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17 September 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Discussion at Luncheon - September 15th  
Secretary Rusk's Dining Room

Attending: Secy. Rusk, Secy. McNamara, McGeorge Bundy, Mr. McCone

1. Reviewed the needs for [REDACTED] (b)(1)  
 [REDACTED] I explained the need for the U-2 mission (b)  
 as discussed and recorded in USIB meeting of September 10th. Rusk  
 took the position that finite intelligence on when a [REDACTED] might  
 be made was not of importance to him from a policy standpoint, as  
 he knew it was inevitable and he knew of no political action he would  
 take if finite information was given to him. Bundy seemed to agree.  
 After extended discussion, I stated that I could not conceive of our  
 failing to take some actions if finite information was in our hands, i. e.,  
 Rusk might contact Gromyko or Dobrynin; the President might communicate  
 with Khrushchev privately; we might discuss the subject with our Allies,  
 both in Europe and the Far East; and we might take some position in the  
 press through leaks or planted information. Certainly we should discuss  
 the subject with Thailand, Laos and South Vietnam. It was agreed that  
 the embarrassment and consequences of failure outweighed the advantages  
 and therefore, while the final decision was up to the President, Rusk  
 would not recommend the mission. Bundy agreed. McNamara indicated  
 his concurrence but was non-committal.

[REDACTED]

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2. During this conversation I raised the question of [redacted] on U-2's. This question was discussed by me with [redacted] and some others but no actions had been taken to implement the plan. All seemed to agree that this might be a good idea. (b)(1)

ACTION: I wish appropriate people in CIA to consider this, discuss it at appropriate levels in the Department, discuss it in further detail with Defense and McGeorge Bundy and if all are in agreement, to promptly take the matter up with [redacted] and appropriate people [redacted] and then to implement the program if all are in agreement. (b)(1)

3. The use of drones was discussed. [redacted]

[redacted] Drones should be flown when necessary to accumulate essential information and should be complementary but second in priority to flying of the U-2 when and if U-2's were available. (b)(1)

[redacted]

4. There was an extensive discussion of proposed DCI briefings of Heads of State. McNamara raised the issue in a very antagonistic way, stating that he had not seen the briefing paper until a half an hour before the luncheon. The Joint Chiefs had not seen it at all, etc., etc. He said that his quick reaction was that "not more than 40% of the proposed information should be given in the briefings and his preference would be to have no briefing at all." Rusk sharply differed with McNamara. He said the subject had been under discussion for a number of months, the Defense Department representatives were in on every phase and that the reasons for the briefing were important and he wished the briefings to go forward. McCone stated that in his opinion there were four important reasons: One, to further develop the confidence of our Allies in our estimates; Two, to establish the importance of the peaceful uses of satellites; Three, to show the contributions, and the limitations, of satellites in any disarmament steps; and Four, to discuss in detail the inadequacy of satellites for reconnaissance over Cuba. Rusk concurred in these objectives, in

fact he stated and restated them during the long discussion in several different ways, but covering essentially the same points. I said that in view of the discussion I would like to call the whole briefing off and Rusk said this could not be done because of the elaborate arrangements which had been made. McNamara said that he thought a few hours work on the part of the Thompson Committee and discussions with the Joint Chiefs would clarify the problem. I said that that was all fine but if the results of such discussions were to sterilize the briefing to the point that I would "advise those whom I was briefing concerning the time of day and the condition of the weather, I did not think it would be advisable to go, and I would not go. McNamara said he didn't think such a sterile answer would come forward. I agreed to McNamara's program, a meeting for 5:00 p.m. of the Thompson Committee was ordered and it was agreed the Joint Chiefs would consider the problem the following morning, early.

5. We discussed at some length the question of the Cuban overflight problem. I explained the status of SKYLARK. I pointed out that the OXCART flying over Cuba would be far less vulnerable than the U-2, but not entirely invulnerable; however it would be known because of the sonic boom in addition to radar detection. McNamara felt that the OXCART would not be vulnerable on the initial flights but if we engaged in frequent flight over a pre-determined pattern the Cubans might put some of their SAMs in a state of alert which would very possibly catch an OXCART. He then said that he thought that one plane a month would be all that would be necessary in order to secure complete coverage of Cuba, once every 30 days which was about all that was required. I said that such coverage would meet USIB's requirements [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] but that I was sure a study of the history of weather over Cuba from records of the last two years of operations would indicate that with few exceptions several flights, rather than one flight a month, would be required for substantial, though not absolutely, total coverage of the Island.

It was agreed that the subject should be explored by COMOR and NPIC and a report prepared. Also a hard study should be made of vulnerability.

ACTION: COMOR should prepare a study on the probability of meeting USIB's requirements of coverage

[REDACTED] and make a judgment as to the number of flights per month, by month, over a 12-month span, required from November 1964 to November 1965 in order to accomplish acceptable coverage of the Island with usable photography and second, DD/S&T, collaborating to the extent necessary with NRO or Dr. Fubini, should make a report on the vulnerability of the OXCART under the SKYLARK program, using all available information on the capabilities of the Cuban radar system. (b)(1) (b)

6. Question was raised by McGeorge Bundy of the problem of forward planning. It was felt there was need for a fresh look at our policies in very many areas of the world and our relationship with such people as Sukarno, Nasser, Castro, etc., etc. It was felt that no forward-planning activities should go forward immediately because of the implications, but probably in November and December intense studies should be made of the whole series of problems. There was no indication that CIA should necessarily participate as these are all policy matters although as the time for making the studies approaches, undoubtedly there will be a very important role for CIA to play.

ACTION: I should discuss this role privately with Helms, Cline and Kent, and possibly one or two others in order that private and unofficial advance thinking might be done on this very important but sensitive subject. (b)(1)

[REDACTED]

ACTION: Discuss this with Helms and possibly others prior to departure today. ✓

JAM(tape):mfb:mcm