

Current Class: [REDACTED]  
Current Handling: EXDIS  
Document Number: 1993LIMA05862

PAGE 01 LIMA 05862 01 OF 03 221917Z  
ACTION SS-00

RELEASED IN PART  
1.5(D), B1

INFO LOG-00 OASY-00 ADS-00 CORE-00 /000W  
-----C2BBAF 221918Z /38

O 221914Z MAY 93  
FM AMEMBASSY LIMA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8575  
INFO DIA WASHDC  
CIA WASHDC  
AMEMBASSY CARACAS  
USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM

[REDACTED] SECTION 01 OF 03 LIMA 05862

EXDIS DECAPTIONED

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, PHUM, US, PE  
SUBJECT: RETIRED GENERAL ON PLOTTING IN THE  
ARMY AND LA CANTUTA INVESTIGATION

1. [REDACTED] - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: A SENIOR RETIRED GENERAL SAID  
CLANDESTINE "COMACA" ORGANIZING IN THE ARMY IS  
GROWING. HE HAD HEARD THREATS FROM COMACA  
OFFICERS TO KILL ARMY COMMANDER HERMOZA AND  
MONTESINOS IF THEY DID NOT RESIGN. HE SAID THE  
ARMY OFFICER CORPS WOULD ACCEPT A FULL

PAGE 02 LIMA 05862 01 OF 03 221917Z  
CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION OF LA CANTUTA,  
DISPUTING GOP STATEMENTS THAT SUCH ACTION WOULD  
PIT ARMY AGAINST CONGRESS. ARMY TRADITION  
REQUIRED THAT HERMOZA ACCEPT RESPONSIBILITY,  
RATHER THAN HIDE OR PIN IT UPON OTHERS. HE  
CALLED FOR STEPPED-UP USG PRESSURE AS THE ONLY  
WAY TO KEEP FUJIMORI FROM BECOMING MORE  
DICTATORIAL. END SUMMARY.

3. [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] MET WITH POLCOUNS ON MAY 21 TO DISCUSS  
TENSIONS IN THE ARMY. [REDACTED]


B1, 1.5(D)

Current Class: [REDACTED]

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
REVIEW AUTHORITY: OSCAR J. OLSON  
DATE/CASE ID: 2 AUG 2001 200003853

Current Class: [REDACTED]  
 Current Handling: EXDIS  
 Document Number: 1993LIMA05862

Page: 2  
 Channel: n/a  
 B1, 1.5(D)



4. [REDACTED] BEGAN BY NOTING AREAS IN WHICH HE HAD SUPPORTED THE GOP: ITS IMPROVED COUNTER-INSURGENCY STRATEGY, WHICH HAD PERMITTED THE

B1, 1.5(D)



PAGE 03 LIMA 05862 01 OF 03 221917Z  
 ARMY TO REDUCE HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS; ITS ECONOMIC POLICIES; AND THE APRIL 1992 COUP. FUJIMORI, HOWEVER, WAS NOT CONSTRUCTING DEMOCRACY, AS HE HAD PLEDGED, BUT RATHER WAS CONSOLIDATING DICTATORIAL RULE. THE COMBINATION OF HIS DICTATORIAL AMBITIONS AND BAD ADVICE FROM MONTESINOS HAD LED TO FUJIMORI'S ATTEMPT TO SUBJUGATE THE ARMY. [REDACTED] ADDED THAT HE BELIEVED THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD TO BE ABLE TO CHOOSE HIS ARMY COMMANDER. THE CHOICE, HOWEVER, SHOULD BE FROM AMONG THE ARMY'S TOP THREE OFFICERS, AND NOT FROM THE MOST MEDIOCRE. THE ISSUE WAS NOT ONE OF ARMY ACCEPTANCE OF CIVILIAN AUTHORITY, BUT RATHER ONE OF EXCESSIVE POLITIZATION OF THE ENTIRE ARMY. OFFICERS TODAY KNEW THAT ADVANCEMENT DEPENDED ON ONE'S TIES TO MONTESINOS AND ASSOCIATES, RATHER THAN UPON MERIT.

