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FROM : U.S. Delegation SALT, VIENNA DATE: December 2, 1971

SUBJECT : SALT MemCon

REF :

Attached SALT MemCon is to be reproduced and distributed in accordance with the memorandum to Mr. Rich, Deputy Director, S/S-O, dated February 25, 1971 from Mr. Furnas, Special Assistant to the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

SMITH

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Attachment:

US/USSR Mini-Plenary Meeting No. 4
November 30, 1971

GP-1

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IS/FPC/CDR VAS Date: 11/18/94

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A-594 *Russia*
(fac)

SALT VI

US/USSR Mini-Plenary Meeting No. 4
Soviet Embassy
1100 hours, November 30, 1971

Persons Present:

Ambassador Smith	Minister Semenov
Ambassador Parsons	Academician Shchukin
Mr. Nitze	General Trusov
General Allison	Mr. Grinevsky
Dr. Garthoff	Mr. Kishilov
Mr. Shaw	Mr. Pavlov
Mr. Parr	(Interpreter)
(Interpreter)	Mr. Novikov
Mr. Krimer	(Interpreter)
(Interpreter)	

Discussion:

Minister Semenov welcomed the U.S. Delegation to the Soviet Embassy. He declared the meeting open. He said that, following established tradition, he would give the floor to the head of the U.S. Delegation, Ambassador Smith.

Ambassador Smith then made a statement. (See Attachment 1.)

Minister Semenov said that the questions put by Ambassador Smith would be studied. They would also be answered partially in today's remarks by the Soviet Delegation. Minister Semenov asked whether the U.S. side intended to continue its remarks.

Ambassador Smith said not for the time being.

Minister Semenov then said that he would ask Academician Shchukin to take the floor.

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Academician Shchukin said that thanks to the joint work on preparing a draft text of a Treaty (Agreement) on the Limitation of ABMs, the sides had been able to agree on a number of provisions. The results of this work had been confirmed in Moscow during the interval between Helsinki and Vienna. In this connection, it was of fundamental importance to have reached agreement on the text of a provision in which each party undertook not to develop, test, or deploy sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based ABM systems or their components. This provision in particular confirmed the importance both sides attached to preparing a draft which excluded the possibility of the deployment of ABM defenses of the territory of a country. The next provision was to the effect that each Party undertook not to develop, test, or deploy ABM launchers for launching more than one ABM interceptor missile at a time from each launcher, nor to modify deployed launchers to provide them with such a capability, nor to develop, test, or deploy automatic or semi-automatic or other similar systems for rapid reload of ABM launchers. Apart from this, the Soviet side cannot recognize as well-founded the proposal of the US involving an obligation not to deploy ABM systems using devices other than ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars to perform the functions of these components. The subject of a Treaty (Agreement) could only be a specific and concrete limitation of ABM systems. It would seem that prohibiting something unknown, as proposed by the US side, would create uncertainty as to the subject of the Treaty (Agreement) on limiting ABMs. Such had never been done in a serious agreement. If systems based on different technical principles should subsequently appear, they could be discussed additionally, as provided by the draft Treaty.

Academician Shchukin then said that he would like to draw attention now to the question of excluding the possibility of ABM defense of the territory of a country. This principle was consistently reflected in the Soviet September 7 proposal. Proceeding from strict observance of the principle of equality, the entire proposal was designed to exclude the possibility of the defense of the territory of the country. Our proposal provides that the deployment of ABMs would be immediately in the area of ICBM silo launchers. It provides that such means as "Spartan" type could not be deployed for the defense of silo launchers.

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Academician Shchukin said that the obligations of the sides provided for in the proposal of the Soviet Delegation would insure equality and would exclude the deployment of such systems for ABM defense of the territory of a country. In addition to defense of the capitals of the respective sides, ABM systems could be deployed in defense of ICBM silo launchers. The sides would undertake not to deploy ABM systems outside the area of one ICBM launcher site in the US; and the Soviet side would be entitled to defend an equal number of ICBM silo launchers. Within these areas, each side would undertake not to deploy more than 200 ABM launchers and 200 ABM interceptors in defense of ICBMs. The components used should not have the capability of defending targets other than the silos deployed in such areas.

Minister Semenov asked Ambassador Smith whether the US Delegation wanted to speak.

Ambassador Smith gave the floor to Mr. Nitze.

Mr. Nitze made a statement. (See Attachment 2.)

Minister Semenov next gave the floor to General Trusov.

General Trusov said he would like to give some considerations concerning modernization and replacement of strategic offensive arms under a freeze of such arms. He said that the question of modernization and replacement was not new to the talks. The two sides had frequently had an opportunity to set forth views, in discussing both general subjects and respective drafts. In addition, it was apparent that the solution to this problem should conform to the nature of the tasks before the two sides at the given stage of the talks. The Soviet Delegation proceeded from the premise that undertakings under a freeze should not prejudice solutions to be agreed to in further active negotiations on land-based ICBM silo launchers. In the understanding between the two governments of May 20, it was pointed out that a freeze should not affect the possibility of modernization and replacement. Notwithstanding the interim nature of an understanding, it should include a provision permitting modernization and replacement of land-based ICBM silo launchers and of the armaments associated with them because improvements will continue while the understanding is in force.

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General Trusov observed that the need to a right to modernize and replace ICBM elements stemmed from: (1) the need to replace in the normal operation of such armaments. Any armaments have their own life expectancy. Therefore, the draft understanding should permit replacement of old elements by new elements of the same or more perfect type; (2) the need to replace outmoded armaments with more perfect ones. Certain weapons might be replaced by improved weapons. This process also involved certain work.

General Trusov continued by saying that undertakings respecting the right to modernize and replace ICBM silo launchers and missiles in them would be in keeping with the nature of a freeze. National means of verification could insure compliance with such provisions of an agreement. The question had been asked earlier whether new deployment of ICBM silo launchers could not be carried out under the guise of permitted modernization and replacement. This did not follow from the Soviet proposal. In the Soviet proposal set forth on November 23 and 25 and in the document of November 26, the latter foresaw that new construction of ICBM silo launchers would not be permitted from a given date. Modernization and replacement we understand to refer to the improvement of existing armaments.

General Trusov concluded by saying that, regarding large modern ballistic missiles, the Soviet Delegation would set forth its views at an early meeting.

Minister Semenov asked Ambassador Smith if the American side had anything more to say.

Ambassador Smith called on General Allison.

General Allison delivered a statement. (See Attachment 3.)

Minister Semenov ascertained that the delegates had nothing more to say and, regarding the next meeting, proposed that it be held on Friday at 1100 hours at the U.S. Embassy.

Ambassador Smith agreed.

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Minister Semenov asked whether this would be a mini-plenary.

Ambassador Smith agreed to this as well.

Drafted by: ^{JP}JPS/aw/jb

Approved by: ^{GS per RSL}Ambassador Gerard Smith

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