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Iraq and Weapons of Mass Destruction

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 80

Updated - February 11, 2004

Edited by Jeffrey Richelson

Originally posted December 20, 2002
Previously updated February 26, 2003

Documents - Press release - Further reading

Between Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, and the commencement of military action in January 1991, then President George H.W. Bush raised the specter of the Iraqi pursuit of nuclear weapons as one justification for taking decisive action against Iraq. In the then-classified National Security Directive 54, signed on January 15, 1991, authorizing the use of force to expel Iraq from Kuwait, he identified Iraqi use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) against allied forces as an action that would lead the U.S. to seek the removal of Saddam Hussein from power. (Note 1)

In the aftermath of Iraq's defeat, the U.S.-led U.N. coalition was able to compel Iraq to agree to an inspection and monitoring regime, intended to insure that Iraq dismantled its WMD programs and did not take actions to reconstitute them. The means of implementing the relevant U.N. resolutions was the Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM). That inspection regime continued until December 16, 1998 - although it involved interruptions, confrontations, and Iraqi attempts at denial and deception - when UNSCOM withdrew from Iraq in the face of Iraqi refusal to cooperate, and harassment.

Subsequent to George W. Bush's assumption of the presidency in January 2001, the U.S. made it clear that it would not accept what had become the status quo with respect to Iraq - a country ruled by Saddam Hussein and free to attempt to reconstitute its assorted weapons of mass destruction programs. As part of their campaign against the status quo, which included the clear threat of the eventual use of military force against the Iraqi regime, the U.S. and Britain published documents and provided briefings detailing their conclusions concerning Iraq's WMD programs and its attempts to deceive other nations about those programs.

As a result of the U.S. and British campaign, and after prolonged negotiations between the United States, Britain, France, Russia and other U.N. Security Council members, the United Nations declared that Iraq would have to accept even more intrusive inspections than under the previous inspection regime - to be carried out by the U.N. Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) - or face "serious consequences." Iraq agreed to accept the U.N. decision and inspections resumed in late November 2002. On December 7, 2002, Iraq submitted its 12,000 page declaration, which claimed that it had no current WMD programs. Intelligence analysts from the United States and other nations immediately began to scrutinize the document, and senior U.S. officials quickly rejected the claims. (Note 2)

Over the next several months, inspections continued in Iraq, and the chief inspectors, Hans Blix (UNMOVIC) and Mohammed El Baradei (IAEA) provided periodic updates to the U.N. Security Council concerning the extent of Iraqi cooperation, what they had or had not discovered, and what they believed remained to be done. During that period the Bush administration, as well as the Tony Blair administration in the United Kingdom, charged that Iraq was not living up to the requirement that it fully disclose its WMD activities, and declared that if it continued along that path, "serious consequences" - that is, invasion - should follow.

The trigger for military action preferred by the British government, other allies, and at least some segments of the Bush administration, was a second U.N. resolution that would authorize an armed response. Other key U.N. Security Council members - including France, Germany, and Russia - argued that the inspections were working and that the inspectors should be allowed to continue. When it became apparent that the Council would not approve a second resolution, the United States and Britain terminated their attempts to obtain it. Instead, they, along with other allies, launched Operation Iraqi Freedom on March 19, 2003 - a military campaign that quickly brought about the end of Saddam Hussein's regime and ultimately resulted in his capture. (Note 3)

As U.S. forces moved through Iraq, there were initial reports that chemical or biological weapons might have been uncovered, but closer examinations produced negative results. In May 2003, the Bush administration decided to establish a specialized group of about 1,500 individuals, the Iraq Survey Group (ISG), to search the country for WMD - replacing the 75th Exploitation Task Force, which had originally been assigned the mission. Appointed to lead the Group, whose motto is "find, exploit, eliminate," was Maj. Gen. Keith Dayton, the head of the Defense Intelligence Agency's Directorate of Operations. In June, David Kay, who served as a U.N. weapons inspector after Operation Desert Storm, was appointed special advisor and traveled to Iraq to lead the search. (Note 4)

By the time of the creation of the ISG, and continuing to the date of this publication, a controversy has existed over the performance of U.S. (and British) intelligence in collecting and evaluating information about Iraqi weapons of mass destruction programs. The reliability of sources has been questioned. It has been suggested that some human intelligence may have been purposeful deception by the Iraqi intelligence and security services, while exiles and defectors may have provided other intelligence seeking to influence U.S. policy.

The quality of the intelligence analysis has also come under scrutiny. The failure to find weapons stocks or active production lines, undermining claims by the October 2002 NIE and both President Bush and Secretary of State Colin Powell (Document 16, Document 27), has been one particular cause for criticism. Controversy has also centered around specific judgments - in the United States with regard to assessments of Iraq's motives for seeking high-strength aluminum tubes, and in the United Kingdom with respect to the government's claim that Iraq sought to acquire uranium from Africa. Post-war evaluation of captured material, particularly two mobile facilities that the CIA and DIA judged to be biological weapons laboratories, has also been the subject of dispute. (Note 5)

In addition, members of Congress and Parliament, as well as potential political opponents and outside observers have criticized the use of intelligence by the Bush and Blair administrations. Charges have included outright distortion, selective use of intelligence, and exertion of political pressure to influence the content of intelligence estimates in order to provide support to the decision to go to war with Iraq. (Note 6)

The material presented in this electronic briefing book includes both essential pre-war documentation and documents produced or released subsequent to the start of military action in March 2003. Pre-war documentation includes the major unclassified U.S. and British assessments of Iraq's WMD programs; the IAEA and UNSCOM reports covering the final period prior to their 1998 departure, and between November 27, 2002, and February 2003; the transcript of a key speech by President Bush; a statement of U.S. policy toward combating WMD; the transcript of and slides for Secretary Powell's presentation to the U.N. on February 5, 2003; and documents from the 1980s and 1990's concerning various aspects of Iraqi WMD activities.

