Initially, this will result in some imbalances in Service representation within DIA in each facility so utilized.

This is considered necessary in the interests of continuity. However, the governing policy will be to achieve to the highest practicable degree, an optimum balance of personnel representation from the three military departments. This will be accomplished in accordance with DIA personnel policies aimed at the maintenance of the highest possible quality and security criteria.
As the DIA assumes full operational stature, the Director, DIA, will absorb many of the intelligence responsibilities now exercised by the intelligence chiefs of the military Services, as well as the responsibilities for substantive intelligence matters now exercised by the J-2, Joint Staff. Thus, the Director, DIA, will become the principal staff advisor to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for substantive intelligence matters, and, acting through the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the principal staff assistant to the Secretary of Defense for both substantive intelligence and managerial matters within his areas of assigned responsibility.

The DIA will be a balanced organization designed to support the major echelons of the military operational chain-of-command, the military departments, non-DOD agencies and international treaty organizations, in peace and war, without requiring major organizational readjustments after the onset of hostilities.

Coordination of all intelligence activities and responsibilities remaining with the military departments will be effected by the Director, DIA, supported by the operating elements of the DIA in their respective areas of responsibility, and by the headquarters staff. This arrangement will ensure the efficient allocation of intelligence resources and the effective management of all DOD intelligence efforts. The Military Intelligence Board (JSMBX A) will be established to advise and assist the Director, DIA, in the exercise of his responsibilities.

II. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

1. OPERATIONS (ANNEX B)

The DIA will arrive at a fully operational status through an evolutionary process. The plan provides for the rapid strengthening of DOD capabilities in the fields of collection, production and dissemination through the establishment of:
1. A Directorate for Acquisition (ANNEX C)

This Directorate, which will be charged with DIA functions and responsibilities in the fields of intelligence requirements and collection will be further sub-divided as follows:

a. The DIA Requirements Office which will establish the DOD Central Requirements Registry. This Office will also be charged with the examination and validation of all DOD intelligence requirements, the assignment of collection priorities, the designation of collection resources, and the restatement of requirements where necessary to ensure their responsiveness to the needs of all consumers of military intelligence.

b. The DIA Collection Management Office which will maintain a complete and current inventory of all collection resources to include their capabilities, limitations, equipments and operations. This Office will levy validated requirements on appropriate collection agencies and resources, monitor collection responses thereto, and evaluate collection efforts to determine reliability, efficiency and cost factors involved. In addition, this Office will stimulate intelligence collection effort through creative planning and the exploitation of scientific and technological developments in their application to intelligence collection activities.

2. A Directorate for Processing which will be charged with the principal substantive intelligence functions and responsibilities of the DIA, and which will directly control and coordinate the production, estimating and current intelligence/indications elements of the DIA. This grouping is essential to the maintenance of a close and continuous interrelationship among these elements, as well as to provide for a similar working relationship with the estimates and production elements of the military Services. This will ensure
the full utilization of Services production and estimates capabilities and the incorporation of their inputs into intelligence produced by the DIA. In order to accomplish its mission, the Directorate for Processing will be divided into the following elements:

a. The DIA Current Intelligence/Indications Center (ANNEX B)

This organization will provide for a single, integrated DOD Current Intelligence/Indications Center designed to meet the needs of the Secretary of Defense and his principal staff assistants, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the military departments, and the commanders of the unified and specified commands and their component commands. In addition, this Center will provide current intelligence/indications support to the President and other senior governmental officials and agencies on a 24-hour basis. It will maintain close working relationships with the production and estimates elements of the DIA and the Services.

b. The DIA Estimates Office (ANNEX C) which will provide all DOD intelligence estimates and contributions to National Intelligence Estimates and the United States Intelligence Board (USIB), and which will assume the estimative responsibilities now charged to the J-2, Joint Staff.

c. The DIA Production Center (ANNEX F) which will, through a time-phased schedule, and in consonance with the concept provided herein, integrate DOD intelligence production as required to discharge the functions and responsibilities assigned to the Director, DIA.

B. HEADQUARTERS ESTABLISHMENT, DIA (ANNEX G)

The headquarters establishment of the DIA will provide adequate administrative support to the headquarters and supervision over the administration of the entire organization, and will assist the Director, DIA, in the exercise of his planning, programming, management and
superisory responsibilities for the overall DIA intelligence effort. This organisational structure will provide for maximum efficiency of operation with minimum requirement for revision during the evolutionary development of the DIA. The headquarters organization will provide the structure for all the elements which will be required in the headquarters when the DIA becomes fully operational.

1. Initially, the manning of the headquarters requires assignment of approximately 125 people including both professional and administrative support personnel. This level of manning should be provided for as early as practicable after 1 October 1961, but in any event, no later than 31 October 1961.

2. During the period ending 1 July 1962, the headquarters complement will increase to a maximum of 250 personnel. This increase reflects the development of a full capability within the headquarters staff to discharge the responsibilities presently assigned.

C. MANAGEMENT RESPONSIBILITIES

The major elements of the staff will be responsible for management functions as follows:

1. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Administration, will provide for headquarters administrative support and security and will be responsible for the initiation and conduct of an integrated personnel program for the career development of defense intelligence personnel. This office will manage the personnel activities of the headquarters, DIA, and will coordinate a Defense Intelligence Personnel Program for both civilian and military personnel. The Defense Intelligence Personnel Program will be initiated on 1 July 1962.

2. The Assistant Chief of Staff for Plans, Policies and Programs will initiate short and mid-range planning immediately upon activation.

The Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Plans, Policy and Programs
will be responsible for the development of an aggressive program for the improvement of defense intelligence activities under the cognizance of the Director, DIA. Long range plans for defense intelligence operations and activities will be developed and will serve as the basis for evaluation and possible consolidation of the intelligence programs of the Services. In the development of long range plans and of programs, full cognizance will be taken of probable resource availability for future requirements based on scientific and technological forecasts.

3. The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence Support Systems will be responsible for the development of intelligence R & D requirements, for coordination of intelligence research and development, for liaison with all defense research, development and testing organizations having related interests or programs. He will also be responsible for the implementation of systems management in intelligence major project areas as directed. In addition, this office will be responsible for the integration of intelligence plans and programs for automation and automatic data processing to ensure that they complement each other and those of non-DOD intelligence agencies to the maximum extent practicable.

4. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Comptroller, will provide financial management and direction for obtaining effective utilization of Department of Defense intelligence resources. This office will review and evaluate budget estimates for all intelligence activities assigned or subject to review and coordination by the Director, DIA, and prepare and submit a consolidated budget for DOD intelligence activities, together with recommendations pertaining thereto; and will participate in the administration of the consolidated budget. This office will conduct management engineering studies and review and analysis of programs to ensure maximum economy and efficiency. Statistical services, reports control and design, and other internal management services will be provided as directed.
5. The Inspector General will perform normal inspection functions within the internal DIA organization and for all agencies, installations, and facilities assigned to the operational control of the Director, DIA. His inspection function will emphasize manner of performance, quality evaluation and operational readiness. In addition, he will perform such duties as relate to the monitoring, coordinating, and supervisory responsibilities of the Director, DIA, as the Director, DIA, requires.
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff  
Asst. Chief of Staff for Intelligence, US Army  
Asst. Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence)  
Asst. Chief of Staff for Intelligence, US Air Force  
Asst. Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Marine Corps  

FROM: Director, Defense Intelligence Agency  

SUBJECT: Establishment of Military Intelligence Board (U)  

REFERENCES:  
a. Secretary Memo of 5 July 1961, Subject: Establishment of the Defense Intelligence Agency  
b. DOD Directive 5105.21 of 1 August 1961  

1. In order to advise and assist the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) in the establishment of the Agency and in the exercise of the responsibilities and functions specified in reference b, the Military Intelligence Board (MIB), is hereby established.  

2. Membership. The MIB shall be composed as follows:  
   Director, Defense Intelligence Agency - Chairman  
   Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff - Member  
   Asst. Chief of Staff for Intelligence, US Army - Member  
   Asst. Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence) - Member  
   Asst. Chief of Staff for Intelligence, US Air Force - Member  
   Asst. Chief of Staff for Intelligence, US Marine Corps - Member  

3. Meetings. Meetings of the MIB will be called by the Director, DIA, as he deems necessary. Any member of the MIB may request the Director, DIA, to call a meeting as appropriate.  

JOSEPH P. CARROLL  
Lt. General, USAF  
Director, DIA
ACQUISITION

I. GENERAL

The Directorate for Acquisition will carry out those functions and responsibilities assigned the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, pertaining to requirements and the collection of intelligence information. This plan provides (through a single integrated facility) for the processing of a requirement in its complete cycle—from receipt, through the collection process and to a final evaluation of results obtained in terms of means, timeliness and cost involved. For this purpose, the Directorate is organized into two major functional elements: the DIA Requirements Office and the DIA Collection Management Office.

II. ORGANIZATION

The organization of the Directorate for Acquisition is shown at TAB A.

III. OFFICE OF REQUIREMENTS

A. Mission

Within a single acquisition facility, register, validate, assign priorities to, and put in appropriate form for publication, all DoD intelligence collection requirements and those levied upon DIA by agencies outside the Department of Defense.

B. Functions

1. Operate a central registry for all intelligence requirements originating in or levied upon the DOD for collection action in order to receive, register and dispatch in final form all requirements, and control the expeditious flow of such requirements while within the DIA.

2. Screen all intelligence collection requirements to eliminate unwarranted duplication and overlap; to effect restatement of requirements where necessary to assure completeness, and that they serve the needs of other DOD agencies; and to assure consistency with assigned missions and overall objectives.
3. Determine the availability within the intelligence community of the information requested.

4. Develop priorities for collection action in consonance with national and Department of Defense objectives and directives.

5. Assign relative priorities to all requirements processed for collection action.

6. Compile, publish, and appropriately disseminate, for informational, management, and control purposes, all validated collection requirements.

C. Operational Concept

1. Requirements Processing

All intelligence collection requirements originating within DOD or levied upon DOD by other departments and agencies will be received by the Registry Branch for processing through a machine records system and the establishment of control for routing within the DIA. The machine records system will record all validated requirements and information pertinent to their levying and monitoring. This information will be available immediately as needed to assist in the validation process to ensure elimination of unwarranted duplication and completeness of requirements with respect to the needs of other DOD elements. Upon validation a priority will be assigned to each requirement in accordance with guidance to be developed by the Priorities Board. Requirements flow is shown at TAB 8.

2. Priorities Board

The Priorities Board will be chaired by the Assistant Director for Acquisition and will be composed of representatives from the collection and production elements of DIA as well as other appropriate agencies of the Department of Defense. The Board will meet as required to consider requirements priority problems. It will establish and maintain
the priority assignment base to be used in processing DOD collection
requirements, giving full consideration to the Priority National Intel-
ligence Objectives, the priority requests of the USIQ, the missions
and objectives of the military departments and operational commands.

D. Space Requirements

Total office space required is 10,100 square feet. Of this amount,
4,000 square feet will be required by the date of activation in October

E. Phasing Schedule

1. Operations

- **1 October 1961 - 1 November 1961.** Activate the Directorate for
  Acquisition and the Requirements Office. Immediate action will be taken
to develop operating procedures for the Validation and Priorities
Divisions, including terms of reference for the Priorities Board, and
development of a priorities assignment base. This plan provides for

- taking over and utilizing a portion of the space now occupied
- by the Air Force Requirements Division in AFCS-I, together
- with the majority of its personnel. Initial operations in require-
ments will consist of processing Air Force requirements only. In order
that the facility can continue uninterrupted operations in processing
Air Force requirements, and to permit the receiving and registration
of Army and Navy requirements, it is essential that personnel from
these latter mentioned services be phased into the Office of Require-
ments during this period. A total of thirty-five personnel will be
required prior to 1 November 1961.

2. **1 November - 1 December 1961.** Commence processing Army and
Navy requirements.

3. **Personnel.** (See TAB C)
IV. OFFICE OF COLLECTION MANAGEMENT

A. Mission

To maintain complete knowledgeability of all collection resources, their capabilities, limitations, equipments and operations; levy validated requirements on appropriate collection agencies or resources; monitor collection responses thereto; and evaluate collection reporting and activities to determine reliability, efficiency and cost factors involved.

B. Functions

1. Maintain an inventory of all collection capabilities available to the Department of Defense.
2. Maintain a comprehensive knowledge of the collection programs, operations and resources existent within all commands or agencies under the control of the Department of Defense and determine the appropriate collection elements for fulfillment of validated intelligence requirements.
3. Levy specific requirements on the military departments, commands, or agencies controlling appropriate collection resources.
4. Monitor and ensure timely intelligence collection response to requirements levied.
5. Designate reporting channels and procedures to ensure that intelligence information is disseminated as quickly as possible from collectors to users.
6. Evaluate collection response to requirements levied and effectiveness of resources.

C. Operational Concept:

Within the Office of Collection Management, validated requirements will be assigned to appropriate collection resources through the controlling departments, commands, or agencies. The effective and economical allocation of requirements to potential collection resources requires that there will be maintained within this Office a comprehensive knowledge
of the capabilities, limitations, equipments, techniques and operations of every collection resource available to DIA. Maintenance of this knowledge and determination of the collection capabilities best suited to take action on each requirement will be accomplished within the Allocation and Monitoring Division.

Monitoring of collection responses and actions on requirements levied will serve to ensure more timely responses; to determine the degree to which requirements have been fulfilled, thereby assisting in maintaining current requirements registration; and to furnish certain information to assist in the final evaluation processes.

The evaluation function will provide practical means and analytical procedures for determination of:

1. The effectiveness of any given collection activity or system against specific types of requirements.

2. The quality of information gained through various collection media.

3. Ways and means of improving collection procedures, techniques and systems.

4. The need for new collection resources and media, and the subsequent development of such resources and media to fill existing gaps.

5. Cost figures in terms of time, manpower and dollars for all DOD intelligence collection activities.

D. Space Requirements

Total office space required is 11,500 square feet. Of this amount, 1,000 square feet will be required by activation in October 1961, and the remainder by 1 January 1962.

E. Phasing Schedule

1. Operations

Upon activation in October 1961, a small increment of personnel from each service will initiate planning, development of procedures and
internal operation of the Allocation and Monitoring Division.

2 January 1962: Initiate collection management activities.

1 March 1962: Establish full-scale collection management, and commence detailed planning, development of procedures and internal operations of the Evaluation Division.

1 April 1962: Assume fully operational status.

V. HEADQUARTERS, DIRECTORATES OF ACQUISITION

A. Space Requirements

Total space required is 2,000 square feet, available 1 October 1961.

B. Personnel Phasing (See Tab C)
# SECRET

**DIRECTORATE OF ACQUISITION**

**REQUIREMENTS FOR PERSONNEL PHASING**

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Total Personnel = 106 Professional and 55 Clerical.
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE AND INDICATIONS CENTER

I. GENERAL

One of the first operational elements to be activated by the DIA is the Current Intelligence/Indications Center. Continuity of the current intelligence/indications effort will be maintained. The phase-over from the Military Services will be accomplished with no interruption or degradation of the quality of the product.

Current intelligence stems from a sound production base. During the interval between the assumption of the current intelligence/indications mission by the DIA and the establishment of a full production capability within DIA, it will be necessary for the Current Intelligence and Indications Center to depend heavily on the production elements of the three Military Departments. Close daily contact between analysts of the Center and analysts of the production elements of the three Military Departments is considered essential, as well as contacts between the other elements of the Center. After the full activation of the Production Center, the Current Intelligence and Indications Center will rely on it for information and intelligence to meet demands for analyses and for other intelligence products which require research in depth beyond the Current Intelligence and Indications Center’s capabilities to serve its customers. The following plan incorporates all of the principles enunciated above.

II. MISSION

To provide the President, the Secretary of Defense and his principal staff assistants, other high government officials, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other major components of the Department of Defense and commanders of unified and specified commands and their components with current intelligence from all sources. This will include essential information on significant events and activities of
potential enemies which might result in the initiation of hostilities,
as well as significant events and activities in non-Bloc countries
which might endanger the security of the US, its allies, and other
portions of the non-communist world, or require the commitment of US
military resources.

III. FUNCTIONS

A. Monitor and produce indications and current intelligence on
potentially hostile activities to include:

1. Developments which could lead to US involvement in active
hostilities or cold war crises.

2. Anti-Soviet Bloc activities which might provide indications of
an impending attack on the US, its allies or other countries.

3. Developments in Free World countries which might indicate
Sino-Soviet Bloc penetration efforts.

B. Produce on a daily and as required basis current intelligence
products, both cable and hard copy, necessary to meet DOD requirements,
and provide briefings as required.

C. Operate and maintain a current intelligence warning/indications
center on a 24-hour basis to receive, display, evaluate, and disseminate
spot items of current military intelligence for governmental and military
decision-makers, planners, and commanders.

D. Maintain liaison with the White House, the military departments,
the CIA, State, NSA, and other US intelligence agencies.

E. Provide DIA participation in the USIB Watch Committee and other
committees dealing with current intelligence; maintain liaison with
other US intelligence agencies represented on the Watch Committee and
with the National Indications Center.

F. Utilize existing worldwide communications facilities and warning/
indications centers at the disposal of US military commanders for
EXHIBIT

exchanging critical/current intelligence, and effect such coordination and monitoring as will enable DIA continuously to fulfill its mission.

G. Identify subject areas in which requirements for additional studies or estimates develop and transmit these requirements to the appropriate production/estimates elements.

H. Effect close and continuous coordination with DIA and Departmental production and estimates elements.

I. Furnish intelligence personnel to the Joint War Room and Joint Battle Staffs, and furnish personnel to the Alert Centre for relocation to the Alternate Joint Communication Center during exercise and emergency conditions.

IV. ORGANIZATION

A. The Current Intelligence and Indications Center, with 144 persons, consists of a Liaison Unit and three Divisions: Administration, Current Intelligence and Indications. (See TAB A). Operations will be initiated by absorbing the APCIN Warning Division, space, its indications and current intelligence functions, and selected personnel; by absorbing the Current Intelligence Division of J-2 (Joint Chiefs of Staff) less its Special Projects Office; and by integrating the personnel furnished by the Army and the Navy with the personnel absorbed from the Air Force and from the Current Intelligence Division of J-2 (Joint Chiefs of Staff).

B. The Liaison Unit, with three officers, will provide liaison to the White House, the Department of State, the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and other US Government elements engaged in current intelligence. Officers and analysts from the Divisions and Branches of the Current Intelligence and Indications Center also will participate in this liaison effort, as appropriate.
C. The Administrative Division, with 21 persons, performs all administrative functions for the Center and includes a Message Center, Graphics Facility, and Reference Files Unit.

D. The Current Intelligence Division, with 80 persons, includes:

1. The Briefing and Editorial Section, which assembles items from the analytical branches and incorporates them into the intelligence media produced on a special or recurring basis. It also provides briefings as required.

2. The Sino-Soviet Bloc Branch, which is responsible for producing current intelligence on the entire Communist Bloc.

3. The Free World Branch, which is responsible for producing current intelligence on the entire Free World, to include Eastern, Western, and Latin American Sections.

4. The Scientific/Technical Branch, which is responsible for the current intelligence aspects of scientific and technical developments.

E. The Indications Division, with 32 persons, includes:

1. The Alert Branch operates the Indications Center and furnishes alert watch officers and NCU plotters on a 24-hour basis. The Alert Officers will screen and effect appropriate distribution of incoming material and maintain the situation room.

2. The Special Projects Unit, which receives certain sensitive material and provides current intelligence assessments, summaries, and briefings required in connection with current intelligence/indications.

F. In view of the continuous nature of the current intelligence/indications mission and the necessity of performing functions 24 hours a day, seven days a week, adequate representation from all components of the Current Intelligence and Indications Center will
be provided in the form of four rotating teams. Each team will consist normally of fifteen persons, to include a senior officer, three Alert Officers (one from each Military Department), analysts from all branches of the Current Intelligence Division, and support personnel. (See TAB B).

V. LOCATION/SPACE

A. The activity will be physically located in the Pentagon.

B. A single facility with 15,970 square feet of space is required when this activity becomes fully operational.

VI. PHASING SCHEDULE

Phase One: 1 September 1961 - 25 October 1961

(1) Plans and liaison effected by Planning Team.

(2) Military Departments nominate personnel for Current Intelligence/Indications Center.

Phase Two: 16 October 1961 - 2 November 1961

(1) By 1 November 1961 the Current Intelligence and Indications Center will be fully manned with 114 personnel. Insofar as feasible this manning will be accomplished on an equitable basis by drawing upon personnel of the three Military Departments as well as the J-2, Joint Staff.

(2) Using the facilities of the J-2 Current Intelligence Division and the AFGEN Warning Division and the personnel assigned, accomplish the adjustments necessary to be ready for operation on 6 November 1961. During this phase the Current Intelligence Division, Joint Staff, and the Air Force Warning Division will continue to operate under existing management.

Phase Three: 5 November 1961 - 1 December 1961

(1) 1200 local time on 5 November the DIA assumes operating responsibility for the Air Force Warning Center and commences maintenance and operation of the DIA Indications Center.
(2) 1200 local time on 5 November the DIA Current Intelligence
Indications Center absorbs the Current Intelligence Division of
J-2 (JCS), less its Special Projects Office, and assumes responsi-
bility for production of DOD Current Intelligence.

(3) 6 November 1961, DIA produces daily media, both cable and
hard copy, necessary to meet DOD requirements, and provides brief-
ings as required.

(4) Maintain liaison with and obtain support from the production
and estimates elements of the Military Departments until the es-

tablishment of the DIA production base.

Phase Four: 1 December 1961 - July 1962

(1) Improve daily media and effect coordination to determine
the extent to which DIA Current Intelligence products are meeting
the needs of consumers.

(2) Continue liaison with production and estimates elements of
the Military Departments.
DIA ESTIMATES OFFICE

I. GENERAL

To discharge the estimative responsibilities assigned to the Director, DIA, the Estimates Office will be established under the Assistant Director for Processing. This Office will respond to national, departmental and command requirements for estimates in a timely and efficient manner while being compatible with the existing planning and estimates machinery of the government.

II. MISSION

To provide the Secretary of Defense and his principal staff assistants and other designated national and international authorities with military intelligence estimates; and to review and coordinate, as directed, the intelligence estimative functions retained by, or assigned to, the military departments.

III. FUNCTIONS

A. Produces intelligence estimates, and related intelligence support, for the Secretary of Defense, the staff assistants to the Secretary, specialized DOD agencies, the military departments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the unified and specified commands.

B. Provides the DOD contributions to, and DIA representation in, the preparation of intelligence estimates for the United States Intelligence Board and other designated national and international authorities.

C. Reviews intelligence estimates prepared by the unified and specified commands and international military organizations as directed.

D. Within the scope of responsibilities assigned to Director, DIA, participates in the coordination of the planning, reduction and review of intelligence estimates of the military departments.
E. Provides timely support to the Chief of Current Intelligence and
indications in the performance of his mission.

IV. ORGANIZATION (I.E. A)

The Office includes a Coordination Group which is responsible for
the integration of over-all estimates which set forth a comprehensive
statement of the threat. Illustrative of these are NIE's concerned
with evaluating the world situation, the annual estimate provided in
support of NATO planning, and the annual estimate provided in support
of Joint Staff planning. Four of the divisions are geographic (Soviet
Bloc, Eastern, Western, and Latin America) with further area sub-
divisions; to provide a high degree of competence in specific world
areas. The fifth division, Scientific and Technical, is required to
meet the growing need for professional estimators in this field as an
integral part of any senior estimates staff. Close coordination by
all elements of the Estimates Office with the DIA production facility
is essential.

V. SPACE

The Estimates Office will require approximately 12,000
square feet of floor space.

VI. SCHEDULE

The schedule for activation and assumption of responsibilities by
the Estimates Office is as follows:

A. 1-25 Oct. 61. Designate Chief of Estimates and provide initial
staff. The initial complement will consist of the Chief of Estimates,
seven estimators and three clerical personnel. They will establish
the office and plan future operations.

B. 26 October 1961. Activate Estimates Office. The initial complement
will provide DIA participation at the USIS representative's meeting.
at which the National Intelligence Estimates are produced. They also
advise the Director, DII, on pertinent NIE's, and continue planning
for the assumption of the remainder of the mission.

C. 1 January 1962. Add second increment of twenty-three estimators
and nine clerical personnel. Absorb all J-2 estimative functions and
assume responsibility for NIE/NNIE coordination. It is anticipated
that the majority of these estimators will be made available from J-2
resources. On this date, the Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff,
will be relieved of his estimative responsibilities and the Director, DIA,
will assume responsibility for providing support to the Joint War Room
and Joint Battle Staffs. In addition, the Director, DIA, will furnish
alert cadre for relocation to the AJCC during exercises and emergencies.
Also, on this date the Estimates Office of the DIA will begin sub-
mitting DOD contributions to the Board of National Estimates. The
Services will submit inputs to DIA to aid in developing these DOD
contributions.

Complete preparations for assumption of the mission. Total personnel
will consist of a Chief of Estimates, sixty-six estimators and thirty-
seven clerical and administrative personnel.

E. 1 July 1962. Assume responsibility for complete mission. Service
Intelligence Chiefs are relieved of the responsibility of providing
inputs to DOD contributions to the Board of National Estimates.
null
I. CONCEPT FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE DIA PRODUCTION CENTER

In order to discharge the responsibilities of the Director, DIA, to include satisfying the intelligence requirements of the major components of the DOD, it is necessary to establish a DIA Production Center. This Center will integrate the military intelligence production activities of the military departments in those areas of responsibility which are assigned to the Director, DIA. To ensure that this consolidation is accomplished efficiently, and in order to preclude the disruption or degradation of military intelligence production, it will be necessary that the basic intelligence production resources of the military departments, to include their reference files, libraries and automatic data processing capabilities remain in place until such time as they can be efficiently and economically amalgamated.

The magnitude of the present military intelligence production effort and the dissimilarities in the manner in which each service performs this function dictate that any integration of the production effort be accomplished only after detailed surveys and careful study. Although this should be accomplished expeditiously, integration of the DOD intelligence production effort must be approached in a deliberate and prudent manner. Accordingly, in contrast to the preceding annexes to this plan, the method of integration of the military intelligence production effort is presented as a concept to provide the basis for more detailed planning.

Basically, this concept provides for the assumption of full operational responsibility for the areas of production responsibility assigned to the DIA by 1 July 1962, either by assuming operational control of existing production resources and facilities in place by that date, or by having achieved a physical amalgamation of selected segments of the production effort prior to that time. A detailed plan for this consolidation will be submitted to the Secretary of Defense, through the Joint Chiefs of Staff, by 1 February 1962. This plan will be developed in full recognition of
the need for providing, on a continuing basis, a complete responsiveness to the intelligence needs of all components of the DIA.

At present, intelligence production within the military departments is organized on both functional and geographic bases. Although each of these organizations has been designed to meet the specific needs of each Service, their inherent lack of similarity precludes their ready consolidation. Accordingly, this concept incorporates the best features of each existing organization in a combination of functional and geographic bases into a DIA Production Center designed to carry out the functions and responsibilities assigned to the Director, DIA.

There are measurable areas, particularly in the scientific and technical field, wherein the Production Center will continue to be dependent to a considerable extent upon specialized resources remaining within the Services or presently being performed on a contract basis under the auspices of one or more of the Services. The efficient integration of the products of these resources into the output of the Production Center requires further detailed planning.

II. MISSION

To develop and produce military intelligence studies and materials in support of the Secretary and the Department of Defense and other designated national and international authorities; and to participate in the review and coordination of residual production of intelligence studies and materials.

III. FUNCTIONS

A. Maintains and operates the DIA intelligence production facility.
B. Develops, produces, and disseminates military intelligence studies and materials in support of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the military departments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, specialized DOD agencies, the unified and specified commands, and other appropriate national and international authorities, to include—...
limited to—area analysis intelligence, foreign military capabilities, scientific and technical intelligence, and targeting intelligence.

C. Provides DIA representation to interdepartmental, national and international conferences, boards, committees, and panels concerned with the production of military intelligence studies—such as the technical committees of USB; and order of battle conferences.

D. Provides timely support to the Chief of Estimates and the Chief of Current Intelligence and Indications in the performance of their missions.

E. Within the scope of responsibilities assigned to Director, DIA, participate in the review and coordination of the production of intelligence studies and materials prepared by the military departments.

IV. ORGANIZATION (Tab A)

A. The organization of the Production Center is broadly divided into intelligence production and support areas.

B. Within the production area, a Production Control Group will supervise the total production resource. This group will analyze incoming production requirements in terms of production resources, break down the task among Divisions of the Production Center, schedule intermediate and final completion dates and monitor the content of the final product. The Special Projects Unit will concentrate on tasks of particular sensibility, complexity or importance.

C. In the support area, typical activities will include:

1. Supply and Administration
2. Electronic Data Processing
3. Security
4. Controller
5. Graphic and Reproduction
6. Dissemination
7. Personnel
8. Contractor Relations
9. Library and Reference Service
D. Of the four major divisions of the Production Center:

1. The first, Area Analysis, will produce such generalized finished intelligence as:
   a. Terrain, ports, harbors, and beach studies
   b. Land, sea, air transportation studies
   c. Industrial resources
   d. Political structure, to include diplomatic alignment and military agreements
   e. Economic resources
   f. Infrastructure, to include communications
   g. Weather
   h. Biographies
   i. Encyclopedia publications

The major portion of DOD obligations under the National Intelligence Survey (NIS) program falls within the responsibilities of this organization. Additionally, its products will be of direct use to the DIA Targets and Capabilities divisions as well as to a wide variety of external intelligence users.

2. The second, Capabilities, is organized on a geographic basis. This will facilitate the integration of existing components from the Services and permit the concentration of mutually supporting specialists. Within the broad groupings (Soviet Bloc, Eastern, Western, and Latin America) each will be responsible for such factors as:
   a. Order of Battle
   b. Deployment
   c. Organization
   d. Material
   e. Logistics
   f. Training
   g. Tactics and Strategy
h. Doctrine

i. Weapon systems

j. Readiness

k. Probable courses of action

l. Operations

The products of this division, formalized as studies, NFIs sections, NIKE inputs, or as direct responses to production requirements placed by intelligence users, will find application throughout the military community.

3. The third division, Scientific and Technical, is responsible for the development of that scientific and technical intelligence required to meet the needs of the Director, DIA, utilizing the capabilities of the Services in performing this mission. It will also interpret, for DIA purposes, the results of Service analyses, and will assume within the DIA primary responsibility for such areas as:

a. Foreign scientific potential

b. Nuclear technology

c. Chemical, bacteriological, radiological warfare

d. Space and missile development

e. Weapon system trends

f. Propulsion

4. The fourth division, Targets, will discharge DIA's responsibilities for target intelligence. Detailed description of its functions must await consideration by the Production Planning Team, specifically including a delineation of the distinction between target intelligence on the one hand, and plans and operations on the other.

5. It is estimated that the personnel requirements for the Production Center will be in the order of magnitude of 1,000.
V. LOCATION - SPACE

Because of its size, the intelligence production facility will necessarily be located at a facility outside the Pentagon. The space required is approximately 150,000 square feet.

VI. PHASING SCHEDULE

A. 1 October 1961 - 1 November 1961. Designate Chief of Production and provide planning staff. In addition to the Chief of Production the initial planning staff will consist of one officer from each military department. With planning guidance furnished by the Director, DIA, this group will initiate a more detailed survey of the resources and functions of the production elements of the Services.

B. 1 November 1961 - 15 January 1962. Add second element of planning staff. The Chief of Production's staff will be augmented by six additional professional and four clerical personnel to aid him in his planning. This staff will prepare for submission to the Director, DIA, a comprehensive plan for the organization of the DIA Production Center as well as a proposed time-phased schedule of implementation. For the purpose of developing early solutions they will also highlight problems they foresee.

C. 15 January 1962. Draft production plan completed. Detailed plan and proposed time-phased schedule submitted to Director, DIA.

D. 1 February 1962 - 1 July 1962. Submit plan to the Secretary of Defense and implement upon approval. On 1 February 1962, the Director, DIA, will submit to the Secretary of Defense, through the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a plan and time-phased schedule for a DIA Production Center. Upon approval by the Secretary of Defense, the Services will initiate internal readjustments in preparation for implementation of the plan. Transfer of functions and resources to the Production Center will be affected on a graduated and coordinated basis. Assumption of the military production responsibilities and functions assigned to the DIA will be affected by 1 July 1962. Thereafter, physical amalgamation, to the extent practicable, will be accomplished on a carefully graduated basis.
MEMORANDUM FOR The Secretaries of the Military Departments
The Director of Defense Research and Engineering
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Assistant Secretaries of Defense
The General Counsel
The Special Assistant and the Assistants to the Secretary of Defense
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Director, National Security Agency

SUBJECT: Disestablishment of the Office of the Assistant to the Secretary for Special Operations

1. Effective 31 October 1961, the Office of the Assistant to the Secretary for Special Operations (OSO) will be disestablished. On 1 November 1961, OSO's special intelligence clearance responsibilities are assigned to the Defense Intelligence Agency.

2. Effective 1 November 1961, NSA will report to the Secretary of Defense through the Honorable John H. Rubel, Assistant Secretary of Defense.

3. All existing regulations, memoranda, and other instructions in conflict with this memorandum will be amended and copies submitted to the General Counsel of the Department by 1 January 1962.

[Signature]
MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDER SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE

SUBJECT: Initial Staffing for the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)

Reference: (a) "Plan for the Activation of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)," approved by Joint Chiefs 29 Sept 61

In the process of implementing reference (a), it is anticipated that an interim Table of Distribution will be submitted for organizational elements as they are activated and as the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) assumes full responsibility for various intelligence functions. A final Table of Distribution for the entire Agency is not expected until DIA approaches full operational status.

The source of manpower for the DIA will be from the Services. To preserve continuity of operations, reference (a) "provides for the taking over and utilization of existing facilities, functions and resources of an individual Military Department and/or the Joint Staff, wherever feasible. Following this, related activities, resources and functions of the other Departments and the Joint Staff are integrated into these facilities under the operational control of the Director, DIA. Initially, this will result in some imbalance in Service representation within DIA in each facility so utilized. This is considered necessary in the interests of continuity. However, the governing policy will be to achieve to the highest practicable degree, an optimum balance of personnel representation from the three Military Departments."

To provide for initial staffing of the Defense Intelligence Agency will require from the Services about 250 civilian and 250 military personnel. Exact numbers of civilian personnel are required from each Service will be forthcoming after a Table of Distribution is received. Military personnel are to be provided by each Service as indicated below.
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| Enlisted                      | 17         | 19   | 29   |           |
|                               | 11         | 72   | 75   | 93        |

* Requirements will be levied then identified by Service.

Carlisle P. Runge

cc: Director, DIA
    JCS
    Admin/Act to SecDef
SUBJECT: Augmentation of the DIA Special Activities Office

TO: The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army
Washington 25, D. C.

1. The Defense Intelligence Agency commenced SFO service to the OSD, JCS, and elements within DIA on 2 January 1962. Included in this service were not just the normal SFO security functions, but briefing functions, production support, reconnaissance planning, and committee membership (COMEX, etc.), as well. In addition, we are developing a plan for sensitive reconnaissance support of the Unified and Specified Commands.

2. To provide these necessary and vital services will require the assignment of top level staff personnel from the military departments who are experienced in both the sensitive reconnaissance areas and SFO security fields. At the present time we are awaiting final approval of our first phase Special Activities JPD calling for 15 persons and are preparing requests for assignment of certain specific individuals within the military services.

3. In order to provide effective SFO support at the highest levels required within DIA until such time as permanent designates arrive on station, I am requesting that you make available on an interim loan basis Captain Lawrence F. Davia, and Mr. John R. Mehlenschir, 69-12, from your Technical Branch, to augment the DIA Special Activities Office.

4. I realize this will cause an additional burden to be placed upon your already heavily committed staff, particularly in the maintenance of reconnaissance objectives lists and in the preparation and delivery of SFO briefings. In this regard, we will make every effort to increase our service in these areas with the arrival of additional personnel.

FOR THE DIRECTOR

[Signature]

Declassified by SV-1
6 October 1988
REPLY TO
ATTN OF: DIA/AS/J Reinecke/71863/12 Feb 62 (Control No: 0095)

SUBJECT: Intelligence Working Group on Continuity of Operations Planning(U)

TO: The Director, J-2 Joint Staff
    The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army
    The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
    The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
    Deputy Director, Processing, Defense Intelligence Agency
    Deputy Director, Acquisitions, Defense Intelligence Agency

1. The Defense Intelligence Agency has been doing preliminary planning with respect to continuity of intelligence operations in case of emergency which requires operations to be conducted from an alternate location (Alt Joint Communication Center, ASCC; National Emergency Command Post Afloat, NECPA; and National Emergency Airborne Command Post, NEAP).(U)

2. During DIA's evolutionary period, and in preparation for DIA's role when it is completely operational, joint planning must be initiated now with the intelligence organizations of the Joint Staff and the military services. Therefore, DIA is forming and will provide the Chairman for, an Intelligence Working Group on Continuity of Intelligence Planning. This working group will assist in the preparation of a Defense military intelligence plan for Continuity of Operations.(U)

3. The specific purpose of the working group will be:(C)

   a. To develop the intelligence functions to be performed by the Joint Staff, the Services, and the DIA at the alternate emergency relocation centers;

   b. To develop the duty titles required to perform the necessary intelligence functions listed in "a." above;

   c. To prepare rosters of names of personnel needed to fill the required spaces ("b." above) and monitor these rosters to insure that they are continuously current;

   d. To insure that necessary administrative procedures (such as alerting procedures; transportation to sites; passes required; and necessary equipment and files are on hand) with respect to relocation of intelligence personnel are being accomplished, and kept current;

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Reviewed for declassification
Declassified in full ( ) Not declassified
Declassified in part ( ) No DIA equity
No DIA objection to declassification
Refer to:
Reviewed by: ( ) On: ( )
e. Any test in connection with relocation that may be assigned or
come necessary in order that the military intelligence functions at
relocation sites may be performed with efficiency, while avoiding
duplication of tasks, facilities, and organization.

4. It is requested that each addresses against a primary and an
alternate member to the Intelligence Working Group on Continuity of
Operations. These to be submitted to Colonel Paul G. Nieshuch, Long
Range Plans Branch, DIA, Oxford 71553, who is designated chairman. (U)

S. B. FRANKEL
Rear Admiral, USA
Chief of Staff

Copies to:
DIAFL-1B Reading file
DIAFL-2B File cy
RCA/DF/CR
Director's File cy
DIAFL-1B File cy
DIAFL-Reading file
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY INSTRUCTION
No. 57-1

HEADQUARTERS DEFENSE
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
23 March 1962

INTELLIGENCE PROCESSING

SUBSTANTIVE INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

1. PURPOSE: This instruction sets forth the types of substantive intelligence support DIA will provide to the Unified and Specified Commanders and the support expected by the DIA from the Unified and Specified Commanders.

2. REFERENCE: SM 262-62.

3. SUPPORT FROM DIA:
   a. Estimates.
      (1) An Over-all Intelligence Estimate - in three detailed volumes, Soviet Bloc, Free World, and Long Range - prepared annually and updated as required.
      (2) Special estimates as required by the Unified and Specified Commands.
      (3) Review and comment on intelligence aspects of Plans of the Unified and Specified Commands.
      (4) Summaries of advanced conclusions of pertinent National Intelligence Estimates. (The approved printed versions of these estimates are now being provided through Service resources.) Upon activation of the DIA Production Center, pertinent National Estimates and other studies will be provided.
   b. Current Intelligence/Indications.
      (1) DIA Intelligence Bulletin Cable (Monday thru Friday).
      (2) DIA Intelligence Bulletin (Monday thru Friday).
(3) DIA Intelligence Summary (Daily except Sunday).

(4) DIA Intelligence Summary Cable (Daily except Sunday).

(5) Special Intelligence Summary Cables.

(6) Spot Intelligence Summary Cables.

(7) Indications Cables and participation in the world-wide Indications System.

(8) Watch Committee Conclusions Cable (Weekly).

(9) Watch Committee "Backup" Cable (Weekly).

(10) Direct telephone (including secure voice where terminals are available) and telecons.

(11) Fulfillment of special or routine requests for information.

c. Basic Intelligence Production.

When the DIA Production Center is established, DIA, within the mission assigned, will furnish the Unified and Specified Commanders with required basic intelligence publications and support now provided by the military Services.

4. SUPPORT TO DIA:

a. Establishment of Unified or Specified Commands indications Centers in support of the DIA Indications Center.

b. All messages having an intelligence content or intelligence implications originated by Unified and Specified Commands or their components to include any indications cables.

c. Fulfillment of DIA Current Intelligence requirements appropriately placed on the Unified and Specified Commands.

d. Intelligence publications originated by the Unified and Specified Commands or their components.
e. DIA may, from time to time, request Unified and Specified Commands to contribute to or comment on special estimates being prepared in support of the national intelligence community.

FOR THE DIRECTOR:

OFFICIAL:  
L. F. DOWNING  
COL, USAF  
ACofS/Admin

S. B. FRANKEL  
REAR ADMIRAL, USN  
Chief of Staff

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SUBJECT: (S) Intelligence Support from the Defense Intelligence Agency to Commanders of Unified and Specified Commands

TO: Commander-in-Chief
U.S. SHRIKE Command
McDill Air Force Base
Tampa, Florida

1. In 64-061-62 the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, has been designated as the primary agent of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to ensure that adequate intelligence and counterintelligence support is provided to the commanders of unified and specified commands. My purpose at this time is to acquaint you with our means of fulfilling this responsibility.

2. To date, the DIA Current Intelligence and Indications Center, (CIIC), has assumed all the substantive current intelligence functions formerly assigned to J-2, the Joint Staff, and has absorbed the current intelligence resources and functions of the military departments at the Washington level. The DIA CIIC is now serving you with regular message summaries and with "hard copy" materials including the DIA Intelligence Bulletin. Procedures and techniques for mutual support in this area have been developed in some detail. They are, of course, subject to alteration as experience dictates.

3. The DIA Estimates Office was activated on 2 January 1962 and has assumed all responsibility for the substantive estimate intelligence functions formerly assigned to J-2, the Joint Staff. The DIA Estimates Office therefore has now assumed full responsibility for your JCS support in the intelligence estimates area. When our Estimates Office becomes fully manned, and as our capabilities in this field increase, you can expect an increasing level of support.

4. SW-261-62 outlines specific DIA responsibilities related to intelligence requirements. The DIA Directorate for Acquisition will process your intelligence collection requirements, and levy as appropriate on DOD resources external to your command or upon resources controlled by non-DOD agencies. Such requirements will be validated, assigned a priority and levied upon a military department, DIA, Department of State, CIA, or other unified and specified commands, as appropriate. You may also expect to receive DIA collection requirements for action within the capabilities of resources under your operational command. These requirements will contain information from both the originator and DIA to assist you in determining the appropriate resources to be utilized.

Declassified by SUI-1
6 October 1998
5. Subject to your concurrence I propose, in the interest of timeliness, and as an interim measure, that responses to all DIA requirements levied for action in your command be transmitted by the collection resource tasked by you through the normal reporting channels of the components to their respective military departments within your command as you deem appropriate. Also, as an interim measure, dissemination of responses at the Washington level will be accomplished by the military departments in accordance with statements of interest held by them and special instructions given by DIA. However, in emergency or critical situations, responses to requirements which are levied by DIA directly upon a collection resource in your command will be transmitted directly to DIA, with information copies through normal command channels, in accordance with the provisions of SH-61-G2. Intelligence reporting forms now used by the military departments will continue in use for the time being.

6. I am particularly interested in rendering any assistance desired by you in connection with your plans for establishing or strengthening your Intelligence Requirements/Collection Office.

7. The DIA Production Center will become operational approximately 120 days following approval by the Secretary of Defense of a plan recently submitted. The specific production responsibilities of the Services which are to be absorbed by DIA are still under study; however, in carrying out those production responsibilities ultimately absorbed, DIA will be completely responsive to your intelligence needs. Further information on production support for you will be provided as detailed planning in this area evolves. In the interim, publications emanating from service production elements, and reports thereto, will continue to be handled as before.

8. More detailed information is being furnished by separate correspondence on the following subjects:

a. Processing of intelligence collection requirements.

b. Submission, validation and control of specific intelligence collection requirements, including a standard format to be used.

c. Media for intelligence support to unified and specified commands.

9. My representatives will meet in the near future with members of your staff to discuss your support requirements from DIA, and matters of mutual interest. I fully recognize that one of my most important responsibilities is to provide intelligence support to operational commands. We are developing on an evolutionary basis, and as we gain additional capabilities
you will be provided further detailed information. In the meantime, I
welcome any requests for information, and any comments that you may have.

JOSEPH F. CARROLL
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: The Statutory Authority for the Establishment of the Defense Intelligence Agency

The Defense Intelligence Agency was established by the Secretary of Defense under the authority vested in him by sections 202(c)(1) and 202(c)(6) of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended.

Section 2 of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, states that it is the intent of Congress "to eliminate unnecessary duplication in the Department of Defense" and "to provide more effective, efficient, and economical administration." To these ends, the Secretary of Defense is directed by section 202(c)(1) of the Act to:

"...take appropriate steps (including the transfer, reassignment, abolition, and consolidation of functions) to provide in the Department of Defense for more effective, efficient, and economical administration and operation and to eliminate duplication."

In addition to the authority contained in section 202(c)(1) of the Act cited above, the Secretary of Defense was also empowered to create the Defense Intelligence Agency by the provisions of section 202(c)(6) of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended. This section of the law was inserted into the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 by floor action in the House of Representatives. It is commonly referred to by the names of its sponsors, then House Majority Leader McCormack and Congressman Curtis. The McCormack-Curtis amendment provides that:
"Whenever the Secretary of Defense determines it will be advantageous to the Government in terms of effectiveness, economy, or efficiency, he shall provide for the carrying out of any supply or service activity common to more than one military department by a single agency or such other organizational entities as he deems appropriate. For the purposes of this paragraph, any supply or service activity common to more than one military department shall not be considered a 'major combatant function' within the meaning of paragraph (1) hereof."

In explaining his amendment to the House of Representatives, Congressman McCormack specifically mentioned that intelligence was one of the activities included among common supply and service activities within the meaning of the amendment. (104 Cong. Rec. 11033 (1958))
SUBJECT: (U) Communications for Special Intelligence Support of USEUCOM

TO: The Joint Chiefs of Staff

1. (U) References:

   a. Memorandum, Deputy Secretary of Defense, for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 21 February 1962, subject: Strengthening of the Intelligence Capabilities of the Unified Command.

   b. USEUCOM letter, file ECJ5, 19 April 1962, subject: Intelligence Functions USEUCOM (U).


   e. Memorandum from Mr. Bundy for the Secretary of Defense, dated 9 October 1962, subject: Review of US Foreign Intelligence and Related Activities in Southeastern Asia and the Far East, approved by the Secretary of Defense on 28 October 1962.

2. (U) Paragraph 5b of reference a states in part that the principal intelligence channel to and from the specified and unified commands, and in turn, to and from the respective component commands of unified commands, shall become the JCS (DIA)/unified and specified command channel.

3. (U) By reference e, the JCS requested the Director, DIA, in coordination with the commanders of the unified commands, to study additional measures for strengthening the intelligence capabilities of the unified commands, including those recommended by the commanders, as a basis for recommendations to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

4. (U) Accordingly, in response to reference b, and the JCS reply thereto, reference e, a representative of DIA made a staff visit to Headquarters USEUCOM for the specific purpose of discussing the proposed Special Intelligence supporting communications expansion, Annex B, Appendix IV to reference b, with personnel of SHAPE, USEUCOM and US Army Special Security Detachment (USAASSD), ACSI, RA.

Director's Cy

Declassified by SVI-1
6 October 1998
5. (3) The DIA staff visit resulted in the following conclusions:

a. The proposed concept of operation is in furtherance of the objectives set forth in references a and e.

b. USEUCOM will make additional floor space available to SSO USEUCOM; detailed engineering and communications equipment procurement will commence; theater equipment and circuitry resources will be explored to meet intra-theater requirements; and additional personnel from USEUCOM resources will be made available to SSO USEUCOM upon JCS approval of the concept proposed in Annex B, Appendix IV, reference b.

c. Provision of the proposed leased circuit between SSO DIA and SSO USEUCOM and the associated teletypewriter and communications security equipments for the SSO USEUCOM terminal should not be the responsibility of USEUCOM.

d. The SSO SHAPE - SSO USEUCOM circuit should not be degraded from 100 to 60 WPM operation to implement reference b.

e. SSO SHAPE has a valid requirement for the existing circuit with Army Security Agency, Europe (ASA/E); therefore, this circuit should not be reterminated as a SSO USEUCOM - ASA/E circuit.

f. The existing SSO DIA - APSSO USESTRICOM full-time, 100 WPM, secure, duplex, teletype circuit and the Special Communications Security Center, Fort Ritchie circuit activation capability are considered adequate to protect the timely exchange of message traffic between USEUCOM and USESTRICOM prior to execution of contingency plans.

6. (2) It is recommended that:

a. The USEUCOM concept for expanding special intelligence communications support, Annex B, Appendix IV, reference b, be approved with the following exceptions:

(1) The SSO SHAPE - SSO USEUCOM circuit not be degraded from 100 to 60 WPM operation.

(2) No provision be made for an SSO USEUCOM - APSSO USESTRICOM stand-by circuit.

b. The SSO SHAPE - ASA/E circuit not be reterminated as an SSO USEUCOM ASA/E circuit.

c. SSO USEUCOM personnel and intra-theater communications requirements be satisfied from USEUCOM resources.
d. Personnel spaces for all personnel who are assigned to SSO USEUCOM in implementation of Annex B, Appendix IV, reference b, be transferred to the USAFSSD, ACSI, DA as this detachment currently furnishes SSO support to USEUCOM.

e. One of the military departments be designated to provide the full-time, 100 WPM, duplex, teletype circuit between SSO DIA and SSO USEUCOM and the associated teletypewriter and communications security equipments for the SSO USEUCOM terminal.

7. (U) A copy of the trip report which was prepared as the result of the DIA staff visit to Headquarters USEUCOM will be made available upon request.

S. B. FRANKEL
Rear Admiral, USA
Chief of Staff
REPLY TO: CCR
ATTN OF: CR

SUBJECT: (CC) DIA Instruction 58-6, "Requirements in Support of General War and Contingency Plans"

TO: Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff

1. References:

a. JCS 252-62, dated 6 March 1962, "Action to Strengthen the Intelligence Capabilities of Commanders of Unified and Specified Commands."

b. JCS 2311/106, dated 17 March 1959, " wartime Classtinstm Intelligence Collection Appoiintm to the Intelligence Annex to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (1959-1960)."

2. Forwarded herewith is a draft of a proposed DIA Instruction 58-6, "Requirements in Support of General War and Contingency Plans."

3. The basis for the issuance of this instruction is the authority contained in reference a., which designates the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency as the primary agent of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to provide adequate intelligence and counterintelligence support to the unified and specified commands.

4. The effect of the proposed instruction will be to replace the guidance now contained in reference b., under which commanders of unified and specified commands have established a total list of wartime intelligence collection requirements, under assignment of collection responsibilities to component commands, submitted the requirements to the CIA for acceptance and forwarded their requirements lists, annotated to show assignments and acceptances, to the JCS for further coordination with the Director of Central Intelligence.

5. In a series of discussions with members of J-2, Joint Staff, the Central Intelligence Agency and representatives of the intelligence chief of the Services, it was first considered that a new JCS paper would be required in order to accomplish the transfer to DIA of the JCS responsibility for processing requirements of unified and specified commands under reference b. Such a paper was drafted and circulated for comment and concurrence. It appeared desirable, however, upon further consideration, to move fully implement the responsibility placed on DIA in reference a. by extending
the scope of requirements support to be given to the unified and
specified commands to cover the entire scope of wartime collection
requirements; that is, all requirements, not simply those requirements
suitable for clandestine collection. Intelligence collection on those
requirements would be on an all-source basis, including the clandestine
capability of CIA. This action would also continue the former procedure
by which coordination was made with CIA in the field and at Washing-
ton with a view to collection action in wartime of those requirements
which were not collectible by any sources expected to be available to
the Department of Defense in time of war.

6. It has therefore been informally concluded that this objective of
broader DIA support can best be secured by the publication of a DIA
instruction under the authority set forth in reference a, and that the
existing JCS instructions in reference b. should be simultaneously
withdrawn. Accordingly a DIA instruction which reflects the views and
concerns of all interrelated agencies has been prepared. It has been in-
formally agreed with Joint Staff representatives that the existing JCS
instructions will be withdrawn upon publication of a DIA instruction,
as proposed herein. All of the Services have concurred in the publication
of this instruction, and also have concurred in the withdrawal of JCS
201/106. However, the Air Force recommends that this JCS paper stay in
effect until so much of the guidance as pertains to command and intelligence
operations concepts rather than requirements can be issued in another JCS
paper. While it is considered that these concepts are not dependent on
JCS 201/106, but on other documents, notably DODD No. 5, or are inherent
in the exercise of military command, nevertheless, appropriate guidance
similar to that recommended for retention by the Air Force is being
submitted by DIA for inclusion in a Planning Guidance Appendix to
the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan for 1954.

7. Request comment or concurrence.

S. B. FRANKEL
Deputy Admiral, USN
Chief of Staff

Atch
As stated
INTELLIGENCE ACQUISITION

REQUIREMENTS IN SUPPORT OF GENERAL WAR AND CONTINGENCY PLANS

1. REFERENCES:
   a. DOD Directive 5105.21, dated 1 August 1962, subject: "Defense Intelligence Agency."
   b. JCS SN 262-62, dated 6 March 1962, subject: "Action to strengthen the Intelligence Capabilities of the Unified and Specified Commands."

2. PURPOSE: To prescribe the procedures and format for submitting statements of intelligence collection requirements in support of contingency and general war plans of the Unified and Specified Commands.