5. THE ASSAULT ON THE ARMY INSTITUTION HAD BEGUN UNDER PRESIDENT GARCIA. GARCIA'S TACTIC WAS TO ENTICE GENERALS INTO CORRUPT ACTIVITIES AND THEN BLACKMAIL THEM. FUJIMORI, OF COURSE, HAD GONE MUCH FURTHER: FIRING SENIOR OFFICERS OR SENDING THEM ABROAD; PROMOTING FLUNKIES;

Current Class: [REDACTED]

Page: 2

Current Class: [REDACTED]  
 Current Handling: EXDIS  
 Document Number: 1993LIMA05862

Page: 3

Channel: n/a

INCREASING PRESIDENTIAL CONTROL OVER ALL ARMY ASSIGNMENTS AND PROMOTIONS; AND TURNING THE SIN AND ARMY INTELLIGENCE INTO A "GESTAPO" TO INTIMIDATE OFFICERS FROM RESISTANCE.

6. THAT SAID, THERE WAS ORGANIZED RESISTANCE.

PAGE 04 LIMA 05862 01 OF 03 221917Z  
 THE CLANDESTINE OFFICER GROUP "COMACA" (GROUP OF COMANDANTES - LTC., MAJORS, AND CAPTAINS) HAD BEGUN UNDER GARCIA. [REDACTED] HE HAD NO FORMAL ASSOCIATION WITH COMACA, BUT THAT ITS MEMBERS SOUGHT HIM OUT PERIODICALLY, AS DID MANY OTHER ARMY OFFICERS. HE BELIEVED THAT COMACA HAD GROWN SUBSTANTIALLY SINCE DECEMBER 1992, DUE TO THE MISTREATMENT BY THE GOP OF GEN. SALINAS AND HIS COUP PLOTTERS. NOW THERE WERE COMACA

B1, 1.5(D)

NNNN

PAGE 01 LIMA 05862 02 OF 03 221921Z  
 ACTION SS-00

INFO LOG-00 OASY-00 ADS-00 CORE-00 /000W  
 -----C2BBC2 221921Z /38

O 221914Z MAY 93  
 FM AMEMBASSY LIMA  
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8576  
 INFO DIA WASHDC  
 CIA WASHDC  
 AMEMBASSY CARACAS  
 USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM

[REDACTED] SECTION 02 OF 03 LIMA 05862

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
 TAGS: PGOV, PINR, PHUM, US, PE  
 SUBJECT: RETIRED GENERAL ON PLOTTING IN THE CELLS IN THE NAVY, AND EFFORTS TO ORGANIZE THEM

Current Class: [REDACTED]

Page: 3

Current Class: [REDACTED]  
 Current Handling: EXDIS  
 Document Number: 1993LIMA05862

Page: 4

Channel: n/a

IN THE AIR FORCE. HE DID NOT KNOW, AND DID NOT WANT TO KNOW, HOW MANY OFFICERS WERE IN COMACA, BUT SAID HE HAD BEEN SURPRISED TO HEAR HOW MANY ARMY BASES REPORTEDLY HAD COMACA MEMBERS. SUCH GROWTH WAS REMARKABLE GIVEN THE SIN'S AND ARMY'S EFFORTS TO PENETRATE THE GROUP AND TO ROOT IT OUT.

7. [REDACTED] COMACA HAD ASKED HIM TO ASSUME [REDACTED]  
 [REDACTED]

B1, 1.5(D)

PAGE 02 LIMA 05862 02 OF 03 221921Z  
 A LEADERSHIP ROLE AGAINST HERMOZA. HE HAD DECLINED, AND SUGGESTED COMACA INSTEAD SEEK SOME ACTIVE DUTY GENERAL, "BUT ROBLES DID NOT WORK OUT THE WAY THEY HAD HOPED." [REDACTED] SAID HE HAD NOT SPOKEN WITH COMACA MEMBERS SINCE THE APRIL 21 "TANCAZO." THEY HAD, HOWEVER, INSISTED THAT IF HERMOZA AND MONTESINOS DID NOT RESIGN, COMACA WOULD ELIMINATE THEM. [REDACTED] DISAGREED TOTALLY THAT ASSASSINATION WAS APPROPRIATE OR HELPFUL. HE DID, HOWEVER, TAKE THE COMACA THREAT SERIOUSLY. HERMOZA AND MONTESINOS WERE PUSHING COMACA TOWARDS MORE EXTREME BEHAVIOR.

