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Distribution: Orig - Dr. Scoville

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DDR [REDACTED]:6561:bb (5 July 62)

5 July 1962

ADM-1

Dr. Scoville

Subject: Mission and Functions of the DD/R

The attached paper is the result of the best thought on the mission and functions of the DD/R of which we are capable. We have been working at this off and on for about ten days, and the content of this paper was foreshadowed to you, though incompletely, at lunch a few days ago. We mention this not in the belief that time spent on a project necessarily equates with quality, but to note this is not a sudden shot from the hip as a result of the cumulative frustrations of trying to get organized.

Perhaps fifty percent of this paper runs contrary to your recently stated aims and tactics. Moreover, it is in a sense gratuitous. But the more we reflect on this whole matter, the clearer it appears to us that in some respects we are fighting the wrong war at the wrong time. On the other hand, we do believe there is a war to be won, and that winning it will not involve making unacceptable sacrifices of principle. It is to this end that the attached paper is directed.

We have not included any explicit recommendations to accompany this paper because to do so would be premature, pending some indication from you whether you feel the arguments put forth in this paper deserve further consideration. We do have some ideas on specific next steps if they are in order.

Please be assured that our purpose herein is simply to present an alternative (and we hope a persuasive one) to the course of action we have been following thus far in attempting to get the DD/R into productive business. If you do not feel that what is concluded in this paper is worth pursuing, we will drop the subject and put our best efforts into whatever course you determine.

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J. R. R.

R. W. K.

3 July 1962

RECONSIDERATION OF THE MISSIONS AND FUNCTIONS
OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR (RESEARCH)

Problem and Facts Bearing on It

The basic problem since the inception of the idea of a Deputy Director (Research) has been to describe its mission and functions in such a way as to maximize the benefits of organizational pooling of research and development knowledge, personnel, and funds.

Since we are not creating a wholly new function, but are rather initially reorganizing the management of an existing one, freedom of action is circumscribed to an extent by Agency history. A distinction must be drawn between the desirable and the possible.

The creation of a DD/R in the first place carries with it the basic decision that the research and development activities of the Agency will be better managed to the benefit of the entire intelligence community by organization and operation on a centralized basis with one over-all manager. This represents an evolution in the Agency's thinking (or lack of thinking), in which research and development activities have always been placed within the functional organization that they supported. Thus TSD has conducted R&D for the CS; COMMO for itself; NPIC for itself; etc.

Several developments, but perhaps two in particular have gradually led to the conviction that centralization of these assets would produce greater net benefits. First was the arrival of a whole new generation of technical developments, complex and often spectacular, which were epitomized by the Russian Sputnik. Here were developments of such overwhelming significance and technical complexity that their creation and development could not be left to isolated conclaves of developers who existed, like budget and fiscal staffs, as support elements of individual components.

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The second major development was specific to the Agency: the successful development, manufacture and operational deployment of the U-2 aircraft, which by all odds was the Agency's, if not the U. S. Government's, major technical collection triumph of the 1950's. Since the highly centralized management of the U-2 program involved administrative relationships novel in the Agency's history, the attractiveness of attempting to repeat this performance was irresistible.

Since the creation of the position of Deputy Director (Research) in February 1962, progress in defining his sphere of command and his functional responsibilities has been virtually negligible. The reasons for this are numerous, and probably cannot all be known to any single author. It does appear, however, that the following are major contributory factors to the lack of progress that has been observed. (We do not aver the validity of these matters; we simply note their influence.)

a. The DD/P has viewed with alarm any organizational suggestion that appears to encroach his authority for the conduct of overseas clandestine operations. This alarm has been seen most strikingly in the case of [REDACTED]

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b. A second worry of the DD/P is that concentrating the development of agent equipment in a Deputy Directorate not under his control only compounds a problem which he has never succeeded in solving even with this function under his own control in TSD. If it has never been possible to reach a meeting of minds between TSD developers and area Division operators, it is logical to expect that transferring these functions to the DD/R will only make a bad situation worse. An extreme comment illustrative of this point was recently made by a senior DD/P official when he said: "We won't use any equipment we don't develop ourselves". This is a silly statement on its face, but it is useful in that it crystallizes a whole body of opinion firmly imbedded in CS lore. It involves not only the fear of loss of control, but the equally horrible

prospect that remedying this situation would require giving to DD/R developers substantial knowledge of the actual operations which they are being asked to support with technical developments.

c. A naive (or worse, disingenuous) belief in the top management of the Agency is that two Deputy Directors may between themselves calmly divide a major parcel of Agency activity in which both have passionate interests. In part, this reflects a lack of clarity at the top as to precisely what it wishes to accomplish; and in part it reflects a really inexcusable lack of understanding of how large organizations work.

