

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

23 OCT 1964

Honorable Dean Rusk
Secretary of State
Washington, D. C.

Dear Dean:

As requested by Bill Foster in his memorandum of 14 October, I am forwarding to you my comments on the study "The Indian Nuclear Problem: Proposed Course of Action". I am in general agreement with that paper as are the JCS; their comments, with which I agree, are attached.

It is my understanding that Chet Bowles will be returning to Washington in early December for consultation. We will have the benefit of his feeling for the Indian nuclear problem following his talks with Shastri. At about the same time as his return, I expect to receive from the Joint Chiefs a study of the implications of the Chinese nuclear capability. With the information then available, I believe it desirable that we review our overall security policy vis-a-vis India and other Asian states in light of the Chinese Communist threat. I think a review in December would be appropriate. I understand your staff agrees.

Sincerely,

Enclosure
JCSM-900-64, 23 October 1964 (S)

INTD GUIDELINE:
MFK/cjm 12/6/94

1) Retain status of staff
With original copy to
DOD
3-1-20195
(DEF 42-2)

Transmitted for
Ed. 10-14

DEF 13 US-INDIA
XIR DEF 12-1 CHICOM

2

Transmitted by 10/23/64



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

JCSM-900-64

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: The Indian Nuclear Problem:
Proposed Course of Action (U)

3893

1. Reference is made to a paper on the above subject, dated 13 October 1964, which was approved by the Thompson Committee on Nuclear Capability and forwarded by the Director, US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), to members of the Committee of Principals for approval or comment. On 19 October 1964, the Thompson Committee reviewed the paper in the light of the intervening detonation of the Chinese nuclear device on 16 October 1964. The recommended course of action and assurances to India were considered to be still applicable, and it was directed that the paper be updated accordingly.

128897/64

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the alternative courses of action considered and concur that the action selected is proper at this time. In considering US assurances enumerated in subparagraph 5a on page 12 of the paper, the first, second, and fourth do not exceed those previously given India by President Eisenhower on 10 December 1959, and by Ambassador Rowley on 25 March 1964. These assurances were generally reaffirmed by the President's statement on 16 October 1964. The third assurance proposes that the United States issue, at an appropriate time after detonation of a Chinese nuclear device, a unilateral public declaration regarding its response to Chinese use of nuclear weapons against another Asian state. This assurance was given by the President in his speech on 13 October 1964. The President did not, however, limit this assurance to nations of Asia. Overall, the US assurances appear appropriate as a basis for discussions with India at which time Indian intentions can be more accurately determined. At the same time, however, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that it is most important that no actions be taken which could alienate US allies, especially Pakistan.

DEF 1

259

6023 128940/64

~~SECRET~~

3. The assurances proposed are general in nature and do not commit the United States to any specific military course of action. This will permit flexibility of response consistent with US interests and other strategic commitments. Existing US forces are structured to permit implementation of current contingency plans for assistance to India as required to stop a maximum supportable Chinese communist attack and to restore the status quo that existed prior to initiation of aggression. The adequacy of current US military resources will, of course, depend on the scope of assistance required and other concurrent strategic military requirements.

4. With respect to Soviet assurances, it is recommended that the United States not initiate discussions on this matter with either India or the Soviet Union. Any implication that the United States would encourage assurances from the Soviet Union could result in greater Soviet influence within the Indian Armed Forces. The United States is currently attempting to stem a trend in this direction.

5. Subject to the foregoing, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend approval of the Thompson Committee report.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

~~SECRET~~
CURTIS E. LeMAY
Acting Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff