

DOCUMENT NO. 12

Minutes of the Meeting between the Hungarian and Chinese Delegations in Budapest, January 16, 1957

On January 16, at the request of Kádár a Chinese government delegation led by Prime Minister Zhou Enlai visited Budapest. The main objective of the visit, as illustrated by the Hungarian minutes of these meetings, was to show demonstrative support for the Kádár regime. (Zhou also delivered a speech at a rally expressing his approval of Kádár's retaliatory measures.) The Chinese had backed military action as early as October 30, one day before the Soviet decision to intervene; they also supported the Kádár regime, which had been set up with Soviet help; and they asked for the most severe punitive measures against the "counterrevolutionists".

At this meeting, the Chinese side states flatly: "the situation [in Hungary] could not have been solved without the Soviet troops." Both sides condemn Tito's role. On international politics, the U.N. assessment of Hungary and the viewpoint of the non-aligned Asian states, led by India, are mentioned. Zhou takes on the task of presenting the official Hungarian position to the Third World. On the most important domestic issue for Hungary, the Nagy case, the two sides agree that treason was committed and discuss the merits of open versus closed trials, and the use of execution as punishment.

Held between 7:00 p.m. and 8:00 p.m., and between 10:15 p.m. and 1:30 a.m., in the Parliament and the residence of the Chinese Government delegation, respectively.

Chinese delegates in attendance:

Zhou Enlai, President of the State Council

He Long, Vice-President of the Council

Wang Jiaxiang, Deputy Foreign Minister¹⁴³

Hao De-qing, Ambassador¹⁴⁴

Qiao Guanhua, Assistant of Foreign Minister

Hungarian delegates in attendance:

János Kádár, Prime Minister

Dr. Ferenc Münnich, Deputy Prime Minister

György Marosán, Minister of State

Imre Horváth, Foreign Minister

Antal Apró, Minister of Industry

Sándor Rónai, Trade Minister

¹⁴³ Wang Jiaxiang (1907-) was ambassador to Moscow from 1949 to 1951, deputy foreign minister from 1949 to 1959 and a member of the CCP CC from 1956 to 1966.

¹⁴⁴ Hao De-qing was ambassador to Budapest from 1954 to 1961.

Zhou Enlai: What is the state of public order in Hungary? Are violent events still occurring?

Kádár: Order has basically been reestablished, but many unlicensed weapons are still in circulation. Our main problems tend to arise in the political sphere. The enemy exploits the severity of our situation, and attempts to gain the confidence of the masses with dishonest slogans. There are still problems concerning public order.

[He relates the murder of the Major]¹⁴⁵

This was not so much a politically motivated murder as a personal vendetta.

Münnich: Since November we have collected more than 100,000 weapons from private individuals, which is a huge quantity in such a small country. We have not yet completed this task.

Marosán: When the Czechoslovak Government Delegation came to Budapest it still had to be escorted by tanks.¹⁴⁶ But by now our Chinese comrades must also be convinced that the situation has changed significantly.

Kádár: On November 20, the Yugoslav ambassador wanted to pay me a visit and asked for a tank to be sent to collect him.

I related the talks in Moscow¹⁴⁷ to the Hungarian Government, and the Hungarian leadership has reached complete agreement concerning the Chinese position.

At the airport, an Indian journalist asked: 'What is the aim of this visit, a gesture of friendship or negotiation?' I replied that we will negotiate, too, but that the friendship aspect of the visit is the most important. (Zhou Enlai agreed.) The Indian himself knows that one day is too short a time for large-scale negotiations.

The text of the declaration, which you would like to discuss, is not yet ready.¹⁴⁸

Understandably, Chinese economic aid has given rise to much pleasure in Hungary.

Zhou Enlai: On my return journey I will make visits to Afghanistan and Nepal; the Hungarian question will also arise during my meeting with Nehru.

