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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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JOINT STATE/USIA/ACDA/DOD Message

1. This message sets forth guidance for US public posture, including public statements by U.S. officials, on certain matters relating to problem of nuclear weapons proliferation. It has grown out of detailed study by interested Washington agencies of Indian nuclear weapons policy, an effort designed to identify USG policies likely prove most effective in strengthening present Indian policy of developing its nuclear capabilities for peaceful purposes only. Although tailored specifically to Indian problem, we believe that at least some of principles enunciated below can be usefully employed in other areas where one or more states have developed significant capability in nuclear field. Addressees should consider this guidance in light of local situation and judge for themselves whether and how they may apply all or part of it in furtherance USG global interest in non-proliferation.

REPRODUCED BY MEMO

Drafted by: USIA:Mr. Hanson	Inf. Ext. 3728	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: NEA, Ambassador Hare
ACDA:Mr. Kohsen	NEA/INC:Mr. Coon	
Classified by: NEA-Mr. Handley	ACDA/ST-Dr. Rochlin (draft)	RUR/RPM-Mr. Baker (draft)
NEA/INC-Mr. Heck (draft)	ACDA/IR-Mr. Glevsteen (draft)	NEA/LAI-Mr. Sterner (draft)
G-Amb. Thompson (draft)	INR/RNA-Mrs. Tait (draft)	NEA/PAP-Mr. Laingen (draft)
DOD/ISA-Dr. Halperin (draft)	S/P-Mr. Gethright (draft)	FE-Mr. Berger (draft)
USIA-Mr. O'Neill (draft)	SCI-Mr. Sievering (draft)	ARA/ISA-Mr. Pringle (draft)
G/PM-Mr. Garthoff (draft)		RUR/SOW-Mr. Flenner (draft)
	SECRET	AF-Mr. Haubeck (draft)

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2. BEGIN UNDERLINE Background: END UNDERLINE FYI At present a number of states are technically capable of producing and testing a nuclear explosive device (or weapon) within a decade, assuming a decision to proceed in such manner were made now. Several of them could accomplish this without outside assistance or in a considerably shorter time, e.g. Canada, FRG, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, and Sweden. End FYI

3. BEGIN UNDERLINE Prestige factor: END UNDERLINE In India, and to some degree in other countries capable of initiating nuclear weapons program, one pressure for proliferation is assumption that a nuclear weapons program automatically endows a state with a special prestige or status and enhances its voice in international councils. As a general rule, therefore:

A. Although it will be difficult to deflect widespread trend toward speaking in terms of QUOTE five nuclear powers, UNQUOTE we should ourselves avoid this term and try to blunt this tendency. We should adopt negative attitude toward proposals based on assumption that the five countries which have tested nuclear weapons have in either some special interest or common/some quality of power, prestige, or capability not shared by others.

B. The phrase QUOTE civil nuclear power UNQUOTE should be used to describe a nation which, in contradistinction to QUOTE military

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nuclear powers UNQUOTE or QUOTE nuclear weapons states, UNQUOTE has potential to employ advanced nuclear technology for development of nuclear weapons, but has deliberately decided against it. The phrase QUOTE nuclear nations UNQUOTE could be used when both civil and military nuclear powers are collectively referred to. Wherever possible, the phrase QUOTE five nuclear powers, UNQUOTE meaning the nuclear-military states (US-USSR-UK-France-ChiComs), should not be used. When referring to U.S. and Soviet Union in nuclear context, phrase QUOTE major nuclear powers UNQUOTE could be used.

C. Our posture should reflect view that in declining to tread the military path, these civil nuclear powers have chosen intelligent and honorable course, and are entitled to respect for their restraint. Depending on circumstances we may wish draw on following themes in interpreting reasons for such restraint:

(1) Civil nuclear powers realize token weapons capability could be dangerous, expensive, prone to obsolescence, and lacking in credibility as a deterrent; hence QUOTE prestige UNQUOTE therefrom could be illusion.

(2) They recognize relevance of economic strength to genuine prestige and political influence, and have rejected heavy burden of nuclear weapons program in favor of using economic resources.

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for advancement of their people.]

(3) They believe in using the atom for peace, and in stopping spread of nuclear weapons. They recognize costs and limitations of small national nuclear systems and know such systems cannot represent wave of future in an increasingly interdependent world.

(4) Many countries technically capable of producing and testing nuclear weapons have signed or accepted nuclear safeguards agreements, as well as the Test Ban Treaty. They intend to honor these commitments. These undertakings would inhibit several of these countries from actually developing, testing, and producing nuclear weapons (or even nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes, since these are indistinguishable from nuclear weapons).

D. As appropriate our statements should reflect fact that many civil nuclear powers already have advanced nuclear industrial and scientific establishments, in some areas surpassing that of the Chinese; that there are significant peaceful benefits associated with atomic energy in the fields of power-generation, medical applications, desalinization, basic science, and so on; that these benefits can be-- and are being--acquired by civil nuclear powers in an efficient, direct manner; and that pursuit of military nuclear program only diverts technical resources and money from projects which contribute directly]

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to economic, social, and political advancement.]