The problem then redefined, is how to organize the DD/R in a way that will overcome the legitimate (but not the illegitimate) fears of the DD/P, without at the same time sacrificing the very real agreed benefits to be had by concentrating under single leadership the technical knowledge and experience required to bring the Agency into the 1960's.

Discussion

As we have observed, in all the debate that has been carried on with (or avoided by) the DD/P, it has been clear that the main core of their thinking is that anything connected with clandestine collection or covert action, which are their spheres of action, must be united with these activities under one Head. There has been no serious proposal that the operation of U-2 aircraft should remain with the DD/P, * or that Project ██████████ should be run by them. No major moves have been made in the direction of Project OXCART, and even less so toward CORONA and similar developments. The heat has been generated on the one hand with respect to those projects with a heavy CS flavor, either operational or support; and on the other with respect to development of agent associated equipment. This latter argument focuses most strongly on TSD.

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*Although only history now prevents a DD/P move in the direction of ██████████ if it continues to be an operational asset.

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As for [REDACTED] it is probably fair to say that at this stage of Agency history the real control of these projects is not going to be released by the DD/P without a struggle of such titanic proportions as to constitute a Pyrrhic victory for the DD/R. The equities in this debate, i. e., the relative importance of technical development vs. operational and political considerations, are so difficult to weigh that any decision would have to be substantially arbitrary. Either way will work if there is a desire to make it, but all bureaucratic history points to the conclusion that in such a situation the status quo will prevail.

With respect to the development of agent equipment (the "TSD problem"), it has long been clear that technical developments without operational advice are less than useful, while on the other hand technical considerations preclude development by operators themselves. In short, there must be in these developments a marriage of interests, and the problem thus becomes how to consummate this marriage without the use of a shotgun. In the past, TSD has been "guided" by a Technical Requirements Board, aided by Technical Requirements Officers in each operating Division. This is essentially a committee approach to the problem and it has been no more successful than any other committee. Technical Requirements Officers have performed this function as an additional duty without real association with the TSD developers. The need is to provide a constant association between the two.

It will be seen that the essence of the debate concerns not those things that TSD is doing which may be described as having a life of their own apart from the CS (such as [REDACTED], but rather concerns those developments which are closely associated with classical espionage and covert action. The relationship between operators and developers in the agent equipment field is an unresolved problem, and one that cannot be solved by putting greater organizational distance between developers and operators. We conclude that the DD/R should not at the present time intrude itself into this essentially family fight but should concentrate its efforts on that aspect of TSD activity which is not dependent for its existence on CS customer acceptance. It may be that in the millennium, the technical performance of the DD/R and its components will be so superior as to override the contrary organizational argument, but we have not even started down that road yet.

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Grim though it may be, we cannot fail to recognize that one "solution" now available to the Director is to cease further transfers to the DD/R after the establishment of OSA and OEL. * This would spill the blood of only a very few of us now in the DD/R, get the supplicants out of the DCI's office, and send the DD/P back to its knitting. But it would inevitably in our view cause a serious degradation in the potential technical capabilities of the Agency at the very time these capabilities are of greatest significance.

For our own part, there is a vital and urgent necessity to reassess what it is we can expect to accomplish, to distinguish perhaps more clearly between the ultimate and the present. At this stage of life we cannot win a battle for control over those activities in which factors other than technical appear to weigh heavily, but we can win support for a function whose primary basis for existence is technical. It may be observed that all viable long-term organizations are based either on genuine specialization or on a generally felt consensus that what they do is best done centrally. At the risk of some repetition, what this means to us in sum is simply this:

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a. We cannot at present expect to "control" [redacted] or any similarly oriented project where the political and liaison considerations are, or can be said to be, at least as significant as the technical.

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b. We cannot insist on the development of equipment which depends for its utilization on customer (i. e. , CS) acceptance. The horse can be led to water, but only time will convince him it is fit to drink. TSD should be left, for the time, to its business of the development of agent equipment, authentication and other close support work. It will gradually be drained dry of talent by the very fact that its technical work will be the least interesting done in the Agency. When it loses in this employment free market, its technical functions will move, like its people, either into oblivion or into the DD/R. Then we can take a shot at getting the DD/P and DD/R on the same wave length in developing agent equipment.

*Still not officially accomplished as of 3 July 1962.

c. We can insist on the development and operation of equipment in which technical proficiency is clearly central and in which political elements are clearly secondary or non-existent. In this category are the OXCARTS, the [REDACTED] the CORONAS.