Key documentation related to the controversy that has become available in recent months makes up almost of all of the 14 additional documents contained in this updated briefing book. These records include:

  • The full Top Secret key judgments section of the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq's Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction (Document 15)
  • The CIA-DIA evaluation of two specialized tractor-trailers (Document 32)
  • Reviews by the British parliamentary committees concerning the quality and use of intelligence on Iraq by the British government (Document 34, Document 36)
  • David Kay's unclassified statement on the ISG's interim findings (Document 39)
  • Congressional critiques of U.S. intelligence performance (Document 37, Document 41)
  • Administration rebuttals of those and other critiques. (Document 35, Document 38, Document 40, Document 43).

Much that is of interest concerning intelligence and Iraqi weapons of mass destruction has appeared in articles, monographs, and studies published by magazines or research groups. A list of key publications is provided immediately after the notes section. Other important materials have been posted temporarily on government web sites. The documentation provided in this briefing book collects many of the most significant of these records in one place, allowing readers to substantially augment their understanding of the issues by directly comparing the different sources and conclusions, and ensuring that these materials will be accessible for the long term.

Note: The following documents are in PDF format.
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Read the Documents

Document 1: Interagency Intelligence Assessment, Implications of Israeli Attack on Iraq, July 1, 1981. Secret.

Source: CIA Electronic Reading Room, released under the Freedom of Information Act

On June 7, 1981, in an attempt to prevent Iraqi acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability, Israeli aircraft bombed Iraq's Osirak nuclear reactor, before it became operational. This assessment, produced by the CIA and other U.S. intelligence agencies, examines Arab reactions to the attack as well as both the immediate and short-term repercussions of the pre-emptive strike.

Document 2: CIA, Iraq's National Security Goals, December 1988. Secret.

Source: CIA Electronic Reading Room, released by Mandatory Declassification Review

Written after the conclusion of the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War, this CIA survey examined Saddam Hussein's likely regional and international objectives and strategies - including his relations with other Arab states and the PLO, his desire to reduce Iraqi dependence on the USSR, and his goal of preventing closer ties between the US and USSR and Iran. With respect to weapons of mass destruction, the analysis briefly discusses Iraqi attitudes toward chemical and nuclear weapons. The first are considered a "short-term fix," while the latter represent "the long-term deterrent."

Document 3: CIA, Iraqi Ballistic Missile Developments, July 1990. Top Secret

Source: CIA Electronic Reading Room, released under the Freedom of Information Act

During the Persian Gulf War, Iraq made extensive use of its Scud missile force to attack both Israel and Saudi Arabia - a Scud that hit a U.S. barracks in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, killed 28 U.S. servicemen. This paper completed a month prior to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait noted that "Iraq has the most aggressive and advanced ballistic missile development program in the Arab world" and that it already had two modified versions of the Scud B - the Al Husayn and Al Abbas.

The paper examines the origins, development, and results of the Iraqi missile program - in the form of the Scud B and its variants. It also examines warhead options - including chemical, biological, and nuclear. In addition, it discusses Iraq's missile production infrastructure as well as foreign assistance to the missile program.

Document 4: Central Intelligence Agency, Prewar Status of Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction, March 1991, Top Secret.

Source: Freedom of Information Act

This study, completed by the CIA's Office of Scientific and Weapons Research after the conclusion of the first Persian Gulf War, examined the status of the four components of Iraq's WMD programs -- chemical weapons, biological weapons, nuclear weapons, and ballistic missiles -- as of January 15, 1991, the day President George H.W. Bush signed National Security Directive 54, authorizing the use of force to drive Iraqi forces from Kuwait.

The report asserted that Iraq apparently believed that it needed chemical weapons both as a deterrent and to fulfill its role as "protector" of the Arab world. There were strong indications, according to the report, that Iraq was prepared to use chemical weapons in any conflict with the United States. The author(s) characterized Iraq's biological weapons program as "the most extensive in the Arab world." With respect to nuclear weapons, the report concluded that Iraq probably had the capability, if combined with clandestinely acquired foreign technology, to develop nuclear weapons in the late 1990s. Iraq's ballistic missile program was "the most advanced in the Arab world," the report also concluded.

Document 5: CIA, Project Babylon: The Iraqi Supergun, November 1991. Secret.

Source: CIA Electronic Reading Room, released by Mandatory Declassification Review

From 1988 to 1990, Iraq was involved in an unusual weapons program, codenamed Project Babylon. The project's objective was the development and production of several large caliber guns, including a 1,000-millimeter-diameter supergun. In addition, the project included development of both conventional and rocket projectiles for the gun. The gun was intended to deliver the explosive devices to military and economic targets up to 620 miles away. The project was being managed for Iraq by a foreign company, Space Research Corporation, headed by Gerald Bull.

By early 1990, a 350-mm-diameter version of the gun had been successfully built and tested. In addition, many of the components for the 1,000-mm. gun and two other 350-mm guns had been delivered to Iraq. In March 1990, Bull was murdered. The following month, the United Kingdom customs service seized the final eight sections that were to be used in the 1,000-mm. gun barrel. Other nations followed by seizing other components of the supergun. The seizures prevented Iraq from completing the project. In July 1991, after initial denials, Iraq acknowledged the project. In October 1991, Project Babylon components were destroyed under U.N. supervision.

