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VOLUME I
The assassination of Colombian presidential hopeful Luis Carlos Galán
by the Medellín drug cartel in August 1989 led Colombian president
Virgilio Barco to impose emergency security measures on the country, and
the U.S. to announce that it might consider the deployment of military
forces to assist Colombia in the war on drugs.(9)
While this act is still considered by many to have been the catalyst for
the first Bush administration’s Andean Initiative, it is clear that even
before the Galán killing the U.S. was preparing to augment its military
commitment to the Andean region.
There was no shortage of reasons why Congress wanted
to get the military more involved in the Andean drug war, but the primary
justification was that the U.S.-supported counterdrug programs then in
operation were not only ineffective, but also increasingly dangerous.
In July 1986, under pressure to meet U.S.-imposed counternarcotics targets,
Bolivia hosted the first major U.S. military commitment to the drug war.
That operation – dubbed “Blast Furnace” – involved the use of six U.S.
Black Hawk helicopters and their support personnel to ferry Bolivian police
during raids on cocaine processing laboratories.(10)
Later, a similar mission, “Operation Snowcap,” deployed U.S. Army Special
Forces and DEA personnel to provide paramilitary training, law enforcement
planning, intelligence and advisory support for counterdrug raids on cocaine
processing labs and airstrips in Bolivia, Peru and Ecuador. U.S.
military personnel were confined to their bases, however, where they trained
host country forces to take on joint operations with DEA agents.
Operation Snowcap was suspended in February 1989 after the House Foreign
Affairs Committee found that the DEA was dramatically unprepared for its
frequent and violent encounters with Peru’s Shining Path guerrillas, who
often overwhelmed the lightly armed law enforcement agents.(11)
The State Department’s inspector general issued a scathing critique of
the agency’s counterdrug programs, finding that these programs had “not
resulted in significant reductions of coca cultivation or the disruption
of cocaine trafficking in the host countries,” and that DEA, “an agency
which does not have military expertise,” was being asked to execute “paramilitary
operations.” DEA officials found themselves coordinating “military
air assault operations” in Peru’s Upper Huallaga Valley, a task for which
its agents had no expertise, and in any case were not authorized to be
doing.
To some, the answer was to get military forces to
take over from DEA agents the more combat-oriented aspects of the counterdrug
mission. As a State Department counterdrug strategy paper put it
in June 1989: “Our goal should be a steady withdrawal of DEA from such
a role as military and economic assistance allows local [military] forces
to take up these tasks.”(12) The debate
over whether to rely primarily on police or military forces in the war
on drugs continued throughout the 1990s but in recent years U.S. policymakers
have increasingly come to favor the participation of regular military units.
This process whereby U.S. military advisors would
prepare host nation security forces to take over the most dangerous of
drug war operations got a boost with the issuance of National Security
Directive 13 on June 7, 1989. Among other things, the directive resulted
in the deployment of approximately 20 U.S. Army Special Forces troops to
Peru to train the police in paramilitary tactics for use against guerrillas
and drug traffickers.(13)
But while Peru and Bolivia were the central focus
in the early days of the drug war, the Andean Strategy developed largely
in response to events on the ground in Colombia. An influential March
1988 cable from U.S. Ambassador Charles Gillespie set off alarm bells in
Washington, warning of escalating levels of violence from guerrilla groups
and drug cartels, and the seeming inability of the Colombian security forces
to do anything about it.(14) These concerns
about the internal threat to Colombian stability triggered an interagency
review of Colombia policy, coordinated by the National Security Council.(15)
The result of this process – President Bush’s Andean
Strategy – was already set to go by the time Galán was killed on
August 18, 1989. Three days later, the president ordered dramatically
escalated levels of military, intelligence, law enforcement and economic
assistance for Colombia, Peru and Bolivia with the promulgation of National
Security Directive 18, “International Counternarcotics Strategy.”