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d. We can insist on all pre-development work in the natural and biological sciences, where the desirability of certain ends is seen but not yet cost in hardware.

Under such a division of labor, DD/R would remain in a support role as an equipment developer for [REDACTED] and perhaps [REDACTED] but it is not necessary to [REDACTED]

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In short, the tack taken is first to consolidate a major portion, though not all, of the headquarters aspects of Agency research and development, retaining only those overseas aspects that are presently an integral part of the headquarters activities thus transferred. Taken altogether, this is not a small package. Conceived in this way, the approach tends inevitably to re-open the question of the proper positioning and functions of the Office of Scientific Intelligence.

The Case for OSI

Pursuing then the concept of centralizing certain major research and development activities at Headquarters, the appropriate organizational position of OSI is worth re-opening. The primary mission of OSI, the production of Scientific and Technical intelligence, is without argument functionally consistent with the DD/I. Past experience has demonstrated, however, that organization by functionally pure concepts has not insured the best, or even desired, results in all instances, and indeed it would seem most desirable to consider organizational changes along different concepts giving appropriate recognition to other facts that exist. Among such facts are the following:

The major intelligence penetrations of the iron curtain have been through technological means. It is further true that this

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technical collection has as its prime purpose the collection of technical data. Although certain economic, geographic and military intelligence has been also acquired, even in these cases such acquisition is dependent upon two primary considerations. One is the scientific and technical intelligence concerning the target country, its technological capabilities, defense systems, communications, etc., and the other is our own scientific and technical capability to counter these technical and natural obstacles. An R&D program, therefore, for the acquisition of intelligence, primarily technical intelligence, must be closely related to the existing known technical intelligence. In other words we begin from what is already known to build the capability to acquire still more of the unknown.

It is further necessary that there be close and continuing guidance to new research and development programs from such intelligence producing elements. Such close integration has had some precedence and, incidentally, has been uncommonly successful in the OSI, JAEIC, AFTAC method of operation. The absence, on the other hand, of such closeness between the analytical and collection efforts in the missile program has continually retarded progress.

If OSI could at this time be brought into the DD/R, it would also mean not only the assets of that office but the community Chairmanships and Secretariats of JAEIC, GMAIC and SIC. This would provide a unique opportunity to build National priority intelligence acquisition programs on a basis of the maximum known information with the further vital aspect of evaluation and feedback into the same line of command.

In essence this could mean drawing together into a single organization technically competent personnel working together in a common effort for the acquisition and production of S&T intelligence without which even such other intelligence as may be collectible by technical means cannot expect to achieve maximum success.

With reference to the valid premise that the production of S&T intelligence is the responsibility of the DD/I, there should be no reason why the DD/R cannot be responsible to the DD/I for

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continued contributions to current intelligence, the National Intelligence Surveys and National Estimates, and in general, support intelligence production objectives and programs in just the same way that OSI as a member office of the DD/I has always done.

DDR 316-82

5 July 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director

SUBJECT: ORGANIZATION HN 1 -

The Deputy Director (Research) is unable to coordinate the proposed organization directive in the latest revision of HN 1 - for the following specific reasons:

a. Paragraph 1. The Deputy Director (Research) considers that the research and development mission outlined in this paragraph is essentially as indeterminate as the version contained in the original HN 1 - of several weeks ago. As you are well aware, we have been unable to convert that directive language into any definitive decisions or actions. Until this subject is clearly defined, with statements concerning the transfer of funds, personnel, projects, etc., I believe we will be unable to proceed on any definitive agreements between the Deputy Directors involved.

b. Paragraph 2. The last sentence should be removed and be replaced by one which states "All ELINT activities, including funds, manpower authorizations, and materiel of the Deputy Director (Support), Deputy Director (Plans), and Deputy Director (Intelligence) will be transferred to the Deputy Director (Research) as soon as possible and no later than 15 August 1962". This paragraph should also contain the appointment of Mr. George Miller as Assistant Director of the Office of ELINT.

c. Paragraph 3. No comment, except that I should like to know what decisions have been made on [REDACTED] and the T/O. 25X1A2d1

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d. Paragraph 4. No comment, except that such a "request" is unlikely to produce much action until the responsibilities are more clearly defined.

e. Paragraph 5. This should be rewritten to authorize the establishment of a Scientific and Technical Career Council under the guidance of the Deputy Director (Research), since it is infeasible to establish such a career service when the major scientific and technical components are not under DD/R control.

Signed Herbert Scoville, Jr.

HERBERT SCOVILLE, Jr.
Deputy Director
(Research)

cc: DDCI

DDR/EBGiller:mh

Distribution:

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