We also spoke about the Hungarian question with our comrades in the Polish leadership, and we told them that the characteristics of the Hungarian and Polish events were different.¹⁴⁹ Gomułka's leadership is fundamentally correct, while events in Hungary played out quite differently. Imre Nagy's traitorousness left its mark on the Hungarian situation. János Kádár

¹⁴⁵ On January 12, 1956, a major in the Hungarian armed forces was shot and killed in Budapest following a scuffle. The case was not a personal vendetta, as described by Kádár, but it was not an act of armed resistance either. Although the man with whom the officer (who was drunk at the time), picked a quarrel was active in underground activities, he was essentially a common criminal who murdered two elderly women during a break-in just a few days later. The sentence has been placed in brackets since it seems to be a remark made by the person writing the minutes and differs from the first-person singular mode of the rest of the text.

¹⁴⁶ The Czechoslovak delegation led by Prime Minister Viliam Široký held talks in Budapest on November 16, 1956.

¹⁴⁷ Before coming to Budapest, Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai was in Moscow for talks between January 7-11, 1957. Since the delegation planned only a two-day visit to Hungary, Kádár and György Marosán flew to Moscow to hold preliminary meetings with the Chinese and Soviet comrades on January 10.

¹⁴⁸ The joint communiqué was published in Népszabadság on January 18, 1957.

¹⁴⁹ Leaving Moscow, the Chinese delegation traveled to Warsaw where they held talks with the Polish leadership between January 11-16. For the notes on these talks see, János Tischler, "Csou-Enlaj kínai miniszterelnök januári látogatása Varsóban," Múltunk, 44, no. 2 (1994): 141-175 [FOTzz20]

could only save the socialist cause in Hungary by opposing Imre Nagy and with Soviet help. We have told the Poles and the leaders in Asia that the Hungarian government cannot solve the problems unless it employs the methods it is currently using.

Eisenhower told Nehru that he does not want war to break out because of the events in Hungary.¹⁵⁰ He realizes and accepts the fact that Hungary will remain in the socialist camp.

The South-Asian countries recognize that if the Soviet troops had not intervened, Hungary would now be in the Western camp and that this would represent a considerable risk of war breaking out. It was only with the help of the Soviet troops that Hungary managed to stay in the socialist camp.

Regarding the five-country Party leaders' summit,¹⁵¹ the Poles asked why they were not invited: it seems that the socialist camp is separating into two groups. We discussed this question with comrade Khrushchev in Moscow, who said that there are quite a few questions on which the Poles' position differs from ours, but that they are also strongly confined by the imminent elections. There were therefore reasons for us to fear the participation of the Poles. It is not even sure that they would have come. Another argument is that the delegations coming to Hungary came from the four neighboring countries. This argument is a bit weak, because Bulgaria does not border Hungary. On no account did they want to exclude the Poles, and comrade Khrushchev advised that they take a stand in the Polish-Chinese declaration,¹⁵² and condemn the UN's intervention in internal Hungarian affairs.¹⁵³ There wasn't actually a difference of opinion with the Poles on this question, who find the unity of the socialist countries important, and approve of negotiations between them.

In Moscow I will suggest that we arrange more meetings of this kind. We will communicate any potential dates via the Embassy.

The governments of the Asian countries recognized that objective circumstances made necessary the intervention of Soviet troops, but their leaders nevertheless contradict this when they pronounce that the Soviet army damaged the interests of the Hungarian people. This viewpoint is primarily based on the account of the Indian ambassador. It is a good thing [that] in the course of our visit I will be able to gain first-hand knowledge of this. In my opinion not just the current situation has to be examined, but its repercussions as well. The situation here could not have been solved without the Soviet troops. India is neutral, which explains its position. We should tell journalists more about how the situation in Hungary is improving.

Nehru raised a number of questions concerning Hungary:

1. Soviet troops sent more than 1,000 tanks to Hungary and more than 25,000 people died.¹⁵⁴ My impression now is that very little Soviet armed force is present here. The battles certainly generated casualties, but it would be good to inspect the figures more precisely.