Bush also ordered a special $65 million drawdown(16)
of Department of Defense articles and other assistance to support the Colombian
military even while the details of the Andean Initiative were still being
hammered out. At the same time, it was announced that up to 100 U.S.
troops would be dispatched to Colombia to advise and assist Colombian security
forces in counternarcotics techniques, and that DEA agents would resume
counterdrug operations in Peru that had been suspended in February.(17)
The documents included in this package offer useful
insight into how far the first Bush administration was willing to go to
address the priorities of its drug war allies, even when it meant offering
implicit support for their counterinsurgency programs. Indeed, these
documents – which at times read like the statements of current Bush administration
officials – illustrate conclusively that the militarization of the drug
war that gained momentum in 1989 was spurred as much by concerns over the
guerrillas as it was by U.S. counternarcotics objectives. U.S. officials
– unwilling to devote significant numbers of American soldiers to the fight
– were well aware that Colombia and other Andean governments would commit
their military forces to the drug war only to the extent that such aid
might also help them suppress insurgent groups. Now more than a decade
later, the United States is poised to commit itself to this arrangement
without reservation.
Note: The following documents are in PDF format.
You will need to download and install the free Adobe
Acrobat Reader to view.
| Document
1 |
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U.S. Embassy Colombia cable, “Government Reacts to Continued
Guerrilla Violence,” February 22, 1988, Confidential, 4 pp. |
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Source: Freedom of Information Act Release to the National
Security Archive |
Ambassador Charles Gillespie’s concerns about escalating guerrilla
violence in Colombia are reflected in this cable, reporting the death of
“the highest ranking officer to have fallen in counterinsurgency operations”
and “an extraordinary meeting of the [Colombian] National Security Council
to discuss guerrilla violence.” Despite their efforts, Colombian
government sources report “little success in arresting guerrilla violence”
and are increasingly concerned that political parties sympathetic to the
guerrillas will do well in upcoming municipal elections and thus “legitimize
de facto guerrilla control of large tracts of border territory.”
Summing up, Gillespie laments that the Colombian armed forces are “stuck
in a reactive mode in their counterinsurgency operations … reflecting the
absence of a national strategy or framework.” Ambassador Myles Frechette
voiced similar complaints about Colombia’s lack of a coherent anti-guerrilla
strategy in 1997 (See Document 51).
| Document
2 |
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Document 2: Frank E. White, Chief, OTDS, “Operation Snowcap,”
March 8, 1988, Classification Unknown, 12 pp. |
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Source: Freedom of Information Act Release to the National
Security Archive |
In this impassioned report, the DEA’s Frank White warns that
agents deployed in the Andes as part of Operation Snowcap “are going to
agonize along through an excruciating death on an isolated jungle floor”
unless the agency radically alters its “tactical approach” to the mission
– primarily the destruction of clandestine drug labs and airstrips in Peru,
Bolivia and Ecuador.
DEA “crossed the line,” he argues, “when Snowcap
agents stated to wear camouflage jungle uniforms, and jump our of Huey
helicopters, carrying M-16 rifles.” Its agents, “with almost no training
themselves,” are leading foreign troops on paramilitary style assault missions.
White recommends a variety of measures including more powerful and sophisticated
weaponry, and advanced training for raids, airmobile operations and in
counter-ambush techniques.
| Document
3 |
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U.S. Embassy Colombia cable, “Murtha and Marsh Visit Concentrates
on Narco Power and Insurgency,” May 24, 1988, Confidential, 10 pp. |
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Source: Freedom of Information Act Release to the National
Security Archive |
During meetings with U.S. Congressman John P. Murtha and Army
Secretary John O. Marsh, the Colombian president, defense minister and
other officials emphasize the difficulties involved in battling “a virile
narco-insurgency” with their currently “undersourced” security forces.
The objective of the visit reported in this cable is to determine “how
the United States might be able to help.”
Rep. Murtha tells President Barco that the U.S. public
is frustrated by the lack of progress in the drug war, urging him to stress
narcotics issues in his upcoming meetings with U.S. congressional leaders.
Barco agrees, adding that “the guerrilla issue is too complicated to explain.”
U.S. Ambassador Gillespie then offers to share with Barco “the embassy’s
analysis of the connections between the insurgency and the traffickers.”
Barco later promises to stress to U.S. officials how the narcotics trade
“is aided and abetted by the guerrillas and what the military/police capability
is to confront both.”
In a separate meeting, Colombian defense minister
Gen. Rafael Samudio emphasizes that “the guerrilla is the traditional enemy
of the military,” but says that resources for the struggle are limited
by counterdrug obligations. Colombia, he adds, cannot afford to neglect
either problem. But he is perplexed by the inability of the U.S.
to provide financing for equipment that would be used to fight insurgents
and traffickers alike “since the former are a part of the narcotics industry”
in Colombia.