This document discusses the rationale, origins, technical details, and history of Project Babylon.

Document 6: CIA, Iraqi BW Mission Planning, 1992. Secret.

Source: CIA Electronic Reading Room, released under the Freedom of Information Act

This information report states that in the fall of 1990, Saddam Hussein ordered that plans be drawn up for the airborne delivery of an unspecified biological agent. The probable target was Israel. The plan envisioned a conventional air raid employing three MiG-21s, to be followed by another raid involving three MiGs and a SU-22 aircraft that would disperse the biological agent.The first mission was shot down over the Persian Gulf and "no efforts were made to find another method to deliver the BW agent."

Document 7: United Nations, Note by the Secretary General, October 8, 1997 w/att: Letter dated 6 October 1997 from the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency to the Secretary General.

Source: http://www.iaea.org

Part of one of the report describes the work done by the IAEA, during the period April 1, 1997 to October 1, 1997 in montoring and verifying Iraqi compliance with the nuclear disarmament provisions of U.N. resolution 687 (1991). It includes an extensive summary of the technical discussions between IAEA and Iraq. The second part of the report provides an overview of IAEA activities since 1991 related to on-site inspection of Iraqi's nuclear capabilities and the destruction, removal, or neutralization of Iraqi nuclear weapons or nuclear-weapons related material or facilities.

Document 8: United Nations, Note by the Secretary General, October 6, 1998 w/att: Report of the Executive Chairman of the activities of the Special Commission established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9(b) (i) of the resolution 687 (1991).

Source: http://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/sres98-920.htm

This report from the executive chairman of the UN Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) covers developments in the relationship between Iraq and the Commission, priority issues with respect to disarmament, and ongoing monitoring and verification activities through October 11, 1998. Two months later, on December 16, UNSCOM, in the face of Iraqi refusal to cooperate, withdrew its staff from Iraq.

Document 9: United Nations Security Council, Letter Dated 8 February 1999 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council, February 9, 1999 w/enc: Report of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency in connection with the panel on disarmament and current and future ongoing monitoring and verification issues (S/1999/100).

Source: http://www.iaea.org

This report summarizes the status of the International Atomic Energy Agency's implementation of U.N. Security Council resolutions concerning the dismantling of Iraq's nuclear program as of February 1999 - two months after U.N. inspectors were withdrawn from Iraq. It includes an examination of the remaining questions and concerns and their impact on the IAEA's ability to develop a "technically coherent picture of Iraq's clandestine nuclear weapons [program] and on the IAEA's technical ability to fully implement its OMV [on-site monitoring and verification] program."

Specific questions and concerns noted in the report include: lack of certain technical documentation, external assistance to Iraq's clandestine nuclear weapons program, and Iraq's inability to provide documentation showing the timing and modalities of its alleged abandonment of its nuclear weapons program.

Document 10a: Forged correspondence to Minister of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Niger, concerning visit to Niger by Iraqi ambassador to the Vatican, February 1, 1999.

Document 10b: Forged correspondence within Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Niger, concerning transfer of uranium to Iraq, July 30, 1999.

Document 10c: Forged letter to the President, Republic of Niger, concerning agreement to supply 500 tons of uranium per year to Iraq, July 27, 2000.

Document 10d: Forged letter to the Niger Ambassador to Italy, concerning protocol of agreement to supply uranium to Iraq, October 10, 2000.

Source: Documents provided by journalist

The only publicly acknowledged evidence for the claim that Iraq had tried to acquire uranium from Africa, which President Bush made in his January 28, 2003 State of the Union address, based on British intelligence information, are these documents that were claimed to have been official correspondence involving officials of the Republic of Niger. The charge that Iraq had sought to purchase uranium had been deleted from a previous speech due to the CIA's objection that the information had not been confirmed.

Documents 10a-10d were all determined to be crude forgeries - which included names and titles that did not match the individuals who held office at the time the letters were purportedly written - although the British government has insisted it has additional information that would support the claim that Iraq was seeking to purchase uranium. The inclusion of the claim in the State of the Union despite its removal from an earlier speech, combined with the revelation of the forged documents, produced further criticism of the Bush administration and CIA Director George Tenet. Tenet, and then the president, took responsibility for the inclusion of the unvetted information. An FBI investigation into the apparent forgery that commenced in the spring of 2003 is now "at a critical stage" according the Washington Post (Mike Allen and Susan Schmidt, "Bush Aides Testify in Leak Probe," Washington Post, Tuesday, February 10, 2004; Page A01).

Document 11: UK Joint Intelligence Committee, Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Assessment of the British Government, September 2002. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.pm.gov.uk

This extensive analysis of Iraqi WMD programs was produced by the British Government's Joint Intelligence Committee, which is responsible for overseeing the production of national and strategic intelligence. One part of the document focuses on Iraqi chemical, biological, nuclear, and ballistic missile programs for the years 1971-1998 and in the post-inspection era (1998-2002). Other parts of the document concern the history of UN weapons inspections and "Iraq under Saddam Hussein."

In the foreword, Prime Minister Tony Blair writes (p.3) that "In recent months, I have been increasingly alarmed by the evidence from inside Iraq that ... Saddam Hussein is continuing to develop WMD, and with them the ability to inflict real damage upon the region, and the stability of the world."