3. OBJECTIVE: To assure the availability in wartime of intelligence collection means which should be provided for in peacetime.

4. SCOPE: This instruction covers all collection requirements of the Unified and Specified Commands in support of contingency and general war plans for collection on an all-source basis. Action by DIA will be confined to those requirements for which support is requested.

5. BACKGROUND: Under the authority of reference a. and b., the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), has assumed responsibility in DOD for intelligence collection requirements to include those processed by DOD in support of Unified and Specified Command contingency and general war plans. In wartime, most requirements will be the same.
as in peacetime; while it is likely that certain additional collection means will become available in wartime, others will be totally denied. Consequently, advance planning is necessary to assure the maximum availability of the information needed. The intent of these instructions is to identify the wartime intelligence requirements on a world-wide basis and establish procedures for processing those requirements which may require the strengthening of existing assets or the development of new assets in order to insure collection when needed. All sources, including those under the control of CIA and other agencies, will be taken into account in determining the collection resources which are to be used; and these will include existing, programmed or planned assets of the agencies concerned.

6. RESPONSIBILITIES:
   a. Unified and Specified Commands will:
      (1) Determine their total intelligence requirements for information in support of the EMI in contingency and general war plans.
      (2) Assign collection responsibility to the subordinate and component commands against existing, programmed or planned collection capabilities of those commands.
      (3) Obtain tentative acceptance of collection responsibility from the CIA Senior War Planner (or the CIA War Planning representative) against existing, programmed or planned CIA assets for those requirements remaining unassigned to the command assets.
(4) Assign to subordinate component commanders responsibility for programming or planning appropriate additional wartime collection capabilities.

(5) Submit to DIA a statement of requirements (in the form of a requirements tag) developed from the KIE in each plan, annotated to show which requirements are assigned for collection action on the basis of existing, programmed or planned command assets, those which are tentatively accepted by the CIA Senior War Planner, and those which are unassigned and for which support is requested of DIA. An example of the desired arrangement of this material is attached hereto as Attachment No. 1.

b. DIA, acting for the JCS, will:

(1) Review and validate the requirements submitted by the commanders of the Unified and Specified commands for which collection action is unassigned.

(2) Undertake to obtain assets, either military or non-military, capable of satisfying unassigned validated requirements.

(3) Assign collection action to other Unified and Specified Commands where such collection action is required and possible.

(4) Notify the commanders of the Unified and Specified Commands of action taken on the requirements submitted by them including appropriate guidance for additional planning.

3
7. GUIDANCE:

a. The review of the EMI in war and contingency plans should result in a requirements statement for each plan. The statement should contain all of the intelligence collection requirements necessary to support the plan but should not be in great detail and should focus on the major aspects, such as the composition, capabilities, and activities of the enemy forces expected to be encountered in the operational area embraced by the plan.

b. The concept of the construction of the requirements statement is based on the consideration that all sources of collection will be applied to all requirements and that the detail inserted for specific collection planning purposes does not imply the exclusion of other targets which might satisfy the basic requirements set forth in the requirements statement. However, in the assignment of requirements to resources, unnecessary duplication of effort should be avoided except where essential because of the importance of the information and the difficulty of the collection task. Specific targeting guidance in the requirements statement may be as detailed as desired but should contain, as a minimum, the following elements:

(1) The collection target with geographic coordinates, where feasible, and such further description of the target as is required to show its likelihood as a source of the information needed.

(2) Priority.

(3) Time information is needed with reference to time of execution of the plan.
(4) Rapidity of transmission and means, if pertinent.
(5) Collection guidance.

c. The following criteria are to be used in the preparation of the requirements statements. Each requirement should be:

(1) Considered with reference to all means of collection which may be available to the command in wartime (clandestine means, air and ground reconnaissance, communications intelligence, prisoner of war and refugee interrogation, battlefield surveillance, etc.).

(2) Identified in sufficiently specific terms to enable focusing of the collection effort.

(3) Indicative of the relative urgency and priority of need for the information required.

d. Requirements developed in accordance with the above guidance should be allocated to existing, programmed or planned command collection assets which are expected to be available in wartime. Maximum cross-servicing and coordination will be accomplished with the military component commands and with the CIA Senior War Planners (or CIA Planning Representative) to insure full consideration of all interests and capabilities.

8. Submission of Requirements: Requirements statements should be submitted as each plan is produced or revised and marked with identification as to the plan or plans supported. It is planned at DIA to maintain a register of requirements for each command keyed to the plan supported. This will enable maintenance of a capability
to review all requirements on a world-wide basis in order to provide for continuing collection support.

FOR THE DIRECTOR:

OFFICIAL:

S. E. FRANKEL
REAR ADMIRAL, USN
Chief of Staff

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(6) Sample Requirements Tab, 1 cy

L. F. DOWING
COL, USAF
AcoFIS/Admin
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**Section 1.4.2:**

- **Objective:**
  - Commendable organization, promotion of utilities and services, and development of better industries.
  - Organization and coordination of utilities, control of accident prevention, organization of utilities, control of accident prevention, and coordination of utilities to ensure efficient operations.

**Table 1.4.2.1:**

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**Note:**

- Collection requirements to obtain 100.0

**Reference:**

- Appendix A

**Signatures:**

- **Author:**
- **Date:**
### SAMPLE

**ANNEX 1**

**COLLECTION ACTION**

**COMPONENTS**

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Date: 1 Mar 63  
Control No. W-ECU-000123/1

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<td>Kladno Airfield 50-07N 14-05E</td>
<td>Early Warning Air Order of Battle</td>
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<tr>
<td>USNAVEUR</td>
<td>East Germany</td>
<td>Saganitz Naval Base 54-30N 13-39E</td>
<td>Early Warning Naval Order of Battle</td>
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</table>
UNCLASSIFIED

ANNEX 2

COLLECTION ACTIONS

CIA FORCE

Command: EUCOM

Date: 1 Mar 63

Control No. W-ECU-000123/2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Requirements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>Hq, Ministry of Defense Prague, 5G-05M 14-28E</td>
<td>All</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Labor Vsetor Airfield 45-07W 14-37E</td>
<td>Early Warning, Air Order of Battle</td>
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<tr>
<td>East Germany</td>
<td>Rostock Naval Base 54-05X 12-08E</td>
<td>Early Warning, Ports and Harbors, Naval Order of Battle</td>
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## ANNEX 3
### COLLECTION ACTION

**DIA ACTION REQUESTED**

**Command:** EU Cox  
**Date:** 1 Mar 63  
**Control No.: U-ECU-000123/3**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Requirements</th>
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<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>Hq Czech, Air Defense District Prague, 50-05N 14-28E</td>
<td>Early Warning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Railroad Transloading Point Ciera-Cop 48-26N 22-12E</td>
<td>Air Order of Battle</td>
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<tr>
<td>East Germany</td>
<td>Hq 20th Guard Army</td>
<td>Early Warning</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Ground Order of Battle</td>
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</table>
MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Disestablishment of the Intelligence Directorate, Joint Staff

References: (a) JCSM-383-63, "The Disestablishment of the Intelligence Directorate, Joint Staff," dated 20 May 1963
(b) JCSM-433-63, "Disposition of Manpower Spaces Formerly Assigned to the Intelligence Directorate, Joint Staff," dated 6 June 1963

The detailed plans as contained in reference (a) for the disestablishment of the Intelligence Directorate (J-2) Joint Staff, and for the transfer of its residual intelligence functions and specified manpower authorizations to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), together with the subsequent recommendations concerning disposition of the remaining Intelligence Directorate personnel forwarded by reference (b), appear satisfactory and are approved for implementation. The actual transfers of manpower authorizations and the budgetary aspects of the disestablishment of J-2 will be handled under established DoD procedures. To facilitate accounting, these transfers will be made effective 1 July 1963.

Insofar as the contemplated changes in the various internal JCS Policy Memoranda are concerned, I appreciate being informed of the types of actions contemplated. I consider it of particular importance that in the course of assigning the residual J-2 functions to DIA and in making the necessary adjustments in joint administrative procedures incident thereto, no managerial, procedural or other administrative arrangement is developed which would have the effect of compromising or abrogating (1) any of DIA's assigned functions, or (2) the authorities and responsibilities of its Director.
To that end, I should like to be informed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff or by the Director, DIA, if in their judgment problems emerge in the disestablishment of J-2 or in the course of developing new administrative procedures for DIA’s assumption of the residual J-2 functions which might result in compromise or abrogation of the guidelines stated above.

I have approved, this date, an amendment to DoD Directive 5105.2-1, which assigns to DIA the function of providing intelligence staff support to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The amendment will be issued shortly.

[Signature]

Copies to:
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower)
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
28 June 1963

U-998L/C

SUBJECT: Transfer of Functional Responsibilities of the Intelligence Directorate (J-2), Joint Staff, to DIA

TO: DISTRIBUTION C

References: (a) JCS 1977/218, subject: "Disestablishment of the Intelligence Directorate, Joint Staff," dated 22 June 1963
(b) Memorandum from the Secretary of Defense to Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, subject: "Disestablishment of the Intelligence Directorate, Joint Staff," dated 21 June 1963

1. In accordance with references (a) and (b) above, DIA assumes the functional responsibilities previously assigned to the Directorate of Intelligence, Joint Staff, effective 1 July 1963.

2. The general functional responsibilities of the organizational elements of DIA in assuming J-2 functions are as follows:

   a. Plans and policy responsibility for COMINT and ELINT as established by DOD Directives 83115.2 and 83115.4 are assigned to DIAF-1. To accomplish these functions an additional element will be organized and assigned the office symbol DIAF-6.

   b. Non-SIGINT plans and policy functions for support of the Joint Staff are assigned to DIAF.

   c. Target Intelligence support functions for the Joint Staff, including plans and policy aspects thereof, are assigned to DIAF-1.

   d. The Security function in support of the Joint Staff, including plans and policy aspects are assigned to DIAF-4.

   e. The functional responsibilities previously assigned to the J-2 Secretariat are assigned to the DIA Secretariat.

3. Organizational realignments and revised detailed functional statements of the affected DIA elements will be prepared and forwarded to DIAOC-4 in accordance with DIA Regulation 45-1.

4. To provide guidance for the processing of JCS papers DIA Regulation 12-13 is effective 1 July 1963.
5. For the information of all concerned the following is a list of telephone extensions and room numbers:

   a. JCS and USS Group, DIA Secretariat, Headquarters, 1E937, extensions 57481/57655.

   b. Assignments and Suspension, 1E937, extensions 56807/74878.

   c. Records and Research (Document Control and Files), 1E933, extensions 75500/70895.

   [Signature]

   S. B. FRANKEL
   Rear Admiral, USN
   Chief of Staff
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, DIA

SUBJECT: The Disestablishment of the Intelligence Directorate, The Joint Staff (U)

1. On 21 June 1963, the Secretary of Defense approved a plan for the disestablishment of the Intelligence Directorate, The Joint Staff, and requested the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency to provide intelligence staff support as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

2. In accordance with the request of the Secretary of Defense, transfers of designated personnel to the Defense Intelligence Agency will be accomplished on 1 July 1963.

3. On and after 1 July 1963, the Director, DIA is requested to provide intelligence staff support to the Joint Staff previously performed by the Director, J-2.

(Sgd) MAXWELL D. TAYLOR

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

cc: DJS
SJCS
Cm File
File 0

RE: DJSM-1079-63
Department of Defense Directive

SUBJECT

Defense Intelligence Agency

(c) DoD Directive C-2000.5, June 22, 1956
(d) DoD Directive S-5100.20, March 19, 1959
(e) DoD Directive C-5200.5, October 27, 1958
(f) DoD Directive S-3115.2, March 19, 1959
(g) DoD Directive S-3115.4, March 19, 1959

I. GENERAL

A. Pursuant to the authority vested in the Secretary of Defense and the provisions of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, a Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) is hereby established as an agency of the Department of Defense under the direction, authority and control of the Secretary of Defense.

B. Functions, authorities, and responsibilities assigned by references (a), (d), (e), (f), and (g) are excluded from the scope of this Directive.

II. ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND

The DIA shall consist of:

A. A Director, a Deputy Director, a Chief of Staff, a head- quarters establishment, and such subordinate units, facilities, and activities as are specifically assigned to the Agency by the Secretary of Defense or by the Joint Chiefs of Staff acting under the authority and direction of the Secretary of Defense.
B. Such subordinate organizations as are established by the Director, DIA, for the accomplishment of DIA's mission.

C. The chain of command shall run from the Secretary of Defense, through the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Director, DIA. Guidance to the Director, DIA, shall be furnished by the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff acting under the authority and direction of the Secretary of Defense, and the United States Intelligence Board (USIB).

III. RESPONSIBILITIES

The DIA, under the direction and operational control of its Director, shall be responsible for:

A. The organization, direction, management, and control of all DoD intelligence resources assigned to or included within the DIA.

B. Review and coordination of those DoD intelligence functions retained by or assigned to the Military Departments. Over-all guidance for the conduct and management of such functions will be developed by the Director, DIA, for review, approval, and promulgation by the Secretary of Defense.

C. Supervision of the execution of all approved plans, programs, policies, and procedures for intelligence functions not assigned to DIA.

D. Obtaining the maximum economy and efficiency in the allocation and management of DoD intelligence resources. This includes analysis of those DoD intelligence activities and facilities which can be fully integrated or collocated with non-DoD intelligence organizations.

E. Responding directly to priority requests levied upon the DIA by the USIB.

F. Satisfying the intelligence requirements of the major components of the DoD.

IV. FUNCTIONS

Under its Director, the DIA shall perform the following functions:

A. Develop and produce all DoD intelligence estimates and DoD information and contributions to National Estimates for the USIB. Such estimates and contributions may indicate differences in analysis and evaluation
B. Provide for the assembly, integration, and validation of all DoD intelligence requirements and the assignment of relative priorities thereto; assign specific requirements to DoD collection resources; and originate requests, when necessary, to non-DoD collection resources to fulfill DoD requirements.

C. Establish a single DoD Collection Requirements Registry and Facility which will be fully compatible with any National Requirements Registry and Facility.

D. Provide plans, programs, policies, and procedures for DoD collection activities.

E. Conduct such technical and counterintelligence functions as may be subsequently assigned to DIA.

F. Provide all DoD current intelligence.

G. Establish and maintain the DoD Indications Center.

H. Conduct coordinating and planning activities to achieve the maximum economy and efficiency in the conduct and management of all DoD intelligence activities.

I. Provide intelligence staff support as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in accordance with their established procedures.

J. Provide the Secretary of Defense, the staff assistants to the Secretary of Defense, the Military Departments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, specialized DoD Agencies, the Unified and Specified Commands, and other organizations in the national intelligence community with military intelligence.

K. Develop DoD intelligence research and development requirements.

L. Develop plans for the integration of DoD intelligence and counterintelligence training programs, career development programs for intelligence personnel, general support programs, and other intelligence activities of the Military Departments.

M. Cooperate with the Central Intelligence Agency and other intelligence organizations for mutual support; common and combined usage of facilities, resources, and training programs; and elimination of duplication.

N. Provide in the person of the Director, DIA, one of the DoD representatives to the USIB.

# First amendment (Ch 4, 6/24/63)
O. Provide for DoD representation on USIB committees and on all other inter-governmental intelligence committees.

P. Provide guidance, in conformance with USIB policies, to the major components of the DoD on the public release of Defense intelligence information.

Q. Develop plans, programs, policies, and procedures for intelligence mapping and charting activities.

R. Prepare and submit to the Secretary of Defense, under procedures approved by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), a consolidated DoD budget for intelligence activities covered by this Directive, together with recommendations pertaining thereto; and participate in the administration of the consolidated budget. The consolidated budget will include the estimates of the funds required to finance the intelligence activities organized within and directly managed by DIA, and the estimates of the military departments of the funds required to finance the intelligence activities which they conduct subject to review and coordination by DIA.

S. Assemble, validate, and establish priorities for all DoD automated intelligence system and supporting equipment requirements; prepare DoD-wide automatic data processing (ADP) plans for intelligence data processing; assign tasks to various DoD Components in support of such plans; develop policy and program guidance for all DoD ADP intelligence plans; specify standards for intelligence data representations, formats, and systems; develop and operate an ADP system for DIA; and provide for the integration of all DoD ADP intelligence systems, insuring that they complement, where appropriate, those of non-DoD intelligence activities to the maximum extent feasible.

T. Establish, maintain, and operate the necessary facilities for providing military photographic processing, printing, interpretation, analysis and library intelligence services for the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Defense Agencies, and, as appropriate, unified and specified commands, the military departments, and non-DoD activities.

U. Develop, produce, and provide all DoD finished intelligence and supporting data, including area analysis, military capabilities, biographic data summaries, target intelligence, and related publications for the use of all DoD Components and for DoD contributions to (1) the National Intelligence Survey; (2) USIB, its subcommittees and boards;
(3) other organizations in the national intelligence community; and (4) international military organizations and other international intelligence arrangements in which the DoD participates.

V. **RELATIONSHIPS**

A. In the performance of its functions, the DIA shall:

1. Coordinate actions as appropriate with other DoD Components and with those departments and agencies of government having collateral or related functions in its field of assigned responsibilities.

2. Maintain appropriate liaison with the other components of the DoD and with the necessary departments and agencies of the government for the exchange of information and findings in the field of its assigned responsibility.

B. The Military Departments and other DoD Components shall provide support, within their respective fields of responsibility, to the Director, DIA, as may be necessary to carry out the assigned responsibilities of the Agency.

VI. **AUTHORITY**

To discharge the responsibilities of the Agency, the Director, DIA, or his designees, are specifically delegated authority to:

A. Have free and unrestricted access to and direct
communication with all elements of the DoD as well as organizations in the national intelligence community.

B. Operate and control all organizations, activities, and resources assigned or attached to the DIA.

C. Establish DIA intelligence facilities, taking over or using, wherever feasible, established facilities of the Military Departments.

D. Obtain such information from any component of the DoD as may be necessary for the performance of DIA's functions.

E. Supervise the execution of approved plans, programs, policies, and procedures for those DoD intelligence functions and activities not directly assigned to DIA.

F. Centralize or consolidate the functions for which DIA is responsible to the extent the Director deems feasible and desirable in consonance with the aims of maximum over-all efficiency, economy, and effectiveness.

VII. ADMINISTRATION

A. The Director, Deputy Director, and Chief of Staff of the DIA shall be appointed by the Secretary of Defense from commissioned officers of the Armed Forces on active duty who normally shall be from different Services. However, there shall be no established system of inter-Service rotation or designation for these key posts. The Director shall have at least three-star rank while serving in this position. His appointment shall be for a term of four years.

B. The appointment of other personnel, civilian and military, to the Agency will be subject to the approval of the Director, DIA.

C. The DIA will be authorized such personnel, facilities, funds, and other administrative support as the Secretary of Defense deems necessary for the performance of its...
functions. The Military Departments and other DoD Components shall provide support as necessary for the Agency. Budgeting and funding for the Agency will be in conformance with policies established by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller).

VIII. EFFECTIVE DATE

This Directive is effective October 1, 1961. Whenever DIA assumes responsibility for an intelligence function assigned to DIA under the terms of this Directive, all DoD Components will review their existing directives, instructions, and regulations for conformity and submit necessary amendments thereto to the General Counsel of the DoD within ninety (90) days.

[Signature]
Deputy Secretary of Defense

Inclosure - 1
Delegations of Authority

First Amendment (Ch 1, 12/14/61)
DELEGATIONS OF AUTHORITY

Pursuant to the authority vested in the Secretary of Defense, the Director, DIA, or, in the absence of the Director, the person acting for him is hereby delegated, subject to the direction, authority, and control of the Secretary of Defense, and in accordance with DoD policies, directives, and instructions, and pertinent OSD regulations, authority as required in the administration and operation of DIA to:

1. Exercise the powers vested in the Secretary of Defense by Section 204 of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended (5 USC 171d), and Section 12 of the Administrative Expenses Act of 1946, as amended (5 USC 22a), pertaining to the employment, direction and general administration of DIA civilian personnel.

2. Fix rates of pay for wage board employees exempted from the Classification Act by Section 202(7) of that Act on the basis of prevailing rates for comparable jobs in the locality where each installation is located. DIA, in fixing such rates, shall follow the wage schedule established by the local wage board.

3. Establish such advisory committees and employ such part-time advisors as approved by the Secretary of Defense for the performance of DIA functions pursuant to the provisions of 10 USC 173, 5 USC 55a, and the Agreement between the DoD and the Civil Service Commission on employment of experts and consultants, dated July 22, 1959.

4. Administer oaths of office incident to entrance into the Executive Branch of the Federal Government or any other oath required by law in connection with employment therein, in accordance with the provisions of the Act of June 26, 1943 (5 USC 16a) and designate in writing, as may be necessary, officers and employees of DIA to perform this function.

5. Establish a DIA Incentive Awards Board and pay cash awards to and incur necessary expenses for the honorary recognition of civilian employees of the government whose suggestions, inventions, superior accomplishments, or other personal efforts, including special acts or services, benefit or affect DIA or its subordinate activities in accordance with the provisions of the Act of September 1954 (5 USC 2123) and Civil Service Regulations.
6. In accordance with the provisions of the Act of
August 26, 1950, as amended (5 USC 22-1); Executive Order 10450,
dated April 27, 1953, as amended; and DoD Directive 5210.7, dated
August 12, 1953 (as revised):

a. Designate any position in DIA as a "sensitive"
position;

b. Authorize, in case of an emergency, the
appointment of a person to a sensitive position in the Agency for a
limited period of time for whom a full field investigation or other
appropriate investigation, including the National Agency Check, has
not been completed; and

c. Authorize the suspension, but not to terminate
the services of an employee in the interest of national security in
positions within DIA.

7. Clear DIA personnel and such other individuals as
may be appropriate for access to classified Defense material and in-
formation in accordance with the provisions of DoD Directive 5210.8,
dated June 29, 1955 (as revised), "Policy on Investigation and Clear-
ance of Department of Defense Personnel for Access to Classified
Defense Information," and of Executive Order 10501, dated November 5,
1953, as amended.

8. Act as agent for the collection and payment of em-
ployment taxes imposed by Chapter 21 of the Internal Revenue Code of
1954 and, as such agent, make all determinations and certifications
required or provided for under Section 3122 of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954 and Section 205(p)(1) and (2) of the Social Security Act,
as amended (42 USC 405(p)(1) and (2)) with respect to DIA employees.

9. Authorize and approve overtime work for DIA
civilian officers and employees in accordance with the provisions of
Section 25.221 of the Federal Employee Pay Regulations.

10. Authorize and approve:

a. Travel for DIA civilian officers and employees
in accordance with the Standardized Government Travel Regulations,
as amended (DoD Circular A-7, Revised);
b. Temporary duty travel only for military personnel assigned or detailed to DIA in accordance with Joint Travel Regulations for the Uniformed Services, dated April 1, 1951, as amended;

c. Invitational travel to persons serving without compensation whose consultive, advisory, or other highly specialized technical services are required in a capacity that is directly related to or in connection with DIA activities, pursuant to the provisions of Section 5 of the Administrative Expenses Act of 1946, as amended (5 USC 73b-2).

11. Approve the expenditure of funds available for travel by military personnel assigned or detailed to DIA for expenses incident to attendance at meetings of technical, scientific, professional or other similar organizations in such instances where the approval of the Secretary of Defense or his designee is required by law (5 USC 174a). This authority cannot be redelegated.

12. Develop, establish, and maintain an active and continuing Records Management Program, pursuant to the provisions of Section 504(b) of the Federal Records Act of 1950 (44 USC 396(b)).

13. Establish and use Imprest Funds for making small purchases of material and services other than personal for DIA when it is determined more advantageous and consistent with the best interests of the government, in accordance with the provisions of DoD Instruction 7280.1, dated January 5, 1962, and the Joint Regulation of the General Services Administration -- Treasury Department -- General Accounting Office, entitled "For Small Purchases Utilizing Imprest Funds".

14. Authorize the publication of advertisements, notices, or proposals in newspapers, magazines, or other public periodicals as required for the effective administration and operation of DIA (44 USC 324).

15. a. Establish and maintain appropriate Property Accounts for DIA.

b. Appoint Boards of Survey, approve reports of survey, relieve personal liability, and drop accountability for DIA property contained in the authorized Property Accounts that has been lost, damaged, stolen, destroyed, or otherwise rendered unserviceable, in accordance with applicable laws and regulations.

#First amendment (Ch 5, 8/12/63)
16. Promulgate the necessary security regulations for the protection of property and places under the jurisdiction of the Director, DIA, pursuant to paragraph III.A. and V.B. of DoD Directive 5200.8, dated August 20, 1954.

17. Establish and maintain, for the functions assigned, an appropriate publications system for the promulgation of regulations, instructions, and reference documents, and changes thereto, pursuant to the policies and procedures prescribed in DoD Directive 5025.1, dated March 7, 1961.

18. Enter into support and service agreements with the Military Departments, other DoD Agencies, or other government agencies as required for the effective performance of responsibilities and functions assigned to DIA.

19. Exercise the authority delegated to the Secretary of Defense by the Administrator of the General Services Administration with respect to the disposal of surplus personal property.

The Director, DIA, may redelegte these authorities, as appropriate, and in writing, except as otherwise specifically indicated above or as otherwise provided by law or regulation.

This delegation of authorities is effective immediately.

[Signature]
Deputy Secretary of Defense
MEMORANDUM FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT

SUBJECT: Disestablishment of the Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense: Manpower and Personnel Actions

The Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (OATSD) is hereby disestablished effective 30 September 1963. The functions of OATSD which must be continued have been divided between the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and the Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities (SACSA), Joint Staff.

The following changes in the manpower authorizations and personnel assignments of OATSD should be affected as soon as possible:

1. Pending reassignment of Major General Edward G. Lansdale, he will continue to be carried on OSD manning roles along with his personal secretary, Mrs. Jane Curtin. However, General Lansdale's position of Assistant to the Secretary of Defense will be terminated effective 30 September 1963.

2. Captain John H. Powell, USA, is to be transferred to the Joint Staff for subsequent assignment to SACSA against an unfilled manpower authorization already allocated to the Joint Staff. The OATSD manpower authorization against which he is currently assigned will be abolished.

3. The balance of the commissioned and enlisted military personnel now assigned to OATSD are to be transferred to DIA together with the manpower authorizations against which such military personnel are assigned.
(4) The balance of the civilian secretarial personnel now assigned to OATSD together with the related manpower authorizations are also to be transferred to DIA.

Insofar as possible, funding for the support of the personnel to be transferred to the Joint Staff and DIA from OATSD should be absorbed by those organizations.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

CONFIDENTIAL

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DOCUMENTS SECTION TWO:

CREATION AND EARLY TRANSFORMATION OF DIA DIRECTORATES
AND MAIN ENTITIES
Section II (Documents 30 to 104)

Early Transformation of DIA Directorates and Main Entities

Introduction

The documents in Section II chronicle the intense evolution of DIA from 1961 to 1965. Secretary of Defense McNamara believed a well-planned and confident beginning was key to the new Agency’s success. Therefore Secretary McNamara entrusted the DIA to its first director, Lt Gen Joseph F. Carroll, USAF, a highly capable officer. DIA took over many intelligence tasks previously done by the Service intelligence elements and the J-2 of the Joint Staff. This required case-by-case choices about exactly when to phase in DIA’s assumption of each new responsibility. The timing not only depended upon the character of each function, but also upon how fast each could be transferred without interruption or degradation.

From the outset in 1961, DIA’s organizational divisions performed one of three functions: Headquarters Support, Management and Agency Support, or Operations. The divisions were essentially unchanged until the 1970 reorganization. The documents in Section II are therefore arranged by Agency function: Administration (30-39); Production (40-63); Collection (64-69); the Defense Intelligence School (70-73); Mapping, Charting and Geodesy (74-78); Security, Counterintelligence and Communications (79-86); Scientific and Technical (87-93); Dissemination (94-97); and, the Defense Attaché System (98-104). Most of these documents were produced by DIA. The Secretary of Defense produced several of them. A number relate to matters of joint interest to the DIA and the Central Intelligence Agency.

The documents detail the deliberate process by which DIA assumed more and more responsibility for key defense intelligence functions. In 1962, Lt Gen Carroll added the Defense Intelligence School, established the Agency’s Intelligence Career Development Program, and launched the Automated Data Processing Center. In 1963, DIA assumed the J-2’s functions from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and opened the Agency’s Intelligence Production Center. In 1964 Lt Gen Carroll established the Agency’s Scientific and Technical Directorate. In 1965 the Agency took over all the Services’ attaché programs.

DIA’s assumption of more and more responsibility was perfectly timed. The mid 1960s brought an explosion in the need for Defense intelligence products and services. The Vietnam War required the Agency to vastly expand the type and variety of intelligence it provided to operational forces. The war, unfortunately, also created several thousand missing U.S. military personnel and prisoners-of-war. MIAs and POWs would remain an Agency focus for many years after the Vietnam War ended.
DOCUMENTS SECTION TWO, PART A:

ADMINISTRATION
SUBJECT: Officer Aviator Requirement

TO: Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel
    Department of the Army

1. The mission of the Defense Intelligence Agency, established
   1 October 1961, makes it essential that the agency is a balanced
   organization designed to support the major echelons of the military
   operational chain-of-command and the military departments in peace
   and war. Our planning actions and the development of our Joint
   Table of Distribution (JTD) provide not only an optimum balance of
   representation from the three military departments, but also provide
   for representation of certain major programs or elements within each
   military department.

2. It has been determined that there is a continuing requirement
   within this agency for representation by an officer qualified to
   effect proper integration of Army aviation into the plans, policies
   and operations of the Defense Intelligence Agency. The incumbent
   will be primarily a staff officer and the wide scope of his activities
   will require a current knowledge of piloting as an integral part of
   his duties. Our JTD now contains an appropriate field grade position
   classified as 69301.

3. It is requested that your Troop Basis Program be adjusted so as
   to insure inclusion of this requirement on a continuing basis.

4. Manning assistance will be required in order to insure that this
   position will be filled at an early date. Nomination of any fully
   qualified field grade officer, grade O-4 through O-6, is acceptable
   against any of our outstanding requisitions.

S. B. FRANKEL
Rear Admiral, USN
Chief of Staff
Effective until 20 March 1942 unless sooner rescinded or superseded

PERSONNEL—GENERAL

OFFICER AVIATOR REQUIREMENTS

1. Purpose. a. This circular establishes the procedures for Department of the Army control of aviator authorizations for commissioned and warrant officer aviators.

b. Major commanders submitting Troop Bases will take necessary action to review and analyze all aviator positions using the guidance contained below.

2. Background. In accordance with a Department of Defense directive, Headquarters, Department of the Army is required to make an annual review and validation of aviator positions. Positions once approved become the basis for the establishment of an Army aviator authorization. To ensure that adequate numbers of officer aviators are available, officers are selected by Headquarters, Department of the Army and trained to meet Army-wide requirements. Aviator positions are included in the annual Troop Bases submissions. Approval of the Troop Base does not necessarily confirm the positions contained therein as the command's aviator authorization; such authorizations will be issued separately by Headquarters, Department of the Army. Future editions of the Troop Program of the Army will contain instructions for identification of aviator positions in Command Troop Bases.

3. Criteria for aviator positions. a. Positions directly related to day-to-day flying activity.

   (1) In general, these positions can be identified by the associated assignment of aircraft and are of two types.

   (a) Positions which involve routine flying—staff transportation, courier missions, and liaison flights. Aviators for these positions possess the necessary pilot manual skill but do not necessarily possess the background knowledge in the broader and more comprehensive aspects of aviation operations and employment.

   (b) Positions established primarily for piloting aircraft in support of particular tactical or administrative operations. Aviators for these positions must possess the necessary manual pilot skill, and in addition must have a comprehensive working knowledge of the supported activity. Examples of this category are the TOE aviator in an artillery...
flight and the TD position in a Research and Development or test agency.

(2) The majority of Army aviator positions are in these two areas, including nearly all of the positions appropriate for warrant officer aviators and most lieutenant aviators. A small percentage of captain and major aviators also may be included in this area to provide for positions requiring an exceptionally high degree of piloting skill and experience, e.g., where considerable instrument flying is involved, where extremely complicated and expensive aircraft are utilized, or where the essential general operating background required dictates more experience and rank. It is unlikely that any positions above the grade of major would be included.

(3) To determine positions for aviators in this category, it is necessary to establish the correlation between the number of aircraft available or expected to be available and the aviators required to operate each individual type aircraft. To these must be added the necessary ancillary aviator positions such as test pilots and aviation operations specialists. From a personnel administration procedural standpoint, these positions are designated by the use of one of the various aviator primary MOS’s.

b. Positions necessary for the direct control and supervision of all aspects of the Aviation Program.

(1) These positions require a broad, comprehensive, and up-to-date knowledge of all aspects of Army aviation, and include those associated with the research, development, and logistical aspects of Army aviation as well as those directly involved with aviation operations.

(2) Positions in this category should be identified by either a primary aviator MOS or by the use of the prefix digit 6, indicating that the incumbent performs a primary function in a command or staff position area but that a current knowledge of piloting is an integral part of his duties.

(3) As a general standard, at least half of the incumbent’s major functions must pertain to aviation matters for the position to qualify as an aviator position.

(4) This category includes most field grade officer aviator positions. The incumbents of these positions give mature direction and supervision to the Army Aviation Program.

(5) There is a requirement for a small number of selected Army aviators in senior grades, including general officers, for as-
signment to certain commands and staffs, including joint staffs, to facilitate proper integration of Army aviation into plans, policies, and operations.

c. In addition to the above positions there are certain others the incumbents of which are closely associated with aviation, but do not require an aviator's skill. Positions in this category should not be included as aviator positions. Individuals can be trained to fill these positions by attending management or technical courses at appropriate branch schools. These positions are of two types—

(1) Working level positions very closely associated with aviation in a limited yet highly specialized area, such as aviation maintenance, supply, administration, communications, facilities, etc.

(2) Managerial positions requiring a diverse knowledge of a variety of functions to include the capabilities and limitations of Army aviation. Such positions would include transportation management, logistic coordination, comptroller monitor-ship, etc.

4. Aviator requirements. a. Aviator positions will be identified in all future detailed TD submitted in support of Troop Bases in accordance with AR 611–101 for officers and SR 605–105–5 for warrant officers. In the review and analysis of aviator positions, commanders must insure the essentiality of an aviator occupying any position. It should be particularly noted that if the position requires an aeronautical rating, in addition to qualification in an MOS that does not require an aeronautical designation, the prefix digit 6 must be used.

b. Upon review and approval of fiscal year 1962 and subsequent Command Troop Bases, Headquarters, Department of the Army will issue aviator authorizations to major commands. These command aviator authorizations are in fact ceilings which, once established, cannot be changed except by Department of the Army approval.

c. Requests for adjustments of aviator authorizations will be accomplished by submitting such requests for changes in aviation authorizations by separate action and in format prescribed by paragraph 3b(1), appendix I, AR 310–41.

(1) Such requests will be submitted on DA Form 608–4a (change to Table of Distribution) (Reports Control Symbol CSG PA–882), in triplicate through channels to Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Department of the Army, Washington 25, D.C. All data required including branch, grade, and MOS for military aviator positions affected and complete justification will be included in request for approval of changes in aviator authorizations.
(2) Approval by Headquarters, Department of the Army will be attached to DA Form 508-4a and returned to the proponent for necessary implementing actions.

(3) This approval will become the basis for a revision of the command's aviation authorization.

d. Recommendations for changes in TOE authorizations will be submitted as Troop Unit Change Requests in accordance with AR 11-15.

5. Implementation.  
   a. The MOS Summary Transmittal Tabulations submitted in support of Troop Bases will be used to establish future command aviator authorizations, fiscal year 1962, and thereafter.

   b. These Troop Bases, summarized by branch and grade for commissioned officers and MOS for warrant officers, will form the base upon which Army aviator authorizations will be suballocated to commands as their aviator authorization.

   c. Manning levels for aviators will continue to be announced in the quarterly command officer manning levels, and will be based on the Headquarters, Department of the Army approved authorizations as outlined above.

   d. Requisitions for aviation officers will be validated by Department of the Army against the requisitioning agency's established aviator manning level. See paragraph 6a, AR 614-185.

   [AG 211 (20 Feb 61) DCSPER]

   BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

G. H. DECKER,
General, United States Army,
Chief of Staff.

Official:
R. V. LEE,
Major General, United States Army,
The Adjutant General.

Distribution:
Active Army: To be distributed in accordance with DA Form 12-4 requirements for DA Circulars—Personnel—Officers O.

NO: None.

USAR: None.
IN REPLY

REFER TO: DIAPL-11

SUBJECT: DIA Regulation No. 12-13, "Processing of OJCS Papers."

TO: Chief of Staff, DIA

Problem

1. To promulgate a DIA regulation, subject as above.

FACTORS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. On 19 Feb 62, DIA disseminated its Regulation No. 60-3, "OJCS-DIA Staff Relationships and Procedures."

3. The need for a regulation establishing procedures within DIA for processing OJCS papers is apparent.

4. DIAAQ, DIASA, and DIAAP concurred in the attached DIA Regulation in draft form. DIAAP reserved the right to recommend revisions based upon experience factors after the regulation is in effect.

RECOMMENDATION

5. That the Chief of Staff indicate at Tab A his approval for DIASA to publish and disseminate the attached DIA Regulation No. 12-13.

ROBERT R. GLASS
Brigadier General, USA
Assistant Chief of Staff,
Plans, Policy, and Programs

Col Desjarlais/bklk:1/Mar/62
1. **PURPOSE.** The purpose of this regulation is to prescribe responsibilities and procedures for processing papers addressed to DIA by the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).

2. **REFERENCES:**
   (a) Name for all Agencies, the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, undated, subject: Instructions for Preparation of Reports for Consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (U)
   
   (b) DIA Regulation 10-1, subject: Correspondence.

3. **SCOPE.** This regulation covers all JCS papers sent to the DIA for information or for formal action. These normally will consist of Secretary's Memoranda (SN); Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) papers; Director of the Joint Staff Memoranda (DJSM); individual staff director's memoranda (JIDM--JIDM); and individual staff directorate papers (JL--JS).

4. **GENERAL.** The Joint and Intradepartmental Branch, Plans and Policy Division, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Plans, Policy and Programs, is designated as the primary DIA point of contact for processing JCS papers with the JCS. It will operate a DIA Control Center for all incoming JCS papers through classification level TOP SECRET. The Control Center will receive, log and maintain a DIA file of incoming JCS papers; determine and obtain the number of copies of JCS papers needed for DIA; maintain a record of DIA action officers and suspense dates on JCS papers; and transmit DIA replies to the appropriate JCS elements.
5. RESPONSIBILITIES FOR OJCS PAPERS REQUIRING ACTION.

a. The Joint and Interdepartmental Branch will:

(1) Assign to the appropriate OJCS element the type of action and the suspense date.

(2) Furnish such specific policy guidance on the action as is appropriate.

(3) Review proposed telephonic concurrences for adequate coordination and consistency before registering them with OJCS elements.

(4) Review proposed written replies to action papers for format, adequate coordination, and consistency prior to signature and dispatch to OJCS elements.

b. The Offices of the Assistant Directors and the Assistant Chiefs of Staff will assign action officers and telephone their names and telephone numbers to the Joint and Interdepartmental Branch.

c. The Action Officer will:

(1) Comply with the type of action assigned, in accordance with principles of completed staff action. The Plans and Policy Division, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Plans, Policy and Programs, will be included for coordination on all responses to OJCS papers.

(2) Submit the response to the action to the DIA Control Center.

(See paragraphs 6a and 6b below).


a. The three types of response to an action consist of:

(1) Staffing of a telephonic concurrence when "sign-off" authority exists in the DIA element concerned. Staffing normally is accomplished by means of a briefing paper, as illustrated at attachment 6, reference b.
(2) Preparation of an original and three (3) copies of the proposed reply, together with one (1) copy of a briefing paper, with coordination indicated thereon, when a written reply is required. Attachments 1 and 6, reference b, illustrate the format for the reply and briefing paper. The statement of the problem in the briefing paper will present the problem from the point of view of DIA objectives and interests, not a restatement of the problem stated in the paper. Attachment 1 to this regulation illustrates the organization of substantive content for a written reply.

(3) Preparation of one (1) copy of a briefing paper, with coordination indicated thereon when appropriate, when the purpose of the action is to inform the DIA command element. Attachment 6, reference b, illustrates the format for the briefing paper.

b. The Joint and Interdepartmental Branch will:

(1) Advise appropriate DIA elements by telephone when an OJCS paper has been assigned to them for action.

(2) Advise appropriate OJCS personnel of designated DIA action officers.

(3) Deliver the signed reply to or register the telephonic concurrence with the appropriate OJCS element.

(4) Maintain a reference library of JCS actions and DIA responses thereto.

c. Offices of Assistant Chiefs of Staff and Assistant Directors.

OJCS papers which levy requirements customarily provide only a short time for submitting responses. As a consequence the most expeditious delivery of OJCS papers to action officers is essential if DIA is to meet its deadlines. To provide for such delivery, the Offices of the Assistant Chiefs of Staff and Assistant Directors will:
(1) Advise Joint and Interdepartmental Branch of the notification procedure desired when it has OJCS papers for pickup.

(2) Submit written authorization and signature cards for representatives they designate as couriers to pick up incoming OJCS papers from the Joint and Interdepartmental Branch and to return responses thereto.

(3) Telephone to Joint and Interdepartmental Branch the name and telephone number of the assigned action officer for each OJCS paper requiring action.

7. Responsibilities for OJCS Papers not Requiring Action.

   a. Joint and Interdepartmental Branch will screen and disseminate to appropriate DIA elements those OJCS papers of information value but requiring no specific action. The transmittal receipts will indicate the list of addressees and identify the documents as DIAFL-1A controlled papers.

   b. DIA elements receiving OJCS papers from Joint and Interdepartmental Branch for information will return them to the Branch after they have served their purpose for dissemination to the remaining addressees.

8. Director, DIA, Attendance at JCS Meetings.

   Staff papers for support of the Director, DIA, when he attends JCS meetings which include JCS agenda items with intelligence aspects, will be prepared in accordance with the rules of the JCS Secretariat (reference (a)). These staff papers will be accompanied by a briefing paper in the format of Attachment 6, reference b.
FORMAT FOR DIA WRITTEN REPLY TO AN OJCS PAPER

1. Normally the DIA reply to an OJCS paper shall be expressed in one of the following ways: concurrence in the content and position presented in the paper; a concurrence accompanied by the submission of specific changes DIA recommends be made in the paper; a concurrence subject to the making of specific changes in the paper; or a nonconcurrence.

2. **Concurrence.**

   When the DIA position on an OJCS paper is concurrence, the DIA reply should include the sentence "DIA concurs in J-2 _______."

   (When the reply is prepared for the Director's signature, the pronoun "I" should be used).

3. **Concurrence with recommended changes.**

   a. When the DIA position on an OJCS paper is concurrence but includes inviting attention to changes which DIA recommends be made, the DIA reply should include the sentence "DIA (I) concur(s) in J-2 _______ but submit(s) the following recommended changes and reasons therefor:"

   b. The recommended changes are presented in the format of the "line-in, line-out" technique. This technique indicates the specific places in the document for the changes to be made and the specific modification of the language of the paper to accomplish the changes by one or more of the methods described below:

      (1) Addition. Underline all words added to the document; then state the reason for the change.

      **EXAMPLE:**

      Page 15, para 7, line 6, change to read:

      "Army Intelligence, Navy Intelligence and CIA concur in the
estimate that ........"

**REASON:**

(2) **Deletion.** Line out the word(s) to be deleted; then state the reason for the change.

**EXAMPLE:**

Page 15, para 7, line 10 change to read:

"... compelled to maintain their present level of political and military support ... ."

**REASON:**

(3) **Substitution.** Line out the word(s) to be deleted; insert the word(s) to be added and underline; then state the reason for the change.

**EXAMPLE:**

Page 15, para 8, line 3, change to read:

"NATO Free world support for U.S. activities in this area ... ."

**REASON:**

4. **Concurrence, subject to the making of changes.**

   a. When the DIA position on an OJCS paper is concurrence only if specific changes are made, the DIA reply should include the sentence "DIA (I) concur(s) in J-2__________ subject to the following changes, for the reasons stated:"

   b. The changes should be presented in the format described in paragraph 3b, above.

5. **Nonconcurrence.**

   When the DIA position on an OJCS paper is nonconcurrence, the DIA reply should include the sentence "DIA (I) nonconcur(s) in J2________.

   This should be followed by a presentation of the reason(s) and, when appropriate, a substitute paper.

Approved for publication and dissemination by DIA/SA

176
21 March 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Joint Command and Control Study Group

SUBJECT: National Military Command and Control Center (NMCC)

REFERENCE: Joint Command and Control Study Group Memorandum, dated 12 March, Subject as above

1. The Director, DIA, concurs in the outline contained in Enclosure A to subject memorandum.(C)

2. In order to assist you in formulating specific guidance to be furnished to the JCCS in revising the NMCC study, the following concept of DIA support for the NMCC is forwarded for your use:(C)

   a. The Working Groups should keep in mind that the NMCC is a facility—designed so that normal daily operational decisions can be made. This facility will rely on many agencies for input data. Military intelligence, the substantive product and the redirected collection effort, is that data for which the Defense Intelligence Agency is responsible. Therefore, any reference to intelligence in the NMCC is a reference to DIA; it should not be construed as something the DIA provides to a detached element within the NMCC.(C)

   b. Since it will be the responsibility of the DIA to provide for the integration of intelligence from a variety of intelligence systems, care must be exercised to prevent fragmentation of intelligence functions and resources. The principal elements of the DIA within the NMCC facility include the Current Intelligence/Indications Center, the Estimates Office, the Special Activities Office, and the Special Security Office. These integrated activities, requiring approximately 50,000 square feet of space, must interface with the control room of the NMCC.(C)

   c. With an appropriate arrangement within the NMCC, employing the JCS duty team in support of the balance of the Battle Staff Team, the stated necessity for additional intelligence members of the Battle Staff Team is open to question. However, if the foregoing physical arrangement is not possible, then the 15 additional personnel must be provided from resources now external to DIA. It is possible that the JCS teams which are not on duty at the JCC could be used for this purpose. Logically, all intelligence personnel of JCS should be assigned to DIA, since their presence at the JCC is as an advance party to the DIA upon relocation.(C)
3. It is the view of the Director, DIA, that the intelligence relationship to the NEC, as now stated in the "Red Book," adequately describes DIA's functional responsibility within the National Military Command Center.(C)

For the Director

S. B. Frankel
Vice Admiral, USN
Chief of Staff

Copy to:
DIA Relative Reading Copy
Director's File Copy
DIA-2 File Copy
DIAHEL Reading Copy
DIAHEL File Copy
30 March 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SUBJECT: Security Classification of Personnel and Budgetary Data Concerning Certain Intelligence Activities

Questions have been raised regarding the validity of the security classification placed upon the total personnel and dollars associated with the budget requests for DIA and NSA. The figures for DIA were classified Confidential and those for NSA Secret.

In explaining to the Appropriations Committees in the hearings on the record the transfer of funding for NSA from the Army appropriation accounts to the Defense agencies accounts it is possible by deduction to ascertain the approximate amount of money for NSA. The question, therefore, is whether in the presentations to the Appropriations Committees there is in fact a compromise of security.

Reference is made to Public Law 85-36 approved May 29, 1959 which states under Section 6. (a): "Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, nothing in this Act or any other law (including but not limited to the first section and section 2 of the Act of August 28, 1935 (5 U.S. C. 654)) shall be construed to require the disclosure of the organization or any function of the National Security Agency, of any information with respect to the activities thereof, or of the names, titles, salaries or number of persons employed by such agency."

It would appear, therefore, that the classification placed on information of the type mentioned above is discretionary with NSA, but on the other hand, having exercised their discretion it cannot be challenged. NSA has indicated that they do not believe security has been compromised in the presentations to the Appropriations Committees even though one might by deduction arrive at an approximate order of magnitude of dollars in the Defense agencies appropriation accounts for NSA. In view of this, it does not appear necessary to hold up the publication and distribution of the House Appropriations Committee hearings.
This, however, does not completely solve the problem. If we are to continue the security classification of Secret on total dollar estimates in the appropriation accounts for Defense agencies for the amounts included for NSA, we are compelled to classify every detailed breakdown of those appropriation accounts and thus withhold information from the public with respect to personnel and dollar support provided for the unclassified activities. This has presented a difficult problem in both the House's and the Senate Appropriations Committees.

In addition, other committees of Congress are inquiring into similar information with respect to the Defense agencies—notably the Vinson committee study. If the information on total dollars included in the various appropriation accounts for NSA can be declassified, then it would appear that the same ground rules should apply to total dollar estimates for DIA and the problem would be resolved. It this cannot be done, then it would appear desirable to place both of these intelligence activities back in the Army budget where it is not so easy to pinpoint.

It is recommended that both DIA and NSA be continued in the Defense agencies appropriation accounts along with DASA as classified projects but that the total dollars as well as the total number of positions for DIA and DASA be considered as unclassified information (the budget does not include the number of positions for NSA). This arrangement would permit release of information with respect to the unclassified agencies included in the budget even though such release would permit the identification of the total dollars included in the budget for DASA, DIA and NSA by deduction.

signed/ J. R. Loftis,

J. R. Loftis
Administrative Assistant

APPROVED: (See attachment.)
ATTACHMENT to Memorandum for The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, from J. R. Loftis, Administrative Assistant, Office of the Secretary of Defense, dated 30 March 1962, subject "Security Classification of Personnel and Budgetary Data Concerning Certain Intelligence Activities."

Approved, except that strength figures for Defense Intelligence Agency will remain classified:

SIGNED

Lt. General Joseph F. Carroll

APR 11 1962
REPLY TO
ATTN OF: DIA/74680/CRT/2APR-62

16 APR 1962

SUBJECT: Development of Plans for DOD Intelligence Career Development Programs

TO: Director, Joint Staff
    Joint Chiefs of Staff

1. DOD Directive 5105.21, dated August 1, 1961, charges the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency with a responsibility to "develop plans for . . . career development programs for intelligence personnel . . . .

Further, the Deputy Secretary of Defense has advised the Director, DIA, that in the development of such plans " . . . for a career program for DOD military and civilian intelligence personnel, consideration should be given to the compatibility of the career personnel program with the personnel systems of the military services. Allowance should also be made to accommodate those officers whose career programs are primarily in other professional fields but who are assigned to intelligence duty as part of over-all career development programs . . . ."

2. DIA plans for career development programs for DOD military and civilian intelligence personnel must be submitted to the Secretary of Defense by 1 July 1962. Formulation of plans has been initiated under a DIA Career Development Group. The Group is composed primarily of senior military and civilian personnel drawn from the Services and from within DIA.

3. Detailed personnel data will be required to enable the establishment of intelligence career development plans and programs encompassing officer, enlisted, and civilian personnel of the military departments who are utilized in all echelons of the intelligence community. Some of the data must be reviewed by the DIA Career Development Group to aid in the formulation of plans. Additional data must be secured to form a basis for the career development programs that will be prepared on the basis of such plans.

4. Informational data on officer, enlisted, and civilian personnel has been requested from each of the military services. Their reports will include information on the military personnel authorized and assigned to your staff.

5. This request is for similar data concerning only civilian personnel who are authorized and assigned to JTD civilian positions on your staff and who are in Intelligence, Counterintelligence or Security.
6. In light of the above facts it is requested that you arrange for the submission of the statistical and informational data in phased increments as set forth in attachment #1.

JOHNNY F. CARROLL
Lt. General, USAF
Director

1 Attach: Data Requirements
DATA REQUIREMENTS

Order of Magnitude

PHASE I

1. PURPOSE: To ascertain the number of civilian personnel, by category, who may be included in or will be affected by a career development program for DOD intelligence personnel.

2. SCOPE: Data is required on civilian personnel who are authorized and/or assigned to JED civilian positions in the areas of Intelligence, Counterintelligence, and Security.

3. AUTHORIZED VS. ASSIGNED: For these, show the numbers currently and projected to be authorized and assigned by grade and classification series. Data will be as of 1 January 1962. Separate data required by fiscal year (FY 62 through FY 65).

4. INSTRUCTIONS:

   a. Report only those civilian specialties which are clearly identified and classified in the Intelligence utilization area, the Counterintelligence utilization area, and the Security utilization area.

   b. Do not report civilian specialties which are coded in other career utilization areas; are in logistic or technical support of intelligence activities; or are in the broad field of security but are primarily concerned with physical or plant security or law enforcement.

   c. Reports to be submitted in two copies by not later than 30 April 1962.
DATA REQUIREMENTS

Technical Support of Intelligence

PHASE II

1. PURPOSE: To identify civilian positions occupied by civilian personnel "whose career programs are primarily in other professional fields but who are assigned to intelligence duty as but part of overall career development programs."

2. SCOPE: Those positions which are authorized primarily to provide full-time technical support of Intelligence, Counterintelligence, or Security activities (e.g., medical officers, economists, legal officers, communicators, nuclear physicists, etc.).

3. INSTRUCTIONS: Report the number currently and projected to be authorized and assigned by grade and classification series. Currently assigned data will be as of 1 January 1962. Projections will be by fiscal years 1963 through 1965.

4. SUBMISSION: To be submitted to DIA in two copies by not later than 30 April 1962.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Detailed Plan for the DIA ADPS Center

Reference: (a) JCSM-17-63 of 11 January 1963

Reference (a) has been noted. To delineate the intelligence ADPS responsibilities of DIA as contained in subject Plan, I have approved and there will be issued shortly an amendment to the DIA charter (DoD Directive 5105.21). This amendment is in lieu of the proposed DIA ADPS directive. The balance of the Plan is approved, subject to the following comments on the proposed manpower authorizations:

1. The proposed requirement for 18 additional military spaces from the Army was resolved by Subject/Issue Consideration No. 90 of 12 November 1962.