8. REGARDING ROBLES, [REDACTED] SAID HE HAD NOT BEEN IN TOUCH WITH HIM BEFORE HE REQUESTED ASYLUM IN THE U.S. EMBASSY. HE HAD DISLIKED ROBLES' MENTIONING OF INDIVIDUAL OFFICERS' NAMES IN HIS STATEMENT. [REDACTED] SAID ROBLES HAD ALWAYS BEEN BETTER BEHIND A DESK THAN AS A COMMANDER. HE WAS, HOWEVER, HONEST. [REDACTED] SAID IT WAS HERMOZA, MORE THAN ANY OTHER PERSON, WHO HAD PUSHED ROBLES TOWARDS HIS ASYLUM REQUEST. HIS READING OF ROBLES' ACTIONS WAS THAT ROBLES HAD USED HIS TWO ARMY OFFICER SONS AS CONDUITS TO COMACA OFFICERS (WHO OTHERWISE WOULD HAVE HAD A HARD TIME APPROACHING ROBLES WITHOUT DETECTION). ROBLES THEN MIGHT HAVE TOLD MILITARY JUDGE GEN. PICON, TO UNDERSCORE THE VALIDITY OF HIS INFORMATION ON LA CANTUTA, THAT IT HAD COME THROUGH HIS SONS. ONCE PICON BETRAYED ROBLES TO HERMOZA, ROBLES REALIZED HE [REDACTED]  
 [REDACTED]

B1, 1.5(D)

PAGE 03 LIMA 05862 02 OF 03 221921Z

Current Class: [REDACTED]

Page: 4

Current Class: [REDACTED]  
 Current Handling: EXDIS  
 Document Number: 1993LIMA05862

Channel: n/a

HAD JEOPARDIZED HIS SONS. THAT WOULD EXPLAIN ROBLES' HASTY DECISION TO PROTECT HIS SONS THROUGH ASYLUM.

9. RESPONDING TO QUESTIONS ABOUT HOW ARMY OFFICERS VIEWED THE TANCAZO, THE ROBLES AFFAIR, AND POSSIBLE CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION OF LA CANTUTA, [REDACTED] SEVERAL INSIGHTS:

B1, 1.5(D)

-- FIRST, GEN. HERMOZA'S APRIL 23 COMMUNIQUE AND DISPLAY OF TANKS WAS, TO AN ARMY OFFICER, AS MUCH AN ADMISSION OF GUILT AS IT WAS A WARNING TO CONGRESS. IT DID NOT BOOST HERMOZA'S PRESTIGE IN THE OFFICER CORPS. [REDACTED] AGREED WITH THOSE WHO SAY THAT THE COMMUNIQUE AND TANCAZO HAD BEEN APPROVED BY FUJIMORI -- HERMOZA WOULD NEVER HAVE DARED DO IT ON HIS OWN.)

-- SECOND, WHILE NO ONE WOULD CRY OVER DEAD TERRORISTS, THE WAY THAT THE SIN/ARMY GROUP HAD CARRIED OUT THE DISAPPEARANCES HAD LEFT NO DOUBTS THAT THE ARMY HAD BEEN RESPONSIBLE, AND HENCE THE DEATH SQUAD HAD DAMAGED THE ARMY'S IMAGE.

-- THIRD, [REDACTED] DISMISSED AS ABSURD THE GOP'S CONTENTION THAT A CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION, INCLUDING SUMMONING LOWER-RANKING OFFICERS TO TESTIFY, WOULD BREAK ARMY MORALE, HURT THE COUNTER-INSURGENCY EFFORT, INCREASE HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS, OR LEAD TO CALLS FOR A

PAGE 04 LIMA 05862 02 OF 03 221921Z  
 CONFRONTATION AGAINST CONGRESS. OFFICERS KNEW THAT IN THESE SITUATIONS, THE COMMANDING OFFICER HAD TO ACKNOWLEDGE RESPONSIBILITY, STEPPING DOWN IF NECESSARY. FULL CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION, [REDACTED] WAS A PROBLEM ONLY FOR HERMOZA AND HIS FRIENDS -- NOT FOR THE ARMY.

B1, 1.5(D)

-- FINALLY, SHOULD THE GOP ONLY PUNISH SEVERAL LOWER-RANKING OFFICERS FOR THE CRIME, THE RESULT WOULD BE TO INCREASE TENSIONS IN THE ARMY, SINCE HERMOZA WOULD BE SEEN AS GUILTY OF COWARDICE.

