Today, October 16, 2002, the National Security Archive publishes
on the Web a comprehensive documentary history of U.S. aerial
espionage in the Cold War and beyond. This publication comes
40 years to the day after CIA analysts briefed President John
F. Kennedy on what is probably the most famous overhead reconnaissance
photograph of all time. The
image - snapped from 70,000 feet by a U-2 reconnaissance
aircraft - proved conclusively that the Soviet Union was installing
medium-range ballistic missiles in Cuba, touching off the
most dangerous episode of the Cold War: The Cuban Missile
Crisis.
This Electronic Briefing Book includes 50 declassified documents
from the CIA, the White House, the Department of Defense and
other agencies, tracing the bureaucratic turf battles and
intelligence requirements that shaped the development of America's
aerial reconnaissance program throughout the Cold War and
into the 21st century.
One of the most significant consequences of the work of the
Wright brothers was the use of aircraft to conduct reconnaissance
of the battlefield during war, and of foreign territories
in peacetime. During World War I aerial reconnaissance played
a significant role in supporting German and British combat
operations, including the Battle of the Somme. In the interwar
years Britain and Germany conducted covert reconnaissance
flights over each other's territories. When World War II came,
the United States, Britain, Germany, and Russia all conducted
extensive aerial reconnaissance operations - some in support
of battlefield operations, others in support of strategic
targeting.(1)
World War II witnessed the introduction of a second type
of aerial reconnaissance. On March 6, 1943, a specially equipped
B-24 overflew the Japanese-held island of Kiska in the Aleutians.
The objective of the mission, which was successful, was to
intercept the emanations of the Japanese radars on the island.(2)
As a result, such flights, known as "ferret" flights,
became commonplace in the southern Pacific.
In the aftermath of the defeat of Germany and Japan, the
United States soon found itself faced with a former ally turned
adversary. That the Soviet Union had suffered massive devastation
during the war did not eliminate it as a potential threat,
given its size and the weakness of any collection of European
nations. Thus, by the late 1940s, the U.S. was employing modified
bombers to try to penetrate the veil of secrecy that had been
established by the Soviet government around activities, particularly
military activities, in the Soviet interior. Most missions
involved peripheral flights near Soviet borders. Oblique photography
allowed aircraft to bring back photos of facilities inside,
but not too far inside, Soviet borders. Electronic reconnaissance
missions brought back signals, which provided data on the
existence of Soviet radars at particular locations, as well
as their technical characteristics (including pulse duration,
pulse repetition, and frequency) that could be used in electronic
warfare operations.(3)
In addition to peripheral missions there were a number of
actual intrusions into Soviet territory - in some cases to
photograph targets that could not be imaged from the periphery,
in other cases to induce the Soviets to turn on radar systems
about which the U.S. was eager to collect intelligence. In
July 1956, the ability of the U.S. to penetrate Soviet territory
in the pursuit of intelligence, particularly photographic
intelligence, took a big step forward when the CIA's U-2 successfully
completed its first missions over the Soviet territory. The
U-2 was not a modified bomber, but had been designed for its
role in overflying Soviet territory. Its virtues included
the ability to fly at over 70,000 feet, which, for several
years, kept it out of harm's way from MiGs and anti-aircraft
missiles.(4)
Less than two years before its first flight over Soviet territory
(there had been reconnaissance missions over Eastern Europe
in the spring), a November 1954 letter from James Killian
and Edwin Land, scientific advisers to President Eisenhower,
had urged Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles to
pursue the development of the exotic spy plane being proposed
by Kelly Johnson of Lockheed. Given Eisenhower's strong support
of the project Dulles established the AQUATONE program to
develop such a plane, and delegated the responsibility for
managing the program to the CIA's Richard Bissell. Bissell's
assistant would be an Air Force general, Osmond Ritland, and
the Air Force would play a major role in the program. It would
soon acquire its own fleet of U-2s for peripheral reconnaissance
and nuclear sampling missions, and, in 1974, assume control
of the CIA U-2s.(5)
Through the end of April 1960, there had been 23 U-2 overflights
of Soviet territory - all successful. However, on May 1, Francis
Gary Powers and his U-2 would be knocked out of the sky by
the shock wave from an anti-aircraft missile that exploded
near his aircraft. The Soviet success in violently terminating
Powers' mission also terminated the use of the U-2 to overfly
the Soviet Union. But the end of Soviet overflights did not
end the U-2s role as a major intelligence collector - overflights
of other nations, including Cuba and Israel, yielded valuable
intelligence while the Air Force continued its employment
of the planes for both peripheral and nuclear sampling missions.(6)
In 1958, well aware that the U-2 could not continue to overfly
the Soviet Union with impunity, and in the absence of any
guarantee that satellite reconnaissance programs would be
successful, President Eisenhower approved CIA plans to build
a successor to the U-2 - one that would fly higher and several
times faster than the U-2. The OXCART program would yield
a exotic-looking aircraft capable of flying at 100,000 feet
at a speed of about Mach 3.1 (2,170) mph. For a variety of
reasons, the plane would not make its first operational flights
until 1967 and the program would be terminated in 1968. It
never flew over Soviet territory due to the success of satellite
reconnaissance programs as well as the unwillingness of U.S.
leaders to take the risks involved in any overflights.(7)
OXCART was terminated in favor of an Air Force modification
- the SR-71. That plane carried a 2-man crew rather than just
a pilot and flew somewhat slower (Mach 3.0) than OXCART -
although it carried a greater variety of sensors. The replacement
of the OXCART with the SR-71 in 1968 was the result of a multi-year
bureaucratic battle involving the CIA, Air Force, National
Reconnaissance Office, and Bureau of the Budget. From 1968
till the termination of the SR-71 program in 1990, the SR-71
would be the most technologically advanced reconnaissance
aircraft operated by the United States. Although there was
significant Congressional pressure to revive the SR-71 program
during the 1990s, that pressure was consistently resisted
by senior Department of Defense officials.(8)
Note: The following documents are in
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Document 1
J.H. Carter, Strategic Reconnaissance,
November 30, 1953, Top Secret, 3 pp.