In reference to the development of the Andean Initiative,
Murtha and Marsh tell the Colombians that they expect Congress to approve
as much as $600 million to “bring the U.S. military into the anti-narcotics
fight.”
| Document
4 |
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U.S. Department of State, Office of Inspector General, “Report
of Audit: International Narcotics Control Programs in Peru and Bolivia,”
March 1989, Unclassified, 35 pp. |
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Source: Freedom of Information Act Release to the National
Security Archive |
State Department Inspector General Sherman Funk’s assessment
“addresses the potentially dangerous paramilitary operations” funded by
State Department anti-narcotics programs in Peru and Bolivia (Colombia
was excluded from the study for “security reasons”).
Like the DEA’s Frank White (See Document
2) Funk finds that the DEA, “an agency which does not have military
expertise, is charged with conducting INM-funded(18)
paramilitary operations.” In Peru and Bolivia these operations occur
in “dangerous, high-risk areas,” where DEA and contractor personnel are
subject to “frequent attacks by drug traffickers, violent resistance by
growers whose coca crops were threatened with eradication, and terrorist
activity by insurgents.” Funk also finds that DEA agents are “coordinating
the military air assault operations” of Peruvian troops.
Although Congress may want DOD to become more closely
engaged in the drug war, Funk warns that the Pentagon “is extremely reluctant”
to do so, adding that a U.S. military advisory and training mission “will
be reminiscent to many of the early U.S. involvement in Vietnam.”
| Document
5 |
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John R. Hamilton, Assistant Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S.
Embassy Peru, Memorandum to the Files, “Summary of Meetings with Study
Commission from the Office of National Drug Control Policy,” March 31,
1989, Confidential, 7 pp. |
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Source: Freedom of Information Act Release to the National
Security Archive |
This document is a record of meetings between embassy staffers
in Peru and a special commission of foreign affairs experts designated
by “Drug Czar” William Bennett to issue recommendations to the National
Security Council on counterdrug programs in the Andean region.
The embassy’s Narcotics Affairs Unit (NAU) briefs
the team on the increasing power of the Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path)
guerrilla group in Peru’s Upper Huallaga Valley (UHV), describing their
“growing involvement in narcotics trade.” The NAU director explains
that State Department helicopters “do not engage in counter-insurgency
operations,” but do periodically “evacuate dead and wounded members of
the Peruvian security forces.”
The embassy’s defense attaché and military
advisor then brief the team on the state of the Peruvian security forces.
The Peruvian military, they note, views counternarcotics operations “as
a subset of the larger subversion problem,” but are increasingly unable
and unwilling to take on either threat. The two U.S. military officials
stress that the armed forces lack resources and are “not aggressive in
counterinsurgency.”
| Document
6 |
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State Department draft report, “Cocaine: A Supply Side Problem,”
April 25, 1989, Confidential, 4 pp. |
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Source: Freedom of Information Act Release to the National
Security Archive |
Written by Edward Vazquez of the State Department’s Office
of Andean Affairs, this document is draft copy of the State Department’s
input to a senior-level interagency process – coordinated by the National
Security Council – on a supply-side approach to international drug control.
Many of these ideas were later incorporated into National Security Directives
13 and 18, issued later that year (See Documents 8
and 13).
Recognizing that Andean governments, for political
reasons, were unlikely to permit the direct participation of U.S. military
forces in counterdrug operations, Vazquez suggests that, “The challenge
is to move Andean governments to attack drug trafficking as a direct threat
to the integrity of their countries … to place traffickers on a collision
course with local forces, and ensure that the local forces have the wherewithal
to prevail.”