¹⁵⁰ Nehru paid an official visit to the United States in December 1956.

¹⁵¹ See Document Nos. 108.

¹⁵² This reference is to the joint communiqué published following the Polish-Chinese negotiations, see above in footnote [FOTzz20](#).

¹⁵³ From the beginning, the Soviet Union considered the U.N. resolutions concerning the Kádár government and the Hungarian revolution to be interference in Hungary's internal affairs. On January 10, 1957, the U.N. General Assembly established a Special Committee on Hungary with the participation of Australia, Ceylon, Denmark, Tunisia and Uruguay in order to investigate the Hungarian events.

¹⁵⁴ According a top-secret report by the Hungarian Central Statistical Office compiled in May 1957, the number of Hungarian casualties of the armed fighting was around 2,700 killed and 20,000 wounded. See, "Az október 23-i és az azt követő eseményekkel kapcsolatos sérülések és halálozások" (Injuries and

2. He was informed that approximately 150,000 Hungarians escaped to the West.¹⁵⁵ (Comrade Kádár interrupted to note that the chief problem today is that the Western countries will not let them back into Hungary.)

3. There were rumors that the Hungarian government had been assassinated. I myself saw that every member of the government was present at the airport; it is clear that these rumors were started by hostile Western press sources. The leaders' security must be protected.

4. It is rumored that the Workers' Councils are all taking up positions against the Government. At the party assembly¹⁵⁶ the workers themselves reported that reactionary groups participate in the Workers' Councils, and so intervention against them is understandable.

5. Many agricultural cooperatives have disbanded--said Nehru. At lunch Comrade Dobi already explained the problems concerning the question of the agricultural cooperatives.

6. Before his journey to America, Nehru expressed his hope that János Kádár's government is consolidating itself. If we negotiate with neutral people, we must categorically abide by our opinion--this is the best method.

7. Concerning Imre Nagy, the Hungarian Government did not keep the promise it made to the Yugoslav Embassy.¹⁵⁷ In relation to this I noted to Nehru that he can understand our situation best--after all, he kept the Prime Minister of Kashmir in custody for three years. With regard to this and the other questions I would now like to gain first-hand information.

Kádár: The Polish-Chinese Declaration is a great help to us. Earlier, unfriendly articles had appeared in the Polish press. We did not keep Poland away from the Budapest Conference on purpose. Talks can be held on certain questions without lengthy preparation, for example the Moscow talks. The fact is that common problems emerged here. Three governments had an interest in the Imre Nagy affair, for example. We also invited our Czechoslovak and Bulgarian comrades, who had similarly expressed opinions on this subject. But we did not invite Poland, the GDR or Albania. The Poles were in any case occupied with other matters,¹⁵⁸ whose settlement we did not want to obstruct. If we had invited representatives from a greater number of countries, we would have had to widen the scope of the negotiations. We would nevertheless definitely like to meet and talk with our Polish comrades. Not in two or three months' time, but as soon as possible: for example, we must sit at the negotiating table with our Polish and Yugoslav comrades in February, lest our initial positions become overly rigid.¹⁵⁹

Zhou Enlai: That is most sensible. After our arrival in Moscow I will immediately communicate this view to Comrade Mao Zedong by telephone.

Marosán: It would be good for the outside world if China initiated such a meeting.

Kádár: During the negotiations held with India, Minister Koshla¹⁶⁰ and Ambassador Menon¹⁶¹ tried to put pressure on us concerning the question of inviting UN observers and the

deaths in relation to the events on October 23 and after), Statisztikai Szemle 68, no. 10 (1990): pp. 797-815. [FOTzz17]

¹⁵⁵ In reality, the final number of emigrants was higher. See footnote FOTzz18 in this chapter.

¹⁵⁶ During its short visit in Budapest, the Chinese delegation participated in a meeting of the Budapest party aktiv.

¹⁵⁷ See Document No. 101.

¹⁵⁸ Kádár is referring to the upcoming general elections in Poland; however, this was only an excuse for deliberately not having invited the Polish leaders to the Budapest meeting.

¹⁵⁹ In fact, due to lingering tensions between the two leaderships, the first meeting took place only on May 9-12, 1958, when Gomulka and Prime Minister Cyrankiewicz visited Hungary.

¹⁶⁰ Jagan Nat Koshla was Indian minister in Prague in 1956.

UN Secretary General. Koshla went as far as to threaten that they would not support us or stand by us if we do not satisfy their demands. They even invited the Indonesian ambassador in Belgrade to Budapest to give them support. They condemned us for sending Imre Nagy to Romania. They had obviously received information about this from the Yugoslav Government.

In response to the questions:

1. The number of tanks is not correct. The bulk of the Soviet tanks in Hungary were used to guard the Western border. The fighting had two focal points in Budapest: the area of the Corvin Cinema and Széna square. The fighting took place within about a half-kilometer radius; in such circumstances tanks could not have been deployed in such numbers.

The number of casualties was between 1,700 and 2,000, with the number of injured above 13,000.¹⁶² Previously we estimated the number of casualties to be 5,000, but we did not take into consideration the fact that 170 people die in Budapest every day under normal circumstances. For a protracted period there was no orderly registration of deaths, and those dying of illness, old age, etc. were not buried in the usual way, but in public squares, gardens, and other places, and we counted them amongst the casualties of the fighting.

2. Escapes to the West have not just slackened significantly, around 10,000 have already returned. The Western authorities are obstructing their return and are preventing official Hungarian institutions from establishing contact with the refugees.

3. Several attempts were made to challenge the government, but the Soviet troops offered adequate protection. In fact for the last month and a half order has been maintained completely by Hungarian security forces, without Soviet intervention.

4. Immediately after the events blew over, it was difficult to see the picture clearly. On November 15 I still declared to the mass public that Imre Nagy thought his intentions were good. His role as a traitor had not yet become clear then. As far as this question is concerned, we must bear in mind that the Yugoslavs of their own accord offered to convince Imre Nagy to resign-- nevertheless they later protected him. At the end of the talks held with Vidić, the Yugoslav deputy foreign secretary, he declared that Yugoslavia wanted to aid the Hungarian Government's consolidation with Imre Nagy's removal. Later Yugoslav statements were completely at odds with this declaration.

5. Nehru's representatives wanted at all costs to persuade us to allow UN observers, or at least the UN Secretary General, to come to Hungary. I asked them whether the situation in Kashmir had improved over the last three years from the presence of UN observers. They were forced to admit that the situation had not improved at all, that in fact it had got worse. To this I asked why they wanted the situation here to get worse as well.

6. In regard to the Workers' Councils, we must bear in mind that they developed in the course of a counterrevolutionary surge and a climate of aggression and pogroms. Declassed [deklasszált]¹⁶³ individuals had been working in factories for many years. They became the voice of the Workers' Councils. To legitimize themselves they rallied honest workers as well. The Regional and Central Workers' Councils, on the other hand, came into existence according

¹⁶¹ Kumara Pladmanabha Sivasankava Menon, Indian ambassador to Moscow, also representing India in both Poland and Hungary.

¹⁶² In reality, the number of casualties was somewhat higher, see footnote [FOTzz17](#) in this chapter.

¹⁶³ This term was used in communist jargon to denote people who held higher social status in the pre-1945 regime, but who lost their stature after 1948 and were typically required to take working-class jobs. The communist leadership, for obvious reasons, continued to look on them with suspicion.

to counterrevolutionary plans. The thinking of the imperialists and the Yugoslavs agrees on this point, and they asked us to explain why we do not rely on Regional Workers' Councils.

Zhou Enlai: This is open interference in internal Hungarian affairs. How many factory workers are there in Hungary?

Marosán: In Hungary there are a million-and-a-half factory workers and today there are approximately 2 million members of trade unions.