2. Although not existing in the Navy intelligence organization, the 10 spaces at issue between DIA and the Navy appear susceptible of identification as supporting Navy ADP systems being transferred to DIA. Accordingly, the Assistant Secretaries of Defense (Manpower and Comptroller), working with DIA and the Navy, are directed to identify and transfer these 10 spaces and associated civilian personnel fund requirements from the Navy to DIA in accordance with established DoD procedures.

3. The 22 authorizations (3 military and 14 civilian) for the Systems Integration Group and Chief, Automatic Data Processing Center, will be furnished by
a levy on the military departments. Inasmuch as these authorizations are not functionally identified with current intelligence functions, this levy will be assessed against over-all manpower ceilings. The Assistant Secretaries of Defense (Manpower and Comptroller) will transfer these spaces and associated civilian personal fund requirements in accordance with established DoD procedures.

[Signature]

DEFSEC

Copy to:
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower)
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
1 March 1963

SUBJECT: (U) DIA-NSA Liaison

TO: DIAAQ
    DIAAF
    DIACC
    DIATS
    DIAPL

DIASA
DIAXX
DIASO
DIATG

1. The Terms of Agreement pertaining to subject have been approved by
the two Directors; copies are disseminated herewith for implementation.

2. Mr. Wallace R. Winkler, who has been serving as senior DIAAQ Liaison
Officer at NSA Hq's., is designated to serve additionally as Acting Senior
DIA Liaison Officer under these Terms of Agreement. Subsequently, when
relieved, he will serve as deputy to the Senior Liaison Officer. DIRMSA
will be informed of this effect.

3. As indicated in the Terms of Agreement, the DIA Senior Liaison Officer
is responsible to the Director, DIA and is accredited to the Director, NSA.
He will operate the DIA liaison element and functions at Fort Meade, as
ey are developed, and will assist in staffing and implementing pertinent
supporting plans and arrangements. For normal command purposes he will
report to the Chief of Staff (DIACS). Appropriate briefings and guidance
will be provided.

4. By separate action under DIAPL a DIA planning group is presently
engaged in preparing a plan for utilizing SIGINT in DIA production. When
this plan is approved and implemented, the scope of DIA liaison/support
arrangements with NSA will be about complete. Meanwhile individual DIA
elements should continue, in collaboration with DIASG and Mr. Winkler, to
prepare and obtain approval of their respective supporting liaison arrange-
ments; as envisaged in the attachment.

S. B. FRANKEL
REAR ADMIRAL, USN
Chief of Staff

Arch
Terms of Agreement
11 February 1963

TERMS OF AGREEMENT
DIA-NSA, LIAISON

I. PURPOSE:

To provide authority and guidance for the necessary arrangements for the conduct of liaison between the Director, National Security Agency (NSA) and the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).

II. SCOPE:

Terms of this agreement apply generally to all matters of mutual interest between the agencies represented by the signatories of this document.

III. AUTHORIZATIONS:

1. Liaison Personnel. Each party shall maintain, at the headquarters of the other, a Senior Liaison Officer, who will be responsible to the Director of his parent agency and accredited to the Director of the host agency. Appointment of the Senior Liaison Officers will be jointly approved by the Directors of both agencies.

2. Organization. Each Liaison Officer will be supported by such additional personnel as is considered necessary and approved by the Director of the parent agency and accredited to the Director of the host agency. The Director of the host agency will be notified in writing of the assignment of such personnel. Functions assumed by either party, involving either an augmentation of liaison personnel or a major change in emphasis of the existing liaison activity, shall be the subject of separate correspondence. All such additional liaison personnel shall be under the control and direction of the Senior Liaison Officer. The size and structure of liaison elements shall not be fixed, but there is a mutual acknowledgement that the number will be carefully controlled.

3. Support. In addition to the normal administrative assistance, suitable office facilities and communications terminals will be made available as necessary by the agency to whom the Liaison Officer is accredited. Each party will also be authorized to use the electrical communications and courier services and facilities maintained by the other.

4. Operations. All points of contact by Liaison Officers within agencies concerning requests, inquiries and access shall be as determined, established and delimited by the Director of the agency to which they are accredited.
5. Within the limitations of Paragraph III.4. above, Liaison Officers of one party shall normally have unrestricted entry to all areas of the other except such elements thereof which contain limited access materials or are otherwise restricted by special security clearance limitations.

6. All liaison, regardless of nature and frequency, will function in accordance with the working practices and security controls prescribed and/or observed by the host agency.

7. Insofar as possible joint Senior Liaison Officers will be kept informed of all inter-agency relationships, as appropriate. Requests by each liaison party for information or material shall be made by that party via its Senior Liaison Officer resident at the agency providing the material. Normally action initiated through the liaison channels of one agency will remain in those channels until completion. When a request is for information or material to be supplied as a matter of routine procedure, the supply, after the initial request, may be direct between the producer and the specified recipient(s) of the requesting agency.

IV. REVISION:

This agreement may be revised at any time by mutual consent of the signatories.

[Signatures]

Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

Director, National Security Agency
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C.

7 March 1963

S-3788/X

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Understanding; Assumption by DIA of DOD Responsibilities and Personnel at the National Photographic Interpretation Center

1. The purpose of this letter is to record a Memorandum of Understanding between the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff; the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval Intelligence; and the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, U.S. Air Force, outlining Department of Defense participation at the National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC). This Agreement designates for transfer to DIA personnel, vehicles, and equipment presently assigned to the military departments, and delineates responsibilities and functions to be assumed by DIA, together with the personnel. This Agreement also outlines the respective residual responsibilities of the military departments in these same areas.

2. Effective 10 March 1963, it is agreed that the Defense Intelligence Agency will assume operational control and direction of the service detachments (NPIC) and become the primary point of contact within the Department of Defense for matters involving the National Photographic Interpretation Center. In order to execute these responsibilities, it is further agreed that the Defense Intelligence Agency will:

a. Assume the functions outlined in Attachment 1 to furnish the departmental essential support in these functional areas.

b. Assume formal administrative control of the 15 personnel, vehicles, and equipment listed in Attachment 2 on or about 16 April 1963.

c. Acquire the individual and related DIA equipment of the individual interpreters together with other in-place equipment, as agreed by the military departments.

d. Occupy space and facilities now used by personnel of the military departments for the accomplishment of functions scheduled for transfer to DIA.

3. Functions to be retained by the military departments are listed in Attachment 2.
4. This agreement is designed to adjust DOD responsibilities with respect to support of the NFRIC and to provide for the consolidation of the Department of Defense effort at that facility in order to overcome and abrogate certain operational shortcomings cited by the Director of Central Intelligence in a letter to the Secretary of Defense on 6 December 1962. Further, this agreement parallels negotiations presently underway to establish an independent DIA photo exploitation capability and is in no way intended to restrict service or DIA participation in approved departmental efforts concluded at the NFRIC.

3 Attachments:
1. Functions to be assumed by DIA (S)
2. Personnel billets Army, Navy, AF (C)
3. Functions retained by Mil Dts (S)

Joseph J. Carroll
Lt. General, USAF
Director

Director for Intelligence
Joint Staff
7 MAR 1963

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
7 MAR 1963

Director of Naval Intelligence
20 MAR 1963

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
U.S. Air Force
7 MAR 1963
Functions to be Assumed by the Defense Intelligence Agency

1. Provide appropriate personnel and other support to the National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC), as agreed with the Director of Central Intelligence in accordance with NSCDD No. 8.

2. Provide timely and comprehensive briefing support to the military departmental staff elements, and other agencies and commands as required, on information derived from the interpretation of photography by the NPIC.

3. Represent the Department of Defense interests at the NPIC, and insure that timely and appropriate reproduction, interpretation, annotation, photo lab, mensural, library and collaterial support is provided to the DIA and the military departments as required.

4. Maintain a liaison office at the NPIC.
Functions to be Retained by the Military Departments

1. Represent respective service interests on UNIB subcommittees, UNIB committees, and other related bodies dealing with exploitation of special projects materials.

2. Review and validate exploitation requests received from departmental intelligence organizations.
15 June 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Joint Table of Distribution for the National Military Command System

I have reviewed JCS-431-63,* which outlines the actions taken by the Joint Chiefs of Staff with respect to a Joint Table of Distribution to strengthen the operation of the command centers of the National Military Command System, and I approve the specific transfers from the JCS (JCS) to DIA and DASA proposed in paragraph 7, therein.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower) will take necessary action to adjust manpower ceilings accordingly. In order to facilitate accounting, these transfers will be made effective 1 July 1963.

/S/ RICHARD B. MICHENER

* Enclosure to JCS 2308/213

Copy to:

Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower)

Sec Def Cont No. X-6078

DETONATED AT 3 YR. INTERVALS: DECLASSED AT 12 YEARS.
CONFIDENTIAL COPY

DOD CHN 01/31/10
MEMORANDUM FOR The Secretaries of the Military Departments
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Director, National Security Agency

SUBJECT: Intelligence Career Development Program

References: (a) Memorandum from DepSecDef to Director-Designate, DIA, Subj: "Specific Responsibilities of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)," dated 12 August 1961
(b) Memorandum from DepSecDef to Director, DIA, Subj: "Career Program for Department of Defense Intelligence Personnel," dated 27 February 1962
(c) JCSM-105-63, Subj: "Plan for DoD Intelligence Career Development Programs (U)," dated 4 February 1963

The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Plan, Appendix B to reference (c), for establishing an Intelligence Career Development Program within appropriate DoD components is approved subject to the restrictions recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. DoD Directive 5010.10, issued this date, reflects this decision.

DoD components concerned will utilize the DIA-developed Intelligence Career Development Programs as basic guidance in complying with the provisions of DoD Directive 5010.10 and for improving and adjusting existing intelligence career development programs.

Programs prepared in accordance with DoD Directive 5010.10 will be developed and implemented within existing manpower authorizations.
Within 180 days, the Director, DIA, will provide me with his preliminary evaluation of the Intelligence Career Development Programs as established and implemented by the DoD components concerned.

Cyrus Vance  
DEPUTY

Copies to:  
The Director of Defense Research & Engineering  
The Assistant Secretaries of Defense  
The General Counsel  
The Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense  
The Assistants to the Secretary of Defense
DOCUMENTS SECTION TWO, PART B:

PRODUCTION
MEMORANDUM FOR LT GENERAL JOSEPH F. CARROLL
DIRECTOR OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SUBJECT: Future Needs Program for Intelligence Estimates and Analysis
of the Intelligence

Since you are now in the process of planning the operations
of the newly-established Defense Intelligence Agency, it seems appropriate
to tell you what I conceive to be some of the future needs for intelligence
estimates that will be generated by the introduction of new methods
of planning and programming in the Comptroller's office. For purposes
of top-level program decision-making, currently available intelligence
estimates are not adequate in ways that will be made more explicit below.
I know that changing or improving estimates of future Soviet military
posture will probably not be easy, but I would like to indicate the
directions in which they might be changed so that better planning and
programming of Department of Defense programs will be possible.

We hope the new planning and programming methods now being
introduced will provide the data needed by top Defense management
to make the really crucial decisions, particularly on the major forces
and weapon systems needed to carry out the principal missions of the
Defense establishment. These decisions cannot be made rationally
without an adequate knowledge of the available alternatives, in terms
of their military worth in relation to their cost. Because of the long
life cycle of major weapon systems, the cost to the U.S. of the systems
must be projected over a period of years, ideally over their entire
life span. Only in this way can the full cost implications, present
and future, of program decisions be appreciated. Also, the entire
system will be oriented to provide top management with essential data
in terms of programs, since it is in terms of programs that major decisions
have to be made.

In order to evaluate specific weapon system programs it will be
necessary to study U.S. military requirements in various functional
areas to cope with the estimated Soviet (and, where relevant, Sino-Soviet
Bloc) military posture during the next five to ten years. These will
not be requirements studies in the traditional military sense. They
will be military-economic studies which compare alternative ways of
accomplishing national security objectives, and try to determine the
equipment which accomplishes the most for a given cost or achieves a given

Declassified by DIA/SVI-1 on 16
objective at least cost. Some of these requirements studies involve
minor complex analyses which are being conducted by various elements
of the Defense establishment with the help of such research groups as
the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group, HAM, etc.

All of this implies at least two things: (1) forward estimates
of Soviet military posture should cover a period of at least five years;
(2) the estimates should be in a form suitable for use in the type
of complex systems analysis study that will increasingly form the basis
for top level decision-making in the Department of Defense.

That estimates of Soviet military posture need to be extended
at least five years into the future is an obvious point. I believe
that the kind of estimate needed can be extended at least this far
in the future, especially if improved methods of constructing such
estimates are developed. How far beyond five years useful estimates
of Soviet posture can be projected is an open question. Only after
the problem of producing a consistent set of estimates for about five
years into the future has been solved will it be possible to judge
how much farther it is possible to go. Of course it may be feasible
to extend the estimate in some areas and not in others. Current estimates,
however, often do not usefully extend even five years. Indeed, some
of the most important do not. For example, the IICM estimate in NEF
11-8-65 covers only the next three years, while in the case of the Soviet
AICM estimate the only thing estimated is an IOC date. That various
estimates have a different character or different time horizons does
not solely reflect the different information bases of the estimates.
When 11-8-60 and 11-8-61 were prepared, more was known about the Soviet
ICM program then, say, the Soviet submarine missile program. Yet
the IICM estimates extend three or four years into the future and the
submarine missile estimate extends for five or six.

There is a problem of what the character of an estimate should
be when the information base is slim, as it must become when it probes
further into the future. Indeed an awareness of the fact that there
is no hard evidence on the Soviet position five years from now should
be the central basis for a re-appraisal of the current character of
estimates of that posture and methods of producing such estimates.
Methods of producing estimates of current posture and likely postures
five years from now must be different. At present the expertise of
the Intelligence Community is most appropriate to the job of producing
estimates of current Soviet posture. There has been insufficient
effort given to the different job of producing five year estimates.
More importantly, far too little effort has been given to determining
just how one makes such future estimates in the absence of "hard"
evidence conventionally defined.

A more useful estimate than the ideal aimed at in current estimates
would perhaps include a most likely case and at least two alternative,
but likely, projections. Each projection could itself be detailed and specific. One of the problems with current estimates is that as uncertainty increases they become hazy, vague, or simply terminate. There is a tendency to become less quantitative and more literary. Yet, top decision makers still have to make decisions in many such cases. Current estimates are not very helpful to them. They give no notion of the main alternatives in most cases. Some more constructive treatment of uncertainty is needed, both for the direct use of the decision makers and for use in the types of systematic analysis that will be undertaken of U. S. military problems.

One decision that can sometimes be made in situations of great uncertainty is to postpone a definite decision with the hope that uncertainty will be less at a later date. If postponement does not cost too much this may be a prudent decision. A useful characteristic of improved intelligence estimates would be the inclusion of an estimate of when in the future the Intelligence Community believes the level of uncertainty will be significantly reduced. If such information were available to top decision-makers, it might ease their problems in designing U. S. military programs.

One of the things most lacking in estimates of Soviet military posture is a concern for weapons as systems or programs. Current estimates are almost wholly concerned with the number of aircraft of specific types, ICBM's the Soviets will have in the future, etc. The performance characteristics of individual weapons is accorded next greatest concern. But, while it is now common to view U. S. weapons as weapon systems (in which the characteristics of the associated basing, command and control systems, etc., may be more important than number of weapons) estimates of Soviet weapons have not reflected this point of view.

In the kinds of analyses we have in mind, estimates of Soviet military posture in weapon systems terms are required. It would also be useful if estimates of Soviet forces were produced in a format comparable to the functional areas we are using for U. S. Forces: General War Offensive Forces, General War Defensive Forces, General Purpose or Theatre Forces, etc. It would also be useful if estimates of Soviet forces were accompanied by estimates of their cost to Soviets, preferably in Rubles. As you know, CIA and others have worked out methods for costing Soviet military programs and with some more effort these methods can be employed with reasonable accuracy.

Such cost estimates would have an interest in terms of comparing U. S. expenditures in various functional areas with the corresponding Soviet expenditures, e.g. U. S. General War Offensive Forces expenditures and Soviet General War Offensive Force expenditures. They may also play a role in improved intelligence estimating methodology. Studies of past patterns of Soviet military expenditures have shown that
expenditures in some functional areas have been quite stable. For example, Soviet expenditure on General War Offensive Forces during the period 1954 through 1959 was almost exactly half as large as their expenditure on General War Defensive Forces. During this period expenditures on the latter force area gradually rose from 15 billion 1955 rubles to 21 billion 1955 rubles. Projection of these and other expenditure patterns into the future and constraining estimated Soviet programs within these expenditure limits might be an extremely useful estimating technique. Current methods of estimating have consistently tended to produce estimates of Soviet programs that showed expenditure patterns different from the actual patterns and trends of Soviet military expenditure. Usually the implied profile of expenditure significantly exceeded the actual for the first few years, then fell off and often dropped below the actual expenditure after four or five years. This phenomenon, the "bow wave effect," could be avoided by more systematic use of probable patterns of Soviet military expenditure.

More generally, taking an over-all programming point of view may be a useful method of improving estimates of the future Soviet military posture. Almost invariably, projected estimates of Soviet force structures arrived at by ad hoc and up overestimating Soviet capability and, as I mentioned earlier, imply an expenditure profile greatly exceeding current Soviet budget levels. Many of these overestimates, which often serve to discredit the estimates, and to lead us to despair instead of to conservative decisions, could be avoided if the Intelligence product were an estimate of the Soviet defense program as a whole, and not merely a list of separate and unrelated estimates of individual elements. In addition to the constraints imposed by projected patterns of expenditure, more systematic account could be taken, by a programming approach, of known patterns of Soviet weapon system replacement and phasing practices, lead time problems, etc. Programming techniques being developed in the Comptroller's office for use in planning U. S. military programs might be adaptable for use in a simulated Soviet military programming effort.

I would be happy to discuss this with you at a mutually convenient time, and to provide you with whatever assistance we can.

Also, as you know, my Programming Office is charged with the responsibility of assisting the Secretary of Defense in developing a 5-year program for the Department of Defense. I would like my office to work in collaboration with yours in developing such a program in the Intelligence area. This will involve identifying intelligence activities, defining program elements, estimating their costs over the next 5 years, and analyzing the value of the information they can be expected to yield.
Although not much can be done during the current budget cycle, I would like to begin work on this early in 1962.
REPLY TO
ATTN OF DIAAPP-2

SUBJECT: (U) Intelligence Estimates

TO: Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)

1. Receipt of OASD (Comptroller) memorandum of 17 November 1961, subject "Future Needs Program for Intelligence Estimates and Analysis of the Intelligence," is acknowledged. While your suggestions are concerned primarily with supporting top-level program decision-making, your overall concept and specific suggestions—taken in conjunction with steps already underway in DIA to coordinate military intelligence estimating for operational decision-making—will be thoroughly explored and implemented to the fullest practical extent. I welcome the recommendation that your staff and mine begin discussions in the very near future along these lines. However, as you know, we in DIA are just beginning to assume our responsibilities, and it may be some time before our full capabilities can be brought to bear on your proposals in concrete terms.

2. While every reasonable effort will be made to take cognizance of the program package approach to intelligence estimating, certain factors require special consideration.

   a. DIA, in conjunction with the Military Departments for the remainder of 1962, contributes substantially to, but does not have complete responsibility for, National Intelligence Estimates. As you know, they are the products of the entire Intelligence Community and are coordinated and promulgated by the United States Intelligence Board. An effort will be made to influence the content and format of appropriate National Intelligence Estimates with the objective of projecting them at least five years and including, where feasible, cost estimates in consonance with the...
program package approach. At the same time, DIA will endeavor to tailor Defense Department military intelligence estimates, especially the "Overall Intelligence Estimates for Planning," to be more responsive to decision-making along the lines you suggest.

b. The DIA has responsibilities to a number of important "consumers"; they include not only the Secretary of Defense and his principal assistants, but also the President, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Unified and Specified Commanders, and—on behalf of the Secretary of Defense as a member of the National Security Council—the NSC via the United States Intelligence Board. To comply entirely with your suggestions with respect to realigning NIEs and military intelligence estimates would involve a standardization of approach which might not be desirable from the point of view of other military and national strategic planners and decision-makers.

c. The Intelligence Community for several years has recognized the following questions as important: (1) can national intelligence estimates be uniformly projected for five years? (2) can they be projected for ten years, so as to cover the life span of most weapon systems? (3) can analysis of growth of Communist military strength since World War II, coupled with analysis of Communist expenditures on those strengths, lead to reliable estimates in the absence of knowledge of Soviet plans and allocated resources during the years to come? The consensus in the Intelligence Community up to now in answer to (1) above has been, theoretically yes, but practically, probably no," to (2) the answer has been "unequivocably no," to (3) the answer has been "not reliable enough." In one sense, the divergences presented in past NIEs, for example in the 11-4 and 11-8 series, present a span of feasible alternatives available to the Soviets, with the majority position identified as the "most likely" and the upper and lower estimates forming "likely" alternative projections. However, until now there has been little or no formal discussion of the adoption of such a procedure or estimating method. The purpose of the restrictive process has been to reduce the alternatives to a single most-likely course of action based on the available evidence.
d. Although there is little evidence that the Soviets have adopted a sophisticated weapons system approach similar to ours, it is agreed that all of the elements essential to the establishment and implementation of such an approach are present in the Soviet military/economic structure. In short, we shall probably be forced to assume a weapon system approach on the part of the Soviets. We shall endeavor, therefore, to construct estimates insofar as possible on the basis of such a model.

e. In the application of economic considerations to Soviet weapons systems development, the military intelligence community has relied largely on CIA and the Department of State particularly on the CIA. In recent years, the Military Departments have endeavored to prevent duplication with CIA in the field of economic intelligence but at the same time to retain sufficient analytical and estimative capabilities to perform essential military intelligence functions. Although it is not my intention to establish a large economic intelligence element in the DIA, we shall endeavor to ensure that adequate weight is given to economic factors in the preparation of military intelligence estimates and in military intelligence contributions to National Estimates. In the past National Estimates often have quite correctly concluded that Soviet economic resources were sufficient to develop any particular weapon system providing the Soviet wished to give sufficient emphasis to the enterprise. Efforts will be made, where appropriate, to set forth fairly specific alternative courses of action within the framework of the overall Soviet Bloc economic potential in our contributions to USIB and in the intelligence furnished by DIA to the Secretary of Defense, consistent with the available information base.

f. Your suggestions as to the format and inclusion of detailed costing data in line with our program package approach also will be given careful consideration, although we are constrained by the actual evidence as to the force structure which exists in the Soviet Union. We shall try to simulate a Soviet program package structure insofar as practicable, relate it to a weapons system approach, and, with the assistance of WEEG, CIA and such service contractors as RAND, calculate probable costs—at least in terms of orders of magnitude. In this last connection, a limiting consideration will be the fact that Soviet cost figures known to us often are very general, sometimes deliberately falsified, and tenous for...
estimative purposes

3. With respect to developing a five-year intelligence program for the DoD, my staff has been working closely with your staff for some time. In response to a Secretary of Defense letter of 28 September, we made a review and analysis of the intelligence activities of the Military Departments. It was submitted to the Secretary on 1 November. It included the identification of intelligence activities, a definition of program elements in which they were reported (with observations for future reference of methods of improving their reporting), some attention to costs for the next five years, some analysis of the present and prospective future value of the activities. We are now engaged in updating our inventory of intelligence activities of the Military Departments. We are also establishing a DIA mechanism to review and evaluate the intelligence activities of the Military Departments and of DIA in a regular and orderly manner so as to be responsive to the DoD Program Package Schedule and to furnish the Secretary of Defense and his principal assistants with timely information for decision-making. Progress along the lines you indicate should become evident prior to the start of the FY-1964 budget cycle.

JOSEPH Y. CARROLL
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director
REPLY TO
ATTN OF: DIAFL-1B/Col Reinecke/19 Jan 62

SUBJECT: DIA Plan for Production Center

TO: Secretary of Defense

THRU: The Joint Chiefs of Staff


(b) Memorandum from the Secretary of Defense, subject: Administrative Requirements for the Establishment of a Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) dated 1 August 1961.

1. The DIA Activation Plan (reference (a)) provides for a detailed plan for the DIA Production Center to be submitted to the Secretary of Defense, through the JCS, by 1 February 1962.

2. The date for submission of the Production Center plan was based on anticipated guidance by about 1 December 1961, stemming from recommendations by the Director of Organizational and Management Planning, OSD, as directed by reference (b).

3. Based upon the guidance contained in DOD Directive 5105.21, I have developed a detailed plan which will be ready for submission to your office by 1 February. However, the decisions on any recommendations made by the Director of Organizational and Management Planning will undoubtedly have a major bearing on the functions of the Production Center. Therefore, I propose that submission of the detailed plan for the Production Center through the JCS be delayed until approximately two weeks after such a decision has been made and promulgated.

Joseph F. Carroll
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director

DIAFL-1B
DIAFL-1
DIAFL
DIAAP
SUBJECT:  Ad Hoc Study Group to Study Indexing and Coding of
Intelligence

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence,
    Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence,
    Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
    Department of the Air Force

1. Reference is made to DOD Directive 5105.21 of 1 August 1961.

2. The above reference charges the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)
with the responsibility for integrating automatic and automatic data
processing plans and programs in the intelligence area. In addition,
certain systems work is now necessary with the imminent intelligence
production functions of the DIA. Accordingly, it has been decided that
an Ad Hoc Study Group be study one important facet of the system, index-
ing and coding, should be established.

3. This Ad Hoc Study Group will be chaired by DIA and will undertake to
examine the current methods of coding and indexing intelligence documents
(hard copy library and automated files) with a view toward obtaining a
standardized system. In particular, current methods will be examined to
determine the degree of difference actually existing in conceptual methods
and in actual practices; the amount of investment in money and man years
associated with the various systems; the user agencies' views as to the
advantages and shortcomings of their system; and the feasibility of con-
verting to a standard system.

4. In order to accomplish this study, service representation is required.
Accordingly, it is requested that you furnish one individual, and the name
of an alternate, to participate in this effort. The work will be essen-
tially full time. The individual selected should be a qualified intelligence
specialist or systems analyst, knowledgeable of the existing systems having
access to staffs and organizations which will provide the required data.
5. It is requested that the names of the selected personnel be forwarded to DIA by 10 February 1962 in order that the group can start work by 15 February 1962. All selected personnel should be cleared for access to material up to and including TOP SECRET, Special Intelligence.

FOR THE DIRECTOR

S. B. FRANKEL
DEA AGENT, USA
Chief of Staff
MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, INTELLIGENCE, USAF

SUBJECT: Air Staff Target Analysis Support

REF: Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, Memorandum of 20 February 1962, same subject.

1. In reference, a proposal was presented for the establishment within ARDC of a unit with the capability to continue support to the Air Staff related to "Target Analysis." This support is intended to meet unilateral service requirements of the USAF. Comments of the DIA concerning this proposal were requested.

2. It is recognized that there will be some realignment within all three Services' Intelligence organizations to meet the operational and planning requirements of their respective Chiefs of Staff caused by DIA's assumption of intelligence responsibilities and functions. The extent of this realignment must, of course, be determined by each Service.

3. The missions and functions for the proposed ARDC Staff Support Unit do not conflict with the DIA Activation Plan approved by the Secretary of Defense on 29 September 1961. However, the DIA Activation Plan was generalized in several areas. DIA will shortly submit to the Secretary of Defense, through the JCS, plans for a Production Center and an ARDC Center, together with a concept for fulfillment of our dissemination functions. It is therefore premature to comment on the detailed relationship between the DIA in these fields and the requirements of the Air Staff. It is contemplated that the JCS will refer DIA's plans to the Services for comment at the time they are submitted. Your review of these plans, and the extent to which they are approved, should provide a better evaluation of your requirements.

4. The plans as drafted contemplate that DIA will develop, produce, maintain, and provide target intelligence data and materials, including those relating to physical vulnerabilities, to meet the requirements of, among others, the Military Departments. DIA is also planning to provide AFP support to the Military Departments on the functional area of target intelligence.

5. It is requested that you keep DIA informed of any proposed realignment of personnel from the present ARDC target intelligence functional areas and its associated AFP support.

COORDINATION:

JOSEPH F. CARROLL
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director
CONFIDENTIAL

C-042

SUBJECT: DIA Production Center and AINS Center Plans and Concept for Dissemination (U)

TO: The Secretary of Defense

FROM: The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Ref: (a) Plan for the Activation of the Defense Intelligence Agency approved by the Secretary of Defense on 29 September 1961
(b) DIA Letter to the Secretary of Defense, subject: DIA Plan for Production Center dated 19 January 1962

1. The following documents are forwarded for approval:

   a. The Plan for the DIA Production Center, (Attachment 1).
   b. The Plan for the DIA AINS Center, (Attachment 2).
   c. The Concept for a DIA Dissemination Capability, (Attachment 3).

2. Because of the interrelationship between the plans and the concept, it is desirable that they be considered and subsequently implemented concurrently.

3. By reference (b), it was requested that the submission of the detailed plan for the DIA Production Center be delayed until approximately two weeks after a decision had been made and promulgated on the recommendations made by the Director of Organizational and Management Planning, Office of the General Counsel, Department of Defense. In this regard, directives have now been issued or are being drafted on all these reserved areas. Since Scientific and Technical Intelligence remains an area where the final decision may have a direct impact on the proposed plan for the DIA Production Center, that part of the plan which addresses itself to Scientific and Technical Intelligence matters provides only for the minimum present needs.

4. A plan for a DIA Automatic Data Processing System Center (AINS Center) is enclosed as Attachment 2. It is essential that the implementation of these two plans proceed concurrently. Further, reference (a) envisaged an AINS function in the Production Center which has now been incorporated into the plan for the AINS Center. The Center will provide AINS service to all organizations in the DIA.

Declassified by SVI-1
6 October 1998
5. Reference (a) recognizes the need for a dissemination capability in support of the acquisition and processing functions. A concept for dissemination, however, was not detailed in the IWA activation plan. In order to provide for this support to the acquisition and processing functions, a concept has been prepared and is enclosed as attachment 3.

6. Full implementation of these projects will require the transfer to the IWA of approximately 2500 personnel from the service intelligence and support activities as identified in the attachments. These will be reflected in a subsequent submission of the IWA Interim Joint Table of Distribution.

SIGNED

JOSEPH F. CARROLL
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director

3 Attach
1. Plan for IWA Production Center
2. Plan for AIFS Center
3. Concept for Dissemination

COL BOONE/ct/3Apr62 KTRAK

cc: IIAEA (2)
    Directors' Coord cy

2IA/PL
SUBJECT: Defense Intelligence Agency Production Center and Automatic Data Processing System Center Plans and Concept for Dissemination Capability

TO: ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, INTELLIGENCE,
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS (INTELLIGENCE)
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, INTELLIGENCE,
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

REF: SM 364-62, dated 9 May 1962, subject as above

1. In accordance with reference memorandum, subject plans and concept are to be developed by the Defense Intelligence Agency in collaboration with the Services. It is anticipated that this work will be completed by three planning groups comprised of representatives of appropriate elements of the Defense Intelligence Agency and supported by Service representatives who will act as points of contact for securing Service data for the use of these activities.

2. Accordingly it is requested that each Service designate personnel as indicated below to support the activities of these Planning Groups:

a. Production Center Planning Group:

(1) Two representatives familiar with intelligence production programs who can collaborate in developing the DIA production program. These persons should have available the intelligence production program of their Service for FY 63.

(2) Two representatives to collaborate in developing the detailed plans, including a JTD, for the orderly and progressive transfer of functions, resources and responsibilities.

b. The ADPS Center Planning Group:

(1) One representative who is familiar with ADPS programs in support of Service intelligence activities.
(Should one of the representatives designated in paragraph 2a (2) above, be qualified in the ADP area, he can support both the Production Center and the ADP Center Planning Groups and an additional ADP representative need not be designated).

c. Dissemination Planning Group:

(1) One representative who is thoroughly familiar with the dissemination, operations and policies of his Service.

2. It is requested that the names of Service nominees be reported by telephone to the DIA Plans Policy and Programs Office on Extensions 55451 or 55358.

S. B. FRANKEL  
Rear Admiral, USN  
Chief of Staff
SUBJECT: Consolidation of Army Area Analysis Production

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, U. S. Army

2. On 9 May you presented a briefing covering Army's plan for amalgamating Area Analysis intelligence production. You asked for my comments on several considerations relating to this amalgamation.

2. My staff has considered in detail the following alternatives:

a. Production of Area Analysis intelligence remaining with individual services. Only major changes from present manner of operation are:

   (1) That DIA will be responsible for the review and coordination of all Area Analysis type intelligence being produced by the three services.

   (2) That the Army ACSI will consolidate personnel and functions of the separate technical services intelligence agencies which had previously been engaged in the production of Area Analysis intelligence. Consolidation to be at Army Map Service under the supervision of the Chief of Engineers.

b. Army designated as executive agent for an integrated DIA Area Analysis effort. Under this plan the assets of all three services which are devoted to the production of Area Analysis type intelligence will be consolidated into three basic divisions: Environmental, Transportation, and Military Industrial. Those organizations, personnel and support, not presently located at Army Map Service, to include those of Army Technical intelligence agencies, Navy, and Air Force will be moved to AMS. Army will be designated as the Executive Agent and operate these divisions in accordance with present Executive Agent practices. DIA will retain review and staff supervisory responsibility. It is anticipated by the Army ACSI that the Chief of Engineers would, in turn, be designated as Army Executive Agent for these divisions.

c. Segment Area Analysis into three basic divisions of DIA Production Center with location at AMS as tenants: This plan is basically identical to Plan B, with one major exception; the three divisions will be integral elements of the DIA Production Center and under complete command of the DIA Production Center Chief. They will merely be tenants at AMS and utilize AMS support facilities.
d. Segment Area Analysis into three basic divisions with two divisions as tenants at AMS: Under this plan only two divisions, Environmental and Transportation would be tenants at AMS. The third division, Military Industrial, would be housed at Arlington Hall Station along with other elements of the DIA Production Center.

3. After considering the various advantages and disadvantages of these alternatives and their conformance with the DIA Production Center concept which was approved by SecDef on 29 September 1961, the following comments are furnished:

   a. The Director DIA cannot subscribe to alternatives shown in paragraph 2a or 2b.

   b. The Director DIA interposes no objection to Army amalgamating production of Environmental and Transportation intelligence production at the Army Map Service.

4. It is requested that planning include provision of space at AMS for integrating approximately 185 additional personnel from Navy and Air Force who are engaged in the production of Environmental and Transportation intelligence.

5. My Production Center Planning Group is available to consult with your planners on any details of your amalgamation as they relate to the DIA Production Center.

JOSEPH F. CARROLL
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director —

Copied to:

Director File Cy
DIAAF
DIASA-2
DIAAF-1
MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: DIA Production and ADPS Center Plans and Concept for Dissemination (U)

References:
(b) "Plan for the Activation of the Defense Intelligence Agency," dated 27 September 1961
(c) Memorandum, JCSM-364-62, for the Secretary of Defense from the Chairman, JCS, dated 9 May 1962
(d) Multi-addressee memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Subj: "Operational Space for DIA," dated 5 April 1962

I have reviewed the Plans for a DIA Production and ADPS Center, the Concept for a DIA Dissemination Capability, and the comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff thereon. I strongly endorse in principle the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as expressed in paragraph 4 of the cover memorandum of JCSM-364-62.

However, since almost all DIA plans for the assumption of certain intelligence functions and for the activation of various DIA organizational elements involve the transfer of intelligence resources from the military departments and other Defense components to DIA, the Secretary and I believe that each such plan should have our approval before it is implemented. Therefore, I specifically approve the Plans for the DIA Production and ADPS Centers and the Concept for a DIA Dissemination Capability as submitted by the Director, DIA, on 4 April 1962.

SecDef Cont. No.: 3619
cc: Chief Direction

DECLASSIFIED ON: 12 SEP 1995
DECLASSIFIED BY: DEPSECDEF
EXEMPTED FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652. EXEMPTION CATEGORY: DECLASSIFY ON INSPECTION BY DEPARTMENT.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff are requested to monitor the implementation of these Plans and to advise the Secretary and me of any adjustments or other changes they consider appropriate and of any instructions which the Joint Chiefs of Staff may issue to the Director, DIA, on the implementation of the Plans. Similarly, if the Director, DIA, desires to make any adjustments during the implementation of the Plans, he should advise the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense of such adjustments.

I also share the concern of the Joint Chiefs of Staff over DIA's manning requirements. However, in my judgment DIA cannot be expected to develop final Joint Tables of Dissemination (JTD's) until after it has assumed full responsibility for the conduct of its assigned functions. Since we all wish to avoid disruption or degradation of vital intelligence efforts during the time DIA is becoming operational, I believe we must expect that there may be a temporary over-all increase in the total number of personnel working in some functional intelligence areas during periods of transition. On the other hand, there may be over-all savings in intelligence personnel in other functional intelligence areas. It appears, therefore, that overages in one area could in some instances be applied to shortages in another. Another complicating factor, of course, is that DIA has been assigned tasks and functions which heretofore have never been performed in the Department. Adequate manning must be provided for these new activities as well.

Consequently, the requirement for final DIA JTD's is waived until DIA assumes full responsibility for assigned functions. The Director, DIA, however, will submit interim JTD's for DIA organizational elements as they are activated and will keep the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary and myself continually apprised of its manning levels, personnel requirements, and adjustments thereto. However, when DIA becomes fully operational, it is expected that the total number of personnel involved in its intelligence activities as well as those involved in intelligence activities at the headquarters level of the military departments will be less than the total number assigned to Washington-level intelligence activities on 1 August 1961.

In providing operational space for the DIA Production and ADPS Centers, the priorities and provisions of reference (d) will govern.
In classic national security context of recent developments in planning for the National Military Command System, the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the organization, location of the Department of Defense, Defense Assessments and other considerations involving the RDT&E and procurement of ADP equipment suggest that action on some aspects of the DIA ADP Plan must be fully compatible with developments in the NMCs area.

In implementing his ADP Plan, the Director, DIA, must assure that existing ADP intelligence capabilities are not disrupted and that economy of resources and efficiency of management and operation characterize all aspects of the DIA ADP intelligence system and all improvements and developments thereto. To realize these objectives it is essential that the military departments provide DIA with technically competent personnel to manage the vital ADP intelligence program. In implementing his ADP Center Plan, the Director DIA, is requested to work very closely with those elements of the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff having NMCs responsibilities, the Director, Defense Communications Agency; the Director of Defense Research and Engineering; and the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller),

Copies to:
- The Secretaries of the Military Departments
- The Director of Defense Research and Engineering
- The Assistant Secretary of Defense/Comptroller
- The Assistant Secretary of Defense/Installations & Logistics
- The Assistant Secretary of Defense/Manpower
- The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
- The Director, Defense Communications Agency
- The Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
REPLY TO


00635

SUBJECT: (U) Detailed Plan for DIA AIPS Center

TO: Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence)
Department of the Navy

21 AUG 1962

1. Reference your letter, same subject, 17 August 1962. The deficiencies noted in the referenced letter are in general valid, and their resolution will certainly contribute to the development of an improved AIPS Center Plan. The first major deficiency, lack of coordination with JCS (JCSG), is being corrected by the insertion of substantially the wording which your letter suggests. In addition, portions of the plan discussing support of the JCSG have been strengthened and have been coordinated with the assembled representatives of the JCSG. Finally, the Detailed Plan for the AIPS Center now contains a discussion of the channel for approval of overall DIA intelligence AIPS plans; they will be submitted to the Secretary of Defense through the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This channel and coordination procedure should assure the required coordination with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

2. The second problem area which you identify, establishing the need for an AIPS Center, is closely related to the third, the organizational placement of the staff planning function. With regard to the latter, the primary problem appears to be one of ambiguity in the draft which your office revised. A major portion of the draft is concerned with the totality of DIA responsibilities in the AIPS area. These responsibilities are not all assigned to the AIPS Center. The responsibility for major planning and coordination functions has been assigned to the Staff, not the Center. The Center is involved in supporting the Staff in these areas because of the detailed systems knowledge required, but this is a staff support function not unusual to a line organization. This relationship is being clarified in the detailed plan.

3. Since staff planning is not to be a responsibility of the AIPS Center, the JCS guidance has been followed. The clear intent of the guidance that "AIPS planning should remain a staff function, pending the establishment of a need for an AIPS Center" is that this staff function not be transferred prematurely to a consolidated AIPS organizational element. Whether a consolidated facility should exist has not been an issue because of the nature of the resources being transferred to the DIA. The Activation Plan for the DIA envisaged consolidating these resources. There are many good reasons for such consolidation, such as better utilization of personnel and equipment, but reiteration of these reasons is unnecessary because
there has never been any real doubt in any of DIA's planning that existing resources would be consolidated.

4. The major question your letter poses is that of the proper organizational placement of this consolidated ADPS facility. The DIA has carefully reconsidered this problem. It is certainly true that an independent ADPS Center may, like any organization, tend to become embroiled in its own problems, and might be less responsive to the DIA Production Center than if it were placed under that Center. Only good management can solve the first of these problems; self-involvement could occur no matter where the function was placed. The DIA will make every effort to prevent the development of such a situation.

5. Responsiveness to the DIA Production Center is a primary goal of DIA's ADPS Center planning. To promote adequate responsiveness, the ADPS Center has been planned to be collocated with the Production Center in Building "G" at Arlington Hall Station. In addition, both the Operations Development and Integration Group and the Systems Analysis and Programming Branches of the ADPS Center are being organized along lines paralleling the other functions of the DIA. There will be systems analysts and programmers assigned to each major functional area, e.g., targeting, order of battle, etc. These personnel will work closely with the associated analytic elements of the Production Center. Maximum practicable stability in assignment of personnel will be maintained in order to provide, for each intelligence area, a group of systems personnel who understand both the ADPS equipment and the intelligence functions they are supporting. A combination of both intelligence analysts and computer personnel are being selected, where possible, for the ADPS Center, each group to be cross-trained in the skills of the other. Thus considerable care has been taken to insure an adequately responsive ADPS capability for the Production Center. The ADPS Center, however, must be responsive to other elements of DIA also, because the transferred personnel and equipment will constitute the only in-being ADPS capability of the DIA.

6. A major problem with regard to ADPS units has arisen from recent developments in invasion security. EIS has informed the DIA that SW and computer equipment produces compromising emanations which can be exploited at distances up to more than a thousand feet. In order to protect the DIA ADPS function, DIA is seriously considering building a new screened wing to Building "G", Arlington Hall Station, as the least costly means of providing the necessary protection. Such protection cannot be provided for a multiplicity of ADPS units except at exorbitant cost. Thus, as a result of both personnel and security limitations, the DIA will have a single ADPS facility for the foreseeable future.
7. General consideration has been given to the use of this single facility. ADPS has many aspects which require top level management. It is costly; the resources being managed for DIA support will cost nearly ten million dollars in FY 63 alone. Systems development is a long range activity; the ACHMATIC system, for example, has been in development since 1957 and is not yet operational. Finally, the decisions required early in the process are not reversible except at considerable cost. Once an automation project is started each step in the design and implementation process requires decisions which may deeply affect the capability of the DIA to perform its functions far into the future, greatly improving or seriously degrading its efficiency. Continuing top level consideration is required for a function with these characteristics.

8. On a more practical level the DIA must use its available resources to best advantage. Urgent new systems, such as those for current intelligence and indications, acquisition, and DCTS, must be started now, and at least part of the best talent available must be spent on these new systems. It has been decided that such redirection to the available resources cannot be accomplished efficiently if the ADPS function is assigned to the Production Center. The criticality of these resources required placing them at an organizational level commensurate with the DIA-wide support they will be expected to provide and at a level where top management can effectively direct their utilization. For these reasons it has been decided to create the ADPS Center as a separate line organization. This discussion of the organizational placement of the ADPS Center will be included in final detailed Center Plans.

9. The specific comments attached to your letter are being worked out with members of the DIA staff. In most cases the wording is being corrected and clarified in accordance with the comments. The plan also clearly states that the estimate of 10 personnel in a DIA estimate does not represent the number now employed by the Navy. However, in order to provide some Navy representation in the ADPS Center and to run the systems being transferred, those estimated requirements are being retained. Since the activation plan for the DIA included the desirability of proportional Service representation and the transferred systems cannot be developed and operated without personnel, it is hoped that the Navy can recompute its position on this matter.

JOSEPH P. CARROLL
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director
MEMORANDUM FOR The Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT: Semi-annual Progress Report to the President on Implementation of the Joint Study Group (JSG) Recommendations

1. The attached semi-annual report should be forwarded through the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.

2. Attached as Tab A is a covering memorandum to the President, including individual statements on each JSG recommendation requiring DOD action. Particular attention is invited to Recommendation No. 30. It concerns reduction in USIB membership.

3. You require quarterly reports of progress from us on the same subject. The report for this quarter is submitted separately. It presents essentially the same information, but copies will reach more interested officials in DOD.

4. The report to the President has been coordinated with the following:
   a. Office of Organization and Management Planning
   b. Office of Asst Secy of Defense (Mr. Rusk)
   c. Office of Director, DIA
   d. Office of Chairman, JCS

5. Reference papers attached are:
   b. Earlier DOD reports (Tabs C & D).

6. Signature of the memorandum to the President is recommended.

JOSEPH F. CARROLL
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director

4 Attach
1. Tab A (Memo to Pres)
2. Tab B (Bundy letter)
3. Tab C (Au. 81 report)
4. Tab D (Au. 82 report)
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT


The attachment reports on action taken on each Joint Study Group recommendation involving the Department of Defense.

The JSG report itself is nearly two years old. The fundamental reorganization of military intelligence, now far advanced, is based on but not limited to guidance on the JSG. There have been adaptations and modifications, chiefly in the light of later study or first-hand knowledge in Department of Defense, or in response to recommendations of your Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. In some cases we have gone further than the JSG proposed, as for example in the establishment of a Defense Intelligence Agency. In other cases, modifications have kept us from an immediate solution. KLINT is a case in point.

The principal actions are well in hand. Activation of a Defense Intelligence Agency Production Center is scheduled for October. Although not responsive to any single JSG recommendation, this action is in consonance with the intent of the report.

In areas such as mapping, charting and geodesy, or technical intelligence, or intelligence career selection and management, the basic planning is completed. Assessments of the impact of these plans are far advanced or completed, and final decisions should be possible shortly.

Relationships between the new agencies—the Defense Intelligence Agency and the National Reconnaissance Office—and established Department of Defense intelligence elements...
have developed satisfactorily. The realignment of command intelligence resources and relationships is fully as intricate a problem as had been anticipated but an evolutionary solution is under way.

No further reporting is contemplated on Recommendation 1, 5, 13, 16, 19, 26 and 43. These are either implemented or provided for by other actions.

Iosci
Recommendation No. 1

Bring military intelligence organization into full consonance with the concept of the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958.

Status: Two principal actions accomplished the objective: establishment of DIA, and realignment of intelligence channels and relations with and between the commands.

The reorganization of DOD intelligence around or within DIA is well advanced. In addition to progress reported previously, a major step will be the activation of the DIA Production Center in October. During that month the phased process of physically integrating service production elements within it will begin.

DIA plans are prepared and in various stages of review for comprehensive planning, supervision and management of intelligence activities remaining with the Services, such as technical intelligence, mapping, charting and geodesy, and clandestine intelligence collection.

Action is proceeding within the commands to redirect guidance and transfer resources in order to reorient direction into the channel from DIA (acting as the primary agent of the JCS) to the OSD commands rather than from the Department to component commands.

Recommendation No. 2

Resources required for effecting military intelligence reorganization should be drawn from existing resources.

Status: Reorganization of DOD intelligence continues in large measure to be accomplished through realignment of resources. However, planning incident to the reorganization, and executive action to accomplish the transition are putting a temporary extra burden on all elements.

Recommendation No. 3

Closer control of intelligence budgeting procedures by the SecDef.

Status: The combined cryptologic program was subjected this year to OSD review on a scale far more intensive than heretofore. Procedures for an equally intensive but more systematic review in future years are being
evolved. Plans and procedures for the development and similarly thorough review of a combined non-cryptologic intelligence program and budget are well advanced.

Through the DOD program system the identification and separation of anticipated intelligence costs have become clearer. Management analysis procedures are developing improved means of budgetary control.

**Recommendations No. 4 & 12**

4. Initiate policies providing more rigorous selection and training of attaché and other intelligence personnel.

12. Improve career management for intelligence personnel in military departments.

**Status:** Several actions contribute to these objectives. Among these are:

a. A comprehensive proposal for DOD intelligence career selection and management is now under study by the JCS.

b. In addition to the present rigorous selection criteria, additional controls are proposed in the proposal mentioned above.

c. DOD intelligence and language training is under general revision:

(1) The Defense Intelligence School is being established by integration of existing appropriate Army and Navy schools in Washington. The school will offer a variety of courses on the strategic level tailored to the requirements of career intelligence personnel, attaché personnel, reservists and others.

(2) The Army has been made responsible for all DOD foreign language training and is developing a plan for the fulfillment of these responsibilities.

(3) Attaché language qualifications and training have been made more stringent, and language training for attaché wives has been further encouraged.

(4) NSA has reviewed COMSEC, SIGINT, and cryptologic training and developed recommendations for improvement.

(5) The Air Force has been made responsible for Air Intelligence training within DOD and for advanced training in photo-interpreter and related sensor areas. Implementation plans are in hand.
Recommendation No. 5

Encourage the military services to maintain and develop clandestine collection capabilities.

Status: DIA is responsible for policy guidance governing all DOD clandestine activities, for the review and validation of such activities, for coordinating with the DCI and CIA in Washington, and for providing for their coordination in the field. A plan has been prepared providing for the transfer to DIA of resources needed to support these responsibilities. Under DIA supervision will be provided program guidance for the initiation of new operations as required. The proposed intelligence career development program will also contribute to the objective of this recommendation by enhancing the professionalism of military clandestine resources.

Recommendation No. 6

Improve the SSO system.

Status: In connection with the over-all realignment of military intelligence relationships and channels between Washington and the field commands, plans are being developed to realign similarly the SSO system in support of these relationships.

Recommendation No. 7

Re-examine feasibility of placing more ELINT resources of U&S commands under NSA control.

Status: How to reach the optimum interaction between technical and command requirements in ELINT is absorbing much attention in DOD and elsewhere. The consensus, when reached and approved, will be set forth in a new DOD ELINT directive. Meanwhile, the military staffs and NSA have done tentative work on the development of a draft national ELINT plan.

Recommendation No. 8

Strengthen NSA control over service cryptologic agencies.

Status: Previous arrangements under which segments of NSA had been placed under the control of Service cryptologic agencies have been terminated. Implementation of the preceding recommendation and a more detailed review by NSA of Service cryptologic agency submissions in connection with the combined cryptologic program and budget review will contribute further to this objective.

UNCLASSIFIED
Recommendation No. 3

Reappraise adequacy of ELINT R&D.

Status: A comprehensive ELINT R&D review was conducted by ODDR&E, supported by the Joint Staff, NSA and the Services. Data developed in this review provide an interim basis for evaluation and coordination of ELINT R&D requirements. Final action on Recommendation No. 7 will contribute further to accomplishment of this objective.

Recommendation No. 13

CIA open its clandestine training facilities as a service of common concern.

Status: With full CIA cooperation DIA analyzed DOD clandestine intelligence training requirements and the means of meeting them. This analysis took account of existing DOD and CIA training programs and facilities, and studied the possibility of CIA alone conducting all such training. It was concluded that (a) [REDACTED] facility should meet DOD requirements for the present [REDACTED] has accordingly been assigned this responsibility), (b) DOD and CIA would benefit from a greater exchange of instructors and materials (which will be arranged), and (c) In the event [REDACTED] is required, for other reasons, to relocate its clandestine training facility from [REDACTED] the advantages of co-locating with the CIA training facility will be carefully reviewed.

Recommendation No. 16

Establishment of NIPC.

Status: The center has functioned for 20 months. Consideration is now being given to assigning to the DIA all DOD personnel detailed for duty with NIPC.

Recommendation No. 15

Continuing exploitation of intelligence opportunities in

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TOP-SECRET
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TOP SECRET

Recommendation No. 26

Coordination of Washington Military Requirements by the DOD.

Status: DIA's Office of Requirements has been operational for nine months. Procedures now in effect fully accomplish this recommendation. The Office integrates and validates all DOD requirements and tasks collection resources to fulfill them. In addition, with J-2 it is developing guidance for more realistic wartime military requirements to be served on CIA.

Recommendation No. 30

Reduction in number of USIA members.

Status: Action on this recommendation is being reserved until the reorganization of military intelligence has progressed further.

Recommendations No. 34 & 35

Transmittal of intelligence guidance to unified commands through channels directed by the JCS and control by unified commands over intelligence activities of component commands.

Status: DIA is the primary JCS agent. The necessary organizational realignments have either been made or are in process. Corresponding transfers of personnel and resources are taking place. DIA is moving forward in its program of publishing a comprehensive series of DOD collection guidance documents. Plans have been formulated which assign specific responsibilities to the US commands over such component command intelligence activities and intelligence production. One unified command has activated an intelligence requirements center, and another is about to do so.

Recommendation No. 39

Develop more effective coordination of intelligence R&D between DOD and CIA.

Status: This recommendation and DOD/CIA discussion which followed it have stimulated closer intelligence R&D coordination and liaison through various channels. DIA's participation, on the DOD side, was concentrated initially on ADP problems, but it is now extending to a broader field.

Recommendation No. ___

Establish specific arrangements in the intelligence community for planning work and anticipating problems.