With respect to military assistance, Vazquez holds
that aid should be distributed without restrictions. “Segregation
and earmarking of assistance funds into smaller lots with greater strings
attached impedes influencing the Andean military.” To support this
position, Vazquez cites the “well-documented” links between traffickers
and insurgents in Peru and Colombia, adding that in Colombia “it often
means attacking drugs by hitting the insurgency.”
| Document
7 |
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State Department cable, “NSC Review of Counter-Narcotics
Operations in Peru,” May 28, 1989, Secret, 3 pp. |
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Source: Freedom of Information Act Release to the National
Security Archive |
| Document
8 |
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National Security Council, National Security Directive 13,
“Cocaine Trafficking,” June 7, 1989, Secret, 2 pp. |
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Source: Freedom of Information Act Release to the National
Security Archive |
The May 28 cable (Document 7) notifies the U.S. Embassy in
Peru of the substance of a presidential National Security Directive to
be issued the following week on U.S. counterdrug programs in the Andes
– the result of a May 25 meeting of the National Security Council chaired
by President Bush. Getting the U.S.-supported interdiction and eradication
programs that had been suspended in February back on track was a key U.S.
objective, and it is clear from a summary of the NSC meeting that the president
was willing to be flexible. The embassy is asked to “ascertain, without
making concrete commitments,” whether Peru would be willing to employ its
military forces against narcotics-related targets in the Upper Huallaga
Valley.
While it is understood that the military is primarily
engaged with the guerrillas, embassy officials are asked to determine whether
“they see their role as one of operating exclusively against [Sendero Luminoso]”
or if they might consider going after traffickers and also “assist the
police and the U.S. in securing anti-drug operations … from guerrilla attack.”
If so, “the U.S. would consider providing additional military assistance.”
The directive itself (Document 8), addressed to heads
of multiple government agencies, contains essentially the same information
as the May 28 cable but does not include any specific reference to counterinsurgency
operations.
| Document
9 |
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State Department draft report, “NSC Options for Narcotics
Control in the Andes,” June 2, 1989, Secret, 6 pp. |
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Source: Freedom of Information Act Release to the National
Security Archive |
By early June, the State Department had moved beyond the scope
of earlier drafts and had developed a list of policy options for consideration
by the National Security Council interagency group charged with devising
the president’s supply-side counternarcotics strategy for the Andes.
The document makes a number of concrete proposals
for crop eradication, narcotics interdiction and other programs, including
three options for military involvement, varying in the degree to which
each would permit the use of U.S. military assistance for counterinsurgency
operations. One option would, “Recognize the interlinked nature of
narcotics trafficking and insurgent groups … to allow the Andean military
to devote significant personnel and equipment toward counter-insurgency
operations.” Another possibility would be to limit such assistance
to counternarcotics programs, while the middle option would, “Encourage
the inter-operability of regional counter-insurgency and counter-narcotics
forces.”
| Document
10 |
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State Department draft report, “Cocaine: A Supply Side Strategy,”
June 15, 1989, Secret, 7 pp. |
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Source: Freedom of Information Act Release to the National
Security Archive |
This document is similar in substance to the April 25 draft
report of the same name (Document 6).
Like the April document, this report lists a number of indicators that
will be used to gauge the success of counternarcotics programs, including
“the relative prices of the raw materials of the industry, hectarage eradicated,
and ultimately the availability of cocaine in the United States.”
Policymakers envision an economic component that would “adopt the model
of the Structural Adjustment Program” in which money would be disbursed
“as targets (e.g. hectarage eradicated) were met.” It is believed
that such a scheme would “encourage serious action” and be “powerful spurs
for desperately poor countries to mobilize the political will necessary
to confront drug traffickers.”
The document notes that Colombian and Peruvian guerrillas
are directly involved in the narcotics trade, protecting crops and otherwise
threatening to undermine counterdrug operations. Increased military
assistance is to be a key component of the program, but “will have to be
carefully monitored to ensure that it is used consistent with anti-narcotics
goals, and that it does not contribute to increased human rights violations.”
DEA forces, previously engaged in “para-military conflict,” are to be withdrawn
from this role “as military and economic assistance allows local forces
to take up these tasks.”
| Document
11 |
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National Security Council, Interagency Working Group Draft,
“Strategy for Narcotics Control in the Andean Region,” June 30, 1989, Secret,
19 pp. |
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Source: Freedom of Information Act Release to the National
Security Archive |
On June 30, 1989, an interagency working group of the National
Security Council met to draft a paper proposing specific options for the
president concerning the proposed enhancement of supply-side counternarcotics
strategy in the Andes, building on earlier drafts from the State Department
and including input from other government agencies.