4. BEGIN UNDERLINE Evaluation of Chinese Communist Nuclear Threat:
END UNDERLINE At least two of present civil nuclear powers, India and Japan, see their own long-term security interests as being directly affected by evolution of Chinese Communist nuclear weapons capability, and future consideration of their nuclear weapons options will be influenced by their appraisal of this threat. Public indications of how we evaluate threat will influence their thinking. We should therefore avoid magnifying Chinese Communist threat; rather we should maintain reasoned and balanced attitude that is consistent with known facts and helps keep consideration of Chinese nuclear weapons program in perspective. In so doing following themes may prove useful:

(a) U.S. continues its primacy in QUOTE strike-back UNQUOTE power, which is essence of nuclear effectiveness--that is, capacity to withstand nuclear attack and prevail over aggressor. U.S. has this power above all others because its nuclear deterrent force is either hidden under sea or fortified underground with steel and concrete. This is why Secretary McNamara was able to say in February, 1966, that U.S. missile force alone (without bombers) could survive Soviet surprise attack with more than enough power to inflict unacceptable damage on both USSR and Communist China simultaneously.]

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(b) Despite their public statements expressing contempt for effects of nuclear war, the Chinese recognize that nuclear attack would be enormously destructive for China. Because they cannot ~~absolutely~~ rely on deterrent value of Soviet nuclear power, Chinese have become even more concerned over possibility of US nuclear attack. Thus Chinese are strongly motivated to shape any military attack and political propaganda strategy in way that would reduce chance of US nuclear response, particularly by avoiding use of nuclear weapons themselves.

(c) Chinese Communists are managing to undertake a nuclear weapons program only at great cost in terms of skilled manpower and resources and with adverse economic consequences.

5. BEGIN UNDERLINE Cost and Related Considerations: END UNDERLINE : Civil nuclear powers generally recognize that costs of effective nuclear weapons program would be heavy. In India's case this constitutes a major deterrent to undertaking such program. But Indian opinion leaders who are pressing for a bomb -- and many others who support present policy -- are generally ill-informed regarding details of heavy costs and complexities of serious nuclear weapons program. Thus there is some merit in seeking spread clearer understanding of cost factors. On other hand we believe it would be

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contrary our non-proliferation objective directly attempt efforts reach Indians on this subject on scale and in fashion which might persuade them we were engaged in QUOTE hard sell UNQUOTE campaign to scare them away from proliferation. That is, pride and resentment at foreign intervention could override substance of our argument and provoke reaction contrary to that intended. Same consideration may apply to some degree or other with other civil nuclear powers. Following broad guidelines are therefore suggested as background and with caveat that recipient posts should carefully weigh extent to which they can be directly employed by USG spokesmen or publications in light local sensitivities.

(a) Building and testing single nuclear device is only beginning of nuclear weapons program. As Secretary McNamara has said, QUOTE Relatively weak national nuclear forces with enemy cities as their targets are not likely to be sufficient to perform even the function of deterrence. If they are small, and perhaps vulnerable on the ^{ground} ~~ground~~ or in the air, or inaccurate, a major antagonist can take a variety of measures to counter them. Indeed, if a major antagonist came to believe there was a substantial likelihood of it being used independently, this force would be inviting a pre-emptive strike against it. UNQUOTE. Even small nuclear

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force would therefore require relatively sophisticated means of delivery and of protection against surprise attack, to be effective or provide deterrent.

(b) Once decision to acquire nuclear military force has been taken, a nation embarks on rising scale of costs and risks. Developing small nuclear force is costly, difficult, and uncertain undertaking for variety of factors including the following:

(1) Modern delivery systems tend to be far more expensive than nuclear weapons costs, and necessitate large-scale, time-consuming, and industrially-advanced effort.

(2) In addition to investment costs of nuclear force program (including substantial foreign exchange element), operating, maintenance, and obsolescence costs must be borne.

(3) Critical manpower and material dislocations as well as direct costs would be incurred.

(4) Much of technology involved in developing military nuclear force is of no value for civilian applications and economic advancement.

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ACTING

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ACTION:	NEW DELHI	
	ALL OTHER NEA DIPLOMATIC POSTS	BY POUCH
	ALL NATO CAPITALS	"
	ADDIS ABABA	"
	CANBERRA	"
	GENEVA	"
	LAGOS	"
	MEXICO CITY	"
	OTTAWA	"
	RANGOON	"
	RIO de JANEIRO	"
	STOCKHOLM	"
	TOKYO	"
	USUN NEW YORK	"
	BUENOS AIRES	"
INFO:	BUCHAREST	"
	HONG KONG	"
	MOSCOW	"
	PRAGUE	"
	SOFIA	"
	WARSAW	"

KATZENBACH

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