Source: Donation
This memo, written by J.H. Carter, the Lockheed Corporation's
assistant director for development planning, notes that then
current aircraft would be suitable for aerial reconnaissance
after the outbreak of hostilities. Carter identifies several
fruitful areas for further work, including the production
of sensors that operate outside the visible-light portion
of the electro-magnetic spectrum (e.g. infrared, radar) and
improving the ability to process the "tremendous amount
of raw data collected from all intelligence sources."
In addition, he notes the "urgent need for the development
of a pre-D-Day reconnaissance systems." He reports that
the most practical means of acquiring intelligence about the
Soviet Union would be through overflights and provides some
of the characteristics of the type of aircraft that would
be required - including the ability to fly at extreme altitudes.
Document 2
J.H. Carter, Strategic Reconnaissance
and Intelligence, n.d., Top Secret, 5 pp.
Source: Donation
This memo, from Lockheed assistant director for development
planning J.H. Carter, reviews the background of Air Force
thinking with respect to strategic reconnaissance and intelligence
operations. It analyzes the problems associated with pre D-Day
reconnaissance, and notes two principal categories - broad
area search operations aimed primarily at identifying areas
of unusual activity, and operations designed to gather specific
and detailed information concerning individual target areas.
Carter also observes that thinking among Air Force planners
"is that a specially designed, exceptionally high performance
manned aircraft may be a practical vehicle..."
Document 3
Letter, Edwin Land to Allen Dulles, November
5, 1954 w/att: Memorandum for the Director of Central Intelligence,
Subject: A Unique Opportunity for Comprehensive Intelligence-
A Summary, November 5, 1954, 6 pp.
Source: Dwight D. Eisenhower Library
The letter and memorandum, written in Land's capacity as
chairman of the intelligence committee (Project 3) of President
Dwight D. Eisenhower's Technological Capabilities Panel, urged
a reluctant Director of Central Intelligence, Allen Dulles,
to pursue development of a special high-altitude aircraft
to overfly the Soviet Union and obtain detailed photographs
of Soviet installations. The ultimate result would be a CIA-
Air Force program, first known as AQUATONE by the CIA, that
resulted in the development (by Lockheed's Skunk Works) and
deployment of the U-2 aircraft, which remains in operation
today.
Document 4
United States Air Force and Central Intelligence
Agency, Organization and Delineation of Responsibilities:
Project OILSTONE, August 2, 1955, Top Secret, 3 pp.
Source: Freedom of Information Act Request
In late 1954, President Eisenhower approved the project supported
by Land, assigning the Central Intelligence Agency to take
the lead in overseeing Lockheed's development of what became
the U-2. While the CIA could serve as project manager it required
Air Force support (including the provision of pilots and their
training) and the CIA official charged with supervising the
project had an Air Force deputy. This agreement, signed about
the same time that the first U-2 was being test flown, specified
the division of responsibilities between the two organizations.
OILSTONE was the Air Force designation for the project.
Document 5
Herbert I. Miller, Memorandum for: Project
Director, Subject: Suggestions re Intelligence Value of AQUATONE,
July 17, 1956, Top Secret, 3 pp.
Source: National Archives, CIA 2000 Release.
On July 25, 1955, less than eight months after Lockheed had
been given official approval to begin the project, the first
U-2 aircraft was delivered to the secret Nevada test site
that would become known as Area 51. On July 4, 1956, after
overflights over Eastern European countries, the first U-2
targeted on the Soviet Union photographed Leningrad's naval
shipyards, as well as several major military airfields. The
following day, another mission overflew Moscow as well as
a number of airfields in an attempt to determine the threat
from Bison heavy bombers. The intelligence from these early
U-2 missions would be crucial in eliminating fears of a "bomber
gap."
Three additional flights followed, on July 9 and 10. Also,
on July 10 the Soviet Union, whose radars proved more capable
of detecting the flights than expected by the CIA, filed their
first protest note concerning the intrusions. As a result,
later that day, President Eisenhower ordered a halt to all
overflights until further notice. This memo, by CIA official
Herbert Miller, summarizes the intelligence value of the AQUATONE
flights and argues that the danger to the United States of
stopping the flights was greater than that of continuing them.
Document 6
A.J. Goodpaster, Memorandum for the Record,
June 2, 1960, Top Secret, 1 p.
Source: Dwight D. Eisenhower Library
In 1958, anticipating that the U-2 would have a limited lifespan
in terms of its ability to overfly Soviet territory without
incident, President Eisenhower had approved a new CIA-led
program to develop a successor the U-2. The codename given
to the project - OXCART - was deliberately deceptive, as the
projected successor was to fly not only higher than the U-2
(in the vicinity of 100,000 feet) but far faster - over Mach
3 (2,100 mph) in contrast to the U-2 speed of less than 500
mph. This memo, written a month after the shootdown of Francis
Gary Power's U-2, summarizes Eisenhower's attitude toward
the project. While he approved continuing with the project
he did not consider it a high priority and suggested that
his advisers might conclude that it should be cancelled.
Document 7
Notes on [OXCART], June 3, 1960. Secret,
1 p.
Source: Dwight D. Eisenhower Library
This memo, probably written by Eisenhower aide Andrew Goodpaster,
sets forth some of the issues involving the OXCART project
in the light of the May 1 U-2 incident. It discusses the timing
of the first test flight and operational use, the issue of
vulnerability to air defenses, and basing considerations,
and security requirements.