Document 12: Defense Intelligence Agency, Iraq - Key WMD Facilities - An Operational Support Study, September 2002 (Extract) Unclassified.

Source: http://www.dia.mil

This extract is part of a larger DIA study, produced for the United States Central Command to assist it in planning military operations. It notes the absence of reliable information on whether Iraq was producing and stockpiling chemical weapons. The authors do express their belief that "Iraq retained production equipment, expertise and chemical precursors and can reconstitute a chemical warfare program in the absence of an international inspection regime." It also summarizes intelligence on possible chemical weapons activities, such as renovation of two facilities formerly associated with the Iraqi chemical weapons program.

Document 13: U.S. State Department, A Decade of Deception and Defiance, September 12, 2002. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.whitehouse.gov

Three pages of this document focus on U.S. charges concerning Iraqi failure to comply with the restrictions pertaining to weapons of mass destruction placed upon it as a result of the Persian Gulf War. It charges, inter alia, that "Iraq is believed to be developing ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometers - as prohibited by UN Security Council Resolution 687" and "Iraq has stepped up its quest for nuclear weapons and has embarked on a worldwide hunt for materials to make an atomic bomb." With respect to chemical weapons, it charges that "Iraq has not accounted for hundreds of tons of chemical precursors and tens of thousands of unfilled munitions, including Scud variant missile warheads."

Document 14: CIA, Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs, October 2002, Unclassified.

Source: http://www.cia.gov

Issued a month after the British assessment (see Document 8), this CIA study is the unclassified version of a Top Secret National Intelligence Estimate completed shortly before its release. The study contains analysis, maps, tables, and some satellite photographs of apparent Iraqi WMD sites.

Among the study's key judgments is the statement that "Iraq has continued its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs in defiance of UN resolutions and restrictions. Baghdad has chemical and biological weapons as well as missiles with ranges in execess of UN restrictions; if left unchecked, it probably will have a nuclear weapon during this decade."

Document 15: Director of Central Intelligence, National Intelligence Estimate, Iraq's Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, October 2002. Top
Secret (Extract).

Source: The White House

In response to the post-war controversy over U.S. intelligence estimates of Iraqi WMD programs, the White House released the entire key judgments section of the Top Secret October 2002 national intelligence estimate on the subject. (An unclassified version of the NIE had been released that same month, see Document 14).

The estimate concluded that Iraq continued its weapons of mass destruction programs despite U.N. resolutions and sanctions and that it was in possession of chemical and biological weapons as well as missiles with ranges exceeding U.N. imposed limits. In addition, it was judged that Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear weapons program and, if left unchecked, would probably have a nuclear weapon before the end of the decade - assuming it had to produce the fissile material indigenously. If Iraq could acquire sufficient fissile material from abroad it could construct a nuclear weapon within several months to a year, the estimate reported.

With regard to both chemical and biological weapons, the NIE reported not only that Iraq had maintained stocks of the weapons but was actively engaged in production. The released section contains the assessment, based at least in part on human intelligence, that "Baghdad has begun renewed production of" a variety of chemical weapons - mustard gas, sarin, cyclosarin, and VX. It also stated that all key aspects of Iraq's offensive biological weapons program were active - including R&D, production, and weaponization - and that most components were larger and more advanced than they were before the Gulf War. It also reported that Iraq possessed mobile facilities for producing bacterial and toxin biological warfare agents.

The estimate also examined Iraq's possible willingness to engage in terrorist strikes against the U.S. homeland and whether Saddam would assist al-Qaeda in conducting additional attacks on U.S. territory. Iraq would probably attempt clandestine attacks in the United States if it feared an attack that threatened the survival of the regime were imminent or unavoidable, probably with biological agents, according to the NIE. In addition, in the event that Saddam concluded that al-Qaeda was the only organization that could conduct the type of terrorist strike against the U.S. that he wished to see take place, he might take "the extreme step of assisting the Islamist terrorists."

The released key judgments section is also notable for its reporting of dissents within the Intelligence Community on two related issues - when Iraq could acquire a nuclear weapon, and its motive in seeking to obtain high-strength aluminum tubes. The State Department's Bureau of Intelligence Research (INR) argued that while Saddam wished to acquire a nuclear weapon, it did not believe that Iraq's recent activities made a compelling case that a comprehensive attempt to acquire nuclear weapons was being made. INR, along with the Department of Energy, questioned whether the high-strength aluminum tubes Iraq had been attempting to acquire were well-suited for use in gas centrifuges used for uranium enrichment.

Document 16: The White House, "President Bush Outlines Iraqi Threat," October 7, 2002. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.whitehouse.gov

This speech, given by President Bush at the Cincinnati Museum Center, presents his administration's view concerning the threat from Iraq. It discusses Iraqi chemical, biological, ballistic missile, and nuclear programs - as well as concerns about possible Iraqi connections to international terrorist groups. With respect to how close Iraq is to developing a nuclear weapon, Bush notes that "we don't know exactly, and that's the problem." He went on to state that "If the Iraqi regime is able to produce, buy, or steal an amount of highly enriched uranium a little larger than a single softball, it could have a nuclear weapon in less than a year."

Document 17: Letter, George J. Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence, to Senator Bob Graham, Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, October 7, 2002. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.globalsecurity.org

This letter from the DCI provided an unclassified CIA assessment of Saddam Hussein's willingness to use weapons of mass destruction. According to the letter, Iraq "for now appears to be drawing a line short of conducting terrorist attacks with conventional or ... chemical and biological weapons against the United States," but if "Saddam should conclude that a U.S.-led attack could no longer be deterred, he probably would become much less constrained in adopting terrorist actions." The letter also discusses the question of Iraqi links to Al-Qaeda and the basis for U.S. assessments of the links.

