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Statement by
George V. Allen, Director, U. S. Information Agency
at the
National Security Council, July 24, 1958

Mr. Allen said he thought one consideration to be kept in mind

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(a)(5) [REDACTED] is the fact that many people in Jordan, particularly among the refugees on the West Bank, are accustomed to listening to Radio Cairo. If they are suddenly deprived of permission to hear it, their resentment against the Government in Amman would be increased, possibly enough to tip the scales toward revolt.

(a)(3) [REDACTED] Mr. Allen said that he thought the worst thing we could do from a public relations standpoint at this moment would be to become involved in Jordan. In his opinion we should face the fact frankly that we are already having great difficulty in gaining public support, world-wide, for sending U. S. troops into Lebanon. While he thought there was a good possibility of solving the Lebanese dispute and of withdrawing our troops with dignity and honor, he did not believe there was as much popular support for the present regime in Jordan as had existed for the previous regime in Iraq, and that consequently, foreign intervention in Jordan could never be justified in world opinion. He pointed out that Jordan is a synthetic country created artificially after

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
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World War I, with no historic roots. Efforts to prop up the regime there were therefore doubly difficult. He believed further political changes in the Middle East were inevitable and that we should be prepared to adjust to them. He thought American oil companies had shown remarkable ability to adjust to changing situations in various parts of the world and that in Iraq they have an opportunity today to establish a firmer foundation for their operations than they ever had during the previous regime, which was always teetering because of the lack of basic support among the people.



(a)(3)

Mr. Allen said that the fact that these officials would not make such statements publicly was an indication to him of the unsoundness of our reliance on individuals who were not able to express their views openly to their people. He read a report that the Sudanese Senate had recently passed a resolution unanimously condemning American and British landings in the Middle East. Unless the United States adopted a policy which had a wider popular base, he thought the Soviets would "beat us all hollow" in the propaganda game.

With reference to the statement that "hot heads" in Iraq had been prevented by leaders of the new regime from blowing up the ^{oil} pipe lines, Mr. Allen argued for an adjustment with nationalist forces in the Middle East now before it is too late. If we fail to do so, he feared hot heads

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