Document 8
CIA, Situation Estimate for Project CHALICE
- Fiscal Years 1961 and 1962, March 14, 1960. Top Secret,
15 pp.
Source: National Archives, CIA 2000 Release
Despite Eisenhower's concerns about the consequences of a
loss of a U-2 over the Soviet Union, he did approve further
missions after his initial, July 1956, order to halt the flights.
During a 23-day period in August 1957, U-2s conducted Operation
SOFT TOUCH - seven overflights of the Soviet Union and two
of the People's Republic of China.(9) This
activity, particularly with regard to the Soviet Union, was
atypical. Thus, Francis Gary Powers May 1, 1960 overflight
would be the 24th and last of Soviet territory. This situation
estimate, prepared a little less than two months before the
shootdown, was intended to provide "guidance for the
planning and conduct of project operations during the FY1961-62
time period." In addition, it provides a concise history
of the program (which had been renamed CHALICE in place of
AQUATONE) and an assessment of the intelligence desired from
future flights.
Document 9
CIA, Future of the Agency's U-2 Capability,
July 7, 1960, Top Secret, 11 pp.
Source: Dwight D. Eisenhower Library
The May 1, 1960 incident resulted in a halt of U-2 overflights
of Soviet territory. By that time the agency's U-2 program
had conducted overflights of a number of other countries and
areas - including the People's Republic of China, Indonesia,
and the Middle East. It had also been used to conducted peripheral
reconnaissance missions of the Soviet Union. However, this
July 1960 document considered the question of whether the
CIA should maintain a U-2 capability or cede the mission to
the Strategic Air Command, which had been employing U-2s for
nuclear air sampling and peripheral reconnaissance missions.
The study explored a number of issues - including intelligence
requirements, U-2 vulnerability, basing needs, and cover arrangements.
It proposed that the CIA maintain "a greatly reduced
and redeployed U-2 capability." The CIA would, in fact,
continue operating U-2s through 1974, conducting peripheral
reconnaissance missions as well as flights over the PRC, Cuba,
the Middle East, Vietnam, and several other Southeast Asian
nations.
Document 10
CIA, Debriefing of Francis Gary Powers,
February 13, 1962, Top Secret, 31 pp.
Source: National Archives, CIA 1998 Release.
Francis Gary Powers parachuted to earth after his U-2 had
been shot down and was turned over to Soviet authorities.
A well-publicized trial followed and he was sentenced to 10
years "deprivation of liberty," the first three
in a Soviet prison, but was exchanged in 1962 for Soviet spy
Rudolf Abel.(10) Upon return to the United
States, Powers was debriefed extensively. This is one of a
number of transcripts from his debriefing. Among the topics
discussed are the moments before and after a Soviet surface-to-air
missile detonated near his plane, bringing it, and him, down.
Document 11
McGeorge Bundy, National Security Action
Memorandum No. 208, Cuban Overflights, December 6, 1962 w/att:
Guidelines for the Planning of Cuban Overflights, November
30, 1962, Top Secret, 3 pp.
Source: John F. Kennedy Library
An October 14, 1962 U-2 mission provided conclusive proof
that the Soviet Union was deploying medium-range ballistic
missiles to Cuba. That discovery led to the showdown between
the US and USSR over the missiles - which led to a Soviet
pledge to withdraw all the missiles in Cuba. The U.S. carefully
monitored, with U-2s and other intelligence systems, Soviet
implementation of that promise. In NSAM 208, national security
adviser McGeorge Bundy notifies John McCone, the director
of central intelligence, that President Kennedy has approved
the attached memo with regard to overflights of Cuba. The
memo, written about a month after the Soviet pledge, specifies
the type of information needed from continued overflights.
Not surprisingly, the first priority related to the issues
of offensive weapons in Cuba. Other requirements included
intelligence on Soviet activities in Cuba and the general
situation in Cuba. It also expresses a U.S. Government preference
for use of high-altitude (i.e. U-2) overflights rather than
low-altitude flights.
Document 12
J.V. Charyk, Memorandum for the Secretary
of Defense, Subject: Reconnaissance Aircraft, January 13,
1963, Top Secret, 3 pp.
Source: Freedom of Information Act Request
At the time Joseph Charyk wrote this memo he was director
of the National Reconnaissance Office, which had been established
in September 1961 to coordinate the research and development,
production, and operation of satellite and aerial reconnaissance
systems used in overflights of the Soviet Union and other
nations. In his memo, Charyk notes that part of the Air Force's
requirement for future reconnaissance aircraft includes development
an aircraft similar to the CIA's A-12, produced by the OXCART
program. The memo goes on to provide a program plan for development
and procurement of the modified A-12, designated the R-12.
The R-12 would eventually become the SR-71.
Document 13
National Photographic Interpretation
Center, IPIR: Brass Knob Mission 3536, 5 April 1963, April
1963, 20 pp.
Source: National Archives, CIA 2000 Release.
This report provides NPIC's analyses of the imagery returned
from the April 5, 1963 U-2 mission over Cuba ("Brass
Knob"). In keeping with McGeorge Bundy's guidance from
November 30, 1962,a substantial focus of this mission focused
on intermediate- and medium-range ballistic missile sites
that were at the heart of the Cuban Missile Crisis. With respect
to those sites, the NPIC report contains statements such as
"Site appears abandoned. No military activity observed."
The report also contains the analysis of imagery of surface-to-air
missile sites, airfields, ports, and military camps.
Document 14
Letter, Secretary of the Air Force Eugene
Zuckert to General Bernard Schriever, April 8, 1963, w/att:
Procurement and Security Provisions for the R-12 Program,
Top Secret, 3 pp.
Source: Freedom of Information Act Request
Attached to the letter from the Secretary of the Air Force
to Bernard Schriever, head of the Air Force Systems Command
is a key memo relating both to the history of the NRO and
the R-12/SR-71 program. It notes that the R-12 program has
become the responsibility of the NRO, with the responsible
component designated "Program D." It also provides
guidance on security, financial and contracting matters, and
reporting - as well as participation of the Strategic Air
Command. The KEDLOCK program, referred to in the section on
security, was the program to develop an advanced fighter version
of the A-12.
Document 15
Letter, General Bernard Schriever to
Eugene M. Zuckert, July 11, 1963, Top Secret, 2 pp.
Source: Freedom of Information Act Request
This memo represents an early attempt by the Air Force to
gain control over all the OXCART related programs, except
OXCART itself, being managed by the CIA and NRO. In his letter
to the Air Force Secretary, Air Force Systems Command head
Bernard Schriever notes that the program plan that had been
prepared would transfer Program D (the component of the NRO
responsible for the R-12/SR-71), the AF-12 (the fighter version
of OXCART), the R-12 (the version of the A-12 being procured
by Program D) and Tagboard (the program to produce D-21 drones,
drones that were to be carried to their launch point by A-12s).
The letter also discusses the change in security that might
follow the transfer, and the circumstances that might result
in such a change.
Document 16
National Photographic Interpretation
Center, Mission [GRC-169], 23 August 1963, August 1963, Secret,
29 pp.
Source: National Archives, CIA 2000 Release.
In 1961, the CIA had arranged with the Nationalist Chinese
government on Taiwan to provide pilots to fly U-2 missions
over mainland China. Those missions began in 1962. Among the
priority targets were known or suspected Chinese nuclear facilities.
This report provides NPIC's interpretation of imagery obtained
by a late August 1963 U-2 mission, flown over the People's
Republic of China by U.S-trained, Nationalist Chinese pilots
(known as the "Black Cat Squadron"), flying from
Taoyuan, Taiwan. The apparent designation for such missions,
at least in 1963, was "Church Door." The targets
imaged included a missile launch site, an arsenal, airfields,
aircraft manufacturing facilities, ports, and industrial complexes.
Document 17
Diary Notes, September 27, 1963, Secret,
3 pp.
Source: National Archives, CIA 2000 Release.
These diary notes, written by Col. Red White, the CIA's Deputy
Director/Support include a reference to the disclosure at
a CIA Executive Committee meeting that the editor of Aviation
Week had told the director of the Defense Intelligence
Agency (Lt. Gen. Joseph Carroll) that he had solid information
about the existence of a successor to the U-2. Although the
editor promised to refrain from publication as long as everyone
else did, DCI John McCone noted that "OXCART is going
to blow sooner or later." He then asked several key aides
to study the issue.
Document 18
Memorandum for the Record, Subject: Memorandum
of Discussion at Luncheon - September 15th, Secretary Rusk's
Dining Room, September 17, 1964, Secret, 4 pp.
Source: Donation
This memo, reporting on a luncheon meeting of the secretaries
of state and defense (Rusk and McNamara), the national security
adviser (Bundy), and the director of central intelligence
(McCone), deals with both proposed U-2 and OXCART missions.
Item 1 apparently deals with a proposed U-2 mission whose
purpose would be to provide specific information as to when
the People's Republic of China would first detonate an atomic
device and reports that Rusk felt that such advance information
would be of little value to him. Item 5 reports on SKYLARK
- proposed OXCART flights over Cuba. SKYLARK represented one
of a number of unsuccessful proposals to employ the OXCART
on operational missions. Approval for OXCART missions would
not be forthcoming until 1967.(11)
Document 19
Directorate of Science and Technology,
Preliminary Report, U-2 Reconnaissance Mission C015C, Flown
8 January 1965, February 8, 1965, Top Secret, 9 pp.
Source: National Archives, CIA 2000 Release.
In 1964 and 1965, Nationalist Chinese pilots made several
attempts to fly a U-2 equipped with an infrared scanner over
nuclear facilities at Baotou and Lanzhou to determine if they
were active. The first two missions, conducted in 1964, were
aborted. However, mission C015C, targeted on Lanzhou was conducted
successfully and led to the determination that the facility
was operational.(12)
Document 20
Lt. Colonel [Name deleted], Memorandum,
Subject: U-2 Characteristics, July 16, 1965, w/att: Desired
Characteristics of New Model U-2, Top Secret, 3 pp.
Source: National Archives, CIA 2000 Release.
This memo and its attachment, prepared by the CIA's Office
of Special Activities, looks ahead to the requirements for
an improved version of the U-2. The attachment specifies 23
different characteristics the modified plane should possess.
Areas covered by the memo include, inter alia, range, altitude,
maneuverability, photographic capabilities, positioning accuracy,
and read-out capabilities. A new U-2, the U-2R, with many
of the characteristics specified, would become operational
in 1968.(13)
Document 21
Brig. Gen. Jack C. Ledford, Briefing
Note for the Director of Central Intelligence, Subject: Bureau
of the Budget Recommendations for the OXCART Program, November
16, 1965, Secret, 1 p.
Source: National Archives, CIA 2000 Release.
This memo represents an early stage in what would be a protracted
bureaucratic battle over the CIA's operation of the OXCART
fleet. From the CIA's point of view, their principal nemesis
was W.R. Thomas III, of the Bureau of the Budget - who suggested
that the CIA role in OXCART be terminated and the Air Force
SR-71s be relied upon to provide high-altitude, high-speed
aerial reconnaissance.
Document 22
[Name deleted], Memorandum for: Director
of Special Activities, Subject: Comments to W.R. Thomas III
Memorandum to the Director, BOB, July 27, 1966.
Source: National Archives, CIA 2000 Release.
This memo, prepared for the head of the CIA's Office of Special
Activities, attempts to provide a detailed rebuttal to the
suggestions of the Budget Bureau's W.R. Thomas that the OXCART
program be terminated in favor of the SR-71 program (which
was also known by the designation SENIOR CROWN). Among the
issues discussed are operational readiness, range, altitude,
and possible utilization. A major element of the discussion
concerns maintenance of a non-military (covert) overflight
capability - while Thomas sees little utility in doing so,
the author of the memos stresses high-level policy decisions
in this regard as well as the Soviet Union's attempt to depict
Francis Gary Powers's U-2 mission as one conducted under military
auspices.
Document 23
Memorandum for the President, Subject:
Advanced Reconnaissance Aircraft, December 26, 1966, Top Secret,
4 pp.
Source: Freedom of Information Act Request
The question of the composition and, as result, management,
of the U.S. advanced aerial reconnaissance effort was the
subject of this memo. It was based on a mid-December discussion
among Cyrus Vance (the Deputy Secretary of Defense), Donald
Hornig (presidential science adviser), Richard Helms (the
Director of Central Intelligence), and C.W. Fischer (of the
Bureau of the Budget). The memo summarizes the status of the
OXCART (A-12) and SR-71 fleets, noted that originally they
had different purposes, and that while they were being developed
the U.S. had acquired an increased overhead reconnaissance
capability through satellites and drones. It further discusses
views of fleet size, identifies fleet reduction alternatives
and the arguments for and against those alternatives, and
presents recommendations. All the participants except for
Helms recommend mothballing the entire OXCART fleet. On December
28th, President Lyndon Johnson approved that recommendation
and the phaseout of the fleet by January 1968.(14)
Document 24
Cyrus Vance, Deputy Secretary of Defense,
Memorandum for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretary
of the Air Force, Director, National Reconnaissance Office,
Subject: SR-71 Plans, May 1967, Top Secret, 1 p.
Source: Freedom of Information Act Request.
This memo represents another step in the process of turning
over the advanced aerial reconnaissance mission to the Strategic
Air Command. It envisioned an operational "SR-71-type
aircraft" capability over Southeast Asia and China by
December 1, 1967. A capability to overfly Cuba with such aircraft
was to be established even earlier - in July. The reference
to "SR-71-type aircraft" presumably allowed for
SAC to employ A-12 aircraft if SR-71s were not available,
or considered less capable than A-12s for a given mission.
Document 25
National Photographic Interpretation
Center, Black Shield Mission X-001, May 31, 1967, Secret,
30 pp.
Source: National Archives, CIA 2000 Release.
Before the December 1 date set for SAC to be ready to conduct
missions over Southeast Asia or China, the CIA received an
opportunity to demonstrate the value of the A-12. Concern
about whether surface-to-surface missiles, SCUDs, had been
deployed to North Vietnam, led President Lyndon Johnson, in
May 1967, to approve the deployment of a contingent of A-12s
to Kadena AB in Japan and the commencement of a flight program.
The first of those flights, which were designated BLACK SHIELD,
took place on May 31, 1967. It produced imagery of surface-to-air
missile sites, air facilities, naval activities and ports,
and other military targets, but produced no data indicating
the presence of SCUDs.
Document 26
National Photographic Interpretation
Center, CIA. BLACK SHIELD Mission BX 6723, 17 September 1967,
November 1967, Secret, 10 pp. (Extract).
Source: National Archives, 2000 CIA Release.
In addition to monitoring North Vietnam for the presence
of surface-to-surface missiles and providing other military
intelligence about that country, this BLACK SHIELD mission
was also able to provide photography of installations in southern
China. As shown in the approximate track of the mission, the
plane flew to very northern portion of North Vietnam, giving
it the opportunity to photograph installations across the
border. Targets photographed included depots, a railroad segment
and related installations, and several military complexes.
Document 27
9th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing, Subject:
NICE GIRL Target Routes, circa November 1967, Secret, 4 pp.
Source: Freedom of Information Act Request
As a result of the capabilities OXCART demonstrated in its
missions, presidential advisers and congressional leaders
began to question the decision to terminate the program. The
CIA continued to argue that the A-12 was the superior aircraft
because it flew higher and faster and had better cameras.
The Air Force contended that its two-seat SR-71 had a superior
suite of sensors, with three different cameras (search, high-resolution,
and mapping), side-looking radar, and ELINT collection gear.
To try to settle the issue three sets of missions, designated
NICE GIRL, were flown over the continental United States between
October 20, 1967 and November 3, 1967. This memo discusses
the target routes associated with NICE GIRL missions, which
proved inconclusive.
Document 28
Paul H. Nitze, Deputy Secretary of Defense,
Letter to Donald F. Horning, Special Assistant to the President
for Science & Technology, November 11, 1967, Top Secret,
3 pp.
Source: Freedom of Information Act Request
This letter from Nitze to Horning summarizes the case for
terminating the OXCART program and relying on SR-71 aircraft
for high-altitude, high-speed reconnaissance operations. It
appears that the evaluation of sensor performance discussed
in the first paragraph pertains to the data generated by the
NICE GIRL missions (Document 27). Among the factors Nitze
notes in favor of the SR-71 are the actual nature of the missions
that an OXCART or SR-71 aircraft would be asked to perform
and the primarily tactical value of the information generated
by actual OXCART missions. He also informs Horning of plans
to begin the phase-out of OXCART on March 31, 1968. In late
December, Nitze informed key officials of a decision to maintain
the OXCART capability through June 30, 1968 but also announced
plans to introduce the SR-71 into reconnaissance operations
over North Vietnam as rapidly as possible.(15)
Document 29
Lt. Gen. Joseph F. Carroll, Director,
DIA, Memorandum for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Subject:
Requirement for a Second BLACK SHIELD Mission Over North Korea,
January 29, 1968, Top Secret, 2 pp.