Document 18: DoD, Iraqi Denial and Deception for Weapons of Mass Destruction & Ballistic Missile Programs, October 8, 2002. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.defenselink.mil

The day after President Bush's Cincinnati speech (Document 12), the Defense Department provided a briefing on Iraqi denial and deception activities with respect to their WMD programs. These slides were used in the presentation. They include a variety of satellite photographs (from commercial as well as a intelligence satellites), tables, and charts that concern Iraq's assorted programs and select facilities (for example, the Abu Ghurayb BW Facility). In addition, the presentation focused on Iraq's denial and deception strategy and concealment apparatus.

Document 19: George W. Bush, National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, December 2002. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.whitehouse.gov

This strategy document is an unclassified extract of Top Secret National Security Presidential Directive 17.(2) The unclassified version asserts that "We will not permit the world's most dangerous regimes and terrorists to threaten us with the world's most destructive weapons." It also notes that "because deterrence may not succeed ... U.S. military forces and appropriate civilian agencies must have the capability to defend against WMD-armed adversaries, including in appropriate cases through pre-emptive measures."

Document 20: Table of Contents, Currently Accurate, Full and Complete Declaration December 7, 2002, w/covering letter from Mohammed A. Aldouri, Permanent Representative to the U.N.

Source: http://www.fas.org

This table of contents describes the content of the report submitted by Iraq to the United Nations with regard to its nuclear, chemical, biological, and missile programs, as required by U.N.Security Council Resolution 1441. It shows the varied methods Iraq used in trying to produce nuclear material suitable for a weapon as well as the large number of sites involved in the nuclear program.

Document 21: Kenneth Katzman, Congressional Research Service, Iraq: Weapons Threat, Compliance, Sanctions, and U.S. Policy, December 10, 2002. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.house.gov/shays/CRS/CRSProducts.htm

This paper, updated from an earlier version, discusses a number of issues concerning Iraq. Outside of the WMD area, it examines human rights/war crime issues, international terrorism, Iraq-Kuwait issues, reparation payments, sanctions, and the oil-for- food program. With respect to weapons of mass destruction, it focuses largely on the U.N. resolutions placing limits on Iraqi WMD programs and the work of U.N. inspectors in attempting to monitor Iraqi chemical, biological, missile, and nuclear programs.

Document 22 : Department of State, Fact Sheet: Illustrative Examples of Omissions From the Iraqi Declaration to the United Nations Security Council, December 19, 2002.

Source: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/16118pf.htm

At a December 19 press conference, Secretary of State Colin Powell stated that U.S. experts found the Iraqi declaration "to be anything but currently accurate, full, or complete." He also charged that the declaration "totally fails to meet the resolution's requirements." The same day the State Department issued a fact sheet providing several examples of omissions from the declaration.

Document 23 : Hans Blix, An Update on Inspection, January 27, 2003.

Source: http://www.un.org

In Resolution 1441, adopted in November 2002, the U.N. Security Council called for progress reports from UNMOVIC and the IAEA two months after renewing inspections in Iraq. As head of UNMOVIC, Blix is responsible for overseeing inspections whose objective is to verify Iraqi chemical and biological warfare disarmament. Part of Blix's report reviews the sequence and content of U.N. resolutions dealing with the disarmament of Iraq.

The key part of his paper, however, deals with the extent of Iraqi cooperation - with regard to both substance and process. With regard to process, while he states that "Iraq has on the whole cooperated rather well so far with UNMOVIC in this field," he does note a number of problems, including Iraq's refusal to guarantee the safety of proposed U.N. U-2 overflights as well as it insistence on sending helicopters into the no-fly zone to transport the Iraqis who serve as the inspectors minders. In addition, Blix notes "some recent disturbing incidents and harassment."

With regard to cooperation on substance, Blix's report is more negative, noting that Iraq has failed to engage in the "active" cooperation called for in Resolution 1441. He questions Iraqi claims concerning the quality, quantity, and disposition of VX nerve gas produced by Iraq as well as claims that Iraq destroyed 8, 500 liters of anthrax. In addition, he reports that Iraq has tested two missiles in excess of the permitted range of 150 kilometers.

The final portion of the report specifies how the inspection process can be made more fruitful - including the turning over of more relevant documents, lists of key personnel, and the facilitation of credible interviews.

Document 24: Dr. Mohammed ElBaradei, The Status of Nuclear Inspections in Iraq, January 27, 2003 w/att: IAEA Update Report for the Security Council Pursuant to Resolution 1441 (2002), January 27, 2003.

Source: http://www.iaea.org

While UNMOVIC handled inspections relating to chemical and biological weapons, the IAEA was charged with trying to verify Iraqi nuclear disarmament. This report from the IAEA director ElBaradei's update report provides background on previous resolutions, the IAEA's findings before the end of inspections in 1998, and his agency's activities since the resumption of the inspection regime on November 27.

The review of agency activities addresses the establishment of a Baghdad field office, Iraq's declarations pertaining to the status of its nuclear program, the request for and discovery of relevant documents, the inventory of nuclear material, ongoing monitoring, interviews, and specific issues raised by states - including the U.S. charge that aluminum tubes procured by Iraq were intended for use in centrifuges.

While in his cover letter ElBaradei observes that "we have to date found no evidence that Iraq has revived its nuclear weapons programme since the elimination of the programme in the 1990s," in the update report it is also noted that "little progress has been made in resolving the questions and concerns that remained as of 1998" and that "further verification activities will be necessary before the IAEA will be able to provide credible assurance that Iraq has no nuclear weapons programme."

Document 25: Colin L. Powell, Briefing on the Iraq Weapons Inspectors' 60-Day Report: Iraqi Non-Cooperation and Defiance of the UN, January 27, 2003.

Source: http://www.state.gov

The same day that Blix and ElBaradei addressed the UN, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell gave a short briefing to reporters on the U.S. view of those reports, followed by a question and answer session. Powell noted the statement by Blix that "Iraq appears not to have come to a genuine acceptance, not even today, of the disarmament that was demanded of it." The secretary went on to mention several specific issues, including Iraqi failure to account for the anthrax and VX it had produced, as well as the development of missiles exceeding the allowed range. Powell also noted impediments to the work of the inspectors, including "a swarm of Iraqi minders," an incomplete list of Iraqi personnel involved in WMD programs, and the inability of the inspectors to interview Iraqi scientists in private.

Document 26: The White House, What Does Disarmament Look Like?, January 2003.

Source: http://www.whitehouse.gov

As part of pressing its case that Iraq was not truly willing to disarm, the Bush administration released this short paper contrasting the nuclear disarmament process in three other countries - South Africa, the Ukraine, and Kazakhstan - with Iraqi behavior. It identified several characteristics of importance - high level political commitment, national initiatives to dismantle weapons of mass destruction, and full cooperation and transparency. It then asserts that "the behavior of the Iraqi regime contrasts sharply with successful disarmament examples." It goes on to note the activities of several Iraqi organizations, including the Special Security Organization, and the National Monitoring Directorate, and the areas where Iraq's "currently accurate, full, and complete" declaration" falls short - including with respect to biological agents, ballistic missiles, and attempts to procure uranium.

Document 27: Colin L. Powell, Remarks to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003.

Source: http://www.state.gov

In the face of requests and demands that the U.S. provide further evidence in support of its position that Iraq was failing to comply with U.N. resolution 1441, was impeding the work of UNMOVIC and IAEA inspectors, and that a resort to military force would be necessary unless Iraq's behavior changed, Secretary of State Colin Powell addressed the U.N. Security Council. The bulk of Powell's remarks, as contained in the transcript, involved his provision of "additional information [about] what the United States knows about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, as well as Iraq's involvement in terrorism ..."

The intelligence provided came from a variety of sources - including satellite imagery, communications intercepts, human assets in Iraq, detainees, and defectors. It represents the largest single public disclosure of such information made in support of U.S. diplomacy - surpassing the scope and volume of disclosures made during the Cuban missile crisis or the campaign in response to the Soviet Union's shootdown of KAL 007 in 1983.

The transcript contains Powell's reading of intercepts, and his description of the content of satellite imagery being shown to the Security Council. It also contains his description of organizations and activities, information about which was obtained from human sources and/or unspecified communications intelligence - such as the existence of a "Higher Committee for Monitoring the Inspections Teams" as well as the presence of Al-Qaida associates in Baghdad.

Document 28: Department of State, Iraq: Failing to Disarm - U.S. Secretary of State Powell's Presentation to the UN Security Council, February 5, 2003.

Source: http://www.state.gov

This Powerpoint presentation provided an overview of part of Secretary Powell's remarks. It contains a selected portion of intercepts concerning and a satellite image pertaining to Iraq's hiding of evidence, charges that Iraq is muzzling its scientists and specifications of how that is being done, the assertion that Iraq is still seeking nuclear weapons (with reference to intercepted aluminum tubes), and the charge that Iraq is harboring terrorists, including Al-Qaida representatives.

Document 29: U.S. Department of State, Iraq: Failing to Disarm, February 5, 2003.

Source: http://www.state.gov

These images constitute the full set of slides used by Secretary Powell in support of his presentation. They contain the full text presented of intercepts, all nine satellite images, and other slides.

Document 30 : Dr. Hans Blix, Briefing of the Security Council, February 14, 2003.

Source: http://www.un.org

In accordance with UN Resolution 1441, UNMOVIC chief Hans Blix delivered a progress on his organizations activities in Iraq, its findings, and Iraqi compliance with the resolution.

Blix noted that "so far UNMOVIC has not found any [weapons of mass destruction], only a small number of chemical munitions which should have been declared and destroyed." However, he also noted that many proscribed programs had not been accounted for, a matter that he characterized as being of "great significance." He specifically mentioned programs for the production of anthrax, VX nerve gas, and long-range missiles. He also noted the status of UNMOVIC investigations of the Al-Samoud and Al-Fatah missiles as well as casting chambers. With regard to Iraqi actions, he reported that Iraq had formed two commissions to search for relevant documents and that the National Monitoring Directorate had provided a list of 83 individuals who could allegedly verify destruction of chemical weapons and expresses his hope that Iraq will draw up a similar of individuals who participated in the destruction of biological warfare items.

Document 31 : Dr. Mohammed El Baradei, The Status of Nuclear Inspections in Iraq: 14 February 2003 Update, February 14, 2003.

Source: http://www.iaea.org

In his update report, the director of the IAEA noted that his agency's inspections had moved from the "reconnaissance phase" (aimed at re-establishing knowledge of Iraqi nuclear capabilities) into the "investigative phase" (achieving an understanding of Iraqi capabilities over the previous four years).