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TOP SECRET
Status: This recommendation's objective is being furthered in various ways. The fundamental reorganization of DOD intelligence was undertaken with the long-term goal uppermost in view. Regular program reviews periodically necessitate a critical review of objectives and undertakings extending several years into the future. Means are being strengthened through which principal DOD intelligence elements are appropriately informed on and able to an orderly way to influence each other's future plans and requirements. Through USIE and related mechanisms (including the Coordination Staff to which DOD has assigned four members) DOD contributes to the anticipation and identification of future requirements and the effective development of means to satisfy them.
SUBJECT: Memorandum of Understanding

TO: Chief of Staff
Department of the Air Force

REPS: (a) DOD Directive 5105.21 "Defense Intelligence Agency," 1 Aug 61
(b) DIA Production Center Plan, 4 Apr 62, approved by Deputy
SecDef on 15 Jun 62

1. Members of the DIA planning staff have advised the Director, DIA that in working out the detailed plans for a consolidated Intelligence Production Center, they have been in continuous contact with members of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence and other concerned elements of the Department of the Air Force staff. Many agreements pertaining to the implementation of the DIA Production Center Plan have been consummated and are reflected in the DIA Production Center Detailed Plan dated 15 August 1962. However, inasmuch as the agreements pertaining to provision of dissemination support were not consummated and included in the detailed plan, the Director, DIA desires that a memorandum of understanding be accomplished delineating the responsibilities for furnishing this support so that the transfer of functions to be assumed by this agency will occur without a degradation of the intelligence product.

2. When the DIA Production Center is activated assuming administrative and operational control of all elements of Air Force Intelligence Center located in Building E, Arlington Hall Station, including responsibility for all functions and production programs now performed thereat, it is agreed that:

   a. It is advantageous to postpone the transfer of the direct and indirect support resources of AFICEN-3D (Dissemination Services Division) less 3D4 located in the Pentagon, until such time as DIA acquires a dissemination and distribution capability.

   b. Until DIA acquires a dissemination and distribution capability, AFICEN-3D (less 3D4) will continue to function in precisely the same manner as in the past except that the functions that were performed for AFIC will be performed for the element of the DIA Production Center located at Arlington Hall Station (Blg B). Other elements of the Production Center located in the Pentagon, at Army Map Service, and at Arlington Hall Station will receive dissemination support from Army or Navy dissemination resources.

   c. The functions referred to above include but are not limited to

      (1) Transmittal to the element of the DIA Production Center located
at Arlington Hall Station (Bldg B) of classified material up to and including SECRET utilizing existing operating procedures.

(2) Read, analyze and determine distribution for the element of the DIA Production Center located at Arlington Hall Station (Bldg B) of raw material originated by all agencies based on a "Customer Requirement" list provided by DIA.

(3) Dissemination to the elements of the DIA Production Center located at Arlington Hall Station (Bldg B) of intelligence produced by the Department of the Army and Chief of Naval Operations.

(4) Dissemination of finished intelligence produced by the element of the DIA Production Center located at Arlington Hall Station (Bldg B) (only that intelligence previously produced by AFIC) to Department of the Air Force organizations and other authorized recipients.

(5) Determination of the releasability of certain raw intelligence material, under authority delegated by DIA, to accredited foreign governments and the dissemination of such material.

d. During the interim period both direct and indirect support of AFCIN-3D functions and personnel will be provided by the Department of the Air Force. Administrative support to be furnished by Department of the Air Force will include provisions of operational space, communications, physical security, expendable supplies, equipment, maintenance, departmental publications and blank forms, mail and records support, reproduction of documents and photographs and any other support presently provided for the operation of AFCIN-3D.

e. The support resources referred to above will be surveyed prior to the activation of the DIA Dissemination Facility and precise identification made of the requirements, both manpower spaces and equipment, for the Department of the Air Force residual function and the DIA element. Then, when the DIA Dissemination Facility is activated, support manpower spaces and equipment identified for withdrawal can be fully justified and accurate.

f. Personnel administration and responsibility for clearance will be assumed by DIA on the effective date of transfer of personnel of AFCIN-3D (less 3D4).

g. Provision of the support detailed in sub-paragraph b above, will be terminated upon request of DIA or by joint agreement between the agency and the Department of the Air Force.
3. Request your concurrence regarding provisions of the support specified herein.

E. B. FRANKEL
Rear Admiral, USN
Chief of Staff

COORD:
DIAAP-1
DIAAP

Director's File Cy
Coord Cy (DIAAP)
Reading File Cy
DIAAP-1 Cy
SUBJECT: Quarterly Status Report on Joint Study Group Recommendations

TO: The Secretary of Defense

1. The quarterly status report is attached. It covers recommendations not previously reported completed, for which DOD is wholly or partly responsible.

2. Six of the 19 recommendations involving DOD had been reported accomplished by 1 September 1962. Seven more are at this time reported accomplished or provided for. Of the six left, two (Nos. 7 and 9) involve ELINT, which in any case is being treated in a broader context than that of these particular recommendations. The same is true of two remaining recommendations (Nos. 4 and 12) concerning personnel and training. It is anticipated that completed action can be reported on these two upon approval of the DIA Intelligence Career Development Plan which is being forwarded for JCS consideration. The SSO system (No. 6) is the subject of a DIA plan now under consideration by the JCS. The last (No. 30), concerning USIE membership, is in abeyance.

JOSEPH F. CARROLL
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director

UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT, THIS DOCUMENT BECOMES CONFIDENTIAL

Declassified by SVI-1 6 October 1998

Copy 24 of 25 copies
Page 1 of 4 pages
TO REGIONS
EXEMPT: JOB NO. 290010
EXEMPT FROM AUTOMATIC

1. Improve career management for military personnel in military departments.

2. Implement personnel in intelligence and other training of active and retiree personnel.

3. Policies for more thorough selection and training for the position.

4. Improved control of intelligence, recommendations.

5. Formalize requirements of military departments and intelligence.

6. New integrated processes by the Secretary.

7. Clearer control of intelligence, recommendations.

8. Formalize requirements of military departments and intelligence.

9. Improved career management for the position.

10. Support and retention of intelligence, recommendations.

11. Improved career management for the position.

12. Support and retention of intelligence, recommendations.

AGENCY PLACE

OF COMMISSION

RECOMMENDATION

QUARTERLY STATUS REPORT: JOIN STUDY GROUP RECOMMENDATIONS
The necessary basic realignments in the area of development of the new tactical intelligence system, have been made. Decisive improvements in the necessary basic realignments in the area of development of the new tactical intelligence system, have been made. Decisive improvements in the necessary basic realignments in the area of development of the new tactical intelligence system, have been made. Decisive improvements in the necessary basic realignments in the area of development of the new tactical intelligence system, have been made. Decisive improvements in the necessary basic realignments in the area of development of the new tactical intelligence system, have been made. Decisive improvements in the necessary basic realignments in the area of development of the new tactical intelligence system, have been made. Decisive improvements in the necessary basic realignments in the area of development of the new tactical intelligence system, have been made. 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MEMORANDUM FOR The Secretaries of the Military Departments
The Director of Defense Research and Engineering
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Assistant Secretaries of Defense
The General Counsel
The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Director, National Security Agency

SUBJECT: DIA Production Center Detailed Plan

References: (a) DIA Plan, subject as above, dated 15 August 1962
(b) JCSM-943-62, subject as above, dated 3 December 1962
(c) Secretary of Defense memo, "Technical Intelligence," dated 1 December 1962
(d) DoD Directive 5105.21, "Defense Intelligence Agency," dated 1 August 1961

The "DIA Production Center Detailed Plan" (hereinafter called the Plan), dated 15 August 1962, and forwarded by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in reference (b) is approved for implementation as submitted by the Director, DIA.

The specific provisions of reference (a) will be implemented as determined by the Director, DIA. Monthly reports on the status of implementation will be submitted by the Director, DIA, to the Secretary of Defense with informational copies supplied to the Secretaries of the military departments. With respect to those intelligence production functions that are temporarily being retained under the Plan by the Navy, the Director, DIA, is given full authority to determine when they should be transferred to the DIA Production Center.
Some of the billets, particularly military, being transferred to DIA are not now filled. The Secretaries of the military departments are requested to assist the Director, DIA, as a matter of priority in obtaining highly qualified personnel to fill these vacancies. To this end, the Secretaries of the military departments are encouraged to waive provisions of regulations pertaining to time limits for permanent change of station moves and stabilized tours and to divert personnel from present or projected assignments to insure that DIA is provided with the competent military personnel it needs. The Secretaries of the military departments and the Administrative Assistant are also requested as a matter of priority to assist the Director, DIA, in obtaining operational space for the DIA Production Center as specified in the Plan.

Throughout the implementation of the Plan, the Director, DIA, will assess the adequacy of his manpower resources to discharge the functions and responsibilities assigned by the Plan. By 15 January 1964 the Director, DIA, will report to the Secretary of Defense through the Joint Chiefs of Staff as to the adequacy of the manning of the DIA Production Center.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower) will adjust the personnel authorizations of the military departments to reflect the transfer to DIA of civilian and military personnel authorizations identified in the Plan. In this regard, it is noted that the authorizations proposed in the Plan for the Scientific and Technical Liaison Office were not included in those approved for DIA in reference (c).

The Assistant Secretaries of Defense (Comptroller) and (Installations and Logistics) will effect, in conjunction with the military departments, the budgetary and program change actions necessary to the expeditious accomplishment of the Plan.

Implementation of the Plan may impose an additional workload on the staffs of the commanders of unified and specified commands in the management and processing of intelligence production (including the field of technical intelligence where appropriate). Accordingly, in consonance with my previously expressed desire to strengthen the intelligence capability of those commands the Joint Chiefs of Staff are requested to ascertain the additional manpower spaces which may
be required by each command. Such manpower resources will be supplied insofar as possible from spaces presently assigned to component command headquarters staffs or to other organizations attached to component command headquarters. If, however, the Joint Chiefs of Staff determine that such spaces are not available from this source, any additional spaces required should be supplied from the resources of the military departments. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are requested to submit to the Secretary of Defense within 180 days a report of additional manpower spaces authorized to each command, including the source of such spaces, and to subsequently inform the Secretary of Defense when the additional spaces have been manned.

An amendment to reference (d) will be issued shortly to specifically confirm the intelligence production function of DIA.

[Signature]

DEPUTY
00989 /ColHolden/59448/20Dec82/cs

DIA — AT THE CREATION

20 December 1962

00989 /ColHolden/59448/20Dec82/cs

SUBJECT: (S) Concept for Photographic Intelligence in the Defense Intelligence Agency

TO: The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

REF: a. DIA Production Center Plan, dated 4 April 1962
   b. Memorandum by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, dated 16 March 1962, subject: Mapping, Charting and Geodesy
   c. Memorandum by the Deputy Director, DIA, dated 1 August 1961, subject: DIA Photo Analysis Support Plan
   d. WH-997-61, dated 10 September 1962, subject: DIA Plan for Photo Analysis Support for the DIA Production Center
   e. Memorandum by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, dated 17 December 1962, subject: DIA Production Center
      Detailed Plan
   f. JCS 2631/395, dated 19 December 1962

1. (S) In the DIA presentation to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 6 November, and again in the presentation on 15 November concerning the DIA Production Center Plan, reference was made to the minimum photo interpretation capability embodied in the original version of that document dated 4 April 1962 (Reference a). Under the concept of that plan, DIA would continue to depend heavily upon the military departments for the photo interpretation support required to discharge DIA's substantive intelligence production and general intelligence support responsibilities to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Unified and Specified Commands.

2. (S) On 17 March, however, the Deputy Secretary of Defense in Reference b, directed the DIA "to survey those DoD photographic interpretation organizations, or elements thereof, which provide major support to the military department intelligence organizations, or mapping and charting organizations, to ascertain what organizational elements and personnel spaces should be transferred to DIA's mapping and charting managerial activity, or to DIA's intelligence production center." These instructions were reasserted by the JCS to the DIA for appropriate action. This directive required the DIA to take a view of the photo interpretation problem which was considerably broader than that contemplated in the original Production Center Plan of 4 April 1962.

3. (S) A survey was accordingly conducted to identify the extent of photo interpretation effort which the services were assuming to support the mapping and charting managerial responsibilities to be assumed by DIA, and the substantive intelligence functions which have been, or are planned to be, transferred to this Agency. It was determined that these

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Declassified by SVI-1
6 October 1998

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would be no requirement for photo interpretation support for DIA’s management responsibilities regarding mapping, charting and geodesy; planning, therefore, could be focused on DIA’s requirements for photo interpretation in support of intelligence production. Based on the premise that the DIA should absorb and consolidate photo interpretation in support of basic intelligence to the same extent that this Agency plans to absorb and consolidate the basic intelligence functions themselves, a plan was prepared and submitted to the JCS on 1 August 1962, (Reference 1). This plan recommended that DIA personnel assume and a proportional share of photo interpretation and processing equipment be transferred from the Services to DIA.

4. (S) On 10 September 1962 the JCS, in Reference 4, returned the DIA photo analysis support plan to DIA with the request that it be reconsidered and revised inasmuch as it was inconsistent with the original DIA Production Center Plan of 4 April 1962, in that DIA now proposed accomplishing the bulk of photo analysis within the Production Center instead of relying upon its requirements for support upon service interpretation activities as originally envisaged. Certain additional questions were raised by the JCS having to do with the potential disruption of PI activities resulting from releasing assets, clarification of the residual PI functions of the Services, and, the feasibility of attempting to evaluate DIA photo analysis requirements before the DIA intelligence production programs to be supported had been established.

5. (S) A revised photo analysis support plan which limits DIA capabilities to the minimum reflected in the Production Center Plan of 4 April 1961, has been prepared as directed. However, reassessment of the existing and prospective intelligence responsibilities of this Agency indicates that the guidelines under which this revised plan has now been prepared will not provide DIA the capability to meet assigned responsibilities to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to the Unified and Specified Commands.

6. (S) The events of the past several weeks have clearly illustrated the critical importance of a complete and sophisticated photo interpretation and photo processing capability which is totally responsive to DIA requirements, if this Agency is to perform its functions promptly and effectively. This experience has provided convincing evidence that the Photo Analysis Support Plan originally submitted to the JCS was a step in the right direction; however, this plan actually did not go far enough to insure maximum utilization and acceptable responsiveness of photo resources of the DIO in time of crisis. In direct reaction to the Cuban situation, and the circumstances under which photo intelligence support was being provided, the Secretary of Defense instructed the Director, DIA, to establish within this Agency a high quality laboratory capability. For these reasons, the enclosed comprehensive concept for
photo intelligence in the Defense Intelligence Agency has been prepared
with the object of providing a realistic basis for the development of a
DIA photo intelligence plan which more adequately provides for the
support now recognized as necessary.

7. (5) The enclosed concept incorporates four basic functions within
the DIA. First, DIA's photo analysis capabilities would be provided
by consolidating appropriate resources of the photo interpretation
organizations which presently exist in the Washington area under the
control of the military departments—such as the Navy Photo Interpre-
tation Center at Suitland, Maryland, the Air Force Intelligence Center
at Arlington Hall Station and the Army photo interpretation organiza-
tions in Washington and at Ft. Belvoir. Secondly, the concept proposes
absorbing from the Departments their responsibility and the related assets
for supporting the National Photo Interpretation Center. Thirdly, it
is proposed to establish a central DUO film library and depository
within the DIA. Finally, the concept provides for the establishment
within DIA of a film and print processing laboratory of first-class
quality and of sufficient capacity to meet the requirements of the
Washington area consumers and those requirements of the Unified and
Specified Commands for bulk or selective print reproduction which are
now met from Service resources.

8. (5) It is requested that this concept be favorably considered and
that this Agency be relieved of the requirement in Reference 4, that
the plan submitted under Reference 4, be revised in accordance with
the photo interpretation requirements contained in Reference 4.

9. (5) Upon approval of this concept a Photographic Intelligence Plan
will be prepared and submitted to the JCS for approval. The new plan
will supersede the Photo Analysis Support Plan submitted under Reference
4.

JOSEPH F. CARROLL
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director

1 Arch
Concept for Photographic Intelligence in the DIA,
dated 6 December 1962

arch is in DIAFL-1G on file
SUBJECT: Memorandum of Understanding

TO: Chief of Staff
   Department of the Air Force

1. References: (a) DOD Directive 5105.21 "Defense Intelligence Agency,
   dated 1 August 1961

   (b) DIA Production Center Plan, 4 April 1962, approved
       by Deputy Sec Def on 15 June 1962

   (c) DIA letter to Department of the Air Force, 1 October
       1962, Subject: Memorandum of Understanding

7. Reference (c) is withdrawn and the following substituted.

3. The DIA planning staff has advised the Director, DIA that in working
   out the detailed plan for a consolidated Intelligence Production Center,
   they have been in continuous contact with members of the Assistant
   Chief of Staff, Intelligence and other concerned elements of the Department of
   the Air Force staff. Many agreements pertaining to the implementation of
   the DIA Production Center Plan have been consummated and are reflected
   in the DIA Production Center Detailed Plan dated 15 August 1962. However,
   inasmuch as the agreements pertaining to provision of dissemination support
   were not consummated and included in the detailed plan, the Director, DIA
   desires that a memorandum of understanding be accomplished delineating the
   responsibilities for furnishing this support so that the transfer of functions
   to be assumed by this agency will occur without a degradation of the
   intelligence product.

4. When the DIA Production Center is activated and assumes administrative
   and operational control of all elements of Air Force Intelligence Center
   located in Building B, Arlington Hall Station, including responsibility for
   all functions and production programs now being performed, it is agreed that:

   a. Certain considerations beyond the control of DIA require postpone-
      ment of the transfer of the direct and indirect support resources of AFCIN-3D
      (Dissemination Services Division) less 3D4 located in the Pentagon, until
      such time as DIA acquires a dissemination and distribution capability.

   b. Until DIA acquires a dissemination and distribution capability,
      AFCIN-3D (less 3D4) will be required to perform essentially the same
      functions for the element of the DIA Production Center located at Arlington
      Hall Station (Building B) as formerly performed for AFCIN. Other elements
of the Production Center located at the Pentagon, at Army Map Service, and at Arlington Hall Station will receive dissemination support from Army or Navy dissemination resources.

c. The functions referred to above include but are not limited to:

(1) Transmitting to the element of the DIA Production Center located at Arlington Hall Station (Building B) classified material up to and including SECRET utilizing existing operating procedures. Action will be taken by AFCIN to extend to DIA the provisions of the current waiver which exempts the use of the AF Form 313 when transmitting SECRET material within AFIC. In the event the waiver cannot be obtained, DIA will take necessary action to alleviate the additional workload imposed by the preparation of the AF Form 313.

(2) Reading, analyzing, and determining distribution for the element of the DIA Production Center located at Arlington Hall Station (Building B) of raw material originated by all agencies based on a "Customer Requirement" list provided by DIA.

(3) Disseminating to the element of the DIA Production Center located at Arlington Hall Station (Building B) the intelligence produced by the Departments of the Army and Navy, and USIB members outside of the Department of Defense. DIA will furnish AFCIN-3D a statement from the Departments of the Army and Navy to the effect that distribution of their classified intelligence products to the DIA Production Center is authorized. No statement from outside agencies will be required since other agency material dissemination by AFCIN-3D is authorized to USIB members.

(4) Disseminating finished intelligence produced by the element of the DIA Production Center located at Arlington Hall Station (Building B) (only that intelligence previously produced by AFIC) to the Departments of the Air Force, Army, and Navy, other USIB members and to certain other authorized recipients.

j. During the interim period certain direct and indirect support of AFCIN-3D functions and personnel will be required from both the Department of the Air Force and DIA.

(1) During the interim period both direct and indirect support of AFCIN-3D functions and personnel will be provided by the USAF. Administrative support to be furnished by the USAF will include provisions of operational space, communications, physical security, expendable supplies, equipment, maintenance, departmental publications and blank forms, mail and records support, reproduction of documents and photographs and any other support presently provided for the operation of AFCIN-3D. Transfer of funds in support of the Production Center will exclude direct and indirect support costs for the dissemination capability.
(c) Support to be furnished by DIA will include a rapid return
administration for military personnel assigned to AFCIN-3D.

a. AFCIN-3D resources will be surveyed prior to the activation of the
DIA Dissemination Facility and precise identification race of the require-
ments, both manpower spaces and equipment, for the Department of the
Air Force residual function and the DIA element. Then, when the DIA Dissemina-
tion Facility is activated, support manpower spaces and equipment identifiers
for withdrawal will have been fully justified and accurate.

f. Personnel administration and responsibility for clearance will
be assumed by DIA on the effective date of transfer of personnel of
AFCIN-3D (less 3D4) to DIA.

g. Provision of the support detailed above, will be terminated by
joint agreement between DIA and the Department of the Air Force.

S. B. FRANKEL
Rear Admiral, USN
Chief of Staff

COORD:
DIAAP-1

Director's File Cy
Coord Cy (DIAAP)
Reading File Cy
DIAAP-1 Cy
REPLY TO

ATTN OF BLAIS-2/Colonel Asch/57948/12 Dec 62- Dr. Helser

27 DEC 1962

004208

SUBJECT: (U) Request for Information on COMAD Intelligence ADP Systems

TO: Commander-in-Chief, Continental Air Defense Command

1. Reference DOD Directive 5105.21, dd 1 August 1962, subj: "Defense Intelligence Agency".

2. DIA is currently in the process of collecting information to initiate development of a DOD World-Wide ADP Plan for Intelligence Information Processing. The principal objectives of this Plan are to reduce the time period currently required to develop intelligence ADP systems, to integrate system and development efforts, to make maximum use of developmental capabilities, and to facilitate the exchange of intelligence data in machine-readable form. Of utmost importance are the improvements to the overall intelligence process that can result through the integration of automated systems. These objectives will be pursued by:

   a. Encouraging the development of centralized management capabilities for intelligence ADP development in the unified and specified commands,

   b. Establishing a central repository in DIA for detailed descriptions of all intelligence ADP projects,

   c. Instituting a system for the free exchange of computer programs, techniques and machine-readable data,

   d. Standardizing certain of the input formats, codes, and techniques used throughout the Intelligence community, and

   e. Identifying certain R&D problems of common concern to all Services and commands.

3. In order to develop the DOD Intelligence ADP Plan, it is requested that the following data be forwarded to DIA when available:

   a. A statement of the planned ADP equipment configuration for your intelligence computer system. This statement should include type of equipment (including peripheral equipment), and scheduled dates of installation.

   b. A copy of any planning document or concept paper your command may have formulated to guide the future development of your intelligence ADP.
system. Of particular interest would be a statement as to which type of intelligence information (e.g. MAH, MAUN, etc.) will be processed on the 425L computer and which type will be processed on the 438L computer.

4. An all-source priority list of intelligence subjects your command intends to process in its computer system, with a statement as to the expected sources of inputs and types of outputs. This material should be forwarded through appropriate security channels.

4. A general statement of the extent to which your intelligence ADP system will be dependent upon 466L and the manner in which it will interface with it.

4. Each Service and command should benefit greatly from the World-Wide ADPS Plan for Intelligence Information Processing which DIA is formulating. Through the mechanisms of this plan and the procedures which will ensue from it, each organization will have access to the total ADP intelligence resources of the Department of Defense in developing its ADP intelligence system.

S. B. FRANKEL
Your Admiral, USN
Chief of Staff
SUBJECT: (U) Supplementary Information on Accompanying Correspondence

TO: The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

1. (S) The President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (FIAB) has made several trips abroad for the purpose of reviewing the U.S. Intelligence posture in the field. After each visit a report is rendered to the White House which in turn refers certain of the recommendations to the Secretary of Defense for comment. OSD normally forwards the correspondence to DIA for preparation of a reply for the SecDef’s signature. DIA submits the proposed reply to SecDef through the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

2. (S) After a trip last fall to the Far East and Southeast Asia, the FIAB submitted a report on 5 October 1962. SecDef comments were submitted to Mr. Bundy on 28 October 1962. (Attachment 1 to Memo for SecDef). Subsequently, on 21 November 1962 Mr. Bundy requested a progress report concerning the status of implementation of the FIAB recommendations. (Attachment 2 to Memo for SecDef).

3. (U) The DIA proposed reply to Mr. Bundy (Attachment 1 to Memo for SecDef) has been coordinated with J-2 of the Joint Staff, and with ASD (Mr. Rebel’s office). DIA has consulted with PACOM in developing the response to recommendation 2.

COORD
Director’s Cy
Reading Cy
DIATT’s Cy
Comeback Cy

Declassified by SVI-1
6 October 1998
4. (U) Recommend that the attached memorandum be approved and forwarded by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff without formal JCS coordination.

1. Attach
   Memo for SecDef

COORD:
DLAPL-1
DLAPL-1
DLAPL

cc: Reading Cy
    Director's Cy
    Comeback Cy
    DIATT's Cy
MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF


Attached is a report on progress in implementing the recommendations submitted by the Joint Study Group (JSG) on Foreign Intelligence Activities, 15 December 1961. Considerable progress has been made toward satisfying the objectives of the Joint Study Group. Many of the recommendations have been implemented while steady progress is being made toward completing the remainder.

This semi-annual report is addressed to eleven JSG recommendations, of which six have subsequently been the subject of more specific recommendations of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board and will subsequently be reported upon to the President as response to the JSG recommendations. Two of the remaining five recommendations are completed and the other three are well in hand. It is therefore recommended that these semi-annual reports be discontinued.

2 Dec

Semi-Annual Progress Report

cc:
GARF, Mr. Randal
JCS
DCI

Declassified by
DIA/SVI-1
a Dec 2000

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Page 5 of 9

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
RECLASSIFICATION FOR DIA 5200.10
DOES NOT APPLY
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

TO: The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Semi-Annual Progress Report to the President on Implementation of the Joint Study Group (JSG) Recommendations

1. Attachment 1 is a semi-annual report which has been prepared for your signature in compliance with Mr. McGeorge Bundy's request of 30 August 1961 (attachment 2).

2. Mr. Rubel's office has provided the inputs for recommendations 7, 8, and 9. The report has been coordinated with Mr. Rubel's office, with the Office of Organization and Management Planning, and with DOD.

3. Attachment 3 is the previous semi-annual report on this subject.

4. Your memorandum of 12 August 1961 requested a monthly (later changed to quarterly) report on these same JSG recommendations. A separate quarterly report is not being submitted since the semi-annual report reflects the same information as would be reported at the end of the past quarter. Effective with this report ten of the nineteen recommendations involving DOD have been implemented. Six of the remaining recommendations have subsequently become the subject of more specific recommendations by the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (FIAB) and will henceforth be reported upon to the President as responses to the FIAB recommendations. The three remaining recommendations are well in hand. Therefore, it is recommended that the quarterly reports required by your office and the semi-annual report to the President be discontinued.

5. Upon your signature, copies of the semi-annual report, less your memorandum to the President, will be distributed to the same addresses as previous quarterly reports.

6. Signature of the memorandum to the President is recommended.

SIGNED
JOSEPH F. CARROLL
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director

3 Atch
1. Memo for the President
2. Memo from Mr. Bundy, 30 Aug 61
3. Preceding semi-annual report Sep 62

cc: OSD, Mr. Rubel

TOPS SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Supplementary Information on Accompanying Correspondence

1. (C) On 15 December 1960, the Joint Study Group on Foreign Intelligence Activities of the United States Government submitted a comprehensive report to the President. The Secretary of Defense was charged with implementing those recommendations which were applicable to his Department.

2. (U) On 12 August 1961, the Secretary of Defense charged the Director, DIA, with responsibility for expediting all of the recommendations applicable to the Department of Defense. He also requested that a monthly report be submitted on the status and estimated completion date of each recommendation. By June 1962, many of the recommendations had been implemented and it was no longer appropriate to submit reports on a monthly basis. In August 1962, the monthly reports were changed to quarterly reports, to be submitted on 1 March, 1 June, 1 September and 1 December.

3. (U) On 30 August 1961, Mr. McGeorge Bundy requested that the Secretary of Defense submit a semi-annual report for the President on actions taken to implement subject recommendations. The reports are to be submitted on 1 March and 1 December.

4. (U) Effective with this report the nineteen recommendations involving DOD have been implemented. Six of the remaining recommendations have subsequently become the subject of more specific recommendations by the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board and will henceforth be reported upon to the President as responses to the FIAB recommendations. Therefore, there are three remaining recommendations to be reported upon in future semi-annual reports or quarterly reports. Since these three are well in hand, the Secretary of Defense is being asked to discontinue the quarterly report, and to recommend to the President the discontinuance of the semi-annual report.

5. (U) Since the contents of the semi-annual report and the quarterly report for 1 March are the same, a separate quarterly report is not being submitted.

6. (U) It is recommended that this report be approved and forwarded to the Secretary of Defense without formal JCS coordination. The report has been coordinated with JCS.

SIGNED
JOSEPH F. CARROLL
Lieutenant General, USAF Director

040011-63
service) levels in Washington. (We believe that if such reorientation and consolidation were found to be practicable and wise, it would result in: (a) great dollar savings, (b) more efficient use of personnel and resources, (c) vast reduction in the amount of duplicative data now being transmitted over separate channels, (d) improved security protection for such data, (e) adjustment of the present situation wherein certain types of sensitive traffic to be exchanged between SCOs in the same general area must be passed via Washington area channels due to absence of local secure interconnecting circuits, and (f) more rapid receipt of critical intelligence at command levels in Washington and in the field. (Today, because he is dependent on a service component command SCO channel, CINCPAC often receives sensitive traffic hours after its receipt by his component commanders; similar, separate service channels prevail at the Washington level.)"

Comment:

On 21 November 1942, the DIA implemented Recommendation 3 by completing the review required by this recommendation and submitting to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, through the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a plan which addressed itself to the objectives of the DIA recommendations. The plan is presently being staffed prior to consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Requirements/Collection Offices, both at DIB level and at the US
commands, should result in an overall tightening of control over the
military intelligence collection effort and in the elimination of
duplication in the processing of intelligence requirements.

Unified Command Current Intelligence and Indications Centers
(CIC) which have a mutually supporting role with the DIA CIC have
been established or brought under control of the headquarters of
MACOM, PACOM, ALCON, COMAD, SAC, and LANTCOM. These elements, organized
initially on a minimum manning basis, were formed through transfer of
component resources. Plans are being developed to create similar full-
time centers at headquarters MACOM and JSTAF.

After DIA has established an operational capability in the newly
assigned areas of mapping, charting, and geodesy; technical intelligence;
and basic intelligence production; the US Commands will themselves
develop, on an evolutionary basis, and with DIA’s guidance and assistance,
an appropriately increased capability in their headquarters to correspond.

Recommendation 2: “The flow of intelligence guidance from the DIA,
on behalf of the JCS, to the Unified Commands and from the Unified
Commands to the component commands be particularly oriented toward
ensuring a controlled integration of effort on the part of the numerous
U.S. military intelligence organizations (e.g., in South Vietnam,
Thailand, Japan, etc.) to the end of accomplishing the most effective
and most economical utilization of their substantial resources.”

Concerns:

DIA’s capability for providing guidance to the field has pro-
gressively increased as the Agency implements control over functions
previously performed by the Services. DIA has provided technical
assistance in the strengthening of the intelligence elements of the
PACOM Headquarters and is exploring with PACOM representatives the
further steps that might be taken.

Headquarters PACOM has taken steps to identify those measures
which may be taken to integrate better the efforts of the numerous
military intelligence organizations of that command.

Recommendation 2: “The DIA, in consultation with other interested
elements of the DIB, review the feasibility and desirability of
consolidating the several parallel military communications networks
(known as Special Security Officers - SSOs) now employed to pass sensitive
data between component command elements in Hawaii and military and
civilian elements of the DIB in the Washington area. In addition to
considering such consolidation, this review should also explore the
feasibility and desirability of reorienting the entire SSO System so
as to enable it to provide primary service and support to Unified and
Specified Commands in the field and to command (as distinguished from
Attachment to Memorandum for Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Dated

Subject: Review of U.S. Foreign Intelligence and Related Activities
in Southeast Asia and the Far East

Recommendation: The DoD, JCS, and DIA place increasing emphasis
on the need for further strengthening the intelligence elements of the
DIA and the Unified Commands (including PACOM) at the expense of the
intelligence elements of the three military services and the component
commands.

Comment:

Strengthening of the intelligence elements of DIA is being
accomplished by a series of successive actions. These include the
transfer to DIA on 31 November 1962 of responsibility for overall
management and control over military mapping, charting, and geodetic
activities, and over scientific and technical intelligence on
1 January 1963. On the same date, the Defense Intelligence School was
created which combines and broadens the instruction previously
conducted separately by the Army, the Air Force, and the Navy. On
1 January 1963 the Air Force Intelligence Center (AFIC) was transferred
to DIA as the nucleus of the DIA Intelligence Production Center. This
nucleus will be expanded on 1 February 1963 by the transfer of the
Army and Navy intelligence production personnel. Consequent with
establishment of the Intelligence Production Center, AFIC Intelligence
automated data processing resources were placed under DIA control.
Cumulatively these actions have resulted in the transfer to DIA of
approximately 1900 additional service manpower years which are related
to the functions being absorbed by DIA. Additional plans for further
consolidation in DIA are still under review.

On 9 January 1963 the JCS approved the installation of a direct
on-line, secure teletype SSU circuit between DIA (JCSB) and Headquarters
DEFCON. This circuit should improve the exchange of information between
these headquarters since there is presently no direct SSU circuit between
them.

The strengthening of DIA is being paralleled in the Unified Commands.
As each functional element of DIA has become operational and assumed the
role of providing overall intelligence guidance and direction, the Agency
has assisted in bringing about a strengthening of comparable elements in
the Unified Commands. Following the establishment of the DIA Requirements/
Collection Office, the Unified Commands have established similar offices or
have made provisions for handling collection/requement actions pending
acquisition of the personnel spaces needed for formal establishment of
such elements. In all cases but one, STRICOM, the additional spaces
required have been taken from the components. The establishment of these
REPLY TO
ATTN OF: DIAPL-1/LtColBiggio/71263/18Jan63/ct

MEMORANDUM FOR MZ. McGEORGE BUNDY

SUBJECT: Review of U. S. Foreign Intelligence and Related Activities in Southeast Asia and the Far East

In response to your memorandum of 21 November 1962 which requested reports on the status of implementation of four recommendations by the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, I am enclosing herewith reports on Recommendations 1, 2, and 3. The reply to Recommendation 4 is being jointly staffed with the Central Intelligence Agency and will be forwarded separately.

1. Ack as stated

cc: The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

Comeback Cy

Coord:
DIAPL-1
DIAPL-1
DIAPL
REPLY TO

ATTN OF: DIAPL-1/LtColBiggio/71263/13Jan63/cr/retyped 21Jan63/wgc

TS-5896#R-1C

SUBJECT: (S) Review of J. S. Foreign Intelligence and Related Activities in Southeast Asia and the Far East

TO: The Secretary of Defense

THERE: The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Attachment 1 which has been coordinated with Mr. Robal's office, has been prepared for your signature in reply to the 21 November 1962 memorandum from the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Mr. McGeorge Bundy. This memorandum, (Attachment 2), requested a report on the status of implementation of the four recommendations contained in the PIA essay report of 5 October 1962. Attachment 1 provides the requested comments on recommendations 1, 2, and 3. The comments on Recommendation 4 will be provided separately by Mr. Robal's office. Initial comments by the Secretary of Defense to the 5 October 1962 PIA essay report is attached (see Attachment 3).

Declassified by SVI-1
6 October 1998

1. Memo for Mr. Bundy subj: as above, w/1 Attach
2. Memo from Mr. Bundy, subj: as above, 21 Nov 62
3. SecDef initial comments

CLASSIFICATION GROUP /

DIAPL-1
DIAPL-1
DIAPL
J-2
DORSE

255
SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT OF JOINT STUDY GROUP

\textbf{Recommendation No. 2}

Draw increased resources needed by JCS and unified commands from existing resources of military departments and component services.

\textbf{Note:}
The expansion of JCS, now nearing completion, has been accomplished from existing resources of the military departments. The intelligence staffs and personnel of the unified commands have been established and are in the process of being strengthened by drawing primarily from existing resources of the respective commands. This recommendation has been completed in the subject of more specific recommendations by the President's FIAA. Therefore, progress on this recommendation will be reflected in progress reports on FIAA recommendation 1 of 5 Oct 1943, indicating that FIAA recommendation 1 of 5 Oct 1943 is being implemented.

\textbf{Recommendation No. 3}

Close control of intelligence budgeting procedures by the Secretary of Defense.

\textbf{Exhibit:}
The Defense Intelligence Agency has completed preparation of the FY 1943 consolidated budget for non-cryptologic intelligence operations of the 

\textbf{Note:}
In addition, FMA 1003 projected expenditure by year, providing the preparation of a consolidated intelligence program which will utilize, current and future costs related to intelligence operations. The consolidated intelligence program will be submitted to the President for approval prior to 1 July 1943. FMA will review the Services' FY 43 budget for intelligence activities, which will be based upon the approved program of the Secretary of Defense. A consolidated non-cryptologic program has been established giving similar financial and program information on non-cryptologic intelligence activities within the 20th Century. Full details are available from the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

\textbf{Recommendation No. 4}

\textbf{Exhibit:}

Policies for more rigorous selection and training of attacks and other intelligence personnel for military personnel in military departments.

\textbf{Note:}
The Defense Intelligence School and the Intelligence Language Institute have been established and are in operation. These will disseminate guidance in the operation of the services' attack systems and continuing selection and training policies and requirements in presently being prepared. The plan for providing non-cryptologic specialists in photography, radar and infrared interpretation is under study in Headquarters, DIA.
Status: Action on this recommendation is being reserved until the reorganization of military intelligence progresses further.

Recommendation No. 24

Transmittal of intelligence guidance to unified commands and through them to component commands through SEC-authorized channels.

Status: DIA's capability for providing guidance to the field has progressively increased as the Agency implements central and functional review performed by the Services. DIA has provided technical assistance in the strengthening of the intelligence elements of the various SHA combat headquarters and in coordinating with them the additional steps which should be taken. The progress on this recommendation will henceforth be reflected in progress reports on FIAD recommendation 2 of 3 October 1963.

Recommendation No. 25

Control by unified commands over intelligence activities of component commands.

Status: Strengthening of DIA in being paralleled in the SHA commands. As each functional element of DIA has become operational and assumed the role of providing overall intelligence guidance and direction, there has been a strengthening of comparable elements in the SHA commands, especially in the areas of requirements/collection and in Central Intelligence and Indications Centers. The progress on this recommendation will henceforth be reflected in progress reports on FIAD recommendation 1 of 3 October 1963.

Recommendation No. 26

Develop more effective coordination of intelligence work between SHA and CIA.

Status: SHA and CIA in their respective areas are in close collaboration with appropriate CIA elements, and the SHA is seen to be in a position to affect closer collaboration in elements, collection research and development requirements. The objective of this recommendation is essentially provided for.
SUBJECT: (C) The DIA ELINT Exploitation Plan

TO: DIAAP
   DIAAQ
   DIALP

DIAC <----- DIAMS
DIASC
DIASA
DIAXX
DIASO

1. The DIA ELINT Exploitation Plan is approved in principle and limited implementation is authorized pending an analysis of the entire ELINT problem.

2. The responsibilities for implementation and ELINT exploitation are assigned as follows:

   a. Over-all implementation and ELINT exploitation are assigned to DIAAP.

   b. DIAAQ and DIAXX will provide assistance in adapting the appropriate acquisition directives and requirements to provide the specific procedures for the submission of collection requirements.

   c. DIAXX will assist in the fiscal and manpower resource identification. However, the required manpower will be provided primarily from DIAAP resources.

   d. DIASA will ensure that processing of personnel actions is accomplished as a priority matter.

   e. DIASO and DIAXX will provide assistance in justifying additional specially cleared billets.

   f. DIAMS will provide machine processing support.

   g. Phasing of implementing actions will be coordinated with all affected elements and monthly reports of progress will be provided to the command section.

3. DIALP will establish a working group to analyze the entire ELINT problem, including all DOD activities which have a functional responsibility in the acquisition and exploitation of ELINT. This analysis should
result in identification of all resources involved in ELINT acquisition and exploitation; a comprehensive program for the future and recommended action to ensure maximum efficiency and effectiveness as well as elimination of any unnecessary duplication. The Chief of the working group will be furnished by DIA with representation from DIAAF, DIAAQ, DIAXX, DIACC, DIAMS and DIARD. To the extent feasible, the working group will take advantage of the data collected and the work done to date in preparing the National ELINT Plan; however, it will not await approval of the NEP before undertaking its task.

S. B. FRANKEL
Rear Admiral, USN
Chief of Staff
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

THROUGH: THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Plan for Photographic Intelligence in the Defense Intelligence Agency


The Detailed Plan for Photographic Intelligence in the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), reference *(a)*, as endorsed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in reference *(b)*, is approved. Implementation of the provisions of the Plan will be as determined by the Director, DIA, and should be completed by 15 February 1964.

The transfer to DIA from other DoD components of military and civilian manpower authorizations; photographic interpretation equipment or activities and or order; facilities; funds; records, and files will be accomplished in accordance with established DoD procedures. Adjustments to the Five Year Force Structure and Financial Program resulting from the implementation of this Plan will be effected under the simplified program change procedures outlined in reference *(c)*. The Director, DIA, is delegated authority to resolve any questions which may arise incident to the identification and transfer to DIA from other DoD components of specific items of equipment or other resources.

Enclosure to Attachment to JCS 2031/339
** Enclosure A to JCS 2031/345
*** Attachment to JCS 1800/705
The following amendment to DoD Directive 5105.21 will be issued shortly and charges DIA to:

"Establish, maintain, and operate the necessary facilities for providing military photographic processing, printing, interpretation, analysis and library intelligence services for the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Defense agencies, and, as appropriate, the unified and specified commands, the military departments and non-DoD activities."

During implementation of the Detailed Photographic Intelligence Plan, the Director, DIA, is requested to provide me with bimonthly progress reports on the status of its implementation with informational copies supplied the Secretaries of the military departments and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Within one year after the Detailed Plan has been implemented the Director, DIA, is requested to assess the adequacy of the manpower levels of DIA's photographic interpretation activity and report thereon to me and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. If the Director, DIA, concludes that additional manpower authorizations or resources are required, he should submit his requests to me through the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Copies to:
Secretary of the Army
Secretary of the Navy
Secretary of the Air Force
Director, Defense Research and Engineering
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations & Logistics)
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower)
TS-71298/1-3

18 October 1963

SUBJECT: (U) Intelligence Planning for Wartime (RCY: DIA-OA-D2)

TO: Commander in Chief, Alaska
    Commander in Chief, Atlantic
    Commander in Chief, Continental Air Defense Command
    US Commander in Chief, Europe
    Commander in Chief, US Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic
    and Mediterranean
    Commander in Chief, Pacific
    Commander in Chief, South
    Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command
    Commander in Chief, US Strike Command

REFERENCES: a. JCS 2031/40, 27 January 1957
             b. JCS 2031/58, 23 December 1957

1. Background:

   a. (TS) Recommendation No. 3 of the Report of the President's Board of
      Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities, dated 20 December 1956,
      stated: "We urge that action be expedited to bring the planning for intelli-
      gence activities in time of war to the highest feasible state of readiness
      and that a realistic war gaming of them begin as soon as practicable."
      Submission of joint progress reports by Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff,
      and Director of Central Intelligence was directed by memorandum from the
      Executive Secretary of the National Security Council, dated 3 March 1959
      (Reference a). This memorandum further directed that particular emphasis
      be placed on provisions of Central Intelligence Agency support to the
      Military in wartime and on the war gaming contemplated in Recommendation
      No. 3.

   b. (U) By memorandum from the Executive Secretary of the National
      Security Council, dated 23 May 1960, it was directed that this report
      be submitted annually.

   c. (U) The Defense Intelligence Agency has responsibility for
      preparation of the report, in coordination with the Central Intelligence
      Agency, for joint submission by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff,
      and the Director of Central Intelligence to the President.
2. (U) The purpose of this letter is to clarify and update the requirement for the annual report.

3. (TS) It is requested that each addressee furnish a report on intelligence, unconventional warfare and psychological warfare activities during FY 1963 under his purview to the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, by 10 January 1964, for inclusion in the DIA format at attachment 1. The report should cover four broad but separate subjects:

   a. (TS) Planning for intelligence and related activities that will enhance the ability of an organization to perform its mission in time of war.

   b. (TS) Testing the completeness and feasibility of plans for rendering of support by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in wartime intelligence collection, insofar as this may pertain to the addressees.

   c. (TS) The state of readiness for intelligence activities in time of war. This will cover testing (including war games) of intelligence plans that support war plans to ensure completeness, feasibility, and adequacy to effect a smooth transition from peace to war, and their ability to satisfy intelligence requirements in time of war.

   d. (TS) The outlook for the future to include actions planned, completed or programmed. In a memorandum to the Director of Central Intelligence and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated 28 March 1963, the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs stated:

   "Noting the specific problem areas identified in Section V of your current report and those referred to in your previous joint submission, it is requested that your next annual report to this office and to the President's Board include an assessment of the results of remedial action taken and of any major outstanding problems which inhibit the accomplishment of the objectives of the Board's recommenda-

   Therefor, therefore, the above quoted requirement should be considered in preparing your report.

4. (TS) Parallel instructions are being sent to the CIA Senior War Planner (SWP) or their equivalents in each command area through CIA channels. Coordination with the SWP during the preparation of your reports is encouraged.
5. This annual, recurring report, due each 10 January on the previous
CV activities, has been assigned Reports Control Symbol RCS: DIA-0A-D2.

S. B. FRANKEL
REAR ADMIRAL, USN
Chief of Staff

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Format for the Report (TB)
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Format of the Annual Report to the President on Recommendation No. 3 of the Report to the President by the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities, Dated 20 December 1956

I. Scope of the Report

The report covers (a) planning for intelligence and other activities in time of war, (b) planning for CIA support of military operations in wartime with regard to clandestine intelligence collection, (c) the testing of this planning, and (d) the outlook for future improvement.

II. Planning for Intelligence and Other Activities in Time of War (REF. par. 3a, basic letter)

A. CIA/DIA Planning
   (Submitted Jointly by CIA and DIA)

B. CIA Planning
   (Submitted by CIA only)

C. Service Planning
   (Submitted by the individual military departments)

D. Area Planning
   (The planning activities of the various CINCs are included under this topical heading.)

III. Planning for CIA Support in Wartime (REF. par 3b, basic letter)

(This section concerns itself with joint planning (CIA/CINC), wartime intelligence collection requirements, safe areas, contact areas, CIA military and administration support, wartime relocation sites, etc.).

Declassified with redactions by DIA/SVI-1
6 Dec 00

THIS DOCUMENT CONSISTS OF 2 PAGES
COPY NUMBER 174 OF 163

ATTACH #1 TO DIA LETTER 10 OCE 63
IV. Testing Actions. (Ref par 3c, basic letter)

(This section, which constitutes the major portion of the report, concerns the testing, exercising, and wargaming of CIA and CINC plans and the results thereof.)

V. The Outlook. (Ref. par. 3d, basic letter)

(This section contains a summary of actions which are contemplated or programmed, problem areas stated in previous reports that have been corrected or remedied, and assessment of the results of the action taken, and any major outstanding problems which inhibit the accomplishment of the objectives of the Board's recommendation.)
MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: (U) Annual Report to the President

1. Recommendation No. 3 of the Report of the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities, dated 20 December 1956, stated: "We urge that action be expedited to bring the planning for intelligence activities in time of war to the highest feasible state of readiness and that a realistic wargaming of them begin as soon as practicable." Semiannual submission of joint progress reports by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Director, Central Intelligence, was directed by memorandum from the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council, dated 3 March 1959. This same memorandum further directed that particular emphasis be placed on provision of Central Intelligence Agency support to the military in wartime and on the wargaming contemplated in Recommendation No. 3. Annual submission of the report on 1 March was directed by memorandum from the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council, dated 23 May 1960.

2. Forwarded herewith are nine copies of the report for 1963. The report is based, in part, upon information provided by the Unified and Specified Commands, and was prepared by the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Central Intelligence Agency, in coordination with the Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities, Joint Staff.

3. The attached report is the tenth in the series in answer to a recommendation made in 1956. The situation which the President's Board found at that time has changed to such an extent that I feel that the report is no longer justified. The original purposes of the President's Board in calling for the report have largely been met by the
increased tempo of war planning and the growing spirit of cooperation between the Armed Forces and the Central Intelligence Agency, and, in particular, by the participation of the Central Intelligence Agency in a growing number of war games. I have, therefore, incorporated a recommendation into the attached memorandums for canceling the requirement for the report. I understand that a similar recommendation is being made to the Director of Central Intelligence by his staff.

4. It is recommended that you sign the memorandum for the Director of Central Intelligence and that you sign the memorandum to the President covering Copy No. 1 of the report.

5. Copies 1 - 6 are to be forwarded under the memorandum for Director of Central Intelligence. Copies 7 - 9 may be retained in your files.

Atch
Memo to Director of Central Intelligence w/1 Atch

cc: DIASC-2 file cy
DIAPL-3 Comeback cy
DIAPL-A file cy
DIADR Reading cy
SUBJECT: (U) Intelligence Support to the National Command Authorities

TO: Distribution A

1. Among the responsibilities of the Defense Intelligence Agency is the vital responsibility of assisting the National Command Authorities in making sound decisions by providing full, accurate and timely intelligence. To assure that the Defense Intelligence Agency is prepared to carry out this responsibility, the Director, Joint Staff, was requested to provide a statement of the alternative and successive decisions, under conditions of rapidly increasing international tension leading up to and including a general war between the U.S. and Communist Bloc, which the National Command Authorities may be called upon to make during the (1) pre-strike period, (2) trans-strike period, (3) post-strike period and (4) terminal phase. The request also asked what specific intelligence data or judgments are required for each of the foregoing decisions and the point in time where each item of intelligence ceases to be of value.

2. The Director, Joint Staff, in his response, provided a statement of the major decisions to be made during the pre-strike, trans-strike, post-strike periods and the terminal phase, and the intelligence requirements for each of those periods. This data is included in the attachment hereto.

3. Attention is invited to the fact that other documents contain requirements for intelligence support under specific conditions (e.g., JSOP, EAP's, NWDS, General Indicator List, JCS 2308/165 (IMMD Master Plan), etc.) and that the attachment is a definitive statement of the intelligence support required by the National Command Authorities, oriented toward general war and the execution of the JSOP. It is anticipated that after further detailed analysis and extensive coordination, it will be possible to develop an expanded revision.

4. All elements of the Defense Intelligence Agency will review their procedures and functions in light of the attachment to assure the capability to provide the required intelligence support, taking necessary corrective action as required.

S. B. FRANKEL
Rear Admiral, USN
Chief of Staff

CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY

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UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENTS THIS DOCUMENT REMAINS TOP SECRET.

Declassified with redactions by DR/ASVP on 6 Dec 00

UNCLASSIFIED
MAJOR DECISIONS TO BE MADE DURING PRE-STRIKE PHASE

1. Whether to increase readiness of US Forces.
2. Whether to initiate actions short of general war.
3. Whether to consult with allies or friendly governments.
4. Whether to initiate general war.
5. Specify general war tasks.
6. Select SIOP Option.
7. Direct execution of other operations concurrent with SIOP.
8. Whether to exercise withholds against any country in the Bloc.
9. 
10. 

Declassified with redactions by DIA.
6 Dec 80
INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS DURING PRE-STRIKE PERIOD

1. It is assumed that prior to the Pre-Strike period normal intelligence information available to the Joint Chiefs of Staff would provide an across-the-board analysis of the world-wide activities of the Sino-Soviet Bloc. The intelligence information should be sufficiently broad so that any abnormalities in Soviet Bloc activity could be analyzed quickly and the significance determined. In essence, the JCS should provide the Joint Chiefs of Staff a timely Intelligence Estimate of the Situation with particular emphasis and detail on geographical areas of high tension or limited conflict.

2. As world tension increases, attention should focus more closely on the operational aspects of the enemy activity to permit assessment of enemy intent, readiness, imminence of attack, size of forces, and possible target systems to be attacked. Information, therefore, should be provided on the following items:

   a. What is the disposition and posture of Soviet Bloc strategic aircraft and missile forces? Are they in an increased alert status? Have aircraft deployed to staging bases? Have Soviet strategic forces increased their overall readiness and capability to strike the Free World? What is the missile refill capability?

   b. Similar information as above on Soviet ground, air, and sea forces to include medium range missile and subversive (para-military) forces.

NOTE: Wherever possible in a and b above, the capabilities of Bloc military forces should be measured in as precise terms as possible. For instance, the capability of the JCS should be measured in the number of weapons that could be launched against the Free World (sub-divided as appropriate) in hourly increments. How many of these weapons could be expected to arrive on the Free World in hourly time increments? What would be the expected megatonnage?

   c. In addition to the operational items listed above, information of a political-military nature must be provided to assist decision makers in determining whether the Soviet Union is pursuing political courses of action that support an intent to engage in general war; i.e., instructions to the civil population; frequent politico-military conferences.

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d. Information on the participation of other Soviet Bloc countries is also required. What is the probability that each Bloc country may not participate in a general war? What is the probability that each can be coerced to remain out of the conflict? What is the probability of dissident elements taking control? This information would apply primarily to decisions regarding possible withholding of attacks during the initial strike.

e. Additional political information should be available regarding the intentions and leanings of allied, friendly, or neutral nations. Information should point up whether our allies would participate with us and the effect if they do not. To what extent could we expect support from friendly or neutral nations? This information would be used by decision makers in determining whether and how much we should consult with our allies and would be especially critical in the NATO arena.

f. As the situation becomes critical, the intelligence effort should provide indications of an impending attack. Do we have unequivocal warning that an attack is imminent? Have forces departed from launching bases? Where are unreported moves being made? Are missiles being counted-down? Where is the attack coming from? Going to? Are the attacking forces moving? Are ground and naval forces moving? What percentage of the total force is involved? Are hard missiles being held back for possible subsequent use? Is the attack an all-out one, or is it ambiguous? Are our cities being attacked? Are military targets being attacked? Are our national command, control and communications systems being attacked? What is the pattern of attack worldwide?

g. Any other information that would bear on the decisions to be made during this phase.
MAJOR DECISIONS TO BE MADE DURING TRANS-STRIKE PHASE

1. Whether to release previously withheld forces.
2. Specify objectives for offensive operations other than STOP.
3. To direct reinforcement of forces etc.
4. Whether to lessen or stop attack against any of the Soviet Bloc countries.
5. Specify reconstitution procedures.
INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS DURING TRANS-STRIKE PHASE

1. During this phase the main intelligence requirements will be information on the effectiveness of our attack and indications of any change in the scope, weight or objectives of the enemy attack. This information should provide the basis for directing and controlling operations and permit decision authorities to reallocate effort as necessary and as the situation permits.

2. Intelligence provided in the Pre-Strike phase will continue to be required. In addition, information will be required on the following items:

a. Is the enemy exercising control of the situation and how is he doing it?

b. Is the effect of our attack generally as expected? What does the enemy estimate our attack is accomplishing?

c. Are any individual countries prepared to cease hostilities?

d. What is the degree of damage worldwide?

e. What are the radiation levels at the various monitoring points?

f. What enemy operating bases (air and sea) are available?

g. What is the effectiveness of enemy defenses?

h. Are any new weapons being employed?

i. What enemy forces are still operational and what are their capabilities?

j. Is the enemy changing the scope of his attack?

k. Any other information that would bear on the decisions to be made during this phase.
MAJOR DECISIONS TO BE MADE DURING POST-STRIKE PERIOD

1. Whether further prosecution of the war is required.
2. Specify scope and objective of second strike (if needed) including missions of commanders.
3. Specify objectives for offensive operations other than 2 above.
4. Specify reconstitution policies of areas.
INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS DURING POST-STRIKE PHASE

During this phase there may be a pause in, or a cessation of hostilities. Intelligence requirements in addition to those of the trans-strike phase are as follows:

a. Identity and location of Soviet residual capability.

b. Is the Soviet in control of his own forces?

c. What damage has resulted to him? Can he continue the war? What has happened to his industrial base?

d. Can he provide necessary direction and control of civil affairs within his country?

e. What damage has resulted worldwide?

f. Are there any significant "third powers?"

 g. What new political alignments appear to be forming within and between countries.

h. Any other information that would bear on the decisions to be made during this phase.
MAJOR DECISIONS TO BE MADE DURING TERMINAL PHASE

1. Required measures to ensure that US retains appropriate military posture to prevail over enemy and to ensure capability to impose peace terms.

2. Pursuant to above necessary decisions regarding occupation, rehabilitation, and utilization of enemy forces.

3. Determination of military assistance to civil functions within US.
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INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS DURING THE TERMINAL PHASE

During this phase hostilities have ceased. Intelligence requirements in addition to those of the post-strike phase are as follows:

a. What are Soviet residual force capabilities both defensive and offensive?

b. What areas could the Bloc force attack and how effective would the attack be?

c. What are his residual war supporting capabilities?

d. What casualties/fatalities have resulted?

e. What is the capability of the Soviet to provide necessary food, clothing, housing, medical care, etc., either by military or civil agencies?

f. Will occupation be necessary, desirable, or possible?

g. What are the enemy's views regarding post war organization?

h. Our allies' views?

i. Any other information that would bear on the decisions to be made during this phase.
DOCUMENTS SECTION TWO, PART C:

COLLECTION
SUBJECT: Assignment of Functions and Responsibilities to the Defense Intelligence Agency

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
   Department of the Army
   Room 20464, The Pentagon

   Director of Naval Intelligence
   Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
   Department of the Navy
   Room 5072, The Pentagon

   Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
   Department of the Air Force
   Room 4492, The Pentagon

REFERENCE: Deputy SecDef ltr, 23 Jan 62, same subject.

1. This Agency has been directed to develop a schedule and plan for the assumption of the specific responsibilities and functions enumerated in the reference.

2. With respect to the Armed Services Personnel Interrogation Center (ASPIC), The Armed Services Document Intelligence Center (ASDIC), and The United States Armed Services Exploitation Center (USASEC), the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army is requested to designate an action officer with whom this Agency's action officer can confer in the development of the necessary papers.

3. With respect to paragraph 2 of the reference, each of the addresses is requested to furnish information on all programs, activities, projects, detachments or individuals within the categories described. To the extent practicable, such information should include the following:
   a. Title of the enterprise.
   b. Statement of mission or purpose and basis or authority on which established.
   c. Number and types of personnel assigned.
   d. Types and quantity of equipment involved.

Declassified by SVI-1 on 6 October 1998
a. FY 62 and FY 63 funding.

f. Description of function or modus operandi.

g. Relationships and reporting channels.

h. Administrative support and administrative procedures involved.

b. This Agency will afford such information identical or equivalent safeguarding as that provided by the organization currently responsible. Brigadier General R. A. Glenn, Assistant Chief of Staff for Plans, Policy and Progress should be consulted on any question of special or restrictive handling.

5. The following extensions are provided of the definitions contained in paragraph 2 of the reference:

a. "International intelligence exchange programs in which the DoD participates and which are now administered by the military departments" applies principally to programs involving the exchange or assignment of intelligence or intelligence liaison officers integrated into or accredited to intelligence organizations. It would be desirable at the same time to list separately such programs or arrangements as involve the exchange of information or intelligence without the assignment of specially designated personnel. Cryptologic exchange arrangements are not included.

b. "Unique intelligence projects which involve the placement of DoD personnel, whether on an overt or covert basis, in sensitive posts abroad" include all units, detachments and individuals meeting this description except the following:

(1) Elements involved in cryptologic collection.

(2) Elements of clandestine operations.

6. It would be appreciated if the data requested in paragraph 3 above could be furnished by 9 February. We would propose shortly thereafter to arrange for working conferences between service intelligence agency personnel, designated by you for each project or activity described, and action personnel of this Agency.

JUICE P. CARROLL
Majorette General, USAF
Director
MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL CINCPNN

SUBJECT: Proposal for Special Activities Office, Defense Intelligence Agency

1. The concept presented in Colonel Cole’s memorandum of 29 January is approved as a basis for further action, with the modifications and guidance indicated below and subject to the concurrence of Major General Collins.

2. It is desired that the plan be modified to provide for a more gradual assumption of full responsibility. The responsibility for the coordination of activities should be the joint concern of the J-2 and myself during the transition period. Therefore, the J-2 should not immediately be deprived of capabilities in this area. I would prefer rather than have an immediate transfer of personnel in the Reconnaissance Section of the Plans Division, J-2, that Colonel Cole and the members of the section and the members of the DIA SFU be authorized to work for both the J-2 and the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency during this transition period. Colonel Cole would then be authorized by me to supervise and coordinate the activities that would eventually be assigned in the Special Activities Office as a forewarning to complete integration.

3. It is noted that the plan does not provide for adequate representation from the Army among senior personnel. I desire that every effort be made to identify and obtain at least one relatively senior Army officer for the organisation and if it were possible, it might be desirable in achieving an adequate balance of service representation to obtain a field grade Army officer.

4. The plan does not provide for liaison between the Assistant Directorates of DIA and the Special Activities Office. This may have been the intent under item 1a of the Support Branch’s mission; however, since the Support Branch will not be manned initially, it is mandatory that provision be made for liaison from the Assistant Directorates for Acquisition and Processing and/or the offices or sections therein. This should be arranged by appropriate coordination with those Directorates during the transition period.

5. In the light of the above, necessary action should be taken to implement the plan and establish the Special Activities Office, DIA. I would appreciate any comments or suggestions concerning this action. I desire that we proceed expeditiously with this matter.

JOSEPH F. CARROLL 09-74-86-61-89
Lieutenant General, U.S. AIR FORCE
Director

Declassified by SDI-1 0005-62
on 5 October 1998

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SUBJECT: Collection Evaluation System (C)

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Air Force

1. An important task to be accomplished by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) is the development of a system for the evaluation of collection activities. At the present time there is no system in operation within the military departments which will meet our needs.

2. It is understood that during the past year your office has developed a plan for evaluating human resource collection of information on the Sino-Soviet Bloc. It is further understood that the plan requires the development of a data base utilizing the IBM 7090 computer located at the Air Force Intelligence Center and that your planning has progressed to the point where an initial capability can be implemented.

3. For these reasons, it is recommended that the Air Force system be placed in operation. This action would permit the Defense Intelligence Agency to draw on specific operational experience at a much earlier date than would otherwise be possible and would also permit the immediate establishment of a fund of computer-stored information for future experimentation in the development of a final type DIA evaluation system.

4. In an effort to increase the scope of computer stored information available for DIA experimentation, it would be desirable, if sufficient computer time can be made available, to permit Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army and the Director of Naval Intelligence to supply input data when feasible and within their limitations and capabilities to provide such inputs in a usable and compatible format.

5. If you approve of placing your planned evaluation system in operation, it is suggested that the Office of Collection Management, Directorate of Acquisition, DIA, work closely with your personnel engaged in the program. This would permit that office to maintain an intimate knowledge of your program and afford it an opportunity to assist your personnel as desired.

SIGNED
WILLIAM W. QUINN
Lieutenant General, USA
Deputy Director

Declassified by STG-1 or 6 October 1998
27 April 1962

KINDERGARTEN FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: (C) IFC Membership

1. Problem: To designate DIA membership on the Interagency Priorities Committee (IFC) of the United States Intelligence Board.

FACTORS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM


3. Security: IPC-D-7/59, dated 1 December 1959, states the nature of this Committee is such that its very title reflects an activity not ordinarily revealed by this government. The full title, therefore, should be classified "SECRET." The short title of the Committee, "IFIC," is in reality a symbol significant only to the intelligence community, and need not be classified. Names of the Chairman and other DIA members when identified with the Committee should be classified "SECRET." Reference to non-CIA members in connection with clandestine activities should bear the classification "SECRET.

4. Functions: The general functions of the Committee, as published in DOD 5/5, are to determine essential foreign information requirements for clandestine collection operations conducted by the clandestine services; CIA and to provide the clandestine service of CIA with comprehensive, periodically revised statements (IFIC lists) of such clandestine collection requirements, and of targets related thereto, with appropriate background information and clear assignments of priorities consistent with the PHU's.

5. Membership: Each department or agency represented on the United States Intelligence Board may nominate a principal and an alternate IFC member. The Chairman of the IFC is appointed by the Director of Central Intelligence.

DISCUSSION

6. The IFC Principal Member for the Air Force was the AN/THZ-1 Requirements Division. of the same office was Air Force Alternate Member. In order to continue uninterrupted operations in processing Air Force requirements, in accordance with the DIA Activation Plan, both members remained as Air Force representatives to the IFC and kept the DIA Office of Requirements informed of IFC activities. On 8 February 1962, the

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Air Force designated new representatives from AMDC to replace both former members who had been transferred to the DIA Office of Requirements.

7. Since activation of the DIA, the Office of Requirements has been the point in DIA which the IPC contacts. These contacts relate to the primary functions of the IPC concerning requirements lists (IPC Lists) and their priority in consonance with the PRIDs. Both of these functions are the responsibility of the Office of Requirements. The former Air Force IPC Member now assigned to the Office of Requirements provides the IPC with answers to their questions concerning requirements, validation and priorities assignment for IPC List revisions currently underway. The IPC considers the former members as interim DIA representatives until formal written notice of DIA nominations for IPC membership is received.

8. UNCLASSIFIED

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Activation of Initial Collection Evaluation System in the Air Force Intelligence Center (U-0105)

1. On 21 March 1968, the Deputy Director, DIA, signed a letter (Attachment 1) addressed to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Headquarters, USAF, requesting that he place in operation an initial collection evaluation capability. This system was designed by personnel in AFCIN who have since been assigned to DIA. The letter pointed out that one of the reasons why AFCIN was being requested to implement this initial capability was the fact that planning and computer programming within AFCIN had progressed to the point where an initial capability could be implemented.

2. On 30 March, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, USAF, answered (Attachment 2) the DIA request stating:
   a. Computer time could be made available to DIA;
   b. The Computer Program was really not completed; and
   c. Shortage of systems analysts and computer programmers would preclude accomplishing the work necessary to put the system into operation.

3. A check with personnel in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Comptroller, USAF, who actually performed the computer programming in question, confirmed the fact that the computer program to store basic data in proper format on magnetic tape had in fact been completed and had been tested utilizing simulated intelligence information. This simulated information was considered sufficiently realistic to constitute a valid test of the program. It is believed, therefore, that the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Headquarters, USAF, may have been misinformed in regard to the status of computer programming required for an initial capability.

4. Even though the initial computer program has been completed, there will undoubtedly exist additional problems in placing the system in full operation. In addition, computer programs for the manipulation of data in support of specific evaluations will have to be written. For this reason, DIA is investigating alternative means of providing the systems analysis and computer programming services required. Among these alternatives are (1) institution of an assistance contract and (2) limited in-house capability in the relatively near future.

Declassified by SVI-2
on 6 October 1993
5. A major prerequisite to valid collection evaluation is the existence of a large mass of data in suitable format for computer manipulation. In order not to delay the assembling of such data, it is desirable that the data be generated and stored until such time as it is practicable to process the data on the computer and store it on magnetic tape.

6. It is recommended that you sign the attached draft letter to the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Headquarters, USAF:

   a. Thanking him for making time on the AFIC Computer available to DIA;

   b. Informing him that alternative means of providing systems analysis and computer programming assistance are being investigated; and

   c. Requesting that, in order to have at least a minimum amount of basic data available for computer manipulation as soon as practicable, this required basic data be generated in AFIC and stored in any convenient, computer-compatible form, pending computer processing.

2 Attach
1. Ltr dtd 21 Mar 62 to AGSI, USAF
2. Ltr dtd 30 Mar 62 from AGSI, USAF, to Dir, DIA

SIGNED

WILLIAM M. MCCORMICK
REAR ADMIRAL, USN
Assistant Director for Acquisitio
Memo for Record

16 April 1962

On 21 March 1962 Deputy Director, DIA, dispatched a letter to ACSI, USAF, requesting that an initial collection evaluation capability, which had been developed by AMCIM, be placed in operation.

On 30 March ACSI, USAF, answered stating that the system could not be placed in operation at this time due to the requirement for additional computer programming and a shortage of computer programming personnel in APIC. This letter represents a modification of the original DIA requirement to obviate the difficulties enumerated by ACSI, USAF.
REPLY TO

APTH OF DIAAQ-2/0-0103

26 APR 1962

SUBJECT: (C) Collection Evaluation System

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

1. Reference AFCIN letter dated 30 March 1962, subject as above.

2. AFCIN's concurrence in our estimate of the importance of a collection evaluation program and offer of time on the AFC digital computer is appreciated.

3. In view of AFCIN's shortage of computer personnel, alternative means of providing the necessary systems analysis and computer programming assistance are being investigated while continuing to plan on utilizing the AFC digital computer for the purpose of processing the necessary basic data.

4. In the interim, it would be desirable to assure as much basic data as possible. This will permit meaningful evaluations of collections at a much earlier date than would otherwise be possible. For this reason, it is requested that action be taken in AFC to assess this basic data and store it in any computer-compatible form convenient to AFC. Specifically, this information consists of (1) the Fliege writer tapes, with minor additions, used in connection with Minneard storage, and (2) evaluation forms on each intelligence subject code in each report to be executed by the analysts of the office having primary responsibility for that particular subject.

5. The suggestion that the collection requirement format, and the intelligence reporting format, as well as the collection evaluation format be directed toward utilizing machine capability has great merit, and we are working toward this goal. However, it is suggested that we go ahead with what we are capable of doing at the present time, in full realization that future refinement in our techniques is probable.

6. AFCIN's reaction to this modified DIA requirement is requested.

S. B. FRANKEL
Rear Admiral, USN
Chief of Staff

COOH:

Col. Wood
Capt. Carroll
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DOCUMENTS SECTION TWO, PART D:

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE SCHOOL
THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
Washington 25, D. C.  

February 27, 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR The Secretaries of the Military Departments  
The Director of Defense Research and Engineering  
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff  
The Assistant Secretaries of Defense  
The General Counsel  
The Special Assistant and the Assistants to the Secretary of Defense  
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency  
The Director, National Security Agency

SUBJECT: Establishment of a Defense Intelligence School

In recognition that professional military education is critical to the career development of military and civilian intelligence personnel of the Department of Defense, a Defense Intelligence School (DIS) will be established in the Washington, D. C., area under DIA.

The initial curriculum of DIS will be designed for advanced (or postgraduate) intelligence staff officer and attaché training and generally will be based on (1) the postgraduate course in intelligence presently being offered at the Naval Intelligence School, and (2) the courses presently being offered at the Army Strategic Intelligence School.

The Department of the Navy is assigned total logistic and administrative support (including programming, financial and budgetary responsibilities) for the DIS.

The Director, DIA, is requested to develop a plan by 1 July 1962 for the establishment of DIS which will be submitted for approval to the Secretary of Defense through the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In developing the plan for the establishment of the DIS, the Secretaries of the military departments, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower), and the Director, National Security Agency should be consulted.

The activation of the DIS may be on a time-phased basis, both for students and courses, in order that the military departments may adjust their personnel policies to the establishment of the DIS.

In coordination with the Secretary of the Army and the Director, National Security Agency, consideration should be given to the possibility of collocating the Washington, D. C. foreign language training facility of DoD with the DIS.

/s/Roswell Gilpatric
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THRU: The Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Establishment of a Defense Intelligence School

1. In accordance with Deputy Secretary of Defense memorandum of 27 February 1962, subject as above, this Agency has developed the attached plan in consultation with the designated representatives of the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower), and the Director, National Security Agency.

2. This plan provides for the integration, in place, of the U. S. Army Strategic Intelligence School and the Postgraduate Department of the Naval Intelligence School on 1 July 1962, or as soon as practicable thereafter, to form the Defense Intelligence Staff College (DISC) under DIA. The school will be developed in two phases. In the first phase the existing facilities and staffs and faculties, augmented by four additional officers, including a general/flag officer as commandant, will be utilized to present a 37-week career development type course for relatively junior DOD intelligence personnel, a joint attaché course, and other short courses based on existing Strategic Intelligence School courses. During this phase, while the school operations are divided between two locations, emphasis will be placed on increasing tri-service student participation, on the selection and rehabilitation of a suitable permanent facility, and on the development of new courses and curricula. The second phase will begin when the school operations are consolidated in a permanent facility, with an appropriate increase in the size of the staff and faculty. At this time student enrollment in the junior career course will be significantly increased, an advanced course for senior officers will be inaugurated, and other courses will be expanded, modified or developed as required.

3. Recommend approval.

FOR THE DIRECTOR:

SIGNED

S. B. FRANKEL
Rear Admiral, USN
Chief of Staff

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Plan for Estab of a DIS

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Memo for Record

1. This plan for the establishment of the DIBC was developed by DIAPL-3 (Col Langford) in coordination with Mr. Donald W. Cameron, representing DIACC, and Capt Victor R. Baneard, representing DIASA, and in consultation with the following officially designated representatives of the DOD agencies indicated:

- **Sec/Army**
  - Lt Col Howell, Ctg & Tng Br, MACSI

- **Sec/Navy**
  - Capt Wiggins, Director, Naval Intelligence School

- **Sec/Air Force**
  - Maj Smith, Plans & Policy Div, AFCE

- **ASD (Mgr)**
  - Col Knight, Directorate for Education Programs

- **NSA**
  - Mr. Jessie L. Tanner, Office of Dir Training

2. This action forwards plan thru JCS to Sec Def for approval.

C. A. LANGFORD
Colonel, USA
Chief, Training Division

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**COORDINATION:** DIAPL

*DIAPQ R/Adm McCormick
*DIAAP Capt Stahl
*DIASA Col Leibel
*DIASG Col Asch
DIACC
DIAIG

* See attached memos expressing concurrence.
MEMORANDUM FOR The Secretaries of the Military Departments
                The Director of Defense Research and
                Engineering
                The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
                The Assistant Secretaries of Defense
                The General Counsel
                The Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
                The Assistants to the Secretary of Defense
                The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
                The Director, National Security Agency
                The Administrative Assistant

SUBJECT: Establishment of a Defense Intelligence School

References: (a) Deputy Secretary of Defense memorandum,
            same subject, dated 27 February 1962
            (b) JCSM-618-62, same subject, dated 18 August
            1962

In response to reference (a), reference (b) forwarded the
plan of the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), for the
establishment of a Defense Intelligence School (DIS), together with
the amendments thereto proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The Secretary and I consider that the DIS should be established
by DoD directive. Therefore, the plan forwarded by reference (b),
as amended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is approved except as modified
by DoD Directive 5105.25, "Defense Intelligence School," approved
this date, and by the subsequent applicable provisions of this
memorandum.

With regard to the Professional Education Branch within
Headquarters, DIA, a determination as to the appropriate manning
level is not considered feasible at this time. The recommendation
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the proposed augmentation for this Branch not be approved is affirmed; but is extended to include the additional civilian space requested. At such time as the Director, DIA, develops and submits for approval a final Joint Table of Distribution for Headquarters, DIA, an appropriate manning level for this Branch should be reflected.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower) will make the necessary adjustments in the manpower ceilings of DIA, and the military departments to reflect the assignment of personnel to the DIA for the DIS.

[Signature]

2
Department of Defense Directive

SUBJECT

Defense Intelligence School

References:
(a) DoD Directive 5105.21, "Defense Intelligence Agency"
(b) DoD Directive 4000.19, "Basic Policies and Principles for Interservice Support"

I. PURPOSE

This directive provides for the establishment of the Defense Intelligence School (DIS) as a professional educational institution attached to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).

II. MISSION

The DIS will conduct courses of instruction related to DoD intelligence functions designed to:

A. Enhance the preparation of selected military officers and key DoD civilian personnel for important command, staff, and policy-making positions in the national and international security structure.

B. Prepare DoD military and civilian personnel for duty in the military attache system.

C. Assist the broad career development of DoD military and civilian personnel assigned to intelligence functions.
III. APPLICABILITY

The provisions of this directive apply to all components of DoD.

IV. FUNCTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

Under the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director, DIA, shall:

A. Operate and control the DIS.

B. Determine the level and scope of courses of instruction to be offered by the DIS for both resident and non-resident use.

C. Review on a periodic basis the courses and curricula of the DIS to insure accomplishment of the mission assigned.

D. Establish for the DIS:

1. The total enrollment and allocation of student quotas for resident courses.

2. Criteria for selection of students for resident courses.

3. Prerequisites and regulations for participation in correspondence courses.

E. Reallocate unfilled quotas for resident courses at the DIS on an equitable basis.

F. Select the Commandant, DIS, from nominees submitted by the military departments.

G. Program, budget and provide financial administration for the DIS.

H. Report annually to the Secretary of Defense on the operations of the DIS including recommendations as appropriate.
V. ADMINISTRATION

A. The Commandant, DIS, will be a general or flag officer of brigadier general or equivalent rank. There will be no established system of inter-departmental rotation for this position.

B. The Commandant and Deputy Commandants will normally be from different military departments.

C. The staff and faculty of the DIS will be selected on an approximately equal basis from the military departments and will include such civilian associates as required.

D. Personnel for the staff and faculty of the DIS will be assigned to the DIA for the DIS and will be subject to the approval of the Director, DIA.

E. Administrative and logistic support furnished by a military department will be in accordance with the basic policies and principles established in DoD Directive 4000.19 (reference (b)).

F. Pay, allowances, and permanent change of station travel costs of military personnel assigned to the staff and faculty of the DIS will be borne by the military department concerned.

G. Pay, allowances, and travel costs of personnel participating in resident courses at the DIS will be borne by the sponsoring organization.

VI. AUTHORITY

The appropriate provisions of Section VI, DoD Directive 5103.21 (reference (a)) apply to the Director, DIA, and his designees, in the discharge of the functions and responsibilities assigned by this directive.
VII. EFFECTIVE DATE AND IMPLEMENTATION

A. This directive is effective upon publication. Its provisions will be implemented as determined by the Director, DIA.

B. When the Director, DIA, assumes a function or responsibility assigned by this directive, all DoD components will review their existing directives, instructions, and regulations for conformity; make necessary changes thereto within 90 days; and notify the Director, DIA, when changes are completed.

C. The transfer of funds, equipment, personnel authorizations and civilian personnel and the arrangement for use of facilities incident to the establishment and operations of the DIS will be accomplished under established DoD procedures.

Deputy Secretary of Defense
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SUBJECT: Charter for the Defense Intelligence School (U)

1. Reference is made to:
   a. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) memorandum, dated 27 February 1963, subject as above.

2. The proposed Charter for the Defense Intelligence School is approved with the following modifications:
   a. Page 2, paragraph 3b - Add following paragraph:

      "3) Orientation Courses - Brief courses as required to meet the joint needs of the Defense Intelligence Agency and the intelligence agencies of the military departments for the orientation of military and Department of Defense civilian personnel in the performance of newly assigned duties."

      Reason: To permit flexibility in developing short courses as may be required.

   b. Page 3, paragraph 7 - Change to read as follows:

      "The total enrollment and allocation of student quotas for the short resident courses, other than the Defense Intelligence Course and the Advanced Intelligence Course, will be determined by the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency . . . ."

      Reason: Clarity

   c. Page 4, paragraph 12 - Add the following sentence:

      "The assignment of heads of the principal school departments will also reflect an equitable representation of the military departments."

      Reason: Clarity and completeness.
4. Page 4, paragraph 13

(1) Substitute "Director, Defense Intelligence Agency" for "Commandant."

Reason: Accuracy - in accordance with DoD Directive 5105.25.

(2) Add following sentence:

"Recommended criteria for their selection will be provided to the Services by the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency."

Reason: Accuracy - in accordance with reference b.

3. In the statement of the mission of the Defense Intelligence School in the proposed Charter, the Joint Chiefs of Staff interpret the following as permitting the training of foreign officers if such training is considered desirable:

"Enhance the preparation of selected military officers and key Department of Defense civilian personnel for important command, staff, and policy-making positions in the national and international security structure."

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

/s/M. J. ENGELDO
Brig Gen, USAF
Secretary
CHAPTER FOR THE
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE SCHOOL

Authority:

a. DOD Directive 5105.21, dated 1 August 1961
b. DOD Directive 5105.25, dated 2 November 1962
c. SM-141-63, The Joint Chiefs of Staff, 31 January 1963
d. SM-414-63, The Joint Chiefs of Staff, 29 March 1963

1. The Defense Intelligence School is a joint educational institution operated and controlled by the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, under the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

MISSION

2. The mission of the Defense Intelligence School is to conduct courses of instruction related to DOD intelligence functions designed to:

a. Enhance the preparation of selected military officers and key DOD civilian personnel for important command, staff, and policy-making positions in the national and international security structure.

b. Prepare DOD military and civilian personnel for duty in the military attaché system.

c. Assist the broad career development of DOD military and civilian personnel assigned to intelligence functions.

COURSES AND SCOPE

3. Courses of instruction, both resident and non-resident, will be established and maintained at the Defense Intelligence School as directed by the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency.

a. Initially these will consist of:

(1) Defense Intelligence Course - a course designed to provide military officers and career civilians with a broad education in the fundamentals of intelligence which will serve as a foundation for their progressive career development and future assignments to intelligence billets.

(2) Attaché Course - a course designed to prepare commissioned officers as selected by the Military Departments for assignment as military attaches and assistant military attaches.

(3) Strategic Intelligence Course - a course designed to provide military officers and career civilians with a working knowledge of strategic intelligence, its primary purpose and major functions, and the application of the components of strategic intelligence to the study of major world areas.

(4) Attaché Staff Course - a course designed to prepare military and civilian personnel as selected by the Military Departments for assignment to support functions in the military attaché system.
(5) **Strategic Intelligence Officer Refresher Course (Reserve Components)** - a course designed to provide commissioned officers of the reserve components with refresher training in, or a working knowledge of, current concepts, methods, and content of the strategic intelligence process.

b. Curricula for the following courses will be developed with a view to inauguration as adequate physical facilities and instructor personnel become available:

(1) **Advanced Intelligence Course** - a course designed to enhance the preparation of selected senior military officers and key DOD civilian personnel for important command, staff, and policy making positions in the national and international security structure. With the inauguration of this course the Strategic Intelligence Course will be discontinued.

(2) **Non-Resident Course** - a course, based on the curriculum of the Defense Intelligence Course, designed to provide active and reserve DOD military officers and civilian personnel with a broad education in the fundamentals of intelligence which will serve as a foundation for their progressive career development and future assignments to intelligence billets.

(3) **Orientation Courses** - Brief courses as required to meet the joint needs of the Defense Intelligence Agency and the intelligence agencies of the Military Departments for the orientation of military and Department of Defense civilian personnel in the performance of newly assigned duties.

**FUNCTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES**

4. a. To discharge the responsibilities of the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, the Commandant is specifically delegated authority to operate and control the activities and resources of the Defense Intelligence School subject to regulations and policies established by the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency.

b. The Commandant is authorized to deal directly with agencies and departments of the Department of Defense, with other governmental departments and agencies, and with other agencies and individuals as necessary for the effective operation of the Defense Intelligence School.

c. Programs of instruction for each course conducted by the Defense Intelligence School will be prepared by the Commandant and submitted to the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, for approval.

d. The Commandant will prepare an annual report to the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, on the operations of the Defense Intelligence School, including recommendations as appropriate. The initial report will cover the calendar year 1963 with subsequent reports prepared as of the end of each succeeding calendar year.

e. The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, will prepare, budget and provide financial administration for the Defense Intelligence School.

**STUDENT ENROLLMENT**

5. Recommended criteria for selection of students will be provided to the Military Departments by the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency.
6. The total enrollment and allocation of student quotas to the Military Departments and other Department of Defense agencies for the Defense Intelligence Course and the Advanced Intelligence Course will be determined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, based on the recommendations of the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency.

7. The total enrollment and allocation of student quotas for the resident courses, other than the Defense Intelligence Course and the Advanced Intelligence Course, will be determined by the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, on an equitable basis among the Military Departments and governmental agencies.

8. The Commandant is authorized to reallocate unfilled student quotas on an equitable basis among the Military Departments and governmental agencies that desire additional quotas.

9. Prerequisites and regulations for participation in correspondence courses will be established by the Commandant, subject to the approval of the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency.

ADMINISTRATION

10. The Commandant, Defense Intelligence School, will be a general or flag officer of brigadier general or equivalent rank. There will be no established system of interdepartmental rotation for this position.

11. The Commandant and Deputy Commandants will normally be from different Military Departments.

12. The staff and faculty of the Defense Intelligence School will be selected on an approximately equal basis from the Military Departments and will include such civilian associates as required. The assignment of heads of the principal school departments will also reflect an equitable representation of the Military Departments.

13. Personnel for the staff and faculty of the Defense Intelligence School will be assigned to the Defense Intelligence Agency for the Defense Intelligence School and will be subject to the approval of the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency. Recommended criteria for their selection will be provided to the Services by the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency.

14. Administrative and logistic support furnished by a Military Department will be in accordance with the basic policies and principles established in DOD Directive 4000.19.

15. Pay, allowances, and permanent change of station travel costs of military personnel assigned to the staff and faculty of the Defense Intelligence School will be borne by the Military Department concerned.

16. Pay, allowances, and travel costs of personnel participating in resident courses at the Defense Intelligence School will be borne by the sponsoring organization.

(AS APPROVED BY THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF IN CM-414-63, 29 March 1963)
DOCUMENTS SECTION TWO, PART E:

MAPPING, CHARTING, AND GEODESY
MEMORANDUM FOR The Secretaries of the Military Departments
The Director of Defense Research and Engineering
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Assistant Secretaries of Defense
The General Counsel
The Special Assistant and Assistants to the Secretary of Defense
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Director, National Security Agency

SUBJECT: Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy

Consistent with DoD Directive 5105.21, "Defense Intelligence Agency," dated August 1, 1961, and in furtherance thereof, the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) is hereby assigned responsibility for establishing a management control arrangement over DoD mapping, charting, and geodetic activities, including hydrography and oceanography. The Director, DIA, is requested to submit a Plan within 90 days which will outline the procedures and organization by which such management control will be achieved. This Plan will be submitted to the Secretary of Defense through the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The Plan will include provisions for DIA to:

(1) Validate all DoD mapping, charting, and geodetic requirements;

(2) Fix priorities on all DoD cartographic programs;

(3) Set specifications for cartographic production;

Declassified by SVI-1
on 6 October 1998

SecDef Cont. No. 1541

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC RECLASSIFICATION; DOD DIR 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY

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(4) Assign and reassign various production programs to the military departments within the mapping, charting, and geodetic resources of the respective departments;

(5) Collate, review, and task (as required) the collection resources of DoD mapping, charting, and geodetic data collection organizations;

(6) Consolidate, review, and assign the relative military importance of DoD mapping, charting, and geodetic research and development requirements;

(7) Establish a uniform DoD system for geodetic control;

(8) Budget for and administer funds required to finance such portion of the mapping, charting, and geodetic program activities which are performed by DIA personnel; and

(9) Prepare, review, and submit to the Secretary of Defense, under procedures approved by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), a consolidated DoD mapping, charting, and geodetic program and budget, together with recommendations pertaining thereto. The consolidated program and budget will include the estimates of the funds required to finance mapping, charting, and geodetic activities organized within and directly managed by DIA, and the estimates of the military departments of the funds required to finance mapping, charting, and geodetic activities which they conduct subject to DIA policy review and coordination.
In the discharge of the above functions, DIA will participate in joint reviews, where appropriate, with other staff advisors of the Secretary of Defense, such as the Director of Defense Research and Engineering and the Assistant Secretaries of Defense. Such joint reviews will normally be accomplished before recommendations and analyses are submitted to the Secretary of Defense for decision.

The Plan will also include specific provision to assure that over-all departmental mapping, charting, and geodetic requirements and priorities will be provided by the Joint Chiefs of Staff after consideration of recommendations made by the Director, DIA.

In addition, the Plan will identify those organizational elements and personnel spaces of (1) the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army; (2) the Office of the Chief of Engineers; (3) the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations; (4) the Hydrographic Office; (5) the Army Map Service; (6) the Aeronautical Chart and Information Center; (7) the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, and the Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, Department of the Air Force; and (8) whatever other existing organizations, as appropriate, which would be transferred to DIA to provide the Agency with the necessary managerial resources. The plan for the identification of the organizational elements and personnel should specifically provide for a segregation of military and civilian personnel by organizational element and all costs related to the functions performed by such organizations. This data will be developed in collaboration with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller).

Furthermore, while recognizing that photographic interpretation is used both in the production of maps, charts, and geodetic materials and in intelligence analysis, DIA will survey those DoD photographic interpretation organizations, or elements thereof, which provide major support to the military department intelligence organizations or mapping and charting organizations to ascertain what organizational elements and personnel spaces should be transferred to (1) DIA's mapping and charting managerial activity, or (2) DIA's intelligence production center.
The Plan will outline those procedures and other managerial arrangements by which DIA can provide for DoD mapping and charting contributions to:

1. The National Intelligence Survey;
2. Joint Chiefs of Staff strategic and war plans;
3. The Air Target Material Program;
4. The Amphibious Objective Study series; and
5. Photographic Interpretation projects.
2 Nov 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy

References: (a) SecDef memo, subject as above, dated 17 March 1962 *
(b) JCSM-527-62, dated 19 July 1962 **

Reference (a) assigned to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) responsibility for establishing a management control arrangement over DoD mapping, charting, and geodetic activities. The Director, DIA, was requested to submit a plan outlining the procedures and organization by which such DIA management control would be established in accordance with specific guidance contained in reference (a).

In essence, reference (a) contemplated that, while mapping, charting, and geodetic production agencies would remain in the military departments, management control over these agencies now existing at organizational levels within the military departments above the agencies would be transferred to DIA so as to provide effective central management of the total DoD effort.

To this end reference (a) directed that the DIA implementation plan identify for transfer from the headquarters of the military departments to DIA those organizational elements, including personnel spaces engaged in managing military departmental mapping, charting, and geodetic activities.

I have carefully examined the revised DIA mapping, charting, and geodetic management control plan, dated 13 July 1962, which was attached as Appendix A to reference (b). It is my considered judgment that this plan does not meet the objectives sought by reference (a). It

* Attachment to JCS 1856/107
** Enclosure A to JCS 1856/113
*** On file in Joint Secretariat; see also attachments to JCS 1856/112
envisages the DIA management control arrangement to be approximately that of the present Photographic and Survey Branch, Directorate for Intelligence of the Joint Staff, with each military department retaining considerable latitude for establishing requirements for the production of items used by that Department's component elements of unified and specified commands. In essence, the revised DIA plan would establish an additional management layer in DIA without eliminating duplicating management layers in the military departments. Significantly, it does not identify specific personnel spaces or staff elements for transfer to DIA.

Accordingly, the revised DIA plan should be further revised to bring it into specific conformity with the guidance contained in reference (a). In undertaking the necessary revisions, I believe it would be helpful for the Director of DIA to work with the Director of Organizational and Management Planning.

I hope it will be possible for the necessary revisions to be completed and submitted to me for my consideration on or before 19 November 1962.

[Signature]

Robert S. McNamara

Copy to:
Director of Organizational and Management Planning
MEMORANDUM FOR The Secretaries of the Military Departments
   The Director of Defense Research & Engineering
   The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
   The Assistant Secretaries of Defense
   The General Counsel
   The Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
   The Assistants to the Secretary of Defense
   The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
   The Director, National Security Agency
   The Administrative Assistant

SUBJECT: Mapping, Charting and Geodesy

References: (a) "Mapping, Charting and Geodesy Management Control Plan," DIA, dated 9 November 1962
(b) JCSM-904-62, Subj: "Second Revision of DIA Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy Management Control Plan (U)," dated 17 November 1962
(c) DoD Directive 5150.34, Subj: "Reconnaissance, Mapping and Geodetic Programs," dated 28 March 1961

The "Mapping, Charting and Geodesy Management Control Plan," dated 9 November 1962, of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), as endorsed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in reference (b), is approved for implementation. To insure widespread dissemination of the essential elements of the Plan within DoD, I have signed and there shortly will be issued a new DoD directive confirming the assignment of functions and responsibilities in the field of mapping, charting, and geodesy contained in the Plan.

In addition, this Plan and the forthcoming DoD directive noted above will supersede any conflicting provision of reference (c), pending the latter's revision.
Since the Plan specifies that each unified and specified commander will exercise a positive role in the mapping, charting and geodetic activities of his command, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are requested to inform the combatant commanders of their newly assigned functions and to request of them an assessment of the number of additional manpower spaces which may be required to discharge their new responsibilities. In the case of unified commanders, such manpower resources will be supplied insofar as possible from spaces presently assigned to their respective component command headquarters staffs or to other organizations attached to component command headquarters. If, however, the Joint Chiefs of Staff do not believe such spaces are available in component command headquarters, or attached organizations, such additional spaces should be supplied from mapping, charting, and geodetic support organizations and staffs of the military departments. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are requested to submit to me within 120 days a report of additional manpower spaces authorized the unified command headquarters under this Plan to include the source of such spaces. I would also like to be informed when the additional spaces authorized the unified commanders have been manned.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff are also requested to submit for my approval within 90 days a revision of the mapping, charting, and geodetic portions of Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).

The specific provisions of reference (a) will be implemented as determined by the Director, DIA. Whenever the Director, DIA, assumes full responsibility for a function or responsibility assigned by the Plan and has developed and issued the necessary managerial and administrative procedures, methods, and systems incident thereto, he will so report to the Secretary of Defense with informational copies supplied the Secretaries of the military departments.

The Secretaries of the military departments, during the course of implementation of this Plan, will evaluate the impact of DIA’s mapping, charting and geodetic functions upon their departmental mapping, charting and geodetic staffs and agencies and will make such organizational and management adjustments therein as
they consider necessary to achieve the objectives of the Plan, informing me of the nature and extent of such adjustments when they have been completed.

The military department Secretaries and the Director of Defense Research and Engineering are requested to assist the Director, DIA, in obtaining highly qualified civilian and military personnel to staff DIA's mapping, charting, and geodesy organization.

The Secretaries of the military departments are also encouraged to waive provisions of regulations pertaining to time limits for permanent change of station moves and stabilized tours to insure the DIA is provided with the competent military personnel it needs.

Throughout the implementation of the Plan the Director, DIA, will assess the adequacy of his manpower resources to discharge the functions and responsibilities assigned by the Plan. On 1 November 1963, the Director, DIA, will report to the Secretary of Defense through the Joint Chiefs of Staff as to the adequacy of the manning of DIA's mapping, charting and geodetic management activities.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower) will adjust the personnel authorizations of the military departments to reflect the transfer to DIA of civilian and military personnel authorizations identified in the Plan. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower) and the Administrative Assistant will adjust the personnel authorizations of the military departments and the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to re-establish for the Joint Staff three commissioned officer authorizations to replace those transferred to DIA by the transfer of the Photographic and Survey Branch, Directorate for Intelligence, Joint Staff.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) will effect transfer of FY 1963 funds to DIA as are necessary and shall, if at all possible, recognize the mapping, charting and geodetic functions of DIA in preparation of the FY 1964 budget.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

DIAMC/Mr. R.H. Kingsley/59505/ac/14 Dec62

SUBJECT: Management of United States Department of Defense Mapping, Charting, and Geodetic Activities

TO: Distribution List

1. The Secretary of Defense has directed that, effective 21 November 1962, management of all U.S. Department of Defense mapping, charting, and geodetic activities will be the responsibility of the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). A Directorate has been established within DIA to perform this function, headed by the Assistant Director for Mapping, Charting and Geodetic (DIAMC). At the same time, the functions and personnel of the Photographic and Survey Branch (FSB) of the Intelligence Directorate of the Joint Staff, JCS, are transferred to DIA.

2. Accordingly, all addresses are requested to take note of this reorganization and to address all communications which were formerly sent to the Photographic and Survey Branch, Intelligence Directorate, Joint Staff, or to the Director for Intelligence, J-2, Joint Staff, JCS, on mapping, charting, and geodetic matters, to the following address:

Defense Intelligence Agency
Attn: DIAMC
Department of Defense
Washington 25, D. C.

3. Direct communication channels already in effect relative to the subject area may be used until further notification. Any future or pending matter involving coordination in the Department of Defense, however, should be directed to the address indicated in paragraph 2 above.

Distribution:
See attached list

Director's File Copy
0578/DIAMC/Mr. Kingsley/39505/ac/13Dec62

17 DEC 1962

SUBJECT: (U) Mapping, Charting and Geodesy

TO: Distribution List

REF:
   a. DoD Directive 5105.21 dated 1 Aug 61, subj: Defense Intelligence Agency (U)
   c. DIA Mapping, Charting and Geodesy Management Control Plan (Second Revision) dated 9 Nov 62 (C)
   d. JCS Pub. 2, entitled: Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF) dated Nov 59 (U) and change No. 3 thereto dated 15 Aug 62 (U)
   e. DoD Directive 5160.34 dated 28 March 61, subj: Reconnaissance, Mapping and Geodetic Systems (U)

1. (U) Reference a established the Defense Intelligence Agency. Reference b directs the DIA to establish management control over all DoD mapping, charting and geodetic activities to include supervision of the execution of all approved mapping, charting and geodesy plans, programs, policies, and procedures.

2. (U) Reference c was approved for implementation by the Secretary of Defense on 21 November 62 and is forwarded for information. To facilitate reference, DoD Directive 5105.27 (reference b) is bound in the foreword of the approved plan.

3. (C) A revision of the mapping, charting and geodetic portions of reference d will be submitted for approval to SecDef within 90 days. Pending this revision and/or the issuance of DIA Instructions, present JCS policy papers on the above subject, and reference d which contains the most important parts of the pertinent JCS policy papers, will remain in effect except as modified by DoD Directive 5105.27 (reference b) and the approved DIA Mapping, Charting and Geodesy Management Control Plan (reference c). Approval of the

Declassified by SVI-1 on 6 October 1998

Director’s File Comments: NOT AUTOMATICA
Plan transfers the functions and personnel of the Photographic and Survey Branch (PSB), Intelligence Directorate, Joint Staff, to the DIA.

4. (U) As required by SecDef approval of reference c, DoD Directive 5160.34, subj: Reconnaissance, Mapping and Geodetic Systems, dated 28 March 61 (reference a) will be given early study and modified as appropriate in connection with the pertinent revision of JCS Publication No. 2 (reference c).

Signed by

[Signature]

DIA MCAG Plan dtd 9 Nov 62 (c)

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DOCUMENTS SECTION TWO, PART F:
SECURITY, COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, AND COMMUNICATIONS
2 January 1962

REPLY TO
ATTN OF: BLDG 0053

SUBJECT Charter of the Defense Intelligence Agency
Special Security Office

To: All concerned

I. GENERAL

In accordance with the provisions of DOD 5105.21 dated 1 August 1961, a Special Security Office is established under the direction, authority, and control of the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Department of Defense.

II. ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND

The Special Security Office shall consist of a Special Security Officer (SSO), a headquarters staff, and such subordinate elements as may be organized to accomplish the assigned mission.

III. RESPONSIBILITIES

The Special Security Office, under the direction and control of the SSO, shall be responsible for the operational control, management, and supervision of the means for:

1. Insuring a rapid, secure means for receiving, storing, and disseminating Special Intelligence and other highly sensitive information within the DIA, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

2. Maintaining a bilater structure for Special Intelligence and other sensitive intelligence as directed.

3. Processing security clearances for Special Intelligence and other sensitive intelligence as directed.

4. Providing terminal communications and courier facilities for the exchange of Special Intelligence and such other sensitive intelligence as directed with the DIA, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the commands established by Secretary of Defense, the military departments, and other USIB agencies.
IV. FUNCTIONS

The Special Security Office, under the direction and control of the DIA, shall be responsible for the following functions:

A. Establish, maintain and operate a Special Security Office for the receipt, storage and dissemination of Special Intelligence and highly sensitive information as directed.

B. Maintain a billet structure for job positions within the DIA and other offices under the security cognizance of the Director which are authorized access to Special Intelligence.

C. Process Special Intelligence clearances for individuals assigned to DIA and other offices under the security cognizance of the Director, conduct indoctrination of such individuals, maintain a clearance roster of all indoctrinated personnel, certify their clearance to other services and agencies as required, and affect the travel restriction program.

D. Establish, maintain and operate communication centers to satisfy requirements for Special Intelligence communications support.

E. Provide a privacy communications channel for use by senior members of the DIA, the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in their discussions of highly sensitive matters with senior personnel of other departments and agencies.

F. Represent the Director as an advisor and enforcement agency in matters pertaining to the security, use and dissemination of Special Intelligence within the DIA and other offices under his security cognizance.

G. Except when otherwise directed by the Director, DIA, conduct and/or control necessary security investigations of compromises, or suspected compromises, of Special Intelligence materials which occur within the DIA and other offices under the security cognizance of the Director and submit recommendations for corrective action as appropriate.

H. Perform such other functions as the Director shall assign.

V. RELATIONSHIPS

In the performance of the assigned mission the SSO shall:
A. Coordinate actions, as appropriate, within the DIA, the military departments or other government departments or agencies having related functions in the field of its assigned responsibility.

B. Make fullest use of existing facilities within the DIA, the military departments and other agencies of the Department of Defense in order to eliminate duplication of effort and facilities.

VI. ADMINISTRATION

A. The SSO shall be designated by the Director.

B. The SSO shall be the Special Security Officer for the DIA, the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

C. Command control of the SSO shall be by the Director through the Chief of Staff.

Joseph F. Carroll
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director
MEMORANDUM FOR the Secretaries of the Military Departments
The Director of Defense Research and Engineering
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Assistant Secretaries of Defense
The General Counsel
The Special Assistant and Assistants
to the Secretary of Defense
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Director, National Security Agency

SUBJECT: DoD Counterintelligence Publications

The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) is assigned responsibility for establishing a uniform system for the publications, cataloging, registry, and distribution of those Department of Defense counterintelligence briefs, studies, and special analyses produced at the military department headquarters level and at such other levels of command as determined necessary by the Director, DIA, to achieve the objectives noted below. This system will provide for the review and monitoring of such counterintelligence publications by DIA to assure (1) the optimum distribution of such documents, (2) adequate coverage of DoD requirements, and (3) elimination of unnecessary duplication.

/s/ Roswell Gilpatric
Subject: The Special Security Officer System of the Defense Intelligence Agency (NS)

To: The Secretary of Defense

1. References:
   a. DODD 6/9, 29 December 1959
   b. DoD Dir. 8105.21, 2 August 1961, subject: Defense Intelligence Agency

2. Reference a. requires that COMMINT operations of United States Intelligence Board member agencies shall be compartmented and maintained separately from other operations. Additionally, the reference provides that each USIB member is the sole authority within his agency responsible for the security, dissemination and use of COMMINT. The Special Security Officer (SSO) is the cognizant official within the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) for the security and dissemination function. (NS)

3. Effective 1 January 1962, the Special Security Office of this agency consisted of nine officers, twenty-eight enlisted men, and two civilians. This personnel figure represents the combined totals of the pre-1 January 1962 strength of the Special Security Office, DIA, and the Special Security Office of the J-2, Joint Staff (DIA assumed operational control of SSO, JCS, on 1 January 1963). The responsibilities and functions of the Special Security Office, DIA, are stated in Attachment A and in Attachment B. (Attachment B states the requirements which must be continued by SSO, DIA, to satisfy the SSO requirements of the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.) (C)

4. During the early phases of the establishment of this agency, the requirements for an SSO system were recognized. However, it was not appropriate to incorporate these requirements into the basic plan, reference b., because of the intangibles relating to the scope of the SSO system support required. Since activation of the agency, these requirements are now coming into focus and can be stated in an operational concept. The concept, among other things, provides for the creation of separate entities of the Special Security Office, DIA, as required, to meet the needs of the agency. (C)

Declassified by SIV-1 on 5 October 1998
5. The full assumption by this agency of its mission will place additional requirements upon the Special Security Office. These requirements in most cases, can be met by the transfer to the DIA of the Service-associated SSO entity. (S)

6. Attachment A sets forth the concept of operation for the Special Security Office, DIA. (U)

7. Attachment C is a proposed Table of Distribution for the Special Security Office, DIA. (U)

8. Request approval of the interim TD attached. (U)

SIGNED

WILLIAM W. QUINN
Lieutenant General, USA
Deputy Director

3 Attach
A. Charter of DIA SSO
B. J2DM-51(C)-51
dtd 22 Dec 51
C. Proposed TD
CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

9 May 1962

SUBJECT: Responsibility for Ciphertext and Teletypewriter Communications for Sensitive Intelligence Information (SI)

TO: DISTRIBUTION C


2. In addition to the functions and missions set forth in the cited reference, the Special Security Officer (SSO) is responsible for staff supervision over all matters pertaining to ciphertext (enciphered speech) for all classifications and teletypewriter (request) facilities utilized within this Agency for the exchange of Special Intelligence and such other sensitive intelligence requiring the protection of the SSO system.

3. All actions pertaining to the responsibilities set forth in para 2 above will be coordinated with the SSO.

S. B. FRANKEL
REAR ADMIRAL, USN
Chief of Staff

Declassified by SVI-1 on 6 October 1998
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Counterintelligence

1. References:


c. Secretary of Defense Memorandum dated 4 April 1962 on Clandestine Intelligence Activities.


2. Department of Defense Directive 5105.21, subject: Defense Intelligence Agency, dated 1 August 1951, in paragraph IV E charges Defense Intelligence Agency with "such counterintelligence functions as are subsequently assigned." No functions have thus far been assigned. The first of the assigned functions was formulated in DIA Instruction 54-1 dated 16 January 1963, subject: Counterintelligence Publications, which relates to the review and coordination of counterintelligence publications. The second of the assigned functions, the review and coordination of DOD Clandestine counterintelligence plans, progress, projects, and activities, is currently under study in DIA.

3. DOD Directive 5105.21 in paragraph IV Q also charges DIA with the responsibility for preparing a consolidated intelligence budget and making appropriate recommendations thereon. On 25 April 1962 the structure of the DOD program was issued by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller). Parts of Program VII relate to counterintelligence and/or security activities of the departments and their field commands. DIA coordinated in these definitions. Subsequent experience indicates that these definitions do not clearly define the full scope of departmental counterintelligence and security functions.

4. DIA has found that, in the fields of counterintelligence and security, the three military departments are operating from vastly different doctrinal and organizational bases. It has also become

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evident to DIA that the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) has been assigned policy responsibilities in Department of Defense security matters.

5. A viewpoint expressed by the Department of the Navy is that the investigative and counterintelligence activities of the military departments are not subject to the provisions of DOD Directive 5105.21, even though it is acknowledged that these operations and functions are under the management control of the Director of Naval Intelligence. Likewise, investigative (except criminal) and counterintelligence activities in the Department of the Army are under the management control and staff supervision of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, but in the Air Force these activities (including criminal investigations) are under the management control of the Inspector General. There are further widespread differences in the views of the military departments as to whether or not the act of conducting background investigations for security clearances on Department of Defense personnel is indeed a counterintelligence activity. As a result of these differences, the counterintelligence programs (including the supporting resource effort) submitted by the military departments to this Agency for review vary from one extreme to the other in terms of detail, resource input data and location within program elements.

6. In its submissions for the Consolidated Intelligence Program, the Army included in the program element "Departmental Intelligence Activities" all of its counterintelligence and security units and activities in the Washington area that are under the management control of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence. In the Army's "Field Command Intelligence Activities" element the program includes only that effort devoted to industrial security, existing the units and resources in the numbered Areas that are devoted to counterintelligence and security. Criminal investigative programs, which are performed by the Provost Marshal, are not included in the intelligence programs.

7. The Navy has included all of its security and counterintelligence activities and units in the "Field Command Intelligence Activities" program element. These security and counterintelligence efforts, including criminal investigations, are under the management control of the Director of Naval Intelligence.

8. In the Air Force the security and counterintelligence efforts, including criminal investigations, are under the management control of the Inspector General. As a result, the Air Force included in the "Departmental Intelligence Activities" program element only the Counterintelligence Division (military and civilian personnel) of the Directorate of Special Investigations, Office of the Inspector General. The Air Force includes no additive security or counterintelligence units and resources in the "Field Command Intelligence Activities" elements.
9. It is believed that increased efficiency and some savings could be achieved in the whole investigative and counterintelligence field. However, before recommendations can be made for increased economy and efficiency, it is necessary, in my view, to examine in detail the investigative and counterintelligence structure, operations and policy-making procedures within the Department of Defense.

10. In view of the above considerations, I recommend that:

a. One of your principal assistants be designated to study this entire field for the purpose of making recommendations to you on matters pertaining to the definition, doctrine, operations and organization of the investigative and counterintelligence activities, as well as management responsibility at the highest level, within the Department of Defense.

b. Pending completion of the study and delineation of responsibilities, the investigative and counterintelligence programs of the military departments be retained at essentially the current level of effort, which should have no adverse effect on these programs.
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. MORTON

SUBJECT: Counterintelligence Responsibilities

1. As you know, during the past few months DIA has been questioned as to its responsibilities in the counterintelligence area and a paper was prepared for SecDef approval which was designed to clarify responsibilities. The following guidance has been furnished:

a. Counterintelligence in the military services includes four interrelated elements. These are the safeguarding of classified defense information within the departments and within industry, the installation and material security mission, a personnel security mission, and finally an intelligence mission oriented on foreign intelligence services.

b. The first three elements listed above are and remain a Service responsibility. The responsibilities of the Defense Intelligence Agency for counterintelligence are properly oriented on the fourth element: i.e., intelligence concerning foreign intelligence services. Counterintelligence collection requirements are presently incorporated in the DIA Requirements Registry, and collection guidance manuals which are issued by DIA include counterintelligence as a topic.

c. In addition, DIA is advised that the program and budget review functions of the DIA should encompass the counterintelligence and security commitments of the military departments; should exclude the criminal investigation activities of the Air Force and the Navy; and should be performed in collaboration with the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower) within his area of interest.

2. The foregoing is based upon information contained in JCS paper 2031/355/3 and is furnished for your general guidance.

LOUIS A. CHIEF
Chief, Financial Services

DECLASSIFIED BY DIA/FSP
CY IN BASIC DIRECTIVES

UNCLASSIFIED
SECRET

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
REGRADING: DOD DIR 5200.20
DOES NOT APPLY
MEMORANDUM FOR The Secretaries of the Military Departments
The Director of Defense Research & Engineering
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Administration)
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations and Logistic)
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower)
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Research and Engineering)
The Director, Defense Atomic Support Agency
The Director, Defense Communications Agency
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Director, National Security Agency

SUBJECT: Establishment of the Defense Special Security Communications System

REFERENCES: (a) DIA Plan for the Establishment and Operation of a Joint SSO System
(b) Memo for SecDef from Chairman, JCS, Subj: "Plan for the Establishment and Operation of a Joint SSO System," JCNSM-232-64, dated 8 April 1964
(c) DoD Directive 5105.21, "Defense Intelligence Agency"
(d) DoD Directive 5105.28, "Defense Intelligence Agency (Technical Intelligence)"
(e) DoD Directive 5-100.20, "The National Security Agency"
(f) DoD Directive 5105.19, "Defense Communications Agency (DCA)"
(g) DoD Directive 5-100.30, "Concept of Operations of the World-Wide Military Command and Control System"
(h) Multi-address Memo from DepSecDef, Subj: "Development, Acquisition, and Operation of the Command and Control Systems of the Unified and Specified Commands," dated 26 October 1963; and JCS-1000-63, same subject, dated 21 December 1963
I have reviewed the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Plan for the Establishment and Operation of a Joint Special Security Office (SSO) System, reference (a); the comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff therein, reference (b); and the relationship of the proposed Joint SSO System to the functions and responsibilities of DIA, the National Security Agency (NSA), and the Defense Communications Agency (DCA), as reflected in references (c) through (f). I have also reviewed the SSO Plan in relationship to the concept for the development of the World-Wide Military Command and Control System, reference (g); certain functions and responsibilities of the unified and specified (U&Ś) commanders, as set forth in references (h) and (i); CRITICOMM, reference (l); and the various efforts currently being undertaken to improve the CRITICOMM network, such as contained in reference (o). This review indicates that a single secure communications system can best satisfy DoD requirements and take advantage of the advanced developments being made in communications technology.

Accordingly, a Defense Special Security Communications System (DSSCS) will be established. The basic objective of the DSSCS is to achieve on an evolutionary basis a wholly-integrated intelligence...
communications system for the transmission and processing of the communications traffic now handled by the several SSO systems of the Department of Defense and the CRITICOMM network. An additional objective of the DSSCS is to obtain a greatly improved secure communications capability at the least overall cost in equipment, personnel, and other resources.

The development and acquisition of the DSSCS must be planned and implemented to insure no unacceptable degradation in the processing of communications handled under specialized security procedures. The DSSCS must satisfy the special intelligence communications requirements of NSCID No. 7, reference (j). In many essential respects, the operational concept for the DSSCS is similar to the concept now employed by the Department of the Navy for operation of its CRITICOMM and SSO communications systems.

The DSSCS will provide the necessary communications, relay, and terminal facilities for the transmission and handling of COMINT and ELINT intercept information, intelligence information based on COMINT, "critical intelligence" messages, other communications whose handling requires specialized security procedures, and private communications of senior Defense officials. The appropriate communications elements of the DSSCS will be a part of the Defense Communications System (DCS). In the interim and pending development of a wholly-integrated system, the DSSCS will consist of: (1) the CRITICOMM network, including its various subsidiary networks; and (2) a Special Intelligence Communications (SPINTCOMM) network.

The CRITICOMM network, and its various subsidiary networks, will continue to service cryptologic activities and other specialized activities and will initially consist of the resources allocated and programmed to the network as of the date of reference (b).

The SPINTCOMM network will service: (a) the Director, DIA, for the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and for other special functions assigned by the Secretary of Defense or the Joint Chiefs of Staff; (b) the DIA; (c) the unified and specified (U&S) commanders and their subordinate unified, component, and Joint Task Force commanders; (d) other commanders (such as the MATS commander) as may be determined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and (e) the military departmental headquarters and departmental support
commands (such as the Army Materiel Command, the Bureau of Naval Weapons, and the Air Force Systems Command) requiring SSO support.

The SPINTCOMM network will initially consist of the communications circuits, equipments, facilities, personnel, and other resources programmed and allocated, as of the date of reference (b), to: (1) the several SSO systems, (2) the CRITICOMM network where it provides joint CRITICOMM/SSO service, and (3) those administrative communications facilities and channels which are cleared for COMINT and which handle SSO traffic.

In establishing the SPINTCOMM network, the Director, DIA, will give priority to the activation of a Defense Intelligence Relay Center (DIRC) (i.e., the facility identified as the "Joint SSO Relay Center, Pentagon" in reference (a)), and alternate DIRCs at such sites as may be determined by the Secretary of Defense, to be connected by secure communications with (a) the U&S commanders, (b) subordinate unified commanders and other commanders as determined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, (c) organizations such as the U.S. Military Mission to the UN, (d) the Defense Agencies, and (e) other governmental organizations. The manpower requirements and equipment resources identified in reference (a) for the establishment of the DIRC are approved. The actual transfer of personnel to DIA to man the DIRC should be phased to the activation of the DIRC itself. Equipment to be leased or procured for the DIRC will be determined by the Director, DIA, in conjunction with the Director, DCA. Procurement will be accomplished in accordance with established DoD procedures, such as provided by reference (b).

In establishing the DIRC, the Director, DIA, will provide arrangements so that sensitive messages, transmitted by secure intelligence channels, addressed to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, and received in the DIRC during non-duty hours, are delivered to the flag or general officer on duty in the NMCC, unless otherwise directed by the principal addresses. These arrangements should be in consonance with reference (g) and should parallel those arrangements being provided for the handling of sensitive State/Defense messages pursuant to reference (m).

As part of the SPINTCOMM net, each U&S commander (in consonance with references (a) and (i)) and, as appropriate, subordinate unified and Joint Task Force commanders will have established in their
headquarters a SPINTCOMM facility. Resources necessary to provide U & S commanders with a SPINTCOMM capability will be supplied by the appropriate military department, as provided in reference (m). Similarly, resources necessary to support subordinate unified and Joint Task Force commanders will be supplied by the military department supporting such command headquarters. In view of the security requirements for such terminal facilities, the personnel required to man such facilities will be assigned to the commanders concerned and will be maintained as separate staff elements in their respective headquarters. In addition, the military departments will continue to provide component commands and their subordinate forces with SPINTCOMM capabilities as required.

To satisfy the special security communications requirements of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, other senior DoD officials, and operational commanders, the Director, DIA, is authorized to task any element or facility of the DSSCS. Similarly, the Director, DIA, will provide arrangements so that the privacy communications requirements of senior DoD officials may be satisfied and will set forth DoD-wide operating procedures and security standards for the handling of such communications. To provide the required security, direct communications to and from any DSSCS facility and the Director, DIA, are specifically authorized. The Directors, DIA and NSA, are authorized to inspect DSSCS facilities and to conduct such operational tests and evaluations as may be required for the accomplishment of their assigned functions.

The Director, DIA, and the Director, NSA, will:

1. Identify the terminal and intelligence processing facilities to be serviced by the DSSCS;

2. Determine the type, amount, speed of service desired, and priorities of communications traffic to be handled in the DSSCS; and

3. Pending development of a wholly-integrated DSSCS, determine the assignment to a network of a facility that is used for both CRITICOMM and SPINTCOMM purposes.
Any major unresolved differences between the Directors, DIA and NSA, arising from (1)-(3) above will be submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their review and recommendations and to the Secretary of Defense for resolution.

In establishing the DSSCS, the basic functions, responsibilities, and authorities of the Director, DCA, as contained in reference (4), will apply and the Director, DCA, will:

1. Provide communications engineering and technical services for the design, development, and acquisition of the DSSCS;

2. Determine the location, type, and number of relay and switching facilities required;

3. Determine the number, type, and routing of circuits required;

4. Allocate and assign circuits to DIA and NSA, and other users, in the DSSCS;

5. Restore circuits and re-route traffic as required in the DSSCS in accordance with established priorities;

6. Establish common communications operating procedures for the DSSCS;

7. Conduct communications tests and evaluations of the DSSCS;

8. Approve all interim communications improvements proposed either for the CRITICOMM or SPINTCOMM networks of the DSSCS;

9. Determine, in conjunction with the Directors, DIA and NSA, in each instance when communications improvements or new requirements are proposed either for the CRITICOMM or SPINTCOMM networks the feasibility of accommodating such improvements or requirements by the other network;
(10) Prescribe technical standards for communications equipment and facilities in the DSSCS;

(11) Review and approve all plant engineering plans for terminal facilities in the DSSCS;

(12) Inspect as required any communications facility of the DSSCS;

(13) Provide SPINTCOMM circuits to connect the DIRC with the U&S commanders and such other DoD and non-DoD organizations as authorized by the Joint Chiefs of Staff or the Secretary of Defense;

(14) Provide SPINTCOMM circuits to connect U&S commanders with subordinate unified, component, and other commanders, as appropriate;

(15) Provide SPINTCOMM circuits to connect the DIRC with subordinate unified commands when directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff or the Secretary of Defense;

(16) Provide SPINTCOMM circuits to connect military departmental headquarters with their support commands (such as the Army Material Command, the Bureau of Naval Weapons, and the Air Force Systems Command) requiring SSO support; and

(17) Disestablish those circuits identified in reference (a) as excess to DIA's requirements unless otherwise required by the Director, DCA.

No SPINTCOMM circuits, other than those provided for in paragraphs (13), (14), (15), and (16) above, are authorized without the specific continuing approval of the Director, DIA.

Subject to the modifications specified above, reference (a) is approved for implementation. Simplified Program Change procedures will be used for the transfer to DIA and the U&S commanders of the resources required. Adjustments in financial resources and responsibilities among the military departments, DIA, NSA, and DCA will be accomplished in accordance with established DoD policies. Thereafter programming, budgeting and fund administration will be accomplished under established DoD procedures.
The Director, DIA, is requested to incorporate the appropriate provisions of this memorandum into a revised edition of reference (a) to provide for the establishment of the SPINTCOMM network of the DSSCS. The revised plan should be submitted within 15 days to the Secretary of Defense, the Secretaries of the military departments, and other appropriate DoD officials, for their information.

Since implementation of reference (c) will also require adjustments in the Joint Tables of Distribution (JTD) of unified and other command headquarters, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are requested to take the necessary actions within the currently approved manpower authorizations of the military departments to provide such commanders with adequate personnel to man the SPINTCOMM facilities to be provided.

Similarly the Directors, DIA, NSA, and DCA, should assess whether any manpower authorizations or personnel transfers among their respective Agencies are required to achieve the DSSCS. If so, such adjustments should be forwarded through the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense for approval.

The Director, DGA, in conjunction with the Directors, DIA and NSA, pursuant to references (a) and (c) and the applicable provisions of this memorandum, is requested to submit (through the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their comments and recommendations) to the Secretary of Defense within 90 days a communications plan to support the development and acquisition of a wholly-integrated DSSCS system. Information copies of the Plan submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff by the Director, DGA, should also be provided the Secretaries of the military departments and appropriate staff officials in OSD.

Pending development of an over-all DoD communications program with the eventual inclusion therein of appropriate communications elements of the DSSCS, the Assistant Secretary of Defense/Comptroller (in conjunction with the Director, Defense Research and Engineering; the Assistant Secretaries of Defense/MANpower and Installations and Logistics; the Directors, DIA, NSA, and DCA; and representatives of the military departments) will develop and issue instructions and formats for the identification and reporting of all resources allocated to the DSSCS.
The Director, NSA (in conjunction with the Directors, DIA and DCA, representatives of the military departments, and other appropriate DoD officials) will thereafter identify and report the resources allocated and programmed to the interim CRITICOMM network, including those CRITICOMM facilities which provide both CRITICOMM and SPINTCOMM services.

Similarly, the Director, DIA (in conjunction with the Directors, NSA and DCA, representatives of the military departments, and other appropriate DoD officials) will thereafter identify and report the resources allocated and programmed to the interim SPINTCOMM network, including those SPINTCOMM facilities which provide both SPINTCOMM and CRITICOMM services.

The Director, DCA, in conjunction with the Directors, DIA and NSA, and other appropriate DoD officials, will assemble, review, and submit recommendations as appropriate to the Secretary of Defense on the interim DSSCS.

Based on the revised edition of reference (a) and the DCA plan for a wholly-integrated DSSCS, the Assistant Secretary of Defense/ Administration (in conjunction with the Directors, DIA, NSA, and DCA, and other appropriate DoD officials) is requested to prepare and submit for the approval of the Secretary of Defense a DoD directive, replacing reference (1), to establish the DSSCS. Pending approval of this new directive, the provisions of this memorandum take precedence over any conflicting provisions of existing DoD directives or other issuances.

The Director, DIA, in conjunction with the Directors, NSA and DCA, will submit, at least semi-annually, periodic progress reports on the status of the DSSCS to the Secretary of Defense with informational copies supplied the Secretaries of the military departments and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Cyrus Vance
Department of Defense Directive

SUBJECT: The Security, Use and Dissemination of Communications Intelligence (COMINT) (U)


(b) National Security Council Intelligence Directive (NSCID) No. 8, dated 15 September 1958.

(c) Director of Central Intelligence Directive (DCID) No. 6/3, dated 29 December 1959.


(e) Department of Defense Directive S-5115.4, "Communications Intelligence (COMINT)."

I. PURPOSE

This directive is issued for the purpose of establishing Department of Defense (DoD) policy and guidance concerning the implementation of United States Intelligence Board (USIB) policy and procedures for the security, use, and dissemination of communications intelligence (COMINT), including the applicable provisions of references (b) and (c).

II. APPLICABILITY AND SCOPE

The provisions of this Directive apply to all DoD components and such components of other departments and agencies of the government where an agreement exists for a DoD component to provide COMINT support.

III. RESPONSIBILITIES

A. The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), is charged with exercising general surveillance and management direction of the COMINT security programs established by all DoD components, except the National Security Agency, for the security, use, and dissemination of COMINT.
B. In consonance with A, above:

1. The Director, DIA, shall:

   a. Establish and administer the COMINT security programs for the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Defense Atomic Support Agency, Defense Communications Agency, Defense Supply Agency, the U.S. Military Mission to the UN, the Nat Evaluation Sub Committee, the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff, the Defense Intelligence Agency, all the Command Centers and Command Posts of the National Military Command System, the Headquarters and Alternate Headquarters Command Centers of the Unified and Specified Command, and such other activities as may receive COMINT support from his agency by special agreement.

   b. In collaboration with the heads of the DoD components concerned:

      (1) Prescribe requisite security regulations and conduct a continuing review of the COMINT security programs under his cognizance, including the exercise of the necessary monitoring and supervisory control, including inspections if necessary.

      (2) Issue DoD instructions and manuals necessary to implement and supplement USIH COMINT security policies and procedures.

      (3) Develop and propose to the Secretary of Defense, through the Joint Chiefs of Staff, changes to, or additional policy and program guidance as may be required to this Directive.

   c. Recommend, as he considers necessary, that the Secretary of Defense delegate to military commanders the authority to establish and administer their respective COMINT security programs.

   d. Advise the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense, and the heads of the DoD components concerned on the effectiveness of the plans and programs, under his cognizance, for the security, use, and dissemination of COMINT. This will include a review, at least annually, to ensure that these COMINT security programs are developed and implemented to meet both current and long-range requirements.
2. The Secretaries of the Military Departments are charged with establishing and administering through their intelligence chiefs the COMINT security programs for their respective Departments, except as provided in paragraph C. 2 below, and for such other activities as may receive COMINT support from their Departments by special agreement.

C. The Director, National Security Agency (NSA), shall:

1. Establish and administer the COMINT security program for his Agency and for such other activities as may receive COMINT support from his Agency by special agreement.

2. Establish and administer the COMINT security program directed by reference (b) wherein the specific responsibilities of the Director of NSA include, within NSA's field of authorized operations, prescribing requisite security regulations covering operating practices, including the transmission, handling and distribution of COMINT material within and among the COMINT elements under his operational or technical control; and exercising the necessary monitoring and supervisory control, including inspections if necessary, to ensure compliance with the regulations.

3. Advise the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Deputy Director, Defense Research and Engineering) on the effectiveness of the plans and programs, under his cognizance, for the security, use and dissemination of COMINT. This will include a review, at least annually, to ensure that these COMINT security programs are developed and implemented to meet both current and long-range requirements.

IV. IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFECTIVE DATE

A. All existing directives, regulations, manuals, letters, bulletins, circulars, or memoranda which stipulate policies or procedures in conflict with the provisions of this directive or the DoD instructions and manuals issued under Section III, B. 1. b. (2) above, will be revised or amended. Two copies of such revisions will be forwarded to the Director, DIA, within 90 days.

B. This directive is effective upon publication.

[Signature]
Deputy Secretary of Defense

SECRET
DOCUMENTS SECTION TWO, PART G:

SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL
MEMORANDUM FOR The Secretaries of the Military Departments  
The Director of Defense Research and 
Engineering  
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff  
The Assistant Secretaries of Defense  
The General Counsel  
The Special Assistant to the Secretary of 
Defense  
The Assistants to the Secretary of Defense  
The Director, National Security Agency

SUBJECT: Technical Intelligence

Department of Defense Directive 5105.21 provides that the 
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) will conduct such technical intelli-
gence functions as subsequently assigned. Technical intelligence, 
as used in DoD Directive 5105.21, means foreign scientific and 
technological intelligence and covers:

(1) Foreign developments in basic and 
    applied research in natural and applied 
    sciences and in applied engineering 
    techniques.

(2) Scientific and technical characteristics, 
capabilities, and limitations of specific 
foreign weapons, weapon systems, and 
material, and the production methods 
employed for their manufacture.

There is a close relationship between technical intelligence 
activities and the research and development efforts of DoD. DoD 
research and development organizations must exploit to the maxi-
mum technical intelligence findings.
Technical intelligence findings are used within the Department of Defense to:

1. Provide personnel at all levels of command with an understanding of foreign technological capabilities and the technological threat posed thereby to facilitate the making of timely and valid research and development decisions;

2. Reduce research and development lead time and to improve our capabilities by suggesting the use of new weapons, new methods, and new devices;

3. Develop countermasures against actual and potential enemy military capabilities; and

4. Determine whether the design and operational effectiveness of present U. S. military equipment, weapons, and weapon systems are sufficient to meet existing and potential enemy capabilities.

The overall cycle for technical intelligence can be generally divided into the following interrelated steps:

1. Requirements generation.

2. Validation and assignment of priorities.

3. Assignment of tasks.


5. Preliminary processing and scientific-technical analysis.

6. Identification of characteristics, capabilities, and limitations.

7. Dissemination of technical intelligence findings.
The final phase in the intelligence process is the development of intelligence estimates based on all pertinent intelligence data and evaluations, including technical intelligence findings.

DIA is responsible for the management and review of all steps in the technical intelligence cycle throughout DoD. Total DoD assets for collecting and analyzing technical intelligence are limited. I expect every effort will be exerted, under the leadership of DIA, to minimize duplication of effort and dissipation of vital resources.

Technical intelligence requirements, like other intelligence requirements, are generated by a wide range of DoD activities, including operational, research and development, and intelligence organizations. DIA is assigned responsibility for establishing a mechanism for collecting and collating total DoD intelligence requirements as provided for in DoD Directive 5105.21.

All DoD technical intelligence requirements will be assembled and validated by DIA along with all other DoD intelligence requirements. Collection priorities must be assigned to validated requirements. DIA is responsible for validating and assigning priorities for all DoD intelligence requirements in consonance with United States Intelligence Board requirements and priorities. DIA processing, and control of collection requirements, is not intended to prohibit DoD organizations from initiating collection activities wherein the opportunity to collect is highly perishable. All such collection actions will be reported to the DIA.

DIA is authorized to task directly the intelligence collection resources of the Department except cryptologic resources under the operational control of the National Security Agency. For the purposes of technical intelligence, such "collection resources" include but are not limited to assets of DoD's research and development organizations, space and missile ranges, and the like.

Preliminary processing and scientific-technical analysis of foreign technological acquisitions and the identification of
characteristics, capabilities, and limitations of foreign weapons, weapon systems, and materials will be done in DoD research and development organizations (and by their contractors) and by DIA directly.

DIA will develop, implement, and supervise a uniform system for preparing and disseminating all DoD technical intelligence findings and reports to all DoD components and to other members of the national intelligence community.

The development of DoD intelligence estimates employing technical intelligence findings is the responsibility of DIA.

The Director, DIA, is requested to develop a plan within 90 days for the assumption of DIA's responsibilities in the technical intelligence area which will provide for the assignment to DIA of the responsibilities noted above. The plan will be submitted to the Secretary of Defense for approval through the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The plan will also permit DIA to:

(1) Provide for the registration of all technical intelligence plans, programs, and specific projects and periodically publish such information so that all authorized DoD components will have access to information concerning the status of activities under way and planned in the foreign scientific and technological area.

(2) Provide a common management system to permit the review of all DoD technical intelligence efforts by (a) DLA, (b) the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, and (c) other staff advisors to the Secretary of Defense, as appropriate.
(3) Provide all Departmental intelligence estimates which employ technical intelligence (including those made for (a) the Joint Chiefs of Staff, (b) the Secretary of Defense and his principal staff advisors, (c) the Secretaries of the military departments, and (d) all other DoD components) and all DoD contributions to National Intelligence Estimates, Special National Intelligence Estimates, the National Intelligence Survey, and other publications of the national intelligence community.

Scientific-technical personnel or organizational elements engaged in intelligence estimating will be transferred to DIA regardless of whether they are presently assigned to DoD intelligence organizations or to DoD research and development organizations.

In addition, to provide DIA with the necessary capability to perform the other responsibilities and functions assigned to it by this memorandum, the Director, DIA, will specifically identify such other organizational elements, personnel, personnel spaces or other activities of DoD which should be transferred to DIA to include a time-phased schedule for their transfer.

The plan to be developed by the Director, DIA, will show the number of officers, enlisted men, and civilians presently engaged in each of the organizational elements, and the number to be transferred to DIA.

DIA will budget for and administer funds required for the civilian personnel and other resources transferred from the military departments.

[Signature]

[SCION]
MEMORANDUM FOR The Secretaries of the Military Departments  
The Director of Defense Research and Engineering  
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff  
The Assistant Secretaries of Defense  
The General Counsel  
The Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense  
The Assistants to the Secretary of Defense  

SUBJECT: Technical Support of the National Military Command System  

References:  
(c) Memo for Chairman, JCS, from Deputy Secretary of Defense, Subj: "Technical Support of the National Military Command System (NMC3)," dated 26 Apr 62  
(d) JCSM-362-62, Subj: "Joint Command and Control Requirements Group (U)," dated 9 May 62  
(e) Memo for Chairman, JCS, from Secretary of Defense, Subj: "Joint Command and Control Requirements Group," dated 18 May 62  

Reference (a) forwarded for the review and consideration of the Secretaries of the military departments and the Joint Chiefs of Staff an organizational concept for the provision of technical support of the National Military Command System (NMCS). The separate views of the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on technical support were provided to me in reference (b). After consideration of the various views, I have decided that the responsibilities and relationships of the components of the Department of Defense which are involved in technical support of the NMCS will be as established below.
The Director of Defense Research and Engineering will be responsible for planning, directing, and supervising the execution of technical support for the NMCS, to include insuring the technical compatibility of the NMCS and related world-wide command and control systems. This technical support will be responsive to continuing functional system design prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and approved by the Secretary of Defense, pursuant to references (c), (d), and (e).

The initial statement of approved functional system design and periodic modifications thereto will be transmitted by the Secretary of Defense to DDR&E, who will be responsible for the acquisition and continued improvement of an operating system which meets the requirements of the currently approved functional system design. The responsibilities of DDR&E will include policy guidance, technical direction, allocation of implementation responsibilities, review of technical plans, review of implementation, consolidation of the NMCS technical support budget, and control of funding. To assist DDR&E in meeting these responsibilities, DDR&E will establish in his office a Director of NMCS Technical Support with a small staff.

The Director, Defense Communications Agency, will be responsible for systems engineering and technical supervision of the implementation of technical support for the NMCS and of such related systems as may be further assigned. For these responsibilities the Director, DCA, will operate under the functional supervision of DDR&E.

Under the technical direction of the Director of NMCS Technical Support, the Director, DCA, will prepare a detailed technical plan, including technical system design, for the acquisition of an operating system responsive to approved functional system design. The initial technical plan, and changes thereto as necessary, will be prepared in consultation with the Joint Command and Control Requirements Group (JCCRG), the unified and specified commands, and the agencies of the military departments and other Department of Defense components who will be responsible for execution of its various elements. The technical plan will be a complete statement of the technical, logistic, funding, construction, training, and other elements needed to acquire
the system. The technical plan will indicate assignment of implementation of portions of the plan to the various components of the Department of Defense.

To provide for the execution of DCA responsibilities, there will be established within the DCA a separate organizational element for NMCS technical support, reporting directly to the Director, DCA. It is desired that the Director, DCA, submit by 1 July 1962, his organizational plan and recommended adjustments in the DCA Table of Distribution to provide for the establishment of this organizational element.

The initial technical plan, and the periodic changes thereto, as prepared by DCA will be reviewed by DDR&E and forwarded to the JCS, who will review the plan for its conformance with currently approved functional system design and will transmit the plan with JCS comments to the Secretary of Defense for approval or modification. The technical plan and changes thereto, as approved, will be transmitted to DDR&E and the DCA for implementation, with information copies to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. DDR&E will issue directives through appropriate channels to cause the responsible agencies to execute their respective elements of the plan and will be responsible for the control of funding. DCA will maintain current a consolidated technical plan which incorporates all approved changes.

Throughout the implementation phase of each component of the system, DCA will perform continuing systems engineering and will exercise technical supervision over the implementing agencies. There will be close and continuous coordination between the DCA, the Director of NMCS Technical Support, the JCCRG, the unified and specified commands and their subordinate commands, and the agency’s assigned responsibilities for implementation.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff will continuously monitor and review the implementation of NMCS technical support so as to determine its responsiveness to the approved functional system design. In the event the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that technical support does not conform with approved functional system design they will inform the Secretary of Defense without delay.
As the component elements of the NMGS are developed, produced, and installed, they will be assigned for operation to unified commands, military departments, and other agencies, where they will be operated under prescribed command arrangements and organizational relationships.

[Signature]

Robert S. McNamara
REPLY TO

ATTN OF: DIAPl-1D

SUBJECT: J-2 Report on DIA Technical Intelligence Plan (JCS 2031/272)

TO: DIA

1. Subject report, concurred in by Army, Navy and Air Force was distributed on Friday, 24 August 1961. This report lists among its conclusions that:

   a. The plan conforms to basic policy.

   b. The proposed funding requirement (106 new spc) is excessive, especially with respect to 99 spc for the Scientific and Technical Division, Production Center.

   c. A maximum of 42 new spc would be an adequate initial staff augmentation for DIA.

2. In implementing these conclusions, the report proposed that a memorandum be sent to the Secretary of Defense to state substantially that:

   a. The JCS note the funding requirements of the plan (106 new spc) and the fact that the Services retain their present responsibilities for all their present technical intelligence functions. The requirement for 99 spc in the Production Center appears to be excessive. A reduction to 37 spc in the Production Center would provide a reasonable and adequate organization to carry out the DIA functions and to provide desired experience.

   b. The major need in the Production Center is for senior scientists, engineers and intelligence officers. To prevent disruption, transfer of personnel must be carefully scheduled in relation to training of replacements by the Services.

   c. The JCS recommend approval subject to specific changes (Appendix A) and to reduction in the proposed funding from 106 to 42 spc. The specific changes proposed to make explicit:

      (1) Services' residual responsibilities for production and estimates.

      (2) Requirement for DIA to coordinate with the Services on the phased transfer of personnel resources.

      (3) Navy personnel data as corrections to information erroneously furnished DIA planning group.
3. The subject report is not yet definitely on the JCS agenda. It is possible it will be scheduled for JCS action on 31 August 1962.

4. The substance of the report is to:
   a. Ensure Services' retain production and estimating responsibilities.
   b. Reduce DIA naming requirements from 106 to 42. (New species)
   c. Require phasing of personnel to be coordinated with Services.

ROBERT R. GLASS
Brig. Gen., U S Army
AC/S for E, F, A&F
MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Technical Intelligence Plan

References: (a) SecDef memo, subject as above, dated 11 May 1962
(b) JCSM-67462 dated 31 August 1962

Reference (a) assigned to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) responsibility for the management of technical intelligence throughout DoD. The Director, DIA, was requested to submit a plan outlining the procedures and organization by which such DIA management control would be established in accordance with specific guidance contained in reference (a).

Reference (a) assigned 5 basic responsibilities to DIA, namely:

1. Responsibility for management and review of all steps in the technical intelligence cycle throughout DoD.

2. Responsibility for establishing a mechanism for collecting and collating total DoD technical intelligence requirements.

3. Responsibility for validating and assigning priorities for DoD technical intelligence requirements.

4. Responsibility for developing, implementing, and supervising a uniform system for preparing and disseminating all DoD technical intelligence findings and reports.
5. Responsibility for the development of DoD intelligence estimates employing technical intelligence findings.

Reference (a) further directed that the DIA implementation plan identify for transfer to DIA such organizational elements, personnel, personnel spaces, and other activities of DoD as necessary to carry out its assigned responsibilities.

I have carefully examined the DIA technical intelligence plan, dated 1 August 1962, which was attached to reference (b) and the Joint Chiefs of Staff comments thereon. It is my considered judgment that this plan does not fully meet the objectives sought by reference (a). The plan does not appear to give to DIA the capability it requires to effectively carry out its assigned responsibilities for managing technical intelligence. Significantly, no specific personnel spaces or staff elements are identified for transfer to DIA. At best, in my opinion, adoption of the DIA plan would result in an ineffective top layering to the present military department technical intelligence organizations.

Accordingly, the DIA plan should be revised to bring it into specific conformity with the guidance contained in reference (a). In undertaking the necessary revisions, I believe it would be helpful for the Director of DIA to work with the Director, Defense Research and Engineering and the Director of Organizational and Management Planning.

I hope it will be possible for the necessary revisions to be completed and submitted to me for my consideration on or before 26 November 1962.

Robert T. McNeil

Copy to:
Director, Defense Research and Engineering
Director, Organizational and Management Planning
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
THE DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SUBJECT: Assignment of Management Responsibilities to DIA and USAF for Development of a DOD Intelligence Data Handling System (IDHS)

References: (a) Memo to Sec AF and Dir DIA from Dep Sec Def, subject Termination of USAF Project 43BL, Intelligence Data Handling System, dated May 2, 1963
(b) Memo to DIA from Dir DIA, subject same as Ref. (a), dated 14 June 1963
(c) Memo to Sec Def from Asst Sec AF (R&D), subject same as Ref. (a), dated July 30, 1963
(d) Memo to Asst Sec AF (R&D), subject same as Ref. (a), dated August 8, 1963

In reference (a) I requested that USAF Project 43BL be terminated at the end of FY 1963. I further asked DIA with US AF support to develop plans for assumption of management responsibilities by DIA in the development of needed intelligence data handling capabilities at the commands and agencies previously supported by Project 43BL. References (b) and (c) forwarded the DIA and USAF plans respectively for this change in management. Reference (d) noted the primary differences between the two plans and asked for discussions to resolve these differences.

Discussions held subsequently between DIAAF, DIA and USAF personnel have revealed that there is general agreement between DIA and USAF with problems still to be resolved in details of DIA funding, command and reporting channels, certain USAF organizational responsibilities and transfer of resources to DIA. Although these differences are substantial it is necessary that those portions of the plan on which there is agreement be implemented immediately in order to preclude further delay in development of needed intelligence capabilities.
Accordingly, the Director, DIA is requested to assume management responsibilities for the DOD Intelligence Data Handling System (IDHS) development and implementation as outlined in the DIA Plan of reference (b) with the exclusion of those points of disagreement listed above. In the cases where disagreements exist, the USAF J33L practices are to be followed by the AFHIN Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR) in order to prevent disruption of developments in progress. DIA is further requested to resolve by agreement with USAF the substantial differences still existing in the plans of references (b) and (c). A final plan resolving existing differences should be submitted by 15 October 1963. DIA and USAF should coordinate with DDR&E to ensure expeditious accomplishment of this task.

The Secretary of the Air Force is directed to:

1. Manage USAF budgeted resources to implement the Intelligence Data Handling System (IDHS) as outlined in the DIA IDHS Plan.

2. Establish AFHIN office (OPR) in the Air Staff as outlined in reference (c) and begin immediate operation in support of the IDHS.

3. Consolidate, under DIA management, resources up to the achievement of operational capability.

4. Implement the USAF IDHS Plan in all areas not in disagreement with the DIA IDHS Plan.

5. Coordinate with DDR&E plans for USAF management of such research, exploratory and advanced development projects previously under J33L and not in direct support of immediate operational requirements.

I am requesting USAF and DIA to enter into discussions with DDR&E upon receipt of this memorandum.

Signed
ROSWELL L. GILPATRIC
Deputy Secretary of Defense
Department of Defense Directive

SUBJECT  Department of Defense Advanced Sensor Interpretation and Applications Training


I. PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES

This Directive establishes a management system for Department of Defense advanced sensor interpretation and applications training so as to assure:

A. The assembly of all DoD advanced sensor interpretation and applications training requirements,

B. A single authority to be made responsible for all DoD training in this area.

II. APPLICABILITY

The provisions of this Directive apply to all components of the Department of Defense.

III. SCOPE

As used in this Directive, advanced sensor interpretation and application training includes:

A. Advanced training in photographic, radar and infrared interpretation.

B. Advanced training in the simultaneous interpretation of multi-sensor applications.
G. Related instructions and instructional material for reserve forces and correspondence students of all military departments.

D. Specialized training requirements of DoD components related to the application or utilization of any of the imagery techniques or instructional material requirements delineated above.

IV. FUNCTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

A. The Secretary of the Air Force or his designee shall:

1. Assemble and maintain for the use of all DoD components a current record of all DoD common and specialized training requirements and programs related to advanced sensor interpretation and application.

2. Establish, maintain, and conduct a Defense Sensor Interpretation and Application Training Program (DSIATP) to provide training, as defined, for all DoD components.

3. Incorporate in the DSIATP those appropriate instructions promulgated by the Defense Intelligence Agency for DoD-wide intelligence training under the provisions of reference (a).

4. Coordinate actions and maintain liaison with other DoD components and appropriate government departments and agencies on matters related to the conduct and development of the DSIATP.

5. Develop training policies, training standards, curricula, and all other matters related to the efficient functioning of the DSIATP in coordination with DoD components, other governmental agencies and departments and private institutions so as to make economic and efficient use of scarce training resources.
6. Provide DSIA TP facilities, as appropriate, for the use of DoD components for related training which can be conducted most effectively and economically on a common basis.

7. Provide as necessary and appropriate, DSIA TP instructional material for DoD reserve forces and correspondence students of all military departments.

B. All DoD components involved in receipt or support of training provided by the DSIA TP will assist, as appropriate, in the establishment and operations of the facility.

V. ADMINISTRATION AND FINANCING

A. Commissioned officer and enlisted personnel from all military services, augmented by qualified civilian personnel, will be assigned as appropriate to the staff and faculty of the DSIA TP.

B. Except as provided below, the Department of the Air Force will be responsible for programming, budgeting, and financing all expenses incident to the DSIA TP.

C. The pay, allowances (including subsistence) of military personnel, and the permanent change of station travel costs of military and civilian personnel, assigned as faculty of the DSIA TP will be borne by the DoD component from which assigned.

D. Pay, allowances (including subsistence), and travel costs (not integral to courses of instructions) of military and civilian personnel assigned as students will be borne by respective sponsoring DoD components.
VI. AUTHORITY

To achieve the objectives of this Directive and to discharge the responsibilities and functions assigned to the Department of the Air Force, herein, the Secretary of the Air Force and his designees are authorized to:

A. Communicate directly with all elements of DoD, other departments and agencies of the government, and appropriate private institutions.

B. Prescribe necessary administrative and managerial procedures.

C. Prescribe administrative procedures for compliance with appropriate security directives pertaining to special clearance requirements for all personnel involved with DSIATP functions, training and curriculum development.

D. Conduct the advanced sensor interpretation and application training program assigned to the Air Force.

E. Take over for establishment of the DSIATP, wherever feasible, established facilities, equipment and personnel spaces of other DoD components.

VII. EFFECTIVE DATE AND IMPLEMENTATION

A. This Directive is effective upon publication. Its provisions will be implemented as determined by the Secretary of the Air Force.

B. When advised by the Department of the Air Force that it has assumed a function or responsibility assigned by this Directive, all DoD components will review their existing directives, instructions, and regulations for conformity; make necessary changes thereto within 90 days; and notify the Department of the Air Force when changes are completed.
C. The transfer of appropriate facilities, equipment and personnel spaces to the Department of the Air Force from other DoD components will be accomplished in accordance with established DoD procedures.

[Signature]
Deputy Secretary of Defense
Department of Defense Directive

SUBJECT  Defense Intelligence Agency (Technical Intelligence)

Refs.:  (a) DoD Directive 5105.21, "Defense Intelligence Agency," August 1, 1961
(b) DoD Directive 5105.28, "Defense Intelligence Agency (Technical Intelligence)," December 1, 1962 (hereby cancelled)

I. PURPOSE

This directive establishes a management arrangement for DoD technical intelligence activities which provides for:

A. Assembly, integration, validation, and assignment of priorities for all DoD technical intelligence collection and production requirements.

B. Establishment of a single DoD technical intelligence program.

C. Overall management by a single authority of DoD technical intelligence activities.

D. Allocation of technical intelligence resources so as to minimize duplication and dissipation of effort.

E. Dissemination of technical intelligence findings and reports throughout DoD and to other members of the national intelligence community.

II. APPLICABILITY

The provisions of this directive apply to all DoD components.

III. DEFINITIONS AND SCOPE

A. Technical intelligence as used in this directive and in reference (a) means foreign scientific and technological
intelligence and covers:

1. Foreign developments in basic and applied research in natural and applied sciences and in applied engineering techniques.

2. Scientific and technical characteristics, capabilities, and limitations of all foreign military systems, weapons, weapon systems, and materiel, research and development related thereto, and the production methods employed for their manufacture.

B. Assets in DoD research and development organizations and in other DoD commands or agencies which are used for the collection or production of technical intelligence are considered DoD technical intelligence collection and production resources for the purposes of this directive.

C. Scientific and Technical Intelligence Production is:

1. The processing, analysis, interpretation, evaluation, and integration of the information necessary to produce technical intelligence as defined in III, A, above.

2. The preparation of technical intelligence and the publication of technical intelligence in the form of studies, reports, findings, technical handbooks, and other documents of a similar nature such as technical briefs and technical working papers.

D. The DoD technical intelligence program is a consolidation of the total DoD scientific and technical intelligence effort by appropriate subelements based on the DIA "Subject Categorization of Scientific and Technical Intelligence Production." It is based exclusively on specific tasks which the Director, DIA, determines should be assigned to collection, processing and analytic activities of DoD components, in order to meet the intelligence requirements of all DoD consumers and to meet the requirements of the military departments for direct support from their scientific and technical intelligence production units.
IV. FUNCTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

A. The Director, DIA, or his designees shall:

1. Review and supervise the technical intelligence programs, projects, and activities of all DoD components.

2. Prepare and submit to the Secretary of Defense, under established DoD procedures, a consolidated DoD-technical intelligence program, together with recommendations pertaining thereto. "The DIA program and budget will include the estimates of the funds required to finance technical intelligence activities organized within and directly operated by DIA, and recommendations with respect to the estimates of the military departments of the funds required to finance the approved technical intelligence activities which the departments' and commands conduct subject to DIA's overall management control.

3. Provide policy and program guidance in the field of technical intelligence to all DoD components.

4. Participate in joint review of technical intelligence budget estimates, financial programs, program changes and resource allocations with other staff advisers of the Secretary of Defense such as the Director of Defense Research and Engineering and the Assistant Secretaries of Defense.

5. Recommend to the Secretary of Defense additions, deletions, or changes in approved technical intelligence policies, plans, programs, procedures, and activities of all DoD components.

6. Consolidate, review, and assign the relative military importance of DoD technical intelligence research and development requirements.

7. Maintain and publish a register of all current DoD technical intelligence plans, programs, and projects.
8. Develop, assemble, integrate, and validate all DoD technical intelligence collection requirements, and assign relative priorities thereto.

9. Assign specific technical intelligence requirements to DoD collection resources; and originate requests, when necessary, to non-DoD collection resources to fulfill DoD requirements.

10. Review, supervise and evaluate the technical intelligence production and collection policies, plans, programs, procedures, and activities of all DoD components.

11. Develop, assemble, integrate, and validate all DoD technical intelligence production requirements and assign relative priorities thereto.

12. Directly assign tasks to the scientific and technical intelligence production units of DoD components for the production of technical intelligence reports, studies, and projects, and task the scientific and technical intelligence production units or allocate portions of the resources thereof as he considers necessary to meet the direct support requirements of the military departments.

13. Realign tasks within approved resources as feasible to respond to new requirements.

14. Directly assign tasks to the scientific and technical intelligence units within the DoD for the processing of technical intelligence data.

15. As appropriate to discharge or support assigned responsibilities and functions, produce technical intelligence as necessary, and:

   a. Conduct preliminary processing and analysis of foreign technological acquisitions;

   b. Identify characteristics, capabilities, and limitations of foreign weapons, weapon systems and materiel; and

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c. Process and analyze other technical data or information.

16. Review and integrate technical intelligence findings, studies and reports produced by the production units of the military departments, their respective contractors, and other DoD organizations.

17. Establish and promulgate uniform formats and categories for all DoD technical intelligence publications.

18. Establish and promulgate standard dissemination procedures for DoD technical intelligence findings, studies, and reports.

19. Provide intelligence estimates employing technical intelligence findings to all DoD components, to other members of the national intelligence community, and to international organizations.

20. Provide DoD contributions which are concerned with or involve technical intelligence to National Intelligence Estimates, Special National Intelligence Estimates, the National Intelligence Survey, and other publications of the national intelligence community.

21. Establish appropriate schedules, priorities and guidance for contributions in the technical intelligence field by DoD components in support of the DIA estimating mission.

22. Represent DoD in preparation of U.S. position papers in technical intelligence matters concerning international policy or activities.

23. Perform such other technical intelligence responsibilities and functions as may be assigned to DIA by the Secretary of Defense or the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

B. The Secretaries of the Military Departments or their designees shall:
1. Maintain, operate, and manage their respective technical intelligence organizations and activities in accordance with the authorities, responsibilities and functions assigned herein to the Director, DIA.

2. Provide resources and other support services to their respective technical intelligence organizations to include programming, budgeting, funding, personnel management, training, procurement, and residual staff support services.

3. Conduct technical intelligence programs and activities in accordance with the tasks assigned by the Director, DIA.

4. Retask the resources allocated by the Director, DIA, for their direct support as necessary to meet new urgent requirements and concurrently report such actions to DIA.

5. Develop and submit to DIA their technical collection requirements.

6. Provide, as requested by DIA, information on technical intelligence programs and activities conducted by their departments.

7. Submit directly to DIA technical intelligence findings, studies and reports produced by their production organizations, including contractors, or by other departmental activities, in accordance with procedures established by the Director, DIA, with copies to intervening headquarters as desired.

8. Provide technical support to DIA as requested.

9. Prepare departmental technical intelligence programs and budget estimates in support of the DoD technical intelligence program.

V. RELATIONSHIPS AND AUTHORITY

A. The Relationships and Authority specified in reference (a) are applicable to the functions and responsibilities assigned by this directive to the Director, DIA.
B. In addition, the Director, DIA, is specifically authorized to:

1. Establish and promulgate whatever administrative and managerial procedures, methods, and systems are necessary to achieve the objectives of this directive.

2. Contract or take over existing contracts, as appropriate, with qualified organizations for studies, processing of data and other support necessary to discharge the functions assigned herein.

C. The functions and responsibilities assigned to the Director, DIA, herein do not preclude any DoD component from initiating collection activities where the opportunity to collect is highly perishable. Such collection actions will be reported to DIA.

VI. CANCELLATION

DoD Directive 5105.28, "Defense Intelligence Agency (Technical Intelligence)," dated December 1, 1962 (reference (b)), is hereby cancelled.

VII. EFFECTIVE DATE AND IMPLEMENTATION

A. This directive is effective upon publication. Its provisions will be implemented as determined by the Director, DIA.

B. When the Director, DIA, assumes a function of responsibility assigned by this directive, all DoD components will review their existing directives, instructions, and regulations for conformity; make necessary changes thereto within 90 days; and notify the Director, DIA, and the Secretary of Defense when changes are completed.

C. The transfer of technical intelligence funds, facilities, equipment, personnel authorizations, and civilian personnel to DIA from other DoD components will be accomplished under established DoD procedures.

Secretary of Defense
DOCUMENTS SECTION TWO, PART H:

DISSIMINATION
Reply to

Attention DIAQ

Subject: Dissemination of Intelligence Information

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army,
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy,
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of Air Force,

1. It is intended to develop an intelligence information dissemination capability within DIA which, on an integrated and centralized basis, will affect the controlled, accurate placement of incoming intelligence information into the hands of all customer users as fast as possible. This capability will provide a rapid, continuous, secure flow of incoming intelligence information as requested by validated collection and dissemination requirements of production consumers and as submitted on an initiative basis by field collectors. In the interests of economy of resources, it is probable that this capability also will include the distribution of the outgoing finished DIA intelligence products.

2. Such detailed planning will be necessary prior to attainment of an operational DIA intelligence dissemination capability, with a substantial portion of this planning being accomplished in coordination with the Services, and in a manner that will prevent any degradation of intelligence dissemination procedures within the Department of Defense.

3. Until this planning reaches a stage where identified Service intelligence dissemination responsibilities can be assumed by DIA, it is requested that you continue to maintain your intelligence dissemination services, to include support of the UUN and the unified and specified commands.

G. E. Frankel

Director of Staff

Prepared by: Mr. G. D. Garrett, Jr., DIAAQ-P/54317/e, j. draskin/4 April 62.

Memo for Record:

Recent and continuing contacts with Service representatives on intelligence dissemination matters, including numerous discussions with key dissemination personnel and culminating in a briefing of the MSB on the DIA Dissemination Concept, makes it advisable to notify the Service intelligence chiefs, as a matter of record (1) of DIA's intent to develop a dissemination capability after (2) detailed planning to be accomplished in coordination with the Services, and (3) that they will continue their dissemination services until this planning is completed - to include dissemination support of DIA and the U&S commands.

G. D. Garrett/DIAAQ-P/mjd/4 April 62

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REPLY TO C-1){62)
ATTN OF DIAAQ

SUBJECT: “Concept for a DIA Dissemination Capability”

TO: The Secretary of Defense

THRU: The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

1. Attainment of a DIA dissemination capability in accordance with the provisions of subject document, approved 15 June 1962, by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, requires that operational control of certain Service intelligence dissemination resources be transferred to this Agency. Attached is a proposed DoD Directive that would accomplish this transfer.

2. Your approval and issuance of this directive is requested.

1 Atch
Draft DoD Directive(C)

Prepared by:
George Garrett/ac/54252/5July 1962

Declassified by SVL-1
on 9 October 1998
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DIRECTIVE

SUBJECT: Intelligence Dissemination Resources and Functions

Refs.: (a) DoD Directive 5105.21, Defense Intelligence Agency
(b) "Concept of a DIA Dissemination Capability," dated 29 March 1962
(c) Memo from Deputy Secretary of Defense, "DIA Production and ADPS Center, Plans and Concept for Dissemination," to Chairman, JCS, dated 15 June 1962.

I. APPLICABILITY

The provisions of this directive apply to the Military Services and the Defense Intelligence Agency.

II. PURPOSE

A. This directive transfers operational control of certain Service intelligence dissemination resources and functions to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) in order to provide centralized control of intelligence dissemination activities and obtain the maximum degree of efficiency and economy in the allocation and management of intelligence dissemination resources and functions.

B. This transfer of operational control of these Military Service resources will serve as the basis for development of a DIA dissemination facility in accordance with the
proposals of reference (b) as approved by reference (c).

III. DEFINITION

A. As used in this directive:

1) "Intelligence dissemination" refers to all activities that are conducted at Departmental or Washington Headquarters levels by the Military Services for developing, dissemination policy; the original receipt and control; review of content; coding or indexing by subject or user; designation of recipient(s); reproduction; stocking of spare copies; preparation for shipment; security control; and delivery to the activities that transmit to the users of all incoming substantive unevaluated ("raw") intelligence information and materials, and semi-finished and finished intelligence.

2) "Intelligence distribution" refers to all activities that are conducted at Departmental or Washington Headquarters levels by the Military Services for the routing; security control; preparation for shipment and delivery to the transmitting agency of the outgoing finished intelligence.
products of the production, estimative, current intelligence or other intelligence-producing activities of the Military Services.

IV. IMPLEMENTATION

A. As soon as practicable and no later than the effective date of this directive, operational control of all resources and functions which the Military Services currently employ and perform for intelligence dissemination and intelligence distribution will be transferred to the Director, DIA.

B. Included among these resources are all manpower authorizations, personnel, equipment, funds, documents and other materials engaged in and necessary to the Military Services' intelligence dissemination and intelligence distribution activities and without which, in whole or in part, these activities cannot be conducted efficiently.

C. All resources affected by this directive will remain physically in place in their present locations until it is determined by the Director, DIA, that their physical transfer to DIA premises or other location is desirable, practicable, will result in their efficient and economical allocation and management, and can be
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affected with little or no disruption to DoD intelligence dissemination, distribution, collection or production activities.

D. Identification of resources over which operational control will be transferred to the DIA will be made by the Military Services in collaboration with DIA in accordance with the definitions in paragraph III, and in compliance with the provisions of paragraph IV.B., of this directive.

E. Where Military Service intelligence dissemination or intelligence distribution activities currently are receiving direct or indirect support from DoD agencies or elements not employed in or assigned to those activities and not referred to in paragraph IV.B., above, that support will continue to be furnished subsequent to DIA assumption of operational control over Military Service intelligence dissemination and intelligence distribution resources.

V. ADMINISTRATION

A. For the present, administrative control and financial support of their intelligence dissemination and intelligence distribution resources and intelligence support activities will remain the responsibility of the Military Services. During this interim period no changes will be
made in the resources and/or support levels without the prior approval of the Director, DIA, or his designee.

B. However, upon the functional transfer of Intelligence Dissemination and Intelligence Distribution activities to the DIA, administrative control of all resources including, but not necessarily limited to, those defined in paragraph IV. B, above, will be transferred to DIA. Specifically, a non-functional transfer of administrative and support billets will be required to furnish the necessary administrative and logistics support, personnel administration, etc., as outlined in paragraph V.e of the approved Dissemination Concept. At the same time that the functions, administrative control, and resources are transferred to DIA, direct and/or indirect support resources as defined in paragraph IV. E, above, will be transferred to DIA or continued until suitable support agreements are reached between DIA and the activities concerned.

C. The channel for exercising operational control of Military Service intelligence dissemination and intelligence distribution resources upon the effective date of this directive shall be from the Director, DIA, or his designee to the Chief or Officer, directly supervising these functions.
V. THE DIRECTOR, DIA, WILL KEEP THE ASSISTANT CHIEFS OF STAFF, INTELLIGENCE, OF THE ARMY AND AIR FORCE AND THE DIRECTOR, NAVAL INTELLIGENCE, INFORMED OF ACTIONS TAKEN AND PROGRESS TOWARD TRANSFERRING FUNCTIONS AND RESOURCES TO THE DIA.

D. PROCEDURES NECESSARY TO PROPERLY SAFEGUARD OR ISOLATE THE TRANSFER OF OPERATIONAL CONTROL OVER RESOURCES USED IN SPECIAL CATEGORY INTELLIGENCE DISSEMINATION OR INTELLIGENCE DISTRIBUTION WILL BE DETERMINED JOINTLY BY THE DIRECTOR, DIA, AND THE MILITARY SERVICE(S) CONCERNED.