Current Class: [REDACTED]

Page: 5

Current Class: [REDACTED]  
 Current Handling: EXDIS  
 Document Number: 1993LIMA05862

Page: 6

Channel: n/a

NNNN

[REDACTED]  
 PAGE 01 LIMA 05862 03 OF 03 221922Z  
 ACTION SS-00

INFO LOG-00 OASY-00 ADS-00 CORE-00 /000W  
 -----C2BBC8 221922Z /38

O 221914Z MAY 93  
 FM AMEMBASSY LIMA  
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8577  
 INFO DIA WASHDC  
 CIA WASHDC  
 AMEMBASSY CARACAS  
 USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM

[REDACTED] SECTION 03 OF 03 LIMA 05862

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
 TAGS: PGOV, PINR, PHUM, US, PE  
 SUBJECT: RETIRED GENERAL ON PLOTTING IN THE

10. [REDACTED] HE BELIEVED -- HE HINTED HE  
 HAD INSIDE INFORMATION -- THAT THE PRESIDENT WAS  
 CONSIDERING REMOVING HERMOZA ON INDEPENDENCE DAY  
 (JULY 28). TO AVOID EMBARRASSMENT, FUJIMORI  
 WOULD ALSO CHANGE THE HEADS OF THE NAVY AND AIR  
 FORCE. THE AIR FORCE COMMANDER WOULD THEN  
 REPLACE MALCA AS DEFENSE MINISTER, AND INTERIOR  
 MINISTER BRIONES WOULD BECOME ARMY COMMANDER.  
 ANOTHER POSSIBILITY WAS TO ASSIGN FIRST MILITARY

B1, 1.5(D)

PAGE 02 LIMA 05862 03 OF 03 221922Z  
 REGION COMMANDER HOWARD RODRIGUEZ AS ARMY  
 COMMANDER, BUT [REDACTED] AGREED THAT RODRIGUEZ  
 COULD PROVE HARDER TO MANIPULATE THAN A KNOWN  
 QUANTITY LIKE BRIONES. THE REAL LONGTERM  
 SOLUTION, BUT UNLIKELY TO HAPPEN, WAS TO HAVE  
 MONTESINOS STEP DOWN AS WELL.

11. NOTING HE WAS AN ARDENT NATIONALIST AND IN  
 PRINCIPLE AGAINST FOREIGN INTERVENTION IN PERU,  
 [REDACTED] UNFORTUNATELY THE ONLY ANSWER

B1, 1.5(D)

Current Class: [REDACTED]

Page: 6

Current Class: [REDACTED]  
 Current Handling: EXDIS  
 Document Number: 1993LIMA05862

Page: 7

Channel: n/a

WAS FOR THE U.S. TO USE ITS INFLUENCE TO RESTRAIN FUJIMORI. THE PRESIDENT WOULD NOT LISTEN TO ANYONE ELSE IN PERU, HE DECLARED.

12. COMMENT: [REDACTED] REMAINS PLUGGED INTO THE ARMY OFFICER CORPS, AND WE SEE NO REASON TO DOUBT HIS CLAIMS OF CONTACTS WITH COMACA. IN CONTRAST TO ROBLES, HE CAME ACROSS AS SERIOUS AND CONCERNED ABOVE ALL ABOUT THE ARMY INSTITUTION. [REDACTED]

B1, 1.5(D)

13. TWO ELEMENTS STAND OUT IN [REDACTED] ANALYSIS. FIRST IS THE THREAT OF VIOLENT COMACA ACTIONS AGAINST THE ARMY LEADERSHIP OR MONTESINOS. WE HAD HEARD THIS POSSIBILITY BEFORE FROM A SEPARATE ACTIVE DUTY ARMY SOURCE. SECOND IS [REDACTED] JUDGMENT THAT A FULL CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION OF LA CANTUTA, INCLUDING THE CROSS-EXAMINATION OF JUNIOR OFFICER AND ENLISTED PERSONNEL, WOULD NOT

B1, 1.5(D)

PAGE 03 LIMA 05862 03 OF 03 221922Z  
 PROVOKE A NEGATIVE RESPONSE FROM THE ARMY RANK-AND-FILE. THAT, OF COURSE, CONTRADICTS THE GOP'S EXCUSE FOR TRYING TO AVOID A FULL CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION THAT WOULD LIKELY FIND HERMOZA AND MONTESINOS AT LEAST POLITICALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DISAPPEARANCES. [REDACTED]  
 VIEWS ON U.S. INTERVENTION AS AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT IN CURBING FUJIMORI'S AUTHORITARIAN INSTINCTS IS ESPECIALLY NOTEWORTHY, GIVEN HIS STRONG NATIONALIST CREDENTIALS.  
 BRAYSHAW##

NNNN

Current Class: [REDACTED]

Page: 7