Kádár: Members of the Yugoslav Embassy and Yugoslav journalists used cars with diplomatic license plates to spread Kardelj's speech,¹⁶⁴ distributing it to Hungarian factories without saying anything about this to the Hungarian Government. When the Hungarian Government ordered a news black-out to the West, the Yugoslav News Agency's correspondent forwarded the enemy material from capitalist correspondents. The Hungarian Government was repeatedly attacked by the Yugoslav press.

Marosán: During this period there was hardly any difference between the Yugoslav and the American journalists.

Zhou Enlai: Has the tone of the Yugoslav press since changed?

Kádár: After Djenmin Djipao's well-known article, Borba and Politika wrote something good about Hungary,¹⁶⁵ for the first time in a month-and-a-half, in the nature of the following: "It seems that the Kádár Government has found the road to consolidation." From that point on, open attacks in the press subsided. We did not argue about it openly because we did not want to make the situation any worse. In Yugoslavia they objected to our government declaration on the basis that it supposedly has a heavy tone and frequently mentions dictatorship. The Yugoslavs regard October 23 as an act of national heroism. In his speech in Pula,¹⁶⁶ Tito declared that it shows what a nation can achieve, bare-handed, if it knows what it wants. This effectively implies a condemnation of Soviet assistance, and contradicts the fact that most of the participants in the uprising did not know what they wanted. Only a small group, the deliberate counterrevolutionaries, were clear about what they wanted.

We can tell Nehru openly that the Soviet troops intervened at our request and in our interest. At that time 700 foreign journalists and the Diplomatic Corps were present in Budapest and other parts of the country. Thus nothing was kept secret from the outside world. The Western journalists themselves exposed the counterrevolutionary activities. What need is there for an investigating committee after that?

There are no deportations. It is true that unbeknownst to the Soviet and Hungarian Governments a subordinated¹⁶⁷ Soviet organ deported a carriage of prisoners captured during the fighting, but to the last man they were returned on our demand. This is no longer discussed.

¹⁶⁴ This refers to a speech Edvard Kardelj delivered before the Yugoslav Federal National Assembly on December 7, 1956. At the December 11 session of the Provisional Executive Committee Kádár voiced his disapproval of these activities. At an HSWP Central Committee session on February 26, 1957, he repeated his criticisms of Yugoslav journalists.

¹⁶⁵ A December 29 editorial in Renmin Ribao (People's Daily), the central daily of the Chinese Communist Party, described the revolution unequivocally as an attack by international imperialism, and inveighed against the speeches by Tito in Pula on November 11 (see Document No. 96) and Kardelj on December 7. For an English translation of the article, see "More on the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat" in Communist China 1955-1959: Policy Documents with Analysis. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1962), pp. 257-272.

¹⁶⁶ See Document No. 96.

¹⁶⁷ The word Kádár uses here, "alantas", can also be translated as "base" or "mean". Although from the context it seems more likely that the sense used in the text is the right one, it is not impossible that Kádár

The counterrevolutionaries took pains mainly to organize strikes in the coalmines, as they knew that would affect production and the country's life as a whole. Once we had arrested 25 or 20 leaders, production began again almost immediately. On Csepel Island, the Workers' Councils resigned with provocative intent, thinking that this would cause confusion.¹⁶⁸ It is typical that at the time of the resignation Western journalists were staying in Csepel, and the UN put the Hungarian question on its agenda. These events were no coincidence. They had deliberately planned to discredit the Hungarian Government.

Zhou Enlai: The enemy obviously does not propagate what isn't useful to it, while it exaggerates things that interest it. I agree with your position concerning Nehru. Two techniques can be used against Nehru: either ignore him, or make a carefully argued case, but the latter could take a very long time.

Kádár: In good faith, we supplied objective, detailed and honest information because we could see that Nehru was getting his information from inimical, or at least not well-intentioned, sources. The Indonesian ambassador listed the Indians' arguments in the same way, but after we had given our answer he did not insist on continuing the debate, and instead asked good naturedly: in what ways could they give us political help?

