

MEMORANDUM

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION

~~TOP SECRET~~ (b)(1)1.5c

JAN 1970



MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT: Disposition of CIA Covert U-2 Reconnaissance Program

I am informed that in a meeting with Budget Director Mayo on 17 December 1969 you expressed your intention of terminating the CIA covert U-2 reconnaissance program.

The continuation or termination of the CIA U-2 program was a question I had intended to raise in the 303 Committee before it unexpectedly arose in your meeting with Mr. Mayo.

The CIA forwarded a memorandum dated 18 December to the 303 Committee recommending retention of this activity for the following reasons. This memorandum is attached at Tab A.

1. The program provides a flexible overhead reconnaissance system with unique capabilities for high resolution photography, ELINT collection, and sensor airdrop. It can react rapidly to worldwide crisis situations cheaply, effectively and at little political risk to the U.S. Government.

2. Agreements for joint operations exist with (b)(1)1.5c (b)(1)1.5c the United Kingdom enabling effective covert U-2 operations unattributable to U.S. Government sponsorship.

3. This new U-2R capability can be utilized with a reaction time of approximately 50 hours anywhere in the world and has a (b)(1)1.5c, (b)(1)1.5g

4. This program provides the U.S. Government with a low cost option for meeting future crisis situations in areas other than the more heavily defended areas of the USSR. (b)(1)1.5g

(b)(1)1.5c

~~TOP SECRET~~ (b)(1)1.5c

(b)(1)1.9228/69a

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5. During noncrisis periods this asset is used to collect intelligence on Communist China which is made available to the (b)(1)1.5c. Removal of the U-2 detachment (b)(1)1.5c would have serious political repercussions and might adversely affect other important joint intelligence projects.

6. The SAC U-2's do not now have adequate sensors for all types of missions, lack the defensive equipment to operate in a hostile environment and of course do not afford the U.S. Government the option of nonattributability.

On 20 December the members of the 303 Committee, with the exception of Mr. Packard, who was out of the city, discussed this activity in depth. It was the strong view of those present that the U.S. should retain this covert reconnaissance capability for contingency use in possible future crisis situations. Should future events dictate the necessity for resumption of covert overflights of the Chinese Communist mainland, this mechanism would be available.

The Committee believes that this would be a particularly bad time to remove the U-2 detachment (b)(1)1.5d as it would cause major political problems with the (b)(1)1.5c. The (b)(1)1.5c does not have access to U.S. satellite photography, so the U-2 photography of Chinese Communist coastal areas is of strategic interest to that government. It is also of significant interest to the United States.

The combined NRO and CIA budget which enables the CIA to operate and maintain this covert reconnaissance capability is on the order of (b)(1)1.5c. The Committee believes that savings resulting from termination or transfer of this activity would be slight compared to the loss of the covert capability and the political repercussions with the (b)(1)1.5c resulting therefrom. The Committee would like to study and review further the feasibilities of continuing or terminating or transferring this activity and make appropriate recommendations to you before the next budget submission.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve retention of the CIA covert U-2 reconnaissance program with a budget on the order of (b)(1)1.5c for FY 1971, with the understanding that the 303 Committee will study this activity further and make appropriate recommendations to you prior to the FY 1972 budget submission.

Attachment  
Tab A

DISAPPROVE \_\_\_\_\_

OTHER \_\_\_\_\_

(b)(1) 9228/69a  
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