VI. EFFECTIVE DATE

THIS DIRECTIVE IS EFFECTIVE ____________.

*Ten duty days after date of directive.*
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

THROUGH: THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Plan for the Defense Intelligence Agency's Dissemination Center

References:
(a) DIA's "Plan for the Dissemination Center," 7 Feb 63 (O), with Memo for SecDef from Director, DIA, dated 7 Feb 63 (O), attached thereto
(b) JCSM-653-63, "Plan for the DIA Dissemination Center," 22 Aug 63 (O)
(c) Multi-address Memo from ASD/Comptroller, Subj: "Changes to the Five Year Force Structure and Financial Program," 10 Jun 63

The Defense Intelligence Agency's (DIA) Dissemination Center Plan, reference (a), as endorsed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in reference (b), is approved. Implementation of the provisions of the Plan will be as determined by the Director, DIA, and should be completed by 31 March 1964.

The transfer to DIA from other DoD components of 145 military and civilian manpower authorizations; dissemination equipment on hand and on order; funds (including those from FY 1964 appropriations); records; and files will be accomplished in accordance with established DoD procedures. Effective with FY 1965, and in consonance with DoD directives, DIA is assigned responsibility for programming, budgeting, and administering the funds (except for the pay and allowances of military personnel) required to perform the functions transferred to DIA under this Plan. Adjustments to the five year force structure and financial...
Program resulting from the implementation of this Plan will be affected under the simplified program change procedures outlined in reference (c).

The following amendment to DoD Directive 5105.21 will be issued shortly and charges DIA to:

"Develop and supervise a DoD-wide intelligence dissemination program; disseminate DoD and non-DoD intelligence information to the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the military departments, the unified and specified commands, the Defense agencies, and authorized non-DoD and international organizations."

During implementation of the Dissemination Plan, the Director, DIA, is requested to provide me with bi-monthly progress reports on the status of its implementation with informational copies supplied the Secretaries of the military departments and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Within one year after the Dissemination Plan has been implemented the Director, DIA, is requested to assess the adequacy of the staffing levels of DIA's dissemination activity and report thereon to me and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. If the Director, DIA, concludes that additional manpower authorizations or resources are required, he should submit his requests to me through the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

/s/

Robert S. McNamara
Secretary of Defense

Copies To:
Secretary of the Army
Secretary of the Navy
Secretary of the Air Force
Assistant Secretaries of Defense
General Counsel
Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
Assistants to the Secretary of Defense
Administrative Assistant
Administrative Secretary
MEMORANDUM FOR:

Commander in Chief, Alaska
Commander in Chief, Atlantic
Commander in Chief, Continental Air Defense Command
US Commander in Chief, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
Commander in Chief, US Southern Command
Commander in Chief, US Strike Command
Commander in Chief, US Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean
Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command

Subject: Responsibilities of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the Unified and Specified Commands for Intelligence Dissemination (J)

Reference: SM-252-52, dated 5 March 1962, subject: "Authority to Strengthen Intelligence Capabilities of Commanders of Unified and Specified Commands"

1. The Secretary of Defense has approved establishment of a DIA Dissemination Center which will have the following mission:

"To disseminate systematically, accurately, and expeditiously, Department of Defense (DOD) and non-DOD intelligence information and intelligence to the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Military Departments, the unified and specified commands, appropriate designated elements of the four Services, offices of DIA, and certain national and international agencies and authorities; to coordinate such residual dissemination activities as may remain directly responsive to the Military Departmental headquarters and to provide guidance necessary for the maintenance of an over-all DOD dissemination program that most effectively employs the collateral and sensitive intelligence dissemination resources of the DOD on a coordinated basis." [As used in this memorandum, "intelligence dissemination" "intelligence information dissemination" or "dissemination" refer to all activities that are performed at Military Departmental or Service Headquarters levels for developing dissemination policy, plans and programs; original receipt and control; review of content;...]

GROUP-3
DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS;
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED
designation of recipient(s); reproduction; stocking of spare copies; preparation for shipment; security control; and delivery to activities (post office, couriers, etc.,) that subsequently transmit to the users of all substantive unevaluated ("raw") intelligence information and materials, as well as the dispatch of finished intelligence received in the DIA Dissemination Center for outgoing distribution.)

2. Detailed plans for the transfer of resources from the military departments to DIA to accomplish the intelligence dissemination mission have now been approved by the Secretary of Defense. These detailed plans provide that the Director, DIA, will:

   a. Activate the DIA Dissemination Center on 16 September 1963.

   b. Acquire identified intelligence dissemination resources.

   c. Disseminate intelligence information and intelligence to the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the military departments, the commanders of unified and specified commands, appropriate designated elements of the four Services, offices of DIA, and certain national and international agencies and authorities.

   d. Maintain appropriate liaison with other components of the DOD, and with the departments and agencies of the Government.

3. Upon activation of the DIA Dissemination Center, the Director, DIA, will issue such instructions and guidance as are necessary to insure an integrated, effective Department of Defense intelligence dissemination program within the provisions and intent of the referenced memorandum. Pending issuance of these instructions and guidance, intelligence dissemination to and by the commanders of unified and specified commands will be conducted in accordance with existing procedures.

4. Commanders of unified and specified commands will ensure that the procedures and responsibilities enumerated in the referenced memorandum are complied with as they relate to intelligence dissemination.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

M. J. INGELIDO
Brig Gen, USAF
Secretary

Copy to:
DIA

CONFIDENTIAL
DOCUMENTS SECTION TWO, PART I

DEFENSE ATTACHÉ SYSTEM
MEMORANDUM FOR The Secretaries of the Military Departments
The Director of Defense Research & Engineering
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Assistant Secretaries of Defense
The General Counsel
The Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
The Director, Defense Atomic Support Agency
The Director, Defense Communications Agency
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Director, Defense Supply Agency
The Director, National Security Agency

SUBJECT: Defense Attaché System (DoD Directive O-5105.32)

References:
(a) DoD Directive 2000.1, "Armed Forces Attache System"
(b) DoD Directive C-2000.4, "Senior U.S. Military Representative"
(c) DoD Directive C-2000.5, "Military Service Attache System"
(d) Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense from the Secretary of the Air Force, "Transfer of Air Force Attache Executive Agent Support Services to the Department of State," dated 30 January 1964

I have concluded that the time is now appropriate to establish a single Defense Attaché System (DAS), as an organizational function of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), in order to imrove the management of the total attaché effort. Accordingly, I have on this date approved DoD Directive O-5105.32, "Defense Attaché System."
In establishing the DAS under the provisions of DoD Directive C-5105.32, the Director, DIA, in conjunction with the Secretaries of the military departments, shall apply the following planning and policy guidelines:

a. Organizational arrangements for the DAS, where appropriate, will be designed to provide an acceptable interface with foreign governments so that essential accreditation is continued; and to maintain the concept of attache affiliation with a particular military Service where such affiliation is essential to assure access to specific locations or to specific sources of intelligence.

b. Total manpower requirements for the DAS, both in Washington and at overseas locations, shall be established and maintained at appreciably lower levels than that required to administer separate attache systems in the three military departments.

c. The recommendations of the Secretary of the Air Force, as detailed in reference (d), shall be considered in establishing administrative support arrangements at DAS operating locations.

Coincident with or subsequent to the operational establishment of the DAS, the Director, DIA, shall review references (b) and (c), and such other related publications, directives or instructions which may be in effect in the DoD, and recommend to me their cancellation or revision, as appropriate.

DoD Directive 5105.32 provides that the DAS shall be implemented as determined by the Director, DIA. During the period of transition from the present military department attache system to the single Defense system, planning and phase-in of functions and responsibilities must be accomplished without any loss of effectiveness or impairment of other intelligence efforts. To this end, within 45 days from the date of this memorandum, the Director, DIA, shall submit for my review an outline time-phased plan for establishing the DAS. Every 30 days thereafter, until the transition has been completed, a progress summary will be submitted to me and the Joint Chiefs of Staff for information.
Department of Defense Directive

SUBJECT: Defense Attache System

(b) DoD Directive 5010.10, "Intelligence Career Development Program," dated 1 February 1964
(d) DoD Directive 5105.21, "Defense Intelligence Agency," dated 1 August 1961

I. PURPOSE

This Directive provides general policy and guidance with respect to the establishment, maintenance, and direction of a single Defense Attache System (DAS).

II. APPLICABILITY

The provisions of this Directive apply to all DoD components.

III. ORGANIZATION AND DIRECTION

Subject to the direction of the Secretary of Defense, or the Joint Chiefs of Staff acting under the direction and authority of the Secretary of Defense, the DAS

[Signature]

DECLASSIFIED: DEC 30, 1995
DECLASSIFIED OR: DEC 12, 1995

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is established as an organizational function of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and shall consist of:

A. All military personnel accredited as attaches or assistant attaches to foreign governments and other DoD personnel assigned to attaché posts;

B. Control and administrative functions previously performed by the military department headquarters with respect to separate attaché systems; and

C. Such headquarters, subordinate units, and facilities as are specifically established by the DIA for accomplishing the functions and responsibilities assigned herein.

IV. POLICY

Establishment, maintenance and direction of the DAS will be governed by the following policies:

A. The DAS will be responsive to the requirements of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff;

B. The primary purpose of the DAS will be the efficient reporting of information;

C. The DAS may be structured to satisfy the overseas representational requirements of all components of the DoD;

D. Within the limits of qualified manpower resources, the provisions of reference (b) will be applied to the selection, training and career development of personnel assigned to the DAS.
V. FUNCTIONS

A. Under the direction of the Secretary of Defense, or the Joint Chiefs of Staff acting under the direction and authority of the Secretary of Defense, the Director, DIA, shall:

1. Establish and administer the DAS;

2. Select attaché personnel upon the submission of nominations from the military departments;

3. Determine the organizational and command arrangements for each attaché post or complex within a foreign country;

4. Determine the total attaché administrative manpower requirements, and the military and civilian composition thereof, at each attaché post or complex;

5. Conduct necessary negotiations with the Department of State for the assignment of military attaches at overseas locations;

6. 

7. Establish requirements and arrange for the specialized training of all attaché-designees and attaché administrative personnel;

8. Establish procedures, in collaboration with the Secretaries of the military departments and the heads of other DoD components, for the conduct of overseas representation;

9. Continuously review the organizational and management arrangements for the DAS in order to improve the effectiveness and responsiveness of the reporting effort;
10. Review, as required, all DoD Directives and Instructions relating to the attache function to assure continued applicability and currency;

11. In collaboration with the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs), develop arrangements to accomplish the military assistance functions where such responsibilities are assigned to the attaches; and

12. Establish a central DoD contact point for the military, air and naval attaches maintained by foreign governments in Washington.

B. The Secretaries of the military departments and, when appropriate, the heads of other DoD components will:

1. Provide the Director, DIA, with assistance, logistic and administrative support, and specialized training required to establish, maintain and administer the DAS; and

2. Nominate to the Director, DIA, qualified personnel for assignment to the DAS.

VI. ADMINISTRATION

A. Manpower authorizations required for the DIA to establish, maintain and administer the DAS will be provided on an approximately equal basis from the military departments and will include such civilian personnel as required.

B. Attaches and assistant attaches accredited to foreign governments shall be selected from commissioned officers, on active duty, of the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps.
C. Administrative and other support personnel assigned to attaché posts may be commissioned officers, civilian personnel, warrant officers and enlisted personnel.

D. The Director, DIA will be totally responsible for programming, budgeting and financing the DAS, except for military costs as specified in paragraph F below.

E. Administrative, logistic, and training support furnished by the military departments will be in accordance with the basic policies and principles established by reference (c) and other appropriate DoD Directives, Instructions and procedures.

F. The pay, allowances (including subsistence) of military personnel and permanent change of station costs of military personnel assigned to DIA for the DAS will be borne by the DoD component from which assigned.

VII. AUTHORITY

The appropriate provisions of references (d), (e) and (f) apply to the discharge of the functions and responsibilities assigned by this Directive.

VIII. CANCELLATIONS

Reference (a) is hereby cancelled.

IX. EFFECTIVE DATE AND IMPLEMENTATION

A. This Directive is effective upon publication. Its provisions will be implemented as determined by the Director, DIA.
B. When advised by the Director, DIA, that he has assumed a function or responsibility assigned by this Directive, all DoD components concerned will review their existing directives, instructions and regulations for conformity; make necessary changes thereon within 90 days; and notify the Director, DIA, when such changes are completed.

C. The transfer of funds, equipment, personnel authorizations and civilian personnel and the arrangements for use of facilities incident to the establishment and administration of the DAS will be accomplished under established DoD procedures.

[Signature]

Secretary of Defense
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Through: The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: (U) The Defense Attache System (DAS)

References:
(a) Memorandum for SecDef from Director, DIA, subject as above, dated 2 February 1965.
(b) Memorandum for SecDef from the Chairman, JCS, subject: "Outline Plan for the Defense Attache System (U)," dated 4 March 1965.

I have reviewed the Defense Attache System (DAS) Outline Plan as submitted in reference (a) by the Director, DIA, and the comments on the Plan as expressed by the Chairman, JCS, in reference (b).

I fully appreciate the benefits to the attaché system of continuing to the extent feasible the identity of Service attaché and of permitting certain Service-attaché and Command-attaché channels for representational functions. However, these features must not be allowed to distort the basic objective of the DAS, namely, the establishment of a single Defense Attaché who will control the activities of all the attaches at a given station. Specifically, the designated Defense Attaché is responsible for the representational activities of his subordinates. The establishment of a separate chain of command over the representational functions of the Service attaches outside the control of the Defense Attaché would defeat the purpose of the DAS. On the other hand, the continuation of direct communications between the Services/Combatant Commanders and the respective Service attaches, in accordance with procedures to be established by DIA, for purposes of expediting and coordinating routine activities would be fully compatible with the concept of the DAS.

* Attachment to JCS 5031/410-1
** Declaration to JCS 5031/410-2

Declassified IAW EO 12958
Overall, I consider the Outline Plan you submitted fulfills my desires and provides an acceptable basis for the establishment and maintenance of the DAS. I approve the Outline Plan as submitted and as proposed for change by reference (b) except as pertain to the following subparagraphs of the Plan:

(a) Page 7, subparagraph 2c(2), change "accredited to host countries" to read "accredited to host country counterpart Services."

(b) Page 7, subparagraph 2c(3), change JCSM recommendation in reference (b) to read:

"(3) May also be accredited, as required, as Assistant Defense Attaches, to host country Ministries of Defense."

I desire that you modify your Outline Plan in accord with the above, notify all appropriate Defense and non-Defense agencies concerned, and proceed with implementing the Plan. I also desire that you submit a progress summary to me and to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for information every 30 days until the transition to the DAS has been completed.

[Signature]
C-1114/WL-1

1 April 1965

SUBJECT: Outline Plan for the Defense Attache System (DAS)

TO: Distribution List

1. References:

a. Secretary of Defense multi-address memo, 12 December 1964, subject: Defense Attache System (DOD Directive C-5.05.32).


2. By reference la the Secretary of Defense required the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, to submit an outline time-phased plan for establishing the DAS. By reference lb the Secretary of Defense approved, with certain changes, the Outline Plan submitted in accordance with reference la and directed the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, to proceed with its implementation.

3. A copy of the approved Outline Plan is forwarded as Enclosure 1 for information or guidance, as appropriate. Implementing instructions will be issued by the Defense Intelligence Agency. Enclosure 1 may be reproduced locally without further reference to this Agency.

FOR THE DIRECTOR:

Richard W. Whitney
Brigadier General, USA
AC/S, Plans and Programs

Enclosure a/s

Declassified by DIA/SVI-1 on 20 Dec 2000
OUTLINE PLAN FOR THE DEFENSE ATTACHE SYSTEM (DAS) (U)

REFERENCES:


Declassified by DIA/SVI-1 on 20 Dec 2000
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SECTION I

GENERAL

1. To achieve the establishment, maintenance and direction of a single Defense Attaché System (DAS), as specified by the Secretary of Defense, this plan provides for the assumption of all of the functions which are clearly the responsibility of the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency.

2. This plan is aimed at achieving:

   a. A carefully phased transfer of functions and resources from the Military Departments to DIA.


   c. A single Defense Attaché System which will:

      (1) As its primary purpose, satisfy requirements of the Department of Defense.

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(2) Provide an acceptable interface with foreign military establishments as an element of US Diplomatic Missions overseas, so that essential accreditation is continued; and to maintain the concept of attache affiliation with a particular Military Service where such affiliation is essential to assure access to specific locations or to specific sources of information.

(3) Satisfy the overseas representational requirements, which are not intelligence related, of all components of the Department of Defense, to the extent compatible with the reporting functions of the attaches.

SECTION II

CONCEPT FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF THE DAS

1. Objectives to be achieved:

a. To provide a means through which sound, fruitful relationships between the US Department of Defense and the defense establishments of foreign countries may be developed.

b. To provide a military attache system directly responsive to the requirements of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and, for the representational functions described in paragraph 3 below, to the Military Services and appropriate commands.

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d. To provide a single military attaché advisor to each Chief of US Diplomatic Mission.

c. To effect economies in the DAS by streamlining Washington level and attaché staff, and by arranging administrative and logistical support from other US agencies wherever practicable.

f. To provide a single channel for the coordination of all DAS activities with other US governmental agencies.

f. To maintain a means of in-country management of those non-intelligence functions with which the DAS is charged.

h. To provide, an effective mechanism for liaison of various types between the Armed Forces of the United States and of the foreign country to which they are accredited.

i. To provide the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, with the staff means by which to direct and manage the system and to ensure the provision of adequate logistical and administrative support; to provide a means for improving the effectiveness and responsiveness of the system.

j. To enhance the attractiveness of the DAS for all members of the Military Services and to improve the professional competence of the attachés.

k. To ensure the provision of qualified, trained personnel whose personal and professional attributes will enhance the effectiveness and prestige of the USA and of US military representation overseas.

l.  

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4. To establish a central DOD contact point for the military attachés maintained by foreign governments in Washington.

2. Basic Concepts and Principles:

4. The Defense Attache System:

(1) Will be established as an organizational function of the DIA, directed and maintained by the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, supported by the Military Departments and other DOD components as directed by the Secretary of Defense.

(2) Will be a single system with a direct chain of authority and responsibility exercised by the Director, DIA, through the Defense Attache.

(3) Will be directly responsive to the requirements of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, and, to the extent compatible with the intelligence collection functions, to the Military Services and appropriate commands, for representational functions described in paragraph 5 below.

(4) Will consist of:

(a) A field organization of stations in foreign countries, known as Defense Attache Offices (DAO). Each office includes the personnel, material and facilities assigned thereto.

(b) DIA elements necessary to direct and support the system.
b. The Defense Attaché:

(1) Will be designated by the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, for each country to which a military attaché is accredited. Normally a Military Service will be designated to provide the Defense Attaché. However, under exceptional circumstances, such as non-availability of qualified personnel, an officer of another Service may be selected for the particular tour under consideration. Such designation will consider, among other criteria:

(a) National and DOD interests in a particular country.
(b) [Redacted]
(c) The prestige and influence of the Military Services of a host country and the relationship of the US Military Services thereto.
(d) Availability of qualified personnel.
(e) Equitable distribution of Defense Attaché positions among the Military Services.
(f) The Military Service providing the commander of other US military organizations or activities in the host country, such as a Military Mission, Group, Command or HAG.

(2) Will be under command and control of the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, and responsible to him for all activities of the Defense Attaché Office.

(3) Will be accredited to the host country Ministry of Defense, when such accreditation is acceptable to the host government, and to his counterpart Service.
(4) Is designated a Defense Attaché as an internal matter
In all cases where his recognition as a Defense Attaché would be
incompatible with host country policies.

c. Service Attachés:

(1) Will, for internal purposes, be under the direction and
control of the Defense Attaché.

(2) Will, for accreditation purposes, be identified by appropriate
Service titles and so accredited to host country counterpart Services.

(3) May also be accredited, as required, as Assistant Defense
Attachés, to host country Ministries of Defense.

(4) Will, for representational purposes, represent the Secretaries
of their parent Departments, the Military Chiefs of their Services and
other Military Secretaries or Chiefs as directed.

(5) Will not be required from each Service on all stations.

3. DIA Responsibilities and Functions. The Director, Defense Intelligence
Agency will:

a. Establish, direct, operate and maintain the DAS.

b. Determine the organization and command arrangements for the
Defense Attaché Offices within a foreign country.

c. Determine the military and civilian composition of each Defense
Attaché Office.

d. Establish a single channel of authoritative direction between
the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, and Defense Attachés.

e. Arrange with Department of State for the assignment and
accreditation of military attaches at overseas locations.
f. Make arrangements with Department of State, the Military Departments and appropriate military commands for the administrative and logistical support to be provided the DAS by them.

g. Coordinate the operational and support activities of the DAS with the Military Departments, the Commanders of Unified and Specified Commands, other DOD agencies and other governmental agencies as required.

h. In collaboration with the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs), develop arrangements to accomplish military assistance and military sales functions where such responsibilities are assigned to the attaches.

i. Arrange for the satisfaction of the overseas representational requirements of the Military Departments to the extent that they are compatible with the intelligence collection function.

j. Develop plans, policies, programs and budgets for the operation and administration of the system.

k. Continually examine requirements levied on the attaché system.

l. Issue directives, orders, regulations and instructions as required.

m. Select attaché personnel from candidates nominated by the Military Departments.

n. Render Efficiency/Effectiveness/Fitness Reports as required by Military Service Regulation.

o. Establish requirements for the specialized training of all Attaché
and Assistant Attache-designees and for all supporting personnel.

p. Provide for the security of the DAS.

q. Direct research, surveys and studies to develop managerial, organizational or technological improvements in the DAS.

c. Conduct periodic inspections of the DAS.

s. Review, as required, all DOD Directives and Instructions relating to the attache function to assure continued applicability and currency.

c. Establish a central DOD point of contact for foreign liaison functions. (A separate plan will be submitted.)

4. Functions and Responsibilities of Military Departments. Military Departments will:

a. Provide administrative and logistical support to the DAS in accordance with applicable directives.

b. Provide training support to the DAS in accordance with assigned responsibilities.

c. Nominate personnel to the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, for assignment to the DAS.

d. 

e. Provide administration of military justice over military attachés and other members of the Armed Forces assigned or attached to Defense Attache Offices in accordance with regulations or directives of the Armed Forces to which the attache or other military member in question belongs.
5. Functional Relationships:

a. Responsible DOD agencies or major commanders are authorized to deal directly with those Defense Attaches who have been assigned, by agreement with DIA, responsibilities for military assistance programs, military sales programs, or other programs of this nature, keeping DIA informed as appropriate.

b. The Military Services and the Commanders of the Unified, Specified and Component Commands are authorized to deal directly and to delegate direct liaison authority with Defense Attaches or Service Attaches, as appropriate, with information to DIA as required, with respect to such functions as the following, to the extent agreed upon between the Services or Commands and DIA:

   (1) Obtaining ship, aircraft or visitor clearance.

   (2) Arranging for foreign officials, ships, and aircraft to visit activities or installations of commands or Military Services, or for US officials to visit foreign countries.

   (3) Transmitting communications between US Service officials and foreign officials.

   (4) Arranging for specialized maintenance (e.g., aircraft and ships); flight safety operations, etc.

   (5) Arranging as appropriate participation by foreign nationals in US military training programs and US military in foreign programs.

   (6) Administering uni-Service programs or activities supported by the Defense Attache System.
(7) Supporting the Service administrative requirements of assigned personnel.

c. Secretaries of Military Departments and Military Chiefs of Service are authorized privacy communication with their respective Service Attaches as they deem necessary.

6. Transfer of Functions and Resources: In order to preserve continuity of operations during the transitional period, this plan provides for the phased assumption of functions and resources by DIA both in Washington and overseas:

a. To allow the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, to assume early operational control over the functions of the DAS, Defense Attaches or Interim Defense Attaches will be designated. DIA, assisted by personnel on loan from the Services to the DIA staff, will initiate direct tasking, exercise operational control, and continue its present functions of guiding collection and reporting.

b. Administrative and logistical support and operations will continue to be performed by the Services, under the supervision of DIA, until the Defense Attache Detachment (DAD) is formally activated and essential augmentation to the DIA staff is approved and accomplished.

c. Washington level resources required to conduct operational and support functions will be determined and will be transferred to DIA from the Services by functional increments in accordance with an approved Joint Table of Distribution.
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d. As common Service support functions overseas are assumed by Department of State or appropriate commands, support functions will be reduced on a station-by-station basis. Personnel adjustments resulting from these reductions or from consolidation of collection functions will be phased over a period to be determined in a detailed plan. Reassignment of personnel no longer needed on station will be governed by a fair consideration of the impact on the individual and his family as well as the cost to the Defense Department.

c. A time-phasing schedule is shown in Section V.

7. Selection of Personnel:

a. The Military Services will nominate candidates to fill specific positions in the DAS according to criteria to be established by the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency.

b. The Military Departments may be required to provide a percentage of personnel at least as great as that presently provided.

c. The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, will select all personnel for the DAS.

d. The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, will provide trained US civilian personnel to the DAS.

SECTION III

THE DEFENSE ATTACHE SYSTEM

1. Defense Attache Offices (DAO)

   a. Mission: To \[censored\] report military and politico-military

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b. Responsibilities and Functions:

(1) The Defense Attaché will:

(a) Operate and administer the Defense Attaché Office, to include the rendering of Efficiency/Effectiveness/Fitness Reports.

(b) Direct the [redacted] activities of the Defense Attaché Office.

(c) Act as advisor for military attaché matters to the Chief of Mission and as advisor for other military matters as appropriate.

(d) Coordinate the activities of the Defense Attaché Office with other local US governmental agencies as appropriate.

(e) Provide the Chief of Mission appropriate military input for consideration of politico-military situations and problems.

(f) Represent the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Commanders of Unified Commands to the host country as requested.

(2) Under the direction and control of the Defense Attaché, Service Attachés will:

(a) [redacted]

(b) Assume the duties of Defense Attaché when so directed.
(c) Represent their Military Service for uni-Service matters
(for which direct channels are authorized as indicated in subparagraph 5b
above)

(d) Render Efficiency/Effectiveness/fitness Reports on
subordinates of their respective Services in accordance with their Service
regulations.

(e) Perform such additional duties as may be directed.

c. Relationship of the Defense Attaché with US Diplomatic Mission,
MAAG, Military Mission and Military Group:

(1) As a diplomatic officer and as a member of the diplomatic
staff of the Chief of Mission the Defense Attaché will, together with
his office personnel, be governed by policies and procedures established
by the Chief of Mission. He is responsible to the Director, Defense
Intelligence Agency, however, for the accomplishment of his mission.
Conflicts in instructions will be referred to the Director, Defense
Intelligence Agency.

(2) The Defense Attaché is the military advisor to the Ambassador
on other military attaché matters, and/or other military
matters as appropriate.

(3) Chiefs of MAAG, Military Mission, Military Group or commands
are advisors to the Ambassador with respect to their assigned functions
and responsibilities and other military matters as appropriate.

(4) The Defense Attaché will coordinate with the Chief, MAAG,
Military Mission, Military Group or command in the spirit of policies
d. Relationships of Attache to Host Governments:

(1) Will be guided by the principle that the public image of the Defense Attache concept must work to the net benefit of the functional capabilities of the Attache System. In cases where the Defense Attache concept would not be compatible with the host country policy or would be detrimental to US interests, it will be considered solely an internal US command arrangement.

(2) All military attaches will be accredited to the appropriate Armed Service and to the Ministry of Defense when the latter accreditation is appropriate and acceptable to the host government.

2. The Defense Attache Detachment (DAD)

a. Mission: To ensure the provision of administrative, fiscal and logistical support to Defense Attache Offices.

b. Responsibilities and Functions:

(1) Process Service nominations for DAS personnel.

(2) Conduct personnel administration and management for military and civilian personnel assigned to the DAS.

(3) Supervise or monitor all matters of supply, housing, fiscal accounting and related matters in support of the DAS.

(4) Act on all requests and correspondence from attaches related to administrative and logistical support matters.

c. Relationship to the DIA Staff: The DAD will be a field element of the DIA directly responsible to the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency. It will function in close coordination with the DIA staff and
will utilize to the maximum the resources and services available within the DIA.

4. Relationship to Military Departments: The DAD will deal directly with the Military Departments in those areas of personnel, logistics, administration, training and security in which the Military Departments have been directed by the Secretary of Defense to support the DAS.

SECTION IV

ADMINISTRATIVE AND LOGISTIC SUPPORT

1. The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, is responsible for ensuring the provision of all administrative and logistical support to the DAS.

2. The Military Departments are responsible for the provision of administrative and logistical support to the DAS in accordance with applicable directives.

3. The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, will arrange with the Department of State and with US Military Commands overseas to obtain appropriate administrative and logistical support of Defense Attaché Offices from Chiefs of Mission or local Commanders. Negotiations with the Department of State will:

   a. Seek a DOD-State worldwide agreement as to the nature and scope of responsibilities to be assumed by Diplomatic Missions abroad and the policies and principles governing the division of responsibilities.
between the Defense Attache and the Chief of Mission.

b. Conclude detailed agreements on a country-by-country basis by reviewing and approving plans developed by the Defense Attache in coordination with the Chief of Mission.

4. Discussions with commanders overseas will await DOD-State agreements.

5. Examples of common Service administrative and support functions considered suitable for total or partial transfer to Chiefs of Mission or local commanders are:

   Personnel Services -
   Fiscal Services -
   Communications Services -
   Security Services -
   Building Operations Support -
   Travel Services -
   Motor, Tool Support -
   Supply and Procurement -

SECTION V

IMPLEMENTATION AND PHASING

1. Implementation of this plan, therefore, contemplates four major steps:

   a. DIA assumes operational control of field activities and supervision of the Washington level resources supporting them; designates

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At this time there is no change in the support rendered by the Executive Agent. Field activities of the Executive Agent, however, are under operational control of the Defense Attaché; Washington activities are under supervision of DIA.

b. DIA submits a Joint Table of Distribution for the DIA staff augmentation and for the Defense Attaché Detachment. Thereafter, the Military Departments transfer personnel and functions into DIA by functional increments. During this phasing period DIA continues to supervise the support functions of the Services.

c. Complete transfer of all identified Service Attache resources to DIA by 30 June 1965.

d. Continue adjustment of personnel and support resources in the field to conform with the approved JTD.

2. The following sequence of actions is indicated, (the date of approval of this plan is assumed for planning purposes to be 1 March 1965):

a. 1 March 1965 to 30 June 1965:

(1) Augment DIA staff resources and organize Interim DMD with personnel on loan from the Services.

(2) Assume control of Washington level and field operational resources; designate Defense Attachés and Interim Defense Attachés.

(3) Assume supervision of the DAS administration and logistical support functions performed by the Military Departments.
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(4) Complete organizational planning for DIA staff and DAD, submit JTO for approval.

(5) Transfer Washington level functions and personnel by phased increment to DIA.

(6) Complete DOD-State agreement for support of DAS and initiate Defense Attache - Diplomatic Mission planning.

(7) Establish central point of contact (FLO).

(8) Submit JTO for field elements of the DAS.

(9) Review and revise DOD Directives as appropriate.

b. 30 June 1965:

(1) Complete transfer of identified Service Attache resources to DIA.

c. Subsequent to 30 June 1965:

(1) Continue adjustment of personnel and support arrangements until planned configuration is realized.

SECTION VI

SPECIFIC PLANS AND INSTRUCTIONS TO BE PROMULGATED

1. Continuation of planning for and establishment of the Defense Attache System will require the following:

a. Preliminary instructions and guidance to the field in anticipation of the designation of Defense Attaches or Incumbent Defense Attaches, including the requirement to submit Defense Attache Plans.

b. Standing instructions to the field in advance of the designation...
of permanent Defense Attaches, announcing approved plans and setting forth regulations for operation of the Defense Attaché Offices,

c. A Detailed Plan for the augmentation of the DIA staff and for the organization of DAD with supporting Joint Tables of Distribution.

d. A Detailed Plan for the Defense Attaché Offices with a supporting Joint Table of Distribution.

e. Development and promulgation of detailed instructions governing administrative and logistical activities derived from DOD-State agreements.

f. [Redacted]

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief of Staff, US Army
Chief of Naval Operations
Chief of Staff, US Air Force
Commandant of the Marine Corps
Director, DIA

Subject: Establishment of the Defense Attache System (U)

References: a. DOD Directive CS105; 32;
12 December 1964
b. JCSM 147-65, 4 March 1965
c. JCS 2428/570-1

1. (U) The DIA Outline Plan for the Defense Attache System,
directed by reference a and forwarded by the Joint Chiefs of Staff by
reference b, was approved by the Secretary of Defense on 20 March
1965. Among its provisions was that identified personnel resources
of the Military Services were to be transferred to DIA by 30 June 1965
to enable the Director, DIA, to direct and support the system from
that date.

2. (U) The DIA requirements for personnel resources neces-
sary to provide the Washington-level direction and support of the
system are under consideration by the Services and the Joint Staff in
reference c. Staff action has not yet been completed on this plan.

3. (S) To enable the Director, DIA, to comply with the target
date agreed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and approved by the Secretary
of Defense, it is requested that effective 1 July 1965 the Chiefs of the
Military Services place on temporary duty with DIA, pending formal
approval of the pertinent JTD, personnel qualified to perform the
functions delineated in the proposed JTD. On that same date the
Services will relinquish and DIA will assume these responsibilites.
for direction and support of the Defense Attache System outlined in references a and b, now being performed by the personnel involved.

4. (U) This action is a financial accounting expediency only, and will not be considered prejudicial to the final allocation of Service spaces on the JTD.

Earle G. Wheeler
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
MEMORANDUM FOR The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT: The Military Attache System (U)

References: (a) Secretary of Defense memorandum to the Secretaries of the Military Departments, subject "The Military Attache System," dated 10 May 1954
(b) Secretary of Defense memorandum to the Secretaries of the Military Departments, subject "Attache," dated 11 May 1959
(c) DoD Directive C-5105.12, subject "Defense Attache System" (U), dated December 12, 1964
(d) Secretary of Defense memorandum for the Director, DIA, subject "The Defense Attache System," dated 20 March 1965
(e) DIA memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, subject "Direction and Support of the Defense Attache System," dated 29 June 1965

Reference (a) directed the Services to implement certain actions involving the subject matter and reference (b) set forth certain principles concerning the concept of Executive Agency support of the Service Attache Systems.

By establishing and implementing the Defense Attache concept, references (c), (d) and (e) in effect supersede references (a) and (b) and place the provisions of these latter references which may still be applicable under the cognizance of the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency.
Accordingly, the memoranda in references (a) and (b) are cancelled.

[Signature]
Sallis Horwitz
Memorandum

C-183/CC-4

TO: Distribution C

FROM: DIACS

DATE: 13 September 1965

SUBJECT: Establishment of the Defense Attache Detachment, DIA

1. References:


2. Under the provisions of references a and b, and in accordance with reference d above, the Defense Attache Detachment is established effective 1 July 1965. The Chief of the Defense Attache Detachment will report directly to the Director, DIA.

3. The mission of the Defense Attache Detachment is to insure the provision of administrative, personnel and logistical support to Defense Attache Offices.

4. The Defense Attache Detachment will initially be comprised of three branches: Administrative Services, Personnel Support, and Logistics. The organization chart and statement of functions are attached as Enclosures 1 and 2. Initial manning as necessary will be based on the DIA recommended interim JTD (reference c) which is pending approval of the Secretary of Defense.
5. The office symbol assigned to the Defense Attache Detachment is DIAAP. The location is 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia. The mailing address is DIA, Washington, D.C. 20301. Telephone number is OX 41362.

ALLAN L. REED
Rear Admiral, USN
Chief of Staff

2 Encis
a/s
DEFENSE ATTACHE DETACHMENT

MISSION:
To insure the provision of administrative, personnel, and logistical support to the Defense Attache Office's (DAOs).

FUNCTIONS:
1. Develops and supervises administrative policies and procedures for the operation of the Defense Attache System.
2. Requisitions military personnel from the Military Departments for assignment to specific positions in DAOs; submits names of nominated officers to DIA staff sections for concurrence and to Director, DIA, for final approval; selects qualified enlisted personnel from those nominated by the Military Departments. Submits U. S. civilian personnel requirements to DIASA for recruitment; interviews referrals and makes final selection of personnel.
3. Requests assignment orders for military and civilian personnel approved for assignment to DAOs.
4. Determines training requirements in coordination with DIASS; schedules training to include special schedules and briefings for DAO designees; and exercises supervisory control over all personnel in designee status.
5. Supervises and coordinates all DAO military personnel matters, and acts for Director, DIA, on requests for leave, TDY, extension and curtailment of tour, and other similar personnel actions of a temporary or recurring nature. Forwards all DAO civilian personnel requests to DIASA-1 with recommendations for action to be taken. Receives from DAOs and forwards to DIASA all recommendations for awards on both military and civilian personnel.
6. Maintains station status records, official military personnel records, and convenience and suspense personnel files. Prepares reports and information for staff visits.

7. Prepares official strength reports; initiates and records military personnel evaluations for the DAOs, records academic grades, and provides strength data to welfare fund agency.

8. Coordinates FBO-State-DoD housing agreements; processes requests for government-leased quarters; coordinates DAO property requirements relative to family housing and quarters; recommends appropriate weight limitations for household effects; and maintains country files containing current description and contents of family housing on station.

9. Obtains passports, visas and port calls for DAO personnel and dependents; counsels travelers as to shipment of baggage, household goods and privately owned vehicles.

10. Prepares replies in coordination with DIAAQ where appropriate to all questions posed by attaches pertaining to travel; formulates and reviews PCS travel policies and procedures; develops uniform PCS policy for DAO military personnel consistent with regulations and policies of each Service.

11. Notifies Defense attaches of visits to areas of accreditation.

12. Processes requests for and monitors the procurement of supplies and equipment for the DAOs; submits requirements to the appropriate supply agency; assists DAOs in supply and maintenance of aircraft and small boat
requirements in conjunction with directives of coming Service. Maintains
direct liaison with installations supporting Defense attache aircraft to
insure timely supply and maintenance support required by DAOs.
15. Reviews pertinent logistic directives and develops appropriate DIA
logistical directives and guidance in support of DAOs.
16. Participates in the preparation of the budget estimates and financial
plan for DAS; furnishes experience factors to DIAAQ for the establishment
of contact authorizations for DAOs; and prepares appropriate directives
governing the use and expenditures authorized for contact and maintenance
allowances.
15. Performs administrative examinations of contract maintenance and supporting documentation.
16. Prepares Defense Attache Manual for Administration (DAMA); distributes,
maintains and insures compliance of DAOs with administrative directives; and
reviews, consolidates and coordinates publication and reproduction require-
ments for the DAS.
17. Develops and publishes security procedures for the DAS in coordination
with DIACI based on DIA security instructions; reviews and makes recommenda-
tions concerning security violations in DAOs and initiates corrective action
for security violations.
18. Monitors electrical communications facilities available to DAOs;
coordinates with DIASO to determine requirements for expansion, elimination
or consolidation of electrical communication facilities at DAOs.
19. Prepares special projects, plans, programs and studies as directed.

20-A
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
THE SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
THE DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SUBJECT: Augmentation of the Defense Intelligence Agency to Support the Defense Attache System (DAS) (U)

References: (a) SecDef memo, did 12 Dec 64, subj: "Defense Attache System"
(b) DOD Directive C-5105.32, did 12 Dec 64, subj: "Defense Attache System (DAS) (U)"
(c) SecDef memo, did 20 Mar 65, subj: "(U) The Defense Attache System"
(d) JCSM-644, 65, did 21 Aug 65, subj same as this memo

Pursuant to the guidance contained in references (a) and (b), the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) have reviewed the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) plan for augmentation in support of the Defense Attache System (DAS).

The DIA plan requests the transfer from the Services to DIA of 147 spaces (66 Army, 23 Navy, and 68 Air Force). The JCS do not concur in the manpower requirements of DIA and recommend in lieu thereof that at this time 137 manpower spaces be transferred (61 Army, 23 Navy, and 53 Air Force). The JCS also disagree with the grade structure proposed by DIA as being excessive.

The Services identified 187.5 man years of support associated with their attache systems. Of this, they indicate a continuing support requirement for approximately 52 man years. This requirement will be refined by later negotiation between the Services and DIA. If the DIA requirement were accepted, 13 additional spaces would be required for the support of the attache system.

The guidance contained in reference (a) provided inter alia, that "total manpower requirements for the DAS, both in Washington and at overseas locations, shall be established and maintained at appreciably lower levels..."
than that required to administer separate attaché systems in the three Military Departments. Acceptance of the DIA request is not in line with this policy. The recommendations of the JCS and the reasoning as indicated in the appendices to reference (d) supports the policy. The JCS recommendation both as to numbers and grades is accepted. Further it is expected that on the next JCS review of the DIA attaché support Joint Table of Distribution that a manpower savings of at least 10% from the total resources identified for support of the attaché system will be reported to this office in furtherance of the outlined policy.

The following manpower adjustments will be affected:

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The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower) will effect the transfer of the personnel authorizations and the associated civilian personnel funds in accordance with established DOD procedures.

SIGNED

CYRUS VANCE

CERTIFIED COPY

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS; DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS. DOD DIR 5200.10

CONFIDENTIAL
APPENDIX A

INTERVIEWS
INTERVIEWS

The following interviews were conducted with individuals in key positions who were eyewitnesses to the creation and establishment of the Defense Intelligence Agency.

General Andrew J. Goodpaster, USA, served an assistant to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1961 and was present for many of the discussions that ultimately led to a DIA. During the mid-1950s, he served as the Staff Secretary in the White House to President Eisenhower with a second duty as his operations assistant in the area of international affairs and intelligence. He spoke during a DIA 25th Anniversary Panel about the origins of the Agency.

Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr., was a former Inspector General of CIA and the Chairman of the Joint Study Group commissioned by President Dwight Eisenhower in May 1960 to study U.S. intelligence. The Joint Study Group Report recognized the need for reorganizing intelligence in the Defense Department and created momentum for the establishment of DIA in 1961. Mr. Kirkpatrick died in 1995.

David O. Cooke was involved in Defense management since 1958 when he was a member of Secretary of Defense Neil H. McElroy's task force on DoD reorganizations. He was a member and then Director of the Office of Organizational and Management Planning which spearheaded the sweeping changes in Defense organization during Secretary McNamara's years and worked for every Secretary until his death in 2002.

Lieutenant General Abbott C. Greenleaf, USAF, served with David O. Cooke as a member of the Office of Organizational and Management Planning which guided the changes in Defense Department organization during the McNamara years. General Greenleaf spoke on the origins of DIA during a 35th Anniversary Program at the Agency. General Greenleaf died in 2002.

Lieutenant General Joseph F. Carroll, USAF, served as the first Director, DIA, during the first critical years of the Agency's existence. He established DIA and served 8 years at its head, the longest serving Director in the Agency's history. General Carroll made his comments on the early days of the Agency to the DIA Historian. General Carroll died in 1991.

Deane J. Allen is the DIA Historian and has served in that capacity since 1981.

Brian G. Shellum is the Deputy DIA Historian and has served in that position since 1994.
Thank you very much General. . . . Anytime there is an opportunity to reminisce about key events of the past I find it very hard to resist. The establishment of DIA was an important and valuable step, . . . that establishment has been a most impressive contribution to our country and to the operation of our whole security structure. One reason that I myself accepted to participate in this gathering was a sense of obligation that I have had for many years, twenty-five of them now, for the support that DIA provided the operation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, operations in Vietnam, and subsequent duties in Europe with our allies. Through all of that DIA has made a powerful and an essential professional intelligence contribution. My remarks are billed as "present at the creation." I will qualify that a bit. I will use a metaphor. I don't want to press this metaphor too far in a mixed gathering. I was really present at the conception, I would say, and I will tell you that I was somewhere else when the actual creation occurred. But I did have a hand in some of the early nurturing and nourishment and, if I may say so, even cleaning up after some of the early events that accompanied the establishment of DIA. I would like to talk a bit about the prologue.

During the 1950s, from the mid 1950s on, I was serving as the Staff Secretary in the White House to President Eisenhower with a second duty as his operations assistant in the area of international affairs and activities of all kinds extending from the military through the diplomatic, through the intelligence and such supporting activities as the USIA and the economic aid program and the atomic program. It was a wide charter and it had to do with duties that the President regarded as quite central to his responsibilities. He was a man, [who due to] his experience had learned to be very attentive to intelligence. He was experienced in using it and he expected it to be of very high quality. Without being negative about it, because the intelligence he received was a very great and essential value to him. I would have to say that he was not fully satisfied with what he was getting. He was uneasy about some of the collateral activities in the intelligence field. He set up a foreign intelligence advisory board composed of a number of very distinguished individuals in whom he had very high confidence to evaluate the whole intelligence picture and the whole range of intelligence operations.

I might say just to illustrate this, that we had been through one gap, the so-called bomber gap in the mid 1950s, and there was a lot of publicity and a lot of pressure to enter into a crash program to match the anticipated, the estimated Soviet buildup. He was unpersuaded on this, and I recall that for several years running this dispute went on. Finally we ran a check. We looked back through the national intelligence estimates of several years to see just what had been happening. We found that the intelligence technique that was being used was one of estimating capabilities, but it was not estimating capabilities to provide bombers on the Soviet side from known or inferred production facilities. Instead it was based on an analysis of what production facilities they could have, had they decided to put their full or nearly full technical economic capability into enlarging their production facilities. The result of this was we found out that they had not enlarged their production facilities and that each year the estimate of what their future production would be just slipped by one year. In fact they had leveled off and there was no real requirement for us to enter into that crash program. We had our B-52 program, which was fulfilling a very vital mission.

The experience of the bomber gap really led us into a second similar experience which was the so-called missile gap. This again was the subject of considerable political activity; great pressures in the press was one, and many proposals for crash programs. Eisenhower himself was very reluctant to enter into crash programs. He wanted to have a more stable program extending without stops and starts, without feast or
famine over many years. In others words planning and organizing for the long pull.

Also we had available an intelligence tool of very great power and value, and that was the U2. This was flown with full recognition of the risks that were being taken. Those risks were differently evaluated. Some said even if the Russians could shoot one down they would never admit that these planes had been overlying their country and that they had been incapable of acting against them. That did not turn out to be a very [accurate] surmise. Eisenhower himself had a clear vision of the storms that might ensue when and if the Soviets ever shot one of these down and he was very close to correct. But he felt that the value of the take both in the positive evidence that we received, and . . ., this is much more difficult, in the negative information we had of what they were not doing, was of sufficient value to justify those risks.

I remember when questions were raised after the U2 was shot down [over whether it had been] wise to do that [use it]. Eisenhower at one either cabinet meeting or security council meeting asked for anybody to stand up who would have been prepared to sacrifice all the intelligence that we had received up to that time. I can tell you no one really wanted to stand up. Whether it was because of the views on the matter or because it would have been seen as challenging a rather strong-minded President, the part of wisdom was to not press that.

[The President] felt, due to this and many other things, that there was an organizational gap and he discussed this with his foreign intelligence advisory board. Because of this vision and view as to the importance of intelligence, he simply was not prepared to tolerate the areas of inadequacy, as he viewed it, that existed there. The CIA was performing very useful work but they were limited in their ability to carry out technical military analysis of the kind he expected and in fact demanded. On the other hand, the intelligence produced by the individual services was highly influenced by service interest. We may as well lay that out on the table. There was what is called in fancy language subobjective. They were pursuing objectives that were related in many ways to their service interest and to the focus of their own attention. In addition there was what might be called "worst casing" on a piecemeal basis. [There was also] the lack of overall integration and recognition of resource constraints on the other side. My remarks on the bomber gap [presented] an example of that.

In the JCS and at the level of the Secretary of Defense, there was the lack of a suitable entity for them to deal with directly in getting the intelligence support they needed. The result was that by the time Eisenhower's administration . . . was coming to an end it had become very clear that some additional entity was needed, and so in trying to clean up his desk before turning over to his successor he gave policy approval to action to try to deal with this need . . . . When President Kennedy came in he had a different approach from Eisenhower . . . . He initially did not have a close tie-in between his policy and operations on the one hand and his intelligence on the other. This was in sharp contrast to Eisenhower who had grown up through his senior professional military experience very dependent and making great use and continuing use and day-by-day use of intelligence. In principal, as the first thing in the morning every day, [officers had] to report to him the intelligence reports that had come in, the diplomatic reports and any military operational reports. I say in principal because you had to fight for the President's time. He sometimes had contrary ideas, and when his ideas were contrary to mine it was generally done his way. But after the Bay of Pigs, President Kennedy, who talked to Eisenhower after the Bay of Pigs took steps to strengthen these ties between intelligence and the policy and operations. There is nothing like a dash of good hard cold intelligence to cool down the policy enthusiasts who would like to go harried off in directions that would be unlikely to prove feasible and unlikely to prove consistent with intelligence about the world environment.

Now I left in March 1961. I served with President Kennedy for about two months of transition after he came to office. I returned in November 1962 as the Assistant to the new Chairman of the Joint Chief's of
Staff, General Maxwell Taylor. This was just following the Cuban Missile Crisis. I found that in the meantime this gleam in the eye that Eisenhower and his associates had at the very close of his administration had become a reality. The first evidence of that I recall was the morning briefing that we had in the Chairman's office on some of the intelligence file, particularly the overhead photography relating to Cuba and to other very sensitive areas where we were watching closely what the Soviets were doing. It is worth a moment perhaps to recall the challenges to security that existed at that time. I will do this very briefly but I do this because I think that it is something you might want to reflect upon and talk about today and during the remainder of your discussions here.

You really have to look at the substantive needs and the evolution of those needs. They are dynamic. New things occur, new situations arise. It is a look at that substantive requirement that tends to guide and shape the needs of the future for DIA and that tell you in what direction to lean as you are mobilizing and focusing and targeting your resources. I want to come back to this point close to the end of my remarks. I myself find it useful in analyzing these challenges to break them down under three general headings.

At the time we tended to lump together the Soviet Union and Communist China. I don't think we had discerned from 1958 on the tensions that were building up between Communist China and the Soviet Union. Though I do recall when Khrushchev met with Eisenhower up at Camp David that he was very careful in his treatment of any issue that involved Communist China— it was extremely delicate. He simply could not be drawn into certain discussions because the Chinese would be very resentful of him and Eisenhower talking over these issues over his head. But at the time, as I said, we did tend to lump the Soviet Union and Communist China and of course the prime focus of much of our intelligence activity had to be on the Soviet Union.

They were in a very assertive and to some degree an unstable period. They had a great deal of confidence, even overconfidence after they put up Sputnik and saw some of the disarray from the western world after they had been the first in space. You had Khrushchev as the leader, a tough, very astute, really quite brilliant, very volatile, almost volcanic type of individual presiding over a military force which increasingly had as its lead the intercontinental ballistic missile, and he was brandishing that at various times using that for purposes of threat. So it was a dangerous period largely because of this lack of stability. We had just been through the pressures on Berlin, which were eased after the Camp David summit in which [Khrushchev] undertook to remove the threat that was implicit in what amounted to an ultimatum that they were going to give the East Germans their independence and thus terminate the rights of the western allies in West Berlin, and which, of course, was intolerable and unacceptable from our standpoint. That was left unresolved after the summit that blew up in Paris in 1960 after the U2 affair, and President Kennedy inherited the full force of that when he met with Khrushchev in Vienna in 1961. Then came, of course, at the close of 1962, the Cuban missile crisis in which very close intelligence on the activities of the Soviets was very much needed. During all of this the ICBM build-up and their submarine ballistic missile build-up were continuing. These constituted major challenges which simply could not be left uncontested, not properly compensated for on the part of the West.

The second general area of challenge, and it is a different kind of challenge, has to do with our major allies. Here the main task was of finding ways to work cooperatively in every field including the intelligence field. That turned out to be about the most difficult field to work in cooperation with our major allies. Because they too were concerned about the Soviet Union and about Communist China and they, like us, were greatly involved with the third major area in what came to be called the third world where Khrushchev had laid down the doctrine that the Soviets would continue to press forward with what he called just wars of national liberation but looked to us like subversion and attempted takeover of country after country. That
was part of the issue, and the other part of the issue had to do with indigenous developments which then as now constituted danger and threat or potential danger and threat to the security interests of the United States and its major allies.

We were particularly concerned then, and I am speaking of the early time of President Kennedy's term of office, with the rapidly disintegrating situation in Laos and Vietnam. When Eisenhower met with Kennedy after Kennedy's election but before his inauguration, Laos was one of the items on that agenda, and its significance was not just in Laos but what it portended for Vietnam as well. So that was an unresolved issue and a worsening issue which Eisenhower passed to Kennedy, and it became very necessary then to try to get some kind of intelligence base as our involvement in Vietnam grew and finally just to carry on a few years [longer] as we ourselves intervened with substantial military force there. There were other areas such as the Congo, again a highly unstable and confused situation. [There were] other special areas of difficulties, such as the continuing tension and stress between India and Pakistan, and late in 1962 the actual military operations of the Communist Chinese against the Indians in the Himalayan mountain areas. Those were some of the substantive areas that were of great concern at the time, and obviously without good intelligence you would simply be flying blind trying to make operational decisions in circumstances of that kind.

When I came back to the States in late '62, I found that DIA existed and was operating effectively. I would like to pay tribute at this point to a man I understand will not be with us here—I wish he could be—and that is Joe Carroll, who guided DIA through that very difficult early period. He and I were closely associated because of my position as Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs at that time. If ever a man had to walk through a mine field blindfolded it was Joe Carroll, and he did that with courage, with constant resolution and with great patience, and with clear explanation of what it was he was trying to do and the role into which DIA was moving. It was a tough job, and he made an outstanding contribution in an area of extreme sensitivity, and DIA began to build its record of service and contribution at that time.