By way of background, the paper notes that the narcotics
trade, economic instability and insurgency movements all threaten to weaken
democracy in the Andes, concluding that to ignore any one of these problems
is to invite failure:
Better counternarcotics operations require the military
to deal with insurgents; better law enforcement and counterinsurgency efforts
require better intelligence; successful counternarcotics and counterinsurgency
operations require economic assistance to offset lost narcotics dollars…
The remainder of the paper presents the pros and cons
of alternative aid package proposals, ranging from enhancements in a single
country only (Colombia, Peru or Bolivia) to a comprehensive regional strategy
that would also include “potential coca producing countries.” According
to the paper, Option III, the “Comprehensive Anti-Cocaine Strategy for
the Andean Region” – the option that most closely resembles the one approved
by the president – “has the corollary benefit of helping democratic governments
fight growing insurgent movements,” but “could have human rights implications.”
Another decision addressed by the paper, whether
to authorize the deployment of U.S. military personnel in an “active operational
support role for host country counternarcotics and counterinsurgency efforts”
was apparently not approved by the president. Nevertheless, it is
interesting to note that among the pros cited for this option is that it
would help “link our interests (CN) [counternarcotics] with theirs (CI)
[counterinsurgency],” leaving little doubt as to what U.S. policymakers
expected Andean military forces would most like to do with the training
and equipment provided by the U.S.
Indeed, the country summaries included as Annex III
to this paper state clearly that in the cases of Colombia and Peru the
armed forces see their primary mission as counterinsurgency. At best,
it seems, the NSC working group expects Colombia to conduct combined “narco-insurgent
operations,” and hopes that support for the Peruvian military will, “Encourage
the inter-operability of counter-insurgency and counter-narcotics forces.”
| Document
12 |
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State Department briefing memorandum, Melvyn Levitsky, Bureau
of International Narcotics Matters (INM) to Robert Kimmitt, Under Secretary
for Political Affairs (P), “NSC Deputies Committee Meeting on Enhancing
Anti-Narcotics Efforts in the Andean Region,” July 7, 1989, White House
Situation Room, 10:00 AM, Secret, 4 pp. |
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Source: Freedom of Information Act Release to the National
Security Archive |
According to this short strategy paper for the State Department’s
Under Secretary for Political Affairs, Robert Kimmitt, it is the State
Department’s preference that supply-side counterdrug programs in the Andes
“should be regional” rather than country-by-country to ensure that traffickers
do not simply relocate their operations. With respect to military
assistance, Kimmitt is to stress to the other NSC deputies that “military
assistance will go toward two uses: narco-insurgents and traffickers.”
| Document
13 |
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National Security Council, National Security Directive 18,
“International Counternarcotics Strategy,” August 21, 1989, Secret, 6 pp. |
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Source: Freedom of Information Act Release to the National
Security Archive |
The program finally approved by President Bush was outlined
in National Security Directive 18, a strategy focused primarily on Colombia
but also including significant allocations for Peru and Bolivia.
“These programs,” according to the document, “will involve expanded assistance
to indigenous police, military, and intelligence officials … for the purpose
of assisting them to regain control of their countries from an insidious
combination of insurgents and drug traffickers.”
The president orders the Secretary of Defense to
revise directives and procedures to “expand DOD support of U.S. counternarcotics
efforts and to conduct training for host government personnel and operational
support activities anywhere in the Andean region” short of conducting “actual
field operations.” According to the directive’s secret annex, “common
features” of counterdrug programs in each country should include, “Increased
military assistance to neutralize guerrilla support for trafficking.”
| Document
14 |
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U.S. Embassy Peru cable, “Washington Interagency Comments
on Narcotics Implementation Plan for Peru,” October 21, 1989, Secret, 8
pp. |
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Source: Freedom of Information Act Release to the National
Security Archive |
This cable is, according to its author, “a reader’s guide”
to the Peruvian embassy’s plan to implement the Andean Strategy – outlined
in National Security Directive 18 (See Document 13)
– highlighting changes suggested by a Washington interagency team.
The text provides a candid summary of how embassy officials expect resources
provided under the counternarcotics initiative will be used by Peruvian
security forces.
The cable declares in no uncertain terms that the
lion’s share of aid provided to the Peruvian armed forces will support
counterinsurgency operations. The embassy characterizes the counterdrug
program as a “deal” struck with the Peruvian government to “help them solve
their number one problem, which is subversion,” in exchange for their efforts
in support of U.S. counternarcotics goals. “The program is
repeat is an anti-subversive program” [emphasis added].