Zhou Enlai: With Nehru, the two methods we have mentioned have to be used flexibly. The information gained here was useful, and it can be used in the Asian countries against ill-intentioned information. The UN cannot do anything, though it is possible that they might expel Hungary, but there is no need to place too much significance on this possibility, as China exists pretty well outside the UN, and then at least we would keep each other company--he remarked in jest.

Kádár: It is not easy to expel a country from the UN.

Münnich: Menon said that the government's declaration had appealed to him, but immediately raised the question: when will there be democratic elections? I replied that they would receive a response in the government's declaration.

Zhou Enlai: Do not fall into the Indians' trap. Don't hurry the elections. At the reception the Indian chargé said that in his opinion, the situation in Hungary is improving and that there was probably need for the intervention of Soviet troops, and then added cunningly: at present the enlargement of the government is a big problem. In my opinion, though the government is small it works well, and it is just right for dictatorship.

Münnich: Unnavati, the Indian military attaché, asked how many Soviet troops were stationed in Hungary. I replied that we are on very friendly terms with the Soviets, and we speak often, but that I have never asked them this.

Horváth: It is very good that Zhou Enlai and Nehru discuss these questions, and the imprecise data is uncovered. They claim that the Soviet intervention was not justified and that the Soviet Union committed an act of aggression. They should prove it. In the UN Hungary was

had the secondary meaning in mind, or at least chose the word deliberately for its dual connotation. The Hungarian leader was indignant at the KGB for deporting Hungarian prisoners to the Soviet Union, an act that could seriously have undermined his efforts at consolidation. The available sources are somewhat ambiguous on the number of deportees--while one Interior Ministry document notes 846 prisoners on Soviet territory, a later report by Ivan Serov mentions 860 people taken to the Sub Carpathian region. In the end, all deportees were returned to Hungary. For the Interior Ministry report, see Document No. 97.

¹⁶⁸ On January 8, 1957, members of the Worker's Council of the Csepel Iron- and Metalworks announced their resignation following a government decree on January 5 that extended capital punishment to both the act of striking and the instigation to strike.

repeatedly slandered, and because of this our delegation walked out of the assembly.¹⁶⁹ On the other hand, it is not easy to exclude a member state from the organization, because this can be blocked by veto. But, with the help of the American electoral machine, it is relatively easy for them to exclude a state from the Assembly.

The Americans' bad intentions are demonstrated by the fact that their Minister has been in Hungary for three months now without presenting his credentials. He puts this down to not being able to maintain the necessary contact with his government.¹⁷⁰ This is the kind of political trickery they work with.

Zhou Enlai: I can refute Nehru with facts. It is clear to us that the Indians would like the nature of power in Hungary to change, via elections or by any other means.

Kádár: What they did not achieve with weapons, the enemy tries to achieve by other methods.

Zhou Enlai: Eisenhower is not starting a war either, but he did not say that he wouldn't continue their subversive activity.

Now it is not so much Nehru's question which is complicated, but rather Tito's. Can he be called a socialist at all? Outside negotiations, their attitude is not always socialist.

Kádár: Jenmin Jipao's article is right when it points to phenomena like the Yugoslav conduct with Hungary, Bulgaria and Albania, a conduct which Yugoslavia would not want to be displayed vis-a-vis herself.

Zhou Enlai: They oppose Stalin, but in this they have learned from him.

Kádár: This side to the Yugoslavs has shown itself before. In January 1946 I participated in the secret meeting between the parties of our two countries. The Hungarian delegation supplied secret information about our party in full, but the Yugoslavs did not describe their internal affairs, they did not respond to our questions, or they started to talk about something else. They did not want to negotiate on an equal basis. There are those in Yugoslavia who think that reform of the socialist regime is possible, even by means of an uprising. The Yugoslavs are themselves conducting intelligence activities in the socialist countries. This came to light when they publicly quoted an internal Albanian party document, which was probably obtained with the help of agents. Such agents could be functioning in Hungary, too.

Zhou Enlai: The democratic character of the dictatorship must by all means be underlined. Comrade Marosán has said that Dudás was in close contact with Imre Nagy and executed his instructions.¹⁷¹ His crime is unquestionably great, he deserves the death penalty, but the matter does not need to be rushed. It is better if we have living evidence in our hands. If he is executed, the enemy can later claim that false testimony was forced from him. If he lives, on the other hand, his punishment can be lessened if he makes a full confession. We have to recognize that there are three strata in society: the first consciously supports us, the second is the enemy, who are against us, and the third is neutral; this third stratum, which cannot see clearly, is the widest. It is in our interest to maintain the support of the masses. Ideally we can educate

¹⁶⁹ The Hungarian delegation left the U.N. General Assembly on December 11, 1956, arguing that the body was not handling the Hungarian question in the spirit of the U.N. charter.

¹⁷⁰ U.S. Minister Edward T. Wailes arrived to Budapest on November 2, 1956. Following his government's instructions, he refused to present his credentials to the Kádár government. As a result, he was declared persona non grata and forced to leave the country on February 22, 1957.

¹⁷¹ This statement is inaccurate. Although József Dudás did indeed meet with Imre Nagy on October 30, and accepted him as prime minister, he did not agree with Nagy's evaluation of the revolution's achievements and the emphasis on establishing peace and order as the top priority.

them with facts. We have to take especially great care with this, because we can only solve our problems with the support of the masses; it is not enough to rely on armed force [karhatalom]. If we sentence him to death as he deserves, we should at least not carry out the sentence, so that we can later use him as a living witness.

Kádár: Dudás was one of the organizers and military leaders of the armed uprising. There are many arguments to support his execution. Many smaller culprits have already been punished. At the same time the authorities have quite a few people in hand who can testify to Imre Nagy's role as a traitor. If the leaders are not punished, then the masses will not be shown that this government seriously wants to settle the score with the counterrevolution. Imre Nagy's role as a traitor is increasingly clear and increasingly demonstrable.

Zhou Enlai: Are you holding an open trial?

Kádár: No, we are holding a closed military trial.

Marosán: 47 witnesses have testified.

Zhou Enlai: Did Dudás recognize his guilt?

Kádár: Yes. During the trial a lot of information concerning Imre Nagy came to light, which we do not want to spread. There was a lot of information about Yugoslavia as well.

Zhou Enlai: Trustworthy cadres, like those who were at the assembly, could take part in the trials, and propagate suitable ideas among the masses. Of course, from our side this is merely advice; you know the situation better. Experience in China has shown that it is advantageous to divide the enemy. This way they can be defeated more easily. If you allow the leading counterrevolutionaries to live, you can accumulate more material, and public trials will have a more educative effect.

Kádár: There are other defendants who can perhaps testify to Imre Nagy's guilt even more effectively.

He Long: We also executed less important people, while keeping many leaders alive. When necessary we asked them for information; they were like a living encyclopedia.

Kádár: We have understood your thinking, but our situation is very complicated. Among those in custody is the former chief of police, whose relationship with Imre Nagy was even closer than that of Dudás.

Marosán: He [Dudás] led the attacks on the Foreign Ministry, the offices of Szabad Nép, and on Party Headquarters, and was the leader of one of the centers of the counterrevolution. We have not yet impeached any of the leaders of the attack on Party Headquarters.

Münnich: If the leading counterrevolutionaries are executed, then the strength of the counterrevolution would be considerably lessened, and weapons would be handed in much more quickly.

After this the discussion turned to the modification of certain phrases in the joint declaration, and with that the meeting drew to a close.

[Source: MOL, XIX-J-1-j. 4. d., pp. 1-8. Published in Tibor Zinner, "...hogy megkönnyítsék a Nagy kormány likvidálását...": Három dokumentum Nagy Imre és köre 1956 november 4. utáni történetéhez." Társadalmi Szemle 44, No. 12 (1989): pp. 93-98. Translated by David Evans.]