One of the things I worked on very closely was identifying and prioritizing intelligence targets: those of chief concern from a standpoint of national security. We had to do this both in terms of short-term interest and long-term interest and we had to consider very closely where to put our resources. Resources are always limited but there is always more to do than you can, and the essence of leadership, one of the first requirements of leadership is simply to be willing to take on that tough task of prioritizing.

If you will permit me another personal word here. At the very close of World War II, I was back from overseas and I served in the Pentagon in strategic plans in the operations division under General Marshall. It didn't take long to come to admire that man for his strength of character, for his willingness to make decisions, and as I reviewed what had been done during the war that admiration grew and solidified. In those very tough days of the war in early and mid 1942 when things were going wrong everywhere, Marshall was one of the figures responsible for laying down what we called basic undertakings: things without which the war was unlikely to be won. It was a short list, and had to be a short list, because we were on our heels, we were on the defensive just about everywhere. He was willing to make the decisions as to what those very essential things were. They were, for example, keep the Russians in the war, maintain the UK base, hold the Suez, [and] hold Australia as a base. I think that was the full list, there might have been one or two others. But notice, and this is the point I am getting at, in making a determination, in deciding what to do he was at the same time deciding what not to do. There were many desirable, many worthwhile things, that we were simply unable to do, and he was a man who had the inner strength to step up to those decisions, not to try to do everything, which would have been self defeating at the time.

There is a lesson in that, and I think a very important lesson in the intelligence field; and Joe Carroll and I worked together to try to drive through that first determination of identifying the outstanding, real
important intelligence targets. Also DIA was beginning to serve as a forum for resolving differences. In
imposing that overall constraint that I referred to earlier, they were building a working relationship with
CIA and, as many of you know and all could guess, that was not an easy process because there was
concern in CIA that DIA was muscling into their turf. The sheer fact of the matter was that DIA was
providing technical military intelligence that went beyond what CIA could or really ever would be able to
provide. The other thing [DIA officers] were doing was [developing] what now goes under the [heading] of
national technical means ... They were staking out an area of responsibility and competence in the whole
area of overhead photography. That was a great leap forward from what we had with the U2 and the earlier
satellite forms of national technical means.

I think that takes me through most of the early stages that could be called the creative time of DIA. At the
end of that period, say late 1962, early ’63 and on into 1964 perhaps, the stage was set for further evolution:
for further development of production capabilities. But from that time on I think there could be no serious
or responsible argument that there was no role for DIA. That role had been established and the need had
been demonstrated and well proven, and as a long-time recipient of the products of DIA let me repeat the
same thing I said at the outset—whether my service was in the Pentagon with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or in
Vietnam, or in Europe as the NATO commander and the commander of the U.S. forces—I feel a great sense
of obligation to the high professional contributions of military intelligence provided by the DIA. I am
happy to be with you to acknowledge that sense of obligation this morning. My own personal schedule will
allow me to stay only a few more minutes, but you have a very able panel here and I have no fear that they
will be able to straighten out any misinformation. I would claim only that I have given you no deliberate
misinformation this morning. My errors have at least the merit of reflecting good intention. Thank you
very much.

QUESTION: What was the impact of the Bay of Pigs on Kennedy’s mindset? Do you think that had we not
had the Bay of Pigs that his decision would have been altered in any way or that it was just a matter of time
for him to get educated in the real world?

GEN GOODPASTER: I think it was the latter. If it hadn’t been the Bay of Pigs it would have been
something else—perhaps not as startling as happened in the Bay of Pigs. After the Bay of Pigs he knew he
had to do something. He consulted with Eisenhower and very quickly learned that aspect of presidential
responsibility. I think that is something that has to be learned by presidents that come from the Congress
where they are able to pick a particular issue and pursue that with the feeling that somebody else is going
to take care of all the rest of it. The way I put it was the President’s desk is where everything comes
together, and he has got to concern himself with the full range of issues. And the kind of interaction that
you get on the Hill of contending interests simply cannot be reciprocated in the staffs and agencies that
serve the President. There has to be some kind of coordinating, some kind of integrating mechanism and
the integrating mechanism above all is the President himself. That desk is where everything comes
together. But he has to have help in that regard.

One of the attacks made during the political campaign of 1960 was that the coordinating mechanism was
too ponderous, too slow, it was a paper drill and so on. There was a good deal of truth in every part of it.
But while recognizing the truth you had to recognize the other side, and that is the utter necessity for the
president to have mechanisms of that kind. You can streamline them, you can make them more effective,
you can make them quicker acting and give them more bite. You can do all those things but you must have
something like that. Dick Neustadt [Richard E. Neustadt] who participated in the study that recommended
to Kennedy to scrap all of this put it very well later when he said we aimed at Eisenhower but we hit
Kennedy in doing that. It was the President himself who was handicapped by the disillusion with this
mechanism, and he set about in one way or another to reconstitute the processes of integration. And it just
has to be done. If it isn't done you are going to find that your priorities are wrong, you are going to find that some set of problems and some set of prejudices have seized the initiative, that you are behind the power curve and are simply unable to get your plane up into the air.

That has to be carried then to the area of the linkage of intelligence with operations and policy. Not that operations and policy tell intelligence what to say, but intelligence tells them what are the bounds of feasibility, what is the true nature of the environment in which you have to operate and that has a very sobering disciplinary effect which is very much needed for these idea people and these hotshots that have all kinds of things that they are interested in. And in intelligence matters [the analyst is] often the purveyor of bad news and he lives at some risk of life and limb because presidents like other people don't especially care to hear about that. But that is part of the job, and I can remember many mornings when Eisenhower himself would look over his glasses at me and he would say what good news have you got for me now. That is the job that has to be done.
By Deane J. Allen

ALLEN: In view of the role you played as Chairman of the Joint Study Group commissioned by President Dwight Eisenhower in May 1960 to study U.S. intelligence and the milestone the Joint Study Group Report established in the chain of events that led to the establishment of DIA 1961, the following questions are significant. First, when the DIA was established in 1961, why didn't CIA take on the responsibilities that were given to DIA?

KIRKPATRICK: Well, let me say that there were two schools of thought. One wanted the CIA to control all of intelligence in the United States Government. The other school, of which I was a member, said that you cannot take intelligence away from the military. It has to be built-in because in time of war they have got to have it—they cannot create it instantly. We have tried that frequently in our past wars.

The battle raged on for years over this issue—from 1947 to 1961—before the second philosophy finally prevailed. The whole point was this. Having been in Army Intelligence in World War II as well as the OSS, I have seen it happen when you simply had to build from the start. We got into World War II with a really flimsy intelligence system that had to be built during wartime. There was a group of us who said, "you got to let Defense have their own intelligence system; CIA cannot control it." There were even some clowns—I use the phrase freely because they were clowns—who felt that CIA also ought to take over cryptographic work, which they can not. Crypto intelligence is something that is quite different. I don't think you can put [for example] HUMINT together with anything like that.

So I think the way it evolved turned out for the best. We've got the Defense Intelligence Agency, and we've got the military intelligence services. On the other hand, I have seen tendencies where DIA has tried to take over the bulk of military intelligence—that is a mistake too. Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and even the Coast Guard, all have to fight their own wars. They cannot build it in wartime; they are going to have to have a cadre of trained officers.

So basically this was the philosophy. The bureaucratic battles went on intensively, until this was done [DIA established]—and I mean intensively.

ALLEN: Various writers have ascribed the beginnings of DIA to such things as a post-Sputnik or a post-Bay of Pigs spin-off, and reactions to these by the President, Congress, or others. I see no evidence of DIA coming into being for these reasons. Instead, I see the impetus for consolidating Defense intelligence beginning in the post-WWII era, particularly in 1953 when an Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Special Operations served as a coordination point for defense intelligence activities. Following various Congressional actions in the 1950's—including the 1955 Hoover Commission report and the 1958 Defense Reorganization Act—the concept for centralized management of DoD intelligence continued to grow until President Eisenhower chartered the Joint Study Group in 1960 to review and revamp U.S. foreign intelligence. However, the actual idea of putting it all together, of being a centralized agency for DoD that managed all DoD intelligence—did that start with your Group or was that notion something that had been growing for some time?
KIRKPATRICK: It was growing. I wouldn't want to give the Joint Study Group credit for that. We laid down concepts basically in our final report which I had been anxious to get out on time. We had a certain deadline. I wanted to get it in before the Administration ended, so I worked 12 hours a day 6 days a week. We finally did get it in. I would be the last to maintain that it was the Joint Study Group [that proposed what became DIA].

On the study group, we were always unanimous even though there were certain very basic disagreements. For example, Alan Evans was the State Department representative. Alan and I were old-time colleagues from the Office of Strategic Services days. Boy! He and I had some of the really very tough knockdown drag-out fights about State's role in intelligence. They were selling out by wanting to keep just a small cadre, which basically I thought was a terrible mistake. They should have, in my opinion, kept their own [intelligence organization]. But to use a basic expression, they didn't have the guts to fight for it, and they didn't have the political clout that CIA had. I remember, it was not Alan but it was another State Department Director of INR that said to me, "Gee, I wish we had what CIA has got with Congress; State is always wrong as far as Congress is concerned." Let me add a parenthesis here for future thought [concerning the importance of CIA having political clout]. The Director of CIA has to be close to the President. This is the way it always has to be. I think if the President doesn't like intelligence, doesn't understand intelligence, then we get troubles—troubles in our policies, troubles in our actions, and everything else.

ALLEN: Was the fact that the military services had so many of the resources in 1961 a big factor in setting up DIA?

KIRKPATRICK: Well, the fact that the military services had all of the resources certainly was a consideration, yes. All they had to do was assign their people and if they were interested in it they would do it.
INTERVIEW EXCERPTS WITH
DAVID O. COOKE
4 APRIL 1995

By Deane J. Allen

ALLEN: The National Security Act of 1947 marked the beginning of the centralization of a number of functions within DoD including the intelligence activities. By 1958, the Defense Reorganization Act sought to streamline the chain of command, again impacting on Defense intelligence. Since you served on the committee that did the initial planning in the spring of 1961, and oversaw the setting up of DIA, would you comment on some of the thinking that occurred at this time? Particularly would you comment on the formation of DIA, including the movement of the JCS J-2 functions to DIA in 1963?

COOKE: Well, the 1958 Defense Reorganization Act only did one thing that had to be done by statute. It raised the statutory ceiling of the Joint Staff from 210 to 400. Other than that there was nothing in the 1958 Act which really couldn't have been done prior to that time. Moreover, there were several changes to the 1949 amendments to the National Security Act and which lead, of course, to the onset of Goldwater-Nichols in 1985. It was simply a matter, you could argue, that the 1958 Act reaffirmed the congressional intent which had been expressed in the '47 National Security Act and the 1949 amendment. When Bob McNamara assumed office [20 Jan 61], however, he had certain conceptions of what he had to do.

Prior to his taking office, I was part of a team that briefed McNamara and Cyrus Vance, who incidentally was the general council at the time, on Defense organization and management. McNamara had asked the question, “Who in the Office of the Secretary of Defense looks after and advises the Secretary on management and organization problems?” Our answer was that the Secretaries of the past had essentially handled the problems ad hoc as they came up. For example, I had been a representative of the Navy on [Secretary of Defense] McNamore’s taskforce on Defense reorganization which lead to the 1958 act. That consequence I think lead McNamara to establishing a small office known as Organization on Management Planning. Incidentally, he picked the title for that because we subsequently discovered that during his meteoric rise in the Ford Motor Company; at one time he held the title of a small office known as Organization on Management Planning.

Organization management planning was assigned to this new office through the General Council. Cy Vance’s small office consisted of three uniformed military by-name requests: Jack Cushman, now a retired Marine three-star, Abbot Greenleaf, also a retired Air Force three-star, and me from the Navy. Somehow I never made three stars. I retired as a captain and took over a lot of things as a civilian. Of the three of us, even though we were jack-of-all-trades, Abbot probably concentrated a little more at the time in the intelligence area. It was more than Jack Cushman or I could cover because McNamara came up with a list. He started out with some 59 tasks and expanded it. Many of the tasks were major organizational changes. For example, the Defense Supply Agency, expanding the Defense Communications Agency, and, of course, DIA, the subject of this interview this morning.

The feeling on DIA, and I think I can speak for McNamara on this, was that there was a curious correlation between the requests of the three military departments and their intelligence assessments so that the intelligence assessments always supported or dovetailed with the resources. McNamara was concerned that perhaps the analysis, intelligence analysis, was shaded to the view of what the Service chiefs and the Service secretaries wanted. It was primarily through the chiefs [the civilian secretary of the military departments
had relatively little to do with intelligence], and out in the CINCs, the unified commands, which were a post-World War II development. Most of the intelligence efforts were in the CINC components, not CINC headquarters.

So the idea was, of course, to gain greater efficiency, effectiveness, and economy, but I will also tell you that there was no reorganization in the Department of Defense. [Reference to the 1958 Reorganization Act] I have been in this business since McElroy's time which was not in part justified by the magic words "efficiency, effectiveness, and economy." [Laughter] I think there was an effort to level the playing field in intelligence and remove Service biases from the intelligence. There was a question of recognition that, not only did the Services need the intelligence, but that they had to hand over the necessary [resources].

In any case, the implementation of that particular path fell to the newly established office of Organization and Management Planning. The [Service] Chiefs of Staff themselves were heavy players in the game, and there were some proposals to make a new Military Intelligence Board which reported to the Chiefs. McNamara looked at this, but held firm on his belief that DIA really should be independent of the Chiefs and report to the Secretary of Defense. We spent a lot of time drilling through a number of iterations and coordinating the concept. What essentially we did, was considered the detail of the concept, and from that, derived the charter or directive [for DIA]. The man who was coordinating that was not only in the Services, but was Graves Erskine who at the time was on the OSD staff for what we would now call counterintelligence and various types [of similar] activities. It went up the river [CIA] and to the National Security Council, and so forth. By the time we got to the last version, I think we told McNamara that we had accommodated all concerned. Everyone agreed with the exception of three "minor" players: the Secretaries of the Army, Navy and Air Force.

At the time, my memory of it is that we really did not focus on the J2. Two comments I think: we had already assumed that the new agency would supply intelligence staff support not only to the Secretary in OSD but to the Chiefs. There is also another compelling reason that does not show up in any of the background as such. We were at that time limited by law to the 400 officers in the Joint Staff. Now admittedly, when this came up, I recall writing something at the time of the Defense Reorganization Act about Chairman Russell and how he had all these numbers of officers. We only had 210 and we went through an exercise that was like a Medieval theologian [concerning] who was in the Joint Staff and who was in the organization of the Joint Staff. At any rate, this was seen as an opportunity to decrease, not increase the size. It would gain spaces within the 400 officer ceiling that could be used primarily, my memory of it is, for J3 and J5 by simply saying the "intelligence functions" (the J2 that provided the intelligence staff support) would be provided by the Director DIA.' It was not an issue.

ALLEN: So moving the J2 functions to DIA really was not so much a functional as it was a practical thing?

COOKE: I think it was a practical better use of resources and it was functional in a sense that inevitably if you are consolidating, to establish at least a level playing field. You certainly don't want an outfit advising the Chiefs out there. Remember at the time the Joint Staff was an open staff to the JCS and a completely closed staff to OSD.

ALLEN: The predecessor organization in JCS prior to setting up the "J" offices was the Joint Intelligence Group. What do you recall that they did?
COOKE: You can go all the way back to before there were "Js," because the origin of the Chiefs goes back, of course, to the combined Chiefs of Staff. It was simply their way of functioning. You know the Congress had at that time an abiding fear for the Prussian General Staff. They didn't understand the concept. In fact, there were very few people in the building who knew what the Prussian General Staff was like in World War I. But they didn't like it at the time when the Chiefs were originally started and the Joint Staff was established. At that time initially [limited] to 100, it simply continued the fact that there were people who were really on Service roads. I would have to check my memory slate on the JCS.

ALLEN: In the plan for establishing DIA which was finally approved by the JCS in September of 1961, and, of course, became operational October 1961, it talks about the DIA taking over the J2 function ultimately. Why did this not occur officially until 1963?

COOKE: Well, it didn't occur in the sense that the charter didn't reflect the change until 1963. Again, it was back a length of time, I think they had successfully assumed the functions of the J2 prior to that time and the charter was merely the last step not the first step.

ALLEN: From the JCS historical record, there was a JCS joint study, with some recommendations by the Chairman of the JCS, 'should we abolish the J2 or not?' They came up with four recommendations: one was abolish those, two, let DIA take it over, three, do some merger of the two, or four, don't abolish it. This is in the March 1963 timeframe where I would have thought the horse was already well out of the barn.

COOKE: I think the horse was already out of the barn, because the decision was essentially not the Chairman's or the Chief's to make without McNamara. This is not to say that we didn't consult the Chiefs, but the real reason was to establish an integrated intelligence that one can argue we still haven't completely achieved. The Services' intelligence organizations showed a great ability to survive.

ALLEN: Secretary McNamara had been in office about two weeks [8 February 1961] when he said, 'there will be a DIA,' and sent a letter to JCS on that fact. The whole spring of 1961 there was a lot going on concerning this; you were a part of it. Of note was the opposition from the JCS. They wanted to call it a Military Intelligence Agency.

COOKE: And they wanted it to report to the Chiefs.

ALLEN: Do you recall their thinking on intelligence expanding?

COOKE: What was the Chief's thinking on intelligence? I will not characterize that. I think it was Bob McNamara that said 'the Chiefs resisted the intrusion,' as they saw it, 'of civilian amateurs in the business of intelligence.' It was that simple.

ALLEN: Through the years subsequent to establishing DIA, there was opposition by the Services for DIA being known as the J2. Yet, the Director of DIA said, 'I am the J2.' Would you address that in particular from various points of view? Start with the Secretary of Defense?

COOKE: I don't think this ever rose to the level of the Secretary of Defense. Simply, the part of the Services was to accept the military leader of the Chiefs, not so much the Service secretary. Over the years you look at what happened to DIA. We added technical intelligence; we eventually added mapping, charting and geodesy, but spun that off into another layer to what is now the Defense Mapping Agency [1972]. But
if you look at intelligence you see an increasing centralization. If you look at the evolution of the Department of Defense since 1947 you will see a trend toward centralization of the functions from the Military Departments from Service Secretaries to OSD. You will see a marked change in the roles of the Chief's other than the Chairman. Now, the Chiefs at best are resource managers and advisors to the Chairman. When [Admiral] Bill Crowe took over, he went very cautiously and I think he was wise to do so and [General] Colin [Powell] went further. [Over the course of their history] it was some time before the Joint Staff finally and reluctantly agreed to report to the Chairman, and not to the Joint Chiefs.

ALLEN: Is DIA the J2 other than name only?

COOKE: Yes, for most of the important intelligence DIA is the J2 equal to the Chairman. [However, the problem remains that] each of the Service Chiefs has access to his own intelligence organization and the hearty surviving elements of each of the Chiefs can be armed with that.

ALLEN: Going back again to the spring of 1961 when you were a part of this group formulating the plan [for DIA], how long did that committee continue and how long did this oversight continue after General Carroll actually became organization head in October 1961?

COOKE: I don't remember if we were getting implementation reports or not; probably not for a couple reasons. We were kept reasonably busy by Bob McNamara and we never had an organization. We never had the luxury of going back very often. If we went back to view DIA, there were always intelligence issues to consider.
PANEL EXCERPTS FROM
LIEUTENANT GENERAL ABBOTT C. GREENLEAF, USAF (RET)
18 OCTOBER 1996

Edited by Brian G. Shellum

There was a Top Secret multi-codeword report done at the instigation of the Eisenhower Administration.... On the day before he left office, President [Dwight D.] Eisenhower, reviewed the 40-odd recommendations, initialed all but one which he rejected and held two or three in abeyance. That particular document was key in the formation of the Defense Intelligence Agency.

Another effort under way at that time [1960] was [by] then Secretary of Defense Thomas S.] Gates who formed an ad hoc group to survey the organization and management of the Department of Defense. Flag officers from each of the Military Departments were invited to attend. Each brought a horse-holder. Doc [David O. Cooke] held the Navy’s horse and I held the Air Force’s horse. After our first meeting with Secretary Gates, we said what we really want to do is work. The flag and general officers went away and Doc and I and our Army colleague were left.

From the course of that work we identified what became the Defense Intelligence Agency, drawing heavily on work that had been done under the auspices of the coordination group. The Army came up with the idea of a “military intelligence agency,” an effort then shared with the J2 and the Joint Staff [who added] a “military intelligence board.”

We put all those things together in a briefing which Mr. Gates had us first give to the Business Advisory Council at Hot Springs, [Virginia], a wonderful place for a briefing. On the 5th of January 1961, that briefing had been restructured and reduced to two hours for Mr. [Robert] McNamara, Mr. [Lyman] Kirkpatrick, Mr. Paul Nitze, and [Mr.] Cyrus Vance, all of whom had been designated at that time as presidential appointees. The briefing took two hours, but the interaction with Mr. McNamara and company took all day. That evening some of us were advised by General George S. Brown, [USAF] not to seek reassignment because when the administration took office we were [to be] reassigned. Doc and I then found ourselves in this organization of management planning, an effort of four people that Mr. McNamara had established, and placed it under the guidance of Cy[rus] Vance initially.

Mr. McNamara [had] heard of the background of [Major General Joseph F.] Carroll, [USAF] who had been very successful in the Bureau and had come to the Air Force on a direct transfer to become a colonel overnight and a general officer the next day [in 1948 to find a number of security leaks throughout the Defense Department]. Rather a fast rise.

So after working the papers for months and finally reaching a final decision, the Secretary of Defense [asked] who is going to head this activity? At that time you must keep in mind, there was a strong suspicion throughout our government of the objectivity of defense intelligence. The Military Services generated estimates that always followed force structure aspirations, particularly the Navy and the Air Force. The Army was much less dogmatic about it.

Should the initial Director of DIA be a card carrying, a platinum carrying intelligence spook belonging to the military services? Well there was no question that there should be a military officer to head it. The Secretary of Defense had been very impressed, as I mentioned, with General Carroll’s work. An informal
inquiry was made of General Carroll. I made that inquiry directly. He said “Abbot, no way in the devil. My entire career is in counterintelligence. What’s my part, if I have one.” I said, “Sir you have also been a manager and have generated quite a reputation for objectivity.” He said, “Well that may be true but it’s on the counter-intelligence side and not what you are talking about.” So I carried that message back to our boss and he said thank you now get the word to the Air Force. He added to the Chairman of JCS that if the Chiefs couldn’t come up with a slate of nominees with Joe Carroll on that slate, well then at the recommendation of the Air Force they should come up with one recommendation and that should be Joe Carroll. So that was it.
INTERVIEW EXCERPTS WITH
LIEUTENANT GENERAL JOSEPH F. CARROLL, USAF (RET)
1991

By Deane J. Allen
Compiled by Brian G. Shettum

ALLEN: Let's start with when you first were appointed Director, that is, Director Designate, and in charge of planning the organization. It would have been during the summer of 1961...

CARROLL: Yes, I do [remember]. Problems were fundamentally the opposition of the Military Services to the operation; the Services were obstinate about it.

ALLEN: What kind of organization were you trying to design? What did you have in mind? Were you given some idea from Mr. [Robert S.] McNamara or Mr. [Roswell L.] Gilpatric?

CARROLL: No.

ALLEN: Before functions from the intelligence organizations of the Air Force, Army, and Navy came together as DIA, the products were poor; thus, DIA was established to give a better product. When you organized DIA, what did you build into the organization to improve these products?

CARROLL: Well, I tried to improve the products because there was an obvious requirement to make improvements. I recall that I was not even aware that the Hoover Commission in 1948 and again in 1955 recommended a DIA.

I did not personally have any role or input to the Joint Study Group nor make any contributions to them directly. I did not read the Joint Study Group report either at the time or since. Consequently I cannot comment on its significance, thoroughness, or accuracy. I know that it is customary to read the report of an activity that is responsible for your agency, but I did not have the time.

I know nothing about the so-called maladies of post-World War II intelligence, but as for the quality of intelligence products I personally believe certain Military Services were too parochial in their intelligence opinions. The problem was the appropriations dollar. Yet I was optimistic about the centralization of intelligence in DIA because Mr. McNamara — well it was his idea — was most supportive of the new Agency. The Military Services were adamant in not changing their intelligence opinion.

The Military Services would seize upon everything and anything that would support their intelligence view. That is why I took the position that individual intelligence chiefs should retain their membership on the United States Intelligence Board. That is why the individual intelligence chiefs are members of the United States Intelligence Board, even today. (The USIB is now called the National Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB).) Mr. [John A.] McCona, the Director of CIA, supported me in this position. That is why the Joint Chiefs extended me for six whole years [beyond his initial tour]. Each time my tour was about to expire, the JCS unanimously recommended to Mr. McNamara that my tour be extended and Mr. McNamara approved.
The establishment of CIA and the difficulties it had with the Military Departments had nothing to do with the establishment of DIA. The establishment of NSA had nothing to do with the establishment of DIA. (NSA was established some years before.) NSA met the unanimous approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Military Services. On the other hand, DIA met with the unanimous disapproval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Military Services. The objection of the Services to DIA was self-serving. They were indeed reluctant to give up resources. They were, of course, concerned with strategic as well as tactical intelligence. I know of no other reason for their concern.

I cannot provide any input concerning the Joint Service actions during the spring of 1961. I would assume that the [Services] were preparing arguments against the proposed organization and perhaps testing them.

General [Lyman L.] Lemnitzer was a brilliant strategist. He did not take a position lightly. General Lemnitzer undoubtedly figured that the Military Services would raise so much hell that DIA would fall by the wayside: that it would fail. I recall going to see General Lemnitzer and telling him that I needed a "papa," one that would stand up for me when the Joint Chiefs of Staff were taking out their frustrations on me because DIA had been pushed down their throats. I recall telling General Lemnitzer that he was that man. By virtue of being the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the alter ego of Mr. McNamara, the Secretary of Defense. So far as I have described General Lemnitzer's reaction to DIA, it was somewhat conceptual. He was indeed reflecting the position and protecting the interests of the Services.

The grand design of DIA as it was first presented to me was to render intelligence support to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense, and also to the Military Services. From the outset we rendered intelligence support to the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In my day, we kept especially close relations with the intelligence chiefs because we rendered support to the Military Services through the intelligence chiefs.

There were no options considered other than a DIA-like organization. Strengthening the Office of Special Operations might have worked but not as well as an independent organization. Strengthening the J-2 of the Joint Staff would not have worked so long as the military controlled the intelligence functions. Mr. McNamara... envisioned a DIA that would soon earn the respect of the entire intelligence community. He wanted DIA to be totally objective, I know because he frequently told me so.

When I became director of DIA, I was told to find enough money and space to get started. Among the space I found is the present Director's office [in the Pentagon]. It had a bathroom in the corner of the office which is a symbol of prestige in Government. It used to belong to Mr. Paul Nitze, Presidential arms negotiator on missiles in Europe. As to money, I was more fortunate. The Services allocated me enough money to pay the salaries of the very few people the Services assigned to DIA and attendant operations. The first thing we took over was current intelligence. This meant that in refurbishing the area, we wound up with a few adjustments that had to be made. We had enough money to pay for these adjustments. I had started agencies before in the Government. All I can say is that when you are told to find enough space and money to get started, it means just that. From then on, you are on your own.

Mr. McNamara was primarily responsible for the establishment of DIA. None of the commissions or studies stand out in my mind as having promoted or effected the concept of a centralized Defense intelligence authority. There was no prominent doctrine or philosophy associated or promulgated by military intelligence prior to the establishment of DIA that affected this situation.
Mr. McNamara's immediate establishment of DIA under the Secretary of Defense after becoming Secretary of Defense was not political. I do not know Mr. McNamara's motive in establishing DIA, but I doubt that it was political. The original group-of-five were Eugene Fubini, John Rubel, [David O.] "Doc" Cooke, Abbot Greenleaf, and Cyrus Vance. The major problem confronting the group of five was the opposition of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Military Services. The charge that they were given, I assume, was to come up with an intelligence structure that made sense.

In the Office of the Secretary of Defense it was Doc Cooke and Abbot Greenleaf who master-minded DIA. These two had more to do with DIA then anyone else. . . . Then there was Eugene Fubini, John Rubel, and Admiral Vladimir Malinsky. Admiral Malinsky was another Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense. He had a great deal of influence on Mr. McNamara, the Secretary of Defense. He did contribute to the organization and functions of DIA. Gene Fubini was Chairman of my Scientific Advisory Committee. He was also an Assistant Secretary Defense in charge of the National Security Agency. He decided all policy matters which governed the Agency.

[General Earl G.] "Buzz" Wheeler [was] the Director of the Joint Staff at the time DIA was born. (He later became Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.) He exercised a good deal of influence on DIA: he was an Army officer. . . . [Major] General R. Collins [was] the J-2 of the Joint Staff. He considered DIA to be a good thing. As a member of the Joint Staff and an Army officer his opinion was in the decided minority. He was unusually cooperative. He subsequently became a member of CIA working under the US Intelligence Board's estimates shop.

[Representing] the military services was [Major General] Alva Fitch, the G-2 of the Army. Alva Fitch was a typical military officer. When the chips were down the mission became paramount, and all his efforts were devoted to that end. I recall that Alva Fitch was scheduled to be Commander in Stuttgart, a three-star position. I insisted to Mr. Gilpatric . . . that Alva Fitch become my Deputy Director [Fitch was the second Deputy Director after Lieutenant General William Quinn]. Mr. Gilpatric wanted DIA to get off to an auspicious start, so he gave me Alva Fitch. That is why the Deputy Director is a three-star position today. Normally when the commander is three-stars the deputy is only two stars.

My role in developing a DIA concept I would hope was an effective one. The DIA of today is a much better one than when I was Director of DIA. This means that the original Director must have done something right. He must have concentrated on the fundamentals of organization.
APPENDIX B
BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION
ORIGINS OF DIA: BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

Joseph F. Carroll, LtGen, USAF: General Carroll was born in Chicago, IL, on 19 March 1910. He graduated in 1933 from St. Mary's College, Mundelein, IL, with a bachelor of arts degree. After receiving a doctorate of jurisprudence from Loyola University, Chicago, in 1940, he became a member of the Illinois State Bar Association. General Carroll joined the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in October 1940, where he served until the termination of World War II. For the purpose of disposing of war surplus property throughout the world, the FBI assigned General Carroll to the Surplus Property Administration. In May 1947, the FBI recalled him to his former position as an Inspector and Administrative Assistant to the Director of the FBI.

In September 1947, the new Secretary of the Air Force requested the FBI assign General Carroll to the Services to recommend an Air Force agency for investigative and counterintelligence functions. He conceived, organized, and became the first director of this new organization, the Office of Special Investigations. On 12 January 1948, he was tendered a commission, as a colonel, USAF Reserve, and then was ordered to active duty in the grade of brigadier general in May 1948. In September 1950, General Carroll was appointed Deputy Inspector General for Security, USAF. In this capacity, he directed the Office of Special Investigations and the Office of the Provost Marshal, USAF, and was responsible for all security plans and policy for the Air Force. General Carroll's status as a reservist on active duty ended on 29 January 1952, when he was integrated into the Regular Air Force as a permanent colonel by a specific Act of Congress. General Carroll served in 1958, as Deputy Commander (Rear) for the U.S. Air Forces in Europe until November 1958 when he became Chief of Staff at that command.

In February 1960, General Carroll was promoted to lieutenant general and became the Inspector General, USAF, Washington, D.C. He remained in that position until October 1961, when Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara appointed him as DIA's first Director. General Carroll served as DIA Director until September 1969.

David O. Cooke: Mr. Cooke has been involved in Defense management since 1958 when he as a member of Secretary of Defense McElroy's task force on DoD reorganization. He was a member and then Director of the Office of Organizational and Management Planning which spearheaded the sweeping changes in Defense organization during Secretary McNamara's years and he continued to handle major Defense management issues for every subsequent Secretary of Defense. Mr. Cooke served as the Director, Administration and Management Office of the Secretary of Defense, until his death in 2002.

Patrick J. Coyne: The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.

Louis A. Cyr: Chief, Financial Services, DoD.

Allen W. Dulles: Director, Central Intelligence Agency 1953-61.

Alva R. Fitch, LTG, USA: General Fitch was stationed in the Philippines at the onset of World War II. At this time, as a Captain, Fitch was extensively involved in the defense of the Island and was subsequently captured. Fitch spent two and one half years in a Japanese interment camp starting several days after the fall of Bataan. Other highlights in Fitch's career include instructing at the Command and General Staff School and a combat tour in Korea. Fitch served as the second Deputy Director of the DIA from January 1964 to June 66.

Thomas D. Fox: Member Counterintelligence and release disclosure group at DIA 1960's.
Benjamin S. Frankel, RADM, USN: As a career intelligence officer, Admiral Frankel served in several capacities throughout the world. A majority of his later career was spent as a Military Attache leading to his position as Chief of Staff. DIA 1961-63.


Roswell L. Gilpatric: Deputy Secretary of Defense from 24 January 1964 to 20 January 1964. Additionally, Gilpatric, a trained lawyer, served in several high level positions with the Department of the Air Force from 1951-53.

Robert Glass, BG, USA: Assistant Chief of Staff for Plans, Policy and Programs, Department of Defense.

Albert C. Hall: Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence) 1971-76.

Linscott Hall, BGen, USAF: Director of Foreign Intelligence, JCS, 1961-64.

Solis Horwitz: Served as Assistant Secretary of Defense (Administration) from 1 July 64 to 29 January 1969.

Lyman Kirkpatrick: Chairman of Joint Study Group; 1960.

Lyman L. Lemnitzer, GEN, USA: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 1960-62.

Vernon L. Lowrance, VADM, USN: Deputy Director, DIA 1966-69.

Herron N. Maples, MG, USA: Director, DIA Production Center 1963.

John McConel: Director of Central Intelligence 1961-64.

Robert S. McNamara: Before becoming Secretary of Defense, on 21 January 1961, McNamara served from 1943-46 in the US Army Air Forces and held various positions at the Ford Motor Company, to include President, from 1946-61. After serving as Secretary of Defense (1961-68), McNamara went on to be President at the World Bank, from 1968-81.

William A. Morton: Head of budget branch in DIA's Comptrollers Office in 1960's.

William W. Quinn, LTG, USA: General Quinn, a graduate from the United States Military Academy in 1933, served as the primary Military Intelligence Officer to the Seventh Army during World War II. As part of this service, he was credited with anticipating the German offensive "Northwind" and received a Distinguished Service Medal for his contribution. In Korea, Quinn commanded the 17th Infantry Regiment; which, was heralded for taking the Hwachon Reservoir twice and engaged in constant combat with communist forces for the majority of the war. Quinn became Deputy Director, DIA (1961-64) after serving as Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence for the Army, and went on to command US Seventh Army, Europe on 1 March 1964.

Carlisle P. Runge: Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Personnel) from 17 February 1961 to 30 July 1962.

Robert Taylor, MGen, USAF: Director of Foreign Intelligence, JCS 1964-67.
Jack E. Thomas, MGen, USAF: Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence.

Cyrus R. Vance: Served as Deputy Secretary of Defense from 28 January 1964 to 30 June 1967. Vance also held the position of Secretary of the Army 1962-64, and was the DoD General Counsel 1961-62.

Earle G. Wheeler, GEN, USA: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 1964-70; and, Chief of Staff, US Army 1962-64.
APPENDIX C
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

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ORIGINS OF DIA: CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

1941
11 JUL: President Franklin D. Roosevelt established the Office of the Coordinator of Information (COI).

07 DEC: Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor.

1942
11 FEB: A Combined Chiefs of Staff paper defined the duties and membership of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), which was a continuation and enlargement of the Joint Army and Navy Board Committee that had been authorized in 1941. The JIC received its official charter in May 1943.

13 JUN: The Office of Strategic Services (OSS) replaced the COI.

1945
08 MAY: Victory in Europe (V-E) Day.

15 AUG: Victory in Japan (V-J) Day.

01 OCT: OSS disbanded; War and State Departments assumed its functions.

1946
22 JAN: Establishment of the Central Intelligence Group (CIG) under the direction of the National Intelligence Authority (NIA).

1947
12 MAR: President Harry S Truman issued a foreign policy statement that became known as the Truman Doctrine.

05 JUN: Secretary of State George Marshall proposed aid plan that became known as the Marshall Plan.


18 SEP: Under the provisions of the National Security Act, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) replaced the CIG, the National Security Council (NSC) replaced the NIA, a Joint Intelligence Group was authorized within the Joint Staff, and the U.S. Air Force was established within the National Military Establishment.

01 OCT: The U.S. Air Force becomes independent of the Army.

1948
01 MAY: Soviets aided in the establishment of a "people's republic" in North Korea (proclaimed independence 09 SEP).

14 MAY: Israel declared itself a sovereign state.

24 JUN: Berlin Blockade began.

26 JUN: Berlin Airlift announced.

1949
15 FEB: The first Hoover Commission (Commission on the Organization of the Executive Branch) delivered report that resulted in amendments to the National Security Act and contributed to the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949.

* All bold face entries refer to events that directly contribute to DIA history.
18 MAR: Plans revealed for a defense alliance called the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

12 MAY: Berlin Blockade ended.

20 MAY: Armed Forces Security Agency created.

16 JUN: Truman denounced anticommunism hysteria.

10 AUG: Truman approved amendments to the National Security Act, which included renaming the National Military Establishment as the Department of Defense (DoD).

29 AUG: USSR detonated its first atomic bomb in secret test (became public knowledge in late SEP).

01 OCT: The People's Republic of China established after communist victory in civil war.


16 FEB: Secretary of State promoted what he called "total diplomacy": the U.S. using all of its resources so as to deal with Soviets from a position of strength.

20 FEB: Senator Joseph McCarthy (Wisconsin) launched campaign to root out suspected communists in federal government.

17 APR: NSC-68 called for major increase in defense spending to strengthen U.S. conventional military capabilities as well as building of hydrogen bomb.

25 JUN: North Korea invaded South Korea.

27 JUN: Truman ordered U.S. troops to assist South; UN votes to help South Korea.

1951 30 MAR: Ethel and Julius Rosenberg found guilty of espionage.

1952 26 FEB: Britain announced development of A-bomb.

01 NOV: U.S. tested H-bomb.

04 NOV: AFSA abolished; National Security Agency (NSA) created.

1953 05 MAR: Stalin died; months later, U.S. and North Atlantic Council leaders announced that they did not see a diminished Soviet threat.

30 JUN: The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Special Operations) established. The Office of Special Operations (OSO) was a small organization that could not exercise administrative control, but the Assistant could recommend policies and provide guidance on program development to DoD intelligence agencies — thus acted as a limited focal point within the defense intelligence community.

27 JUL: Korean Armistice signed.
1954

11 JAN: Secretary of State John Foster Dulles outlined a new nuclear strategy which became known as "massive retaliation." It was part of President Dwight D. Eisenhower's New Look strategic program.

07 MAY: French and Vietnamean forces at Dien Bien Phu fell to Viet Minh.

21 JUL: In Geneva the French signed an armistice with the Viet Minh agreeing to temporary division of Vietnam.

30 SEP: "Doolittle Report" recommended an increase in covert operations by the CIA because of extensive Soviet threat.

1955

14 MAY: Warsaw Treaty Organization (Warsaw Pact) established.

20 JUN: Second Hoover Commission (established 10 JUL 53) submitted report to Congress. Based on its Task Force on Intelligence Activities review, it recommended internal reorganization of the CIA and the establishment of a joint congressional oversight committee of intelligence activities.

21 JUL: Eisenhower suggested that the U.S. and USSR allow each other to conduct reconnaissance flights over their key areas in his "Open-Sky" proposal.

01 AUG: First U-2 surveillance plane was test-flown.

19 SEP: Premier Nikolai Bulganin said that the Soviet Union would only allow aerial reconnaissance over facilities if part of an arms control program.

1956

14 FEB: Nikita Khrushchev, First Secretary of the Communist Party, presented policy of "peaceful coexistence": which proposed avoidance of war and included the assumption that communism could expand in ways other than war.

29 OCT: Israel invaded Egypt's Sinai Peninsula. The British and French forces then attacked Egyptian forces in an attempt to take the Suez Canal. A UN cease-fire ended the war on 06 NOV.

01 NOV: After numerous demonstrations against communism, Hungary adopted a policy of neutrality and requests that USSR withdraw troops.

05 NOV: Soviets attacked Budapest and took over the government.

1957

05 JAN: President proposed what became known as the Eisenhower Doctrine: it offered military and economic aid to certain countries in Middle East to counter the Soviet-generated unrest there.

27 AUG: Soviets successfully tested an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM).

04 OCT: The Soviet Union launched Sputnik—a satellite that orbited the earth.

17 DEC: U.S. successfully launched an ICBM.
1958
01 FEB: U.S. successfully launched a satellite, Explorer I, into earth's orbit.

15 JUL: Eisenhower announced American military intervention in Lebanon in defense of its independence. Within days British troops landed in Jordan to do same there.

18 JUL: Soviet Union accused U.S. and UK of invading the Middle Eastern countries and endangering world peace.

06 AUG: The Department of Defense Reorganization Act was passed to streamline and make operations in DoD more efficient.

15 SEP: In response to the Defense Reorganization Act, the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) was created.

1959
01 JAN: Castro seized power in Cuba.

15 SEP: Khrushchev arrived in U.S.. His agenda included addressing the UN, meeting with Eisenhower, and touring the country.

01 DEC: The Joint Chiefs of Staff/Military Departments Task Force created to evaluate and eliminate redundancies in DoD.

1960
01 MAY: Soviets shot down the American U-2 plane piloted by Francis Gary Powers for invading their air space while collecting intelligence.

11 MAY: Eisenhower stated that U.S. had to perform intelligence operations regarding the USSR to ensure national security. In a news conference elsewhere, Khrushchev called such flights an act of aggression.

06 MAY: The results of the Task Force mentioned above led to the creation of a Joint Study Group (JSG), which was tasked to review certain aspects of the foreign intelligence intelligence effort of the U.S..

13 MAY: U.S. increased aid to South Vietnam.

12 JUL: Khrushchev said that the Monroe Doctrine was no longer relevant but was used by U.S. to plunder people of Latin America.

14 JUL: U.S. State Department said Monroe Doctrine was still relevant for U.S. actions in Latin America.

06 DEC: A new Sino-Soviet ideological compromise was published.

15 DEC: JSG submitted a final report to the JCS, among its many recommendations was one for a centralized intelligence agency that would act as a primary entity for the military intelligence community.

30 DEC: JCS forwarded a memorandum that expressed concern over the JSG conclusions and recommendations.
1961

06 JAN: In a speech to a Communist Party meeting, Khrushchev stated that the USSR supported wars of national liberation because they were the result of Western imperialism and colonialism. He said they were compatible with USSR policy of peaceful coexistence.

30 JAN: President John F. Kennedy, in State of Union address, said the USSR had not abandoned its goal of world domination; thus the U.S. had to use all political, economic, and military resources to meet the communist challenge.

08 FEB: Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara informed the Chairman of the JCS of his decision to establish a Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).

02 MAR: JCS completed and forwarded a concept paper pertaining to the establishment of DIA.

17 APR: Bay of Pigs invasion.

18 APR: Khrushchov demanded that the U.S. halt the invasion and warns that the USSR would aid Cuban government to counter attack.

20 APR: Kennedy, in commenting on failure of invasion, noted that the U.S. would not hesitate to use military force to protect its interests.

04 MAY: An executive order established the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board as the successor to the President's Board of Consultants in Foreign Intelligence Activities (of 6 FEB 56).

04 JUN: Khrushchev, at Vienna summit, proposed making Berlin a demilitarized "free city" with the East German government controlling access. U.S. opposed plan.

05 JUL: Secretary of Defense approved concept for establishment of DIA.

06 JUL: Soviets signed a ten-year military aid pact with North Korea.

25 JUL: Kennedy informed public that among the measures being taken to strengthen U.S. military capabilities was a defense budget increase of over $3 billion and a substantial increase in military personnel.

02 AUG: DoD publicly announced the creation of DIA.

13 AUG: Soviets/East Germans began to erect Berlin Wall. American, French, and British forces went on alert there. Diplomatic protests ensued.

31 AUG: USSR announced resumption of nuclear testing in the atmosphere.

05 SEP: Kennedy announced resumption of underground nuclear testing.

28 SEP: JCS signed "Plan for the Activation of DIA," and the Secretary of Defense approved it a day later.

01 OCT: DIA officially became operational, with Lieutenant General Joseph F. Carroll (USAF) as its first director.
31 OCT: DIA assumed Defense intelligence coordination duties as the Office of the Assistant to the Secretary for Special Operations was disestablished.

30 DEC: Secretary of State Rusk reiterated that the U.S. would protect its rights in Berlin. U.S. wanted to resolve the crisis peacefully, but would back diplomacy with military power.

1962

01 JAN: DoD Central Requirements Registry established.

03 JAN: DIA approved Exempted Service Appointment System.

20 FEB: Astronaut John Glenn orbited the earth.

17 MAR: USSR defended communist efforts in Vietnam and called on U.S. to withdraw military forces there.

18 MAY: Khrushchev, in Bulgaria, said the USSR preferred peace but supported class struggle, wars of national liberation, and struggles against colonialism.

25 MAY: Secretary of State Dean Rusk accused Khrushchev of supporting peaceful coexistence policy as a way to extend communism.

03 JUL: Algeria gained independence after protracted war with France.

02 SEP: Soviets announced that they would arm and train the Cuban military.

04 SEP: Kennedy stated that he was concerned about Soviets building Cuba's military power and that the U.S. would act to prevent aggressive actions by the Castro government.

11 SEP: USSR declared that arms and military equipment sent to Cuba were for defensive purposes only.

22 OCT: Kennedy told the American people that offensive missiles were being built in Cuba and informed Khrushchev that the U.S. wanted the Soviet missiles in Cuba removed.

23 OCT: Khrushchev accused U.S. of interference in the affairs of Cuba and the USSR. USSR raised combat readiness of its military forces.

24 OCT: The President called for U.S. naval quarantine (blockade) of Cuba.

27 OCT: Khrushchev said USSR would remove missiles if U.S. would promise not to invade Cuba and will remove American missiles in Turkey.

02 NOV: Defense Intelligence School established.

30 NOV: Mapping, Charting and Geodesy (MC&G) directorate was added to DIA.

1963

01 JAN: Defense Intelligence School and Production Center activated.

19 FEB: Automatic Data Processing Center established.

27 OCT: While in the Federal Republic of Germany, Secretary of State Rusk said that recent agreements, including the est ban treaty, did not establish a policy of detente — detente could only result if issues involving Berlin, Germany, Vietnam, Laos, and Cuba were resolved.
22 NOV: President Kennedy assassinated.

1964 01 FEB: Intelligence Career Development Program initiated.

06 MAR: The Secretary of State noted the three parts of American policy toward communist countries: the prevention of aggression, reduction of the risk of war, and encouragement of communist nations to move toward freedom.

31 MAR: Dissemination Center became operational.

30 APR: Scientific and Technical Intelligence directorate established.

02 AUG: North Vietnamese patrol boat attacked U.S. warship in the Gulf of Tonkin.

14 OCT: Coup in USSR: Aleksei Kosygin became premier and Leonid Brezhnev first secretary of the Communist Party.

12 DEC: A DoD directive established the Defense Attache System (DAS).

1965 07 FEB: President Lyndon B. Johnson ordered attacks against North Vietnam for directing Viet Cong attacks on American military installations.

31 MAR: The Johnson Administration committed U.S. combat — as opposed to advisory — troops to Vietnam.

28 APR: Johnson ordered troops to the Dominican Republican to protect U.S. citizens endangered by clashes between communist, anticomunist, and other groups.

29 JUN: First Vietnam land battle involving a large U.S. contingent began.

01 JUL: DIA assumed responsibility over DAS.

09 AUG: The Secretary of State said U.S. wanted to improve relations with the USSR but not if it meant abandoning South Vietnam.

06 DEC: Premier Kosygin, in a New York Times interview, said that there was no contradiction between favoring peace and supporting wars of national liberation, and gave as an example the USSR's support of the National Liberation Front in North Vietnam.

APPENDIX D
AND OFFICE SYMBOLS
# GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS AND OFFICE SYMBOLS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AALA:</td>
<td>Area Analysis Intelligence Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACSI:</td>
<td>Assistant Chief of Staff Intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADP:</td>
<td>Automatic Data Processing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADPC:</td>
<td>Automatic Data Processing Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADS:</td>
<td>Automatic Data Processing Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFCIN:</td>
<td>Air Force Center for Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASD:</td>
<td>Assistant Secretary of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCAL:</td>
<td>Commander-in-Chief, Alaska</td>
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<tr>
<td>CINCARIB:</td>
<td>Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Intelligence Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCLANT:</td>
<td>Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCONAD:</td>
<td>Commander-in-Chief, Continental Air Defense Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCPAC:</td>
<td>Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCSAC:</td>
<td>Commander-in-Chief, Strategic Air Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCSTRIKE</td>
<td>Commander-in-Chief, Strike Command (now Central Command)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMC:</td>
<td>Commandant, United States Marine Corps</td>
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<tr>
<td>COMMINT:</td>
<td>Communications Intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>CRITICOMM:</td>
<td>Critical Intelligence Communication</td>
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<tr>
<td>CTA:</td>
<td>Central Technical Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>DAS:</td>
<td>Defense Attaché System</td>
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<tr>
<td>DASA:</td>
<td>Defense Atomic Support Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>DCA:</td>
<td>Defense Communications Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>DCSOPS:</td>
<td>Deputy Chief of Staff Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>DDR&amp;E:</td>
<td>Director of Defense Research and Engineering</td>
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<td>DESPA:</td>
<td>Department of Engineering Special Projects Agency</td>
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<td>DIA:</td>
<td>Defense Intelligence Agency</td>
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<td>DIAAP:</td>
<td>Defense Intelligence Agency Administration</td>
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<tr>
<td>DIAAP-1:</td>
<td>Defense Intelligence Agency Administration for Target Intelligence Support to Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>DIAAQ:</td>
<td>Defense Intelligence Agency Assistant Director for Acquisition</td>
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<tr>
<td>DIACC:</td>
<td>Defense Intelligence Agency Comptroller</td>
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<tr>
<td>DIACC-4-(SI):</td>
<td>Defense Intelligence Agency Manpower &amp; Organization Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>DIACS:</td>
<td>Defense Intelligence Agency Chief of Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>DIAPL:</td>
<td>Defense Intelligence Agency Public Liaison</td>
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<tr>
<td>DIAPL-4:</td>
<td>Defense Intelligence Agency Plans for Security in Support of Joint Staff</td>
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<td>DIAPL-(SI):</td>
<td>Defense Intelligence Agency Plans for COMINT and ELINT</td>
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<tr>
<td>DIARD:</td>
<td>Defense Intelligence Agency Assistant Chief of Staff, Research &amp; Development</td>
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<td>DIASAO:</td>
<td>Defense Intelligence Agency Special Activities Office</td>
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<td>DIAIS:</td>
<td>Defense Intelligence Agency Information Systems</td>
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<td>DIASA:</td>
<td>Defense Intelligence Agency Administration</td>
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<td>DIASG:</td>
<td>Defense Intelligence Agency Special Advisory Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>DIASO:</td>
<td>Defense Intelligence Agency Special Security Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIAMS:</td>
<td>Defense Intelligence Agency Automatic Data Processing Systems Center</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
DIAXX: Defense Intelligence Agency Special Activities Office
DIRC: Defense Intelligence Relay Center
DIS: Defense Intelligence School
DLO: Defense Liaison Officer
DOD: Department of Defense
DSIATP: Defense Sensor Interpretation and Application Training Program
DSMAC: Defense Special Missle and Aeronautics Center
DSSCS: Defense Special Security Communications System
ELINT: Electronic Intelligence
IDHS: Intelligence Data Handling System
J-2: Joint Services Intelligence
JCCRG: Joint Command and Control Requirements Group
JCS: Joint Chiefs of Staff
JCSM: Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum
JRC: Joint Reconnaissance Center
JTD: Joint Tables of Dissemination/Distribution
MIB: Military Intelligence Board
NMCC: National Military Command Center
NMCS: National Military Command System
NPIC: National Photographic Interpretation Center
NSA: National Security Agency
NSC: National Security Council
NSCID: National Security Council Intelligence Directive
NSCIP: National Security Council Intelligence Program
OATSD: Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
ONI: Office of Naval Intelligence
OPR: Office of Primary Responsibility
OSD: Office of the Secretary of Defense
OSO: Office of Secretary of Special Operations
PCP: Program Change Proposal
SECDEF: Secretary of Defense
SIGINT: Signals Intelligence
SPAD: Special Activities Division
SPRINTCOMM: Special Intelligence Communications
SSO: Special Security Officer
USC: United States Code
USCINCEUR: United States Commander-in-Chief, European Command
U&S: Unified and Specified Commands
USIB: United States Intelligence Board
DIA—At the Creation is the documentary record of the Agency's early tumultuous years as the first central Defense intelligence organization in United States history. Inside this book are 104 Department of Defense documents from 1961 to 1965—some highly classified in their day—telling precisely when, how, why and by whom DIA was established. The story will be of interest to any serious student of the United States intelligence agencies.

Before DIA was established in 1961, the Army, Navy and Air Force managed their own intelligence programs according to their needs. Wasteful duplication, unsatisfactory coordination, and conflicting intelligence estimates frequently resulted. There was keen competition and bias in intelligence products. Several post-World War II Presidential commissions confirmed that central management was best for Defense intelligence and the Secretary of Defense should be in charge.


After 40 years managing Defense intelligence, DIA is an indispensable part of the U.S. intelligence community.

The DIA History Office Staff is publishing this collection as the origination document volume in a series on significant Cold War Defense intelligence records. This first volume is released to coincide with the 40th Anniversary of DIA, and provides an understanding of the original mission of the Agency and its continuing importance in a new era of Defense intelligence to policymakers, diplomats, commanders, and law enforcement officials.

Deane J. Allen, the chief editor of this volume, is the DIA Historian and has been senior historian at the Agency since 1981. Brian G. Shullam, who assisted in editing this work, is the Deputy DIA Historian and has served in that position since 1994.

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