With respect to human rights and end-use limitations,
embassy officials are confident they can keep tabs on military operations,
“in spite of restrictions on the presence of U.S. personnel in combat zones.”
However, the embassy adds that enforcing violations by Peruvian security
forces may be problematic, warning that “as soon as the money for Peruvian
high priority [i.e. counterguerrilla] programs stops so do the counter-narcotics
efforts.”
| Document
15 |
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National Security Council discussion paper, “Andean Drug
Summit,” November 1, 1989, Secret, 8 pp. |
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Source: Freedom of Information Act Release to the National
Security Archive |
This discussion paper was circulated in preparation for a meeting
of the Deputies Committee of the National Security Council in which participants
were to discuss U.S. objectives at the proposed Andean drug summit, involving
the presidents of Colombia, Peru, Bolivia and the United States.
With respect to guerrilla groups, the paper notes
that successful counterdrug operations will require host governments “to
provide security against the ability of insurgent movements to disrupt
their efforts.” Colombia and Peru in particular “will want to use
our assistance, at least in part, to deal with such threats.” Support
for counterinsurgency operations raises other issues, however, and the
NSC “will need to discuss the guidelines for such cooperation, particularly
in the area of human rights.”
| Document
16 |
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State Department cable, “Discussion with President Garcia
on the Andean Summit,” December 8, 1989, Confidential, 8 pp. |
|
Source: Freedom of Information Act Release to the National
Security Archive |
In this cable the State Department lists a number of issues
it would like Ambassador Anthony Quainton to raise with President Alan
Garcia of Peru. Among other things, Quainton is to tell Garcia that
the Andean aid package and the upcoming summit offer “a unique chance …
to fundamentally restructure” the U.S.-Peru relationship.
While the U.S. recognizes that Peru’s “highest priority”
is to defeat the Sendero Luminoso guerrillas and “not narcotics trafficking,”
the U.S. feels “there is significant overlap” in the two objectives.
The ambassador is to explain to Garcia that, “In coca producing areas where
Sendero Luminoso is active, we can provide assistance to both the police
and the military.”
However, Washington is also wary of links between
narcotics traffickers and the very security forces they propose to fund.
Quainton is asked to tell Garcia that the U.S. finds “very disturbing”
reports of “military cooperation with narcotics traffickers, together with
widely reported human rights violations.” Adding that, “We cannot
support the military if the military is aiding traffickers.”
Notes
9. Ethan Bronner, “US aide talks of troop help
for Colombia,” The Baltimore Sun, August 21, 1989, p. 1.
10. CIA Directorate of Intelligence, “Beyond
Operation Blast Furnace: Bolivia’s Struggle Against Narcotics,” February
1988, FOIA release to the National Security Archive.
11. United States Congress, House of Representatives,
Committee on Foreign Affairs, “U.S. Narcotics Control Programs in Peru,
Bolivia, Colombia and Mexico: An Update,” February 1989, p. 4.
12. State Department paper, “Cocaine: A Supply
Side Strategy,” June 15, 1989, see Document 10.
13. Kevin Noble, “U.S. Troop Presence Small but
Growing in South America's Cocaine Wars,” Associated Press, September 14,
1989.
14. The author does not possess a copy of this
cable, but would be pleased to learn about the existence of a declassified
version.
15. Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict,
“The Andean Strategy – Its Development and Implementation: Where We are
Now and Where We Should be Going,” September 15, 1991.
16. Under the authority of Section 506(A) of
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.
17. Michael Isikoff, “Up to 100 Military Advisers
To Be Sent to Colombia; DEA Agents to Resume Attacks in Peru,” The Washington
Post, September 1, 1989, p. A1; An agreement on a military assistance
package for Peru was not reached until May 1991, largely because of Peruvian
domestic concerns about militarizing the drug war. But the aid was
also held up by the newly inaugurated President Alberto Fujimori in 1990
who called the narrow focus on combating drug trafficking “inconvenient
for our interests.” See Eugene Robinson, “U.S. Drug Effort Runs Into
Latin Resistance,” The Washington Post, September 14, 1990.
18. INM is the State Department’s Bureau for
International Narcotics Matters, now called the Bureau for International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Matters (INL).
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