

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON



October 2, 1952

TOP SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION

Dear Mr. Draper:

I am enclosing for your use two copies of the summary minutes of the Chiefs of Mission meeting in London, September 24-26, 1952.

Sincerely yours,

W. J. McWilliams  
Director, Executive Secretariat

Enclosure:

Summary minutes of the  
Chiefs of Mission meeting,  
copies 28 and 29.

The Honorable  
William H. Draper, Jr.  
United States Special Representative  
in Europe,  
c/o American Embassy,  
Paris.

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U.S. Policy  
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WASHINGTON



OCT 30 1952

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Dear Mr. Draper:

I am enclosing two copies of a corrected page which should be inserted in the summary minutes of the Chiefs of Mission meeting in London, September 24-26, 1952. This page has been revised at Ambassador Gifford's request in order to reflect correctly his remarks with respect to joint efforts to improve the British economic situation.

Sincerely yours,

W. J. McWilliams  
Director, Executive Secretariat

Enclosure:

Revised page 4, summary minutes  
of the Chiefs of Mission meeting,  
copies 28 and 29.

The Honorable  
William H. Draper, Jr.,  
United States Special Representative  
in Europe,  
c/o American Embassy,  
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A basic question involves the Middle East. The British have hinted that they might withdraw from the Middle East as they did from Greece. The U.S. should keep them in the picture and support their policy, particularly since the U.S. is not ready to take over the responsibility now exercised by the U.K.

There is no major problem in the current political situation. The Labor and Conservative parties have the same goals in the international fields but display a difference in emphasis in reaching them. The economic situation is serious in view of the import requirements. The Socialist system has slowed down incentives and has curtailed production. The curtailment makes it difficult for Britain to meet international competition. In addition, the working people are better off in Britain than ever before, although this does not apply to other classes of the population. This situation makes it difficult to bring about technological improvement and increased production.

The British are very sensitive about the decrease in their prestige. We should not formally or publicly engage in any joint enterprise, such as a joint study committee, designed to find a long range solution for the British economic situation. Joint enterprises should be avoided since future stability in the U.K. will involve many fundamental and painful political decisions.

Mr. Bruce stated that serious consideration will have to be given to long term policy after the close of the Commonwealth Conference and the inauguration of the new Administration in Washington. He pointed out that British prestige is lower in the Middle East than the British are willing to recognize. Many believe that the U.S. should take an active lead in formulating a new policy in the Middle East instead of following the British line. He doubted the ability of the U.S. to replace Britain in this area particularly in view of the extent of nationalist movements and the fact that anti-Westernism in the Middle East made no distinction between the U.K. and the U.S.

Mr. Korman stated that we could not let British prestige take a blow in this area. We cannot expect to be popular or to be liked in the Middle East, but we should be respected. We should demonstrate that we are interested in them and that we mean business in the protection of our interests. We should shift the emphasis in our policy in order to meet the situation. We should not rely on individuals in Middle East countries who are in contact with nationalistic movements except in the case of our own interests. We must recognize and fight the nationalist movements in the British position. The national movements in the Middle East should be recognized because of the effect on them if the British position. They should not be motivated by

Alexander Dorn

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