Source: Freedom of Information Act Request
Some BLACK SHIELD missions overflew North Korea. The first
North Korean overflight occurred on January 26, 1968, in response
to the seizure of the Pueblo three days earlier. This memo
specifies additional information in three categories (jet
capable airfields, naval order of battle, and ground force
activity) that the Pacific Command and Defense Intelligence
Agency wished to see provided by a second mission over North
Korea. The Pacific Command, in particular, "urgently
requested" that another mission be flown - which was
done on February 9.
Document 30
Unattributed memo, Short Resume of SR-71
Management Arrangements, n.d., Top Secret, 1 p.
Source: Freedom of Information Act Request
The February 9, 1968 OXCART mission over North Korea (Document
29) was followed by another on May 8. That mission would be
the last and marked the end of the OXCART program as the result
of the decision by Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford to
confirm the earlier decision to replace the the CIA A-12s
with Air Force SR-71s and President Johnson's concurrence
with Clifford. This memo traces the management arrangement
associated with the SR-71 program from first Air Force interest
to the Strategic Air Command's ("the White Air Force")
assumption of control of the program in July 1969.
Document 31
Lt. Col. [deleted], Memorandum, Subject:
Critique of IDEALIST/TACKLE Mission C198C, November 15, 1968,
Top Secret, 2 pp.
Source: National Archives, CIA 2000 Release.
This memo is the result of an after-action review of one
of the last U-2 missions flown over China (U-2 flights by
Nationalist Chinese pilots constituted the TACKLE component
of the IDEALIST program). It shows how the mission review
produced tasks for a number of CIA components - including
the Aviation Division of OSA, the Office of ELINT, and the
Office of Scientific Intelligence - in order to produce additional
intelligence as well as to enhance the survivability of U-2
missions.
Document 32
CIA, Memorandum for: 303 Committee, Subject:
Recommendations for Retention of the CIA IDEALIST Program,
December 18, 1969, Top Secret, 4 pp.
Source: Freedom of Information Act Request
In a December 17, 1969 meeting with the director of the Bureau
of the Budget, President Richard Nixon expressed his intention
of ending the CIA's role in U-2 operations, assigning the
Air Force sole responsibility for the U-2 program - a course
of action also favored by NRO director John McLucas. This
memo, produced by the CIA, probably in response to word of
Nixon's decision, for the 303 Committee - the National Security
Council committee responsible for overseeing sensitive intelligence
operations - argues the case for the CIA continuing to operate
a U-2 fleet. It focuses on capabilities of CIA U-2s in contrast
to Air Force U-2s, the CIA's ability to carry out covert overflights,
and the U-2's utility in the event of crisis or interference
with U.S. satellite reconnaissance systems.
Document 33
Henry A. Kissinger, Memorandum for the
President, Subject: Disposition of CIA Covert U-2 Reconnaissance
Program, January 7, 1970, Top Secret/[BYEMAN], 2 pp.
Source: Freedom of Information Act Request
This memo represents one of at least two instances in which
national security adviser Henry Kissinger successfully changed
President Nixon's mind concerning a decision adverse to the
CIA with respect to reconnaissance matters.(16)
Kissinger notes Nixon intention to terminate the CIA role
in the U-2 program. In addition to transmitting the CIA's
December 18 memo, Kissinger, summarizes its main points, and
reports the views of the 303 Committee - based on the discussion
at a December 20 meeting. The committee members, he reports,
strongly support the retention of a CIA U-2 fleet. Nixon would
revoke his decision to assign sole responsibility for the
U-2 program to the Air Force - although the issue would be
revisited on a yearly basis.
Document 34
Richard Helms, Director of Central Intelligence,
Memorandum for: Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs et. al., Subject: IDEALIST Program, August 4, 1970,
Top Secret, w/att: Carl E. Duckett, Director of CIA Reconnaissance
Programs, Memorandum for: Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs et.al., Subject: IDEALIST Program, August
4, 1970, Top Secret, 6 pp.
Source: Freedom of Information Act Request
These two memos - both directed to Kissinger by DCI Richard
Helms and his Deputy Director for Science and Technology,
Carl Duckett - were written in apparent anticipation of a
new challenge to the CIA's role in U-2 operations. Duckett's
memo offers an overview of the status and capabilities of
the program, the issues involved in possible termination,
and alternative allocations of U-2 aircraft between the Air
Force and CIA.
Document 35
John L. McLucas, Director, National Reconnaissance
Office, Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, Subject:
Consolidation of the U-2R Fleet, August 17, 1970, Top Secret,
w/att: CIA IDEALIST - AIR FORCE SENIOR YEAR U-2 PROGRAMS,
n.d., 6 pp.
Source: Freedom of Information Act Request
As McLucas explains in his covering memo, the attached paper
focuses on the roles and missions of the U-2 fleets maintained
by the Air Force and CIA and examines costs and operational
considerations as well as the recommendation that the Air
Force assume responsibility for the entire U-2 mission. The
conclusions that U-2s are being used in an overt rather than
covert role, that the Air Force can perform such missions,
and that savings are possible with consolidation lead to the
recommendation to consolidate the U-2 fleet under SAC.
Document 36
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Program
Analysis and Evaluation, A Study of SR-71 Utility for Post-Strike
Reconnaissance, August 11, 1971, Top Secret, 13 pp.
Source: Freedom of Information Act Request
One key mission envisioned for the SR-71, but not the A-12,
was post-strike reconnaissance - its use in the event of a
nuclear war with the Soviet Union as well as in other scenarios.
This draft study describes the SR-71 aircraft and its sensors,
the deployment of aircraft, the location and capability of
processing sensors, details of its envisioned pre-launch,
penetration, and target coverage activities, and an evaluation
of SR-71 utility for post-strike reconnaissance. The data
collected could possibly contribute to both generalized estimates
of ballistic missile performance and the evaluation of whether
specific targets were destroyed.
Document 37
Secretary of Defense, Memorandum for
the Director of Central Intelligence, Subject: Management
of the U-2R Fleet, n.d., Top Secret, 1 p.
Source: Freedom of Information Act Request
This undated memo was apparently sent to DCI James Schlesinger
in the spring of 1973, proposed that the U-2 program be placed
under the central management of the Air Force. It notes that
the Air Force fleet "has been under considerable operational
and resource pressure to satisfy current mission needs"
and suggests that requirements could be more efficiently satisfied
if the entire U-2 fleet was under central management. Schlesinger
responded in June that he saw no problem in transferring the
CIA's U-2s to the Air Force.(17)
Document 38
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Memorandum for
the Members of the Special Committee, Subject: Proposed SR-71
Deployment, October 8, 1973, Top Secret, 3 pp.
Source: Freedom of Information Act Request
This proposal, written shortly after the beginning of the
Yom Kippur War, suggests employing the SR-71 to collect intelligence
- both via peripheral coverage of targets in Syria and Egypt
as well as overflights when satellite reconnaissance or other
sources failed to provide adequate information. At the time
the U.S. did not possess a real-time satellite imagery capability
that could yield timely coverage. The memo goes on to specify
what actions would need to be taken to conduct such an operation.
Ultimately, the Strategic Air Command did conduct one or more
SR-71 missions after the conclusion of combat - launching
from a base in upstate New York.(18)
Document 39
NRO Staff, Memorandum for Dr. McLucas,
Subject: November Forecast of NRP Satellite and Aircraft Overflight
Activities, October 19, 1973, Top Secret, 2 pp.
Source: Freedom of Information Act Request
Addressed to John McLucas, the director of the NRO, this
memorandum provides an overview of projected/requested U-2
and SR-71 reconnaissance activities for November 1973 as well
as of missions recently completed. Despite its brevity, the
memo provides significant data on the codenames assigned to
various reconnaissance activities, the nations targeted, as
well as the specific facilities or activities that were to
be photographed or electronically monitored.
Document 40
NRO Staff, Memorandum for Dr. McLucas,
Subject: Denied Area Aircraft Reconnaissance, October 25,
1973, Top Secret, 4 pp.
Source: Freedom of Information Act Request.
One of John McLucas's goals as director of the NRO when he
assumed the position in 1969 was to terminate the office's
role in the development or operation of aerial reconnaissance
systems - a job he believed could be effectively performed
by the Air Force. This memo reviews the relationship between
the NRO, JCS Joint Reconnaissance Center, and CIA Office of
Special Activities with regard to the management and approval
of aerial overflight missions and notes the existence of flaws
in the system when crisis situations arise. It then explores
"whether or not the way we operate is the best way"
and states that "we see even less need for the NRO to
be involved in aircraft overflight operations." Finally,
it suggests that correspondence be initiated to transfer full
responsibility for aircraft overflights to the JCS.
Document 41
Deputy Director, NRO, Memorandum for
Mr. Plummer, Subject: Operational Control of Intelligence-Related
Reconnaissance Aircraft over Non-Combat Areas, February 8,
1974, Top Secret, 3 pp.
Source: Freedom of Information Act
James Plummer replaced John McLucas as NRO director in late
1973, with the issue of the NRO's role in aerial reconnaissance
still unresolved. In this memo to Plummer, the office's deputy
director noted McLucas's desire to transfer authority to the
JCS and the actual movement towards that objective. However,
he suggests that rather than relinquish authority in the area,
the NRO reassert it - enumerating the reasons why he believed
the NRO should continue to manage aerial overflight operations.
Document 42
Cable, for [Deleted], From Brig. Gen.
Wendell Bevan [Director, Office of Special Activities], June
26, 1974, Secret, 3 pp.
Source: National Archives, CIA 2000 Release.
As noted earlier, in 1969, NRO director John McLucas raised
the possibility of ending the CIA's role in the U-2 program.Over
the next several years, President Nixon and the NSC's 40 Committee
decided that the CIA should continue conducting U-2 overflights.
But, in June 1973, DCI James Schlesinger concluded that the
CIA's role in the U-2 program could be safely terminated.
The 40 Committee decided that the CIA role should conclude
on August 1, 1974.
This cable announced that the Republic of China had agreed
to the end of the TACKLE program, the component of the IDEALIST
(U-2) program (JACKSON was the codename for British participation
in the U-2 program) that involved use of Nationalist Chinese
pilots in operations directed against the PRC. With the OXCART
program having been terminated in 1968 and the end of CIA
involvement in the U-2 program, the CIA's Office of Special
Activities would be disbanded in early 1975.
Document 43
W.E. Colby, Director of Central Intelligence,
Memorandum for: Chairman, 40 Committee, Subject: Re-institution
of Airborne Reconnaissance of Cuba, September 16, 1974, Secret,
2 pp.
Source: National Archives
In an earlier memo Colby had informed the chairman of the
40 Committee, the NSC element responsible for oversee sensitive
intelligence and covert action operations, that there had
been no aerial overflights of Cuba - a particularly difficult
target for reconnaissance satellites - since the end of May
1974. It also noted that resumption would send a "negative
signal" to Cuba with regard to U.S. policy. In addition
to summarizing that earlier memo, Colby notes that an opportunity
presented itself to conduct overflights that would not be
interpreted by the Cubans as a negative signal.
Document 44
Joseph P. Sisco, Under Secretary of State
for Political Affairs, Memorandum for: The Secretary, Subject:
Reinstitution of Airborne Reconnaissance of Cuba, September
17, 1974, Secret, 1 p.
Source: National Archives.
The day after Colby circulated his memo, State Department
undersecretary for political affairs Joseph Sisco followed
with a memo of his own to the Secretary of State suggesting
that the he accept Colby's idea and support a SR-71 overflight
of Cuban shortly after the expected arrival of Soviet naval
units.
Document 45
Strategic Air Command, History of SAC
Reconnaissance Operations, 1978, 1979, and 1980, June 1982,
Top Secret, 34 pp. (Extracts)
Source: Freedom of Information Act Request
These extracts from a history of SAC reconnaissance operations
focus on two of a number of U-2 and SR-71 missions described
in the history. The SR-71 operation, GIANT REACH, employed
SR-71s based at RAF Mildenhall. Several of the missions involved
monitoring Soviet Union/Warsaw Pact spring and autumn troop
rotations - including those feared to be associated with a
possible Soviet invasion of Poland. Other targets were Soviet
naval forces on the Kola Peninsula. The U-2 missions described
in the extract, designated OLYMPIC GAME, were targeted against
North Korea.
Document 46
Major General James B. Vaught, Memorandum
for Director, Joint Reconnaissance Center, Subject: SR 71
Mission Request, November 3, 1980, Top Secret, 1 p.
Source: Freedom of Information Act Request
In the aftermath of the failure of the April 1980 mission
to rescue the hostages in Iran, the U.S. began planning for
a second mission. This November 1980 memo represents one of
many requests to collect intelligence that would be useful
in another rescue attempt. It also illustrates some of the
information that would be needed in attempting such a rescue.
Document 47
Defense Intelligence Agency, Future
Soviet Threat to US Airbreathing Reconnaissance Platforms,
1986, 8 pp.
Source: Freedom of Information Act
This 1986 DIA study explored the Soviet threat to U.S. aerial
reconnaissance systems - including the U-2 and SR-71. It explores
the threat posed by surface-to-air missiles and anti-aircraft
artillery, interceptor aircraft, air surveillance and control,
electronic warfare, and denial and deception (Maskirovka)
- as well as the implications for the United States and NATO.
Document 48
Richard Cheney, Secretary of Defense,
Memorandum for the Secretary of the Air Force, Subject: SR-71
Program Termination, June 21, 1990, Unclassified, 1 p.
Source: Freedom of Information Act
In the late 1980s the Air Force began trying to terminate
the SR-71 program. While a national intelligence asset, the
expensive program was funded out of the Air Force budget,
and key Air Force officials, including Chief of Staff Larry
Welch, thought the money would be better spent on additional
fighter aircraft. Thus, they sought to terminate the program
and redirect the money. Despite support among key members
of Congress, their goal was achieved in 1990, as indicated
by this memo.
Document 49
Coy F. Cross, 9th SRW, The Dragon Lady
Meets the Challenge: The U-2 in Desert Storm, circa 1992.
Source: Freedom of Information Act
In Operation Desert Storm, the U-2 overflights of Iraq provided
a large quantity of imagery. These two chapters of the monograph,
written by the 9th Reconnaissance Wing's historian, provide
an overview and assessment of U-2 operations in Desert Storm.
Document 50
Letter, William J. Lynn to Members of
Congress, August 21, 1998.
Source: Freedom of Information Act
The support for an SR-71 operational capability did not dissipate
with Richard Cheney's 1990 memo. Proposals were made to reinstate
an operational SR-71 capability during the Gulf War and later.
All such efforts failed, and this letter from [position] to
members of Congress represented one more rejection of such
a proposal.
Notes
1. Jeffrey T. Richelson, A Century of
Spies: Intelligence in the Twentieth Century (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 157-172.
2. Alfred Price, The History of U.S. Electronic
Warfare, Volume I: The Years of Innovation - Beginnings to
1946 (Washington, D.C.: Association of Old Crows, 1984),
pp. 52-53.
3. See William E. Burrows, By Any
Means Necessary: America's Secret Air War in the Cold War
(New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 2001).
4. Chris Pocock, The U-2 Spyplane: Toward
the Unknown (Atglen, Pa.: Schiffer Military History, 2000),
pp. 42-61.
5. Jeffrey T. Richelson, The Wizards
of Langley: Inside the CIA's Directorate of Science and Technology
(Boulder, Co: Westview, 2001), pp. 172-174.
6. Chris Pocock, Dragon Lady: The
History of the U-2 Spyplane (Shrewsbury, England: Airlife,
1989), pp.59-199; Seymour M. Hersh, The Samson Option:
Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy (New
York: Random House, 1991), pp. 52-58.
7. Richelson, The Wizards of Langley,
pp. 20-22, 98-100, 138-146.
8. Paul F. Crickmore, Lockheed SR-71:
The Secret Missions Exposed (Oxford, England: Opsrey,
2000), pp. 176-201.
9. Norman Polmar, Spyplane: The U-2 History
Declassified ( Osceola, WI.: MBI, 2001), pp. 108-110.
10. Ibid., p.142.
11. Richelson, The Wizards of Langley,
p.142.
12. Ibid., pp. 94-95.
13. Polmar, Spyplane, p.272.
14. Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach,
The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance:
The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974 (Washington, D.C.:
CIA, 1992), p. 310.
15. Richelson, The Wizards of Langley,
p. 145.
16. Kissinger also intervened to convinced
Nixon to approve the CIA plan to build what became the KH-11
electro-optical imaging satellite.
17. Richelson, The Wizards of Langley,
p. 173.
18. Paul Crickmore, Lockheed SR-71 Blackbird
(London: Osprey, 1986), p.164.