He also reported on the status of the inspection process - noting that in the preceding two weeks the IAEA had conducted 38 inspections at 19 sites, and that its methods included sampling air, water, and sediment, as well as the use of hand-held and car-borne gamma-ray detectors. With respect to specific issues he addressed, among others, uranium acquisition, uranium enrichment, and the high explosive, HMX.

Similarly to Blix, he reported that "we have to date found no evidence of nuclear or nuclear related activities in Iraq," but that "a number of issues are still under investigation." ElBaradei also noted that a new document provided by Iraq contained "no new information," and expressed the hope that the newly established Iraqi commissions "will be able to uncover documents and other evidence that could assist in clarifying … remaining questions."

Document 32: Central Intelligence Agency/Defense Intelligence Agency, Iraqi Mobile Biological Warfare Agent Production Plants, May 28, 2003. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.cia.gov

In his February 5, 2003, presentation to the U.N. Security Council, Secretary of State Colin Powell charged that Iraq had begun constructing mobile facilities to produce biological weapons in the mid-1990s. This program involved, he charged, the manufacture of mobile trailers and railcars to produce biological agents, designed to evade U.N. inspectors. Agent production reportedly took place from Thursday night through Friday, a period during which the United Nations did not conduct inspections due to the Muslim holiday.

This paper presents a joint CIA-DIA evaluation of two specialized tractor-trailers and a mobile laboratory truck discovered in Iraq after the U.S. invasion. Kurdish forces took one tractor-trailer into custody near Mosul in late April. U.S. troops discovered the other in early May, at the al-Kindi Research, Testing, Development, and Engineering Facility in Mosul. U.S. troops also found the mobile laboratory, in late April. The CIA and DIA analysts concluded that the discoveries constituted "the strongest evidence to date that Iraq was hiding a biological warfare program."

The text of this paper reviews the Intelligence Community's pre-war sources on the Iraqi mobile program (including a chemical engineer, a civil engineer, and a defector from the Iraqi Intelligence Service), and the Community's pre-war assessment of the program. The paper also asserts that the discovered plants are consistent with intelligence reports, and that legitimate uses, including hydrogen production, are unlikely.

According to a subsequent New York Times report, engineers from the Defense Intelligence Agency who examined the trailers concluded in June that the vehicles were probably used to produce hydrogen for artillery weather balloons, as the Iraqi had claimed.

Document 33 : CIA Statement on Recently Acquired Iraqi Centrifuge Equipment, June 26, 2003.

Source: http://www.cia.gov/cia/wmd/iraqi_centrifuge_equipment.htm

After Saddam Hussein's regime was deposed in March 2003, Dr. Mahdi Shukur Ubaydi, who headed Iraq's uranium enrichment program before 1991, turned over to U.S. officials in Baghdad a volume of centrifuge documents and components he had hidden in his garden.

This brief CIA statement reports on some of what Dr. Ubaydi told U.S. officials. The images, which were removed from the CIA's web page shortly after their initial appearance, include both photographs of centrifuge parts and blueprints.

Document 34: House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, The Decision to go to War in Iraq: Ninth Report of Session 2002-03, Volume I (London: The Stationary Office
Limited, July 2003). Unclassified.

Source: http://www.uk.gov

The primary purpose of this document is to report the committee's assessment of whether the British Parliament received "accurate and complete" information from the government in the period leading up to military action in Iraq - particularly with respect to weapons of mass destruction.

The two key sections of the report examine the claims made in the government's
September and February "dossiers," including assertions concerning Iraq's chemical and biological weapons capability, its long-range missile effort, its nuclear weapons program, Iraq's alleged attempt to acquire uranium from Africa, and the assertion that Iraqi forces could deploy chemical or biological weapons within 45 minutes of being given an order to do so.

The report also contains 33 conclusions and recommendations. The committee
concluded that the government genuinely perceived "a real and present danger" from Iraq, that in the absence of significant human intelligence Britain was heavily dependent on US technical intelligence, defectors, and exiles "with an agenda of their own," and that the accuracy of British assessments could not yet be determined.

Document 35: Statement by Director of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet on the 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq's Continuing Programs for Weapons of
Mass Destruction, August 11, 2003.

Source: http://cia.gov/cia/public_affairs/press_release/2003/pr08112003.htm

In the face of criticism in the press and Congress over the apparent disparities between the claims of the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi WMD and the failure to find weapons stocks or open production lines in the aftermath of the war, DCI Tenet issued this statement in defense of the estimate.

He characterizes much of the commentary as "misinformed, misleading, and just plain wrong," and goes on to state that "we stand by the judgments in the NIE," and promises that after the Iraq Survey Group completes its work, "but not before," the Intelligence Community, "will stand back to professionally review where were are."

Tenet's statement goes on to defend the consistency of the community's analysis concerning Iraqi programs as well as its collection efforts after the departure of U.N. inspectors in 1998. He then proceeds to examine intelligence performance with each component of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction programs - nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and delivery systems.

The most extensive part of his statement is a defense of the estimate's judgment that Iraq was seeking to reconstitute its nuclear weapons program. He states that this conclusion was based on six factors, which did not include its reported attempt to acquire uranium from Africa. In addition, he describes the alternative views within the Intelligence Community as to whether Iraq was attempting to obtain high-strength aluminum tubes for use in uranium enrichment or for conventional military uses.

Document 36: House of Commons Intelligence and Security Committee, Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction - Intelligence and Assessments (London: The Stationery Office Limited, September 2003). Unclassified.

Source: http://www.cabinet-office.gov.uk/reports/isc/

The House of Commons Intelligence and Security Committee defined the objective of their report as determining "whether the available intelligence, which informed the decision to invade Iraq, was adequate and properly assessed and whether it was accurately reflected in [British] Government publications."

The initial portions of the report provide overviews of the committee's investigation, of the intelligence assessment organizations (the Joint Intelligence Committee and Assessments Staff), and of JIC assessments from August 1990 to September 2002. The subsequent parts of the study focus on the September 2002 dossier (including the claims that Iraqi forces could deploy chemical or biological weapons within 45 minutes and had sought to purchase uranium from Africa), assessments from October 2002 to March 2003, the February 2003 document on Iraqi denial and deception (which included substantial portions, without attribution, from a previously published, non-governmental analysis), and several other issues, including intelligence support to U.N. inspectors.

The report includes twenty-six conclusions and recommendations concerning a variety of topics - including the adequacy of the Secret Intelligence Service's human intelligence effort in Iraq, whether it was reasonable that British intelligence analysts drew the conclusions they did given the available intelligence on Iraqi WMD programs, how quickly it appeared Iraqi forces could employ chemical or biological weapons, and decisions to include or exclude certain information or conclusions about Iraqi capabilities and the extent of the threat posed to Britain.

Document 37: Letter, Porter J. Goss and Jane Harman, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, to George J. Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence, September 25,
2003. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A36817-2003Oct2?language=printer

This letter criticizes the Intelligence Community's performance in providing intelligence related to Iraq's chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons programs, as well as with respect to Iraqi ties to al-Qaeda. Goss and Harman, the committee's chairman and vice chairman, respectively, write that a "dearth of post-1998 underlying intelligence reflects a weakness in intelligence collection" - pointing to past committee concerns about inadequacies in human intelligence (HUMINT) and measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT) crucial to producing accurate assessments on weapons of mass destruction and terrorism. The "lack of specific intelligence on regime plans and intentions, WMD, and Iraq's support to terrorist groups appears to have hampered the IC's ability to provide a better assessment to policymakers from 1998 through 2003."

Document 38: Letter, George J. Tenet to Honorable Porter J. Goss, October 1, 2003. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A36712-2003Oct2?language=printer

In this letter to Porter Goss, the chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet disputes the contents of the September 25 letter Tenet received from Goss and Committee Vice Chairman Jane Harman. He also criticizes the Committee's distribution of the letter to the press "before providing the Intelligence Community any reasonable opportunity to respond."

Tenet argues that the HPSCI was not in a position to fully assess the Intelligence Community's performance on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction programs or its ties to al-Qaeda. The Committee, Tenet charged, had reached its conclusions without having heard from David Kay, special advisor to the Iraq Survey Group - which had been charged with searching Iraq for weapons of mass destruction.

Further, Tenet charged that the Committee's assertion that the Intelligence Community did not challenge longstanding judgments and assessments was "simply wrong." He also accused the Committee of having failed to try to understand the scope of U.S. collection activities targeted against Iraqi WMD programs.

Document 39: Statement by David Kay on the Interim Progress Report of the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Defense, and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, October 2, 2003. Unclassified.

Source: http://cia.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/2003/david_kay_10022003.html

In the aftermath of Operation Iraqi Freedom, coalition forces failed to uncover production facilities for, or stocks of, weapons of mass destruction. To improve the chances of success, an Iraq Survey Group was established under the direction of Maj. Gen. Keith Dayton, the chief of the Defense Intelligence Agency's Directorate of Operations. Dr. David Kay, who served as a U.N. weapon inspector for several years after the 1991 Persian Gulf War, was appointed as a special advisor to the group, and would direct the group's operations in Iraq.

Kay's October 2 presentation to the Congressional committees provides an unclassified summary of the group's interim report. Kay told the attending members that the ISG had not yet found stocks of weapons, but was not at a point where it could be determined definitively that such weapons stocks did not exist or that they existed before the war but had been relocated.

Kay also noted a number of factors that had hindered the ISG's search - including the compartmentalization of Iraqi WMD programs, deliberate dispersion and destruction of material and documentation related to those programs, post-war looting, and a "far from permissive environment" for search activities.

In addition, Kay summarized some of the Survey Group's discoveries, which included: a clandestine network of laboratories and safe-houses controlled by the Iraqi Intelligence Services containing equipment suitable for CBW research; reference strains of biological organisms concealed in a scientists home; documents and equipment hidden in scientists' homes that could be used for resuming uranium enrichment activities; and a continuing covert capability to manufacture fuel propellant useful only for prohibited SCUD missiles.

Document 40 : Stuart Cohen, Iraq's WMD Programs: Culling Hard Facts from Soft Myths, November 26, 2003. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.cia.gov/nic/speeches_iraq_wmd.htm

The author of this essay served as acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was written. Cohen argues that "no reasonable person" who examined the "millions of pages" of information available would have reached "conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different" from those reached by the CIA and the nation's other intelligence agencies.

Cohen goes on to identify and dispute what he characterizes as ten myths concerning the October 2002 estimate, including "the estimate favored going to war," "analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush administration," divergent views were buried and uncertainties concealed, "major NIE judgments were based on single sources," and "analysts overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991."

Document 41: Congresswoman Jane Harman, "The Intelligence on Iraq's WMD: Looking Back to Look Forward," January 16, 2004.

Source: http://www.house.gov/harman/press/releases/2004/011604_WAC.html

This speech given by the Jane Harman (D-CA), the vice chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, characterized the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction programs as "significantly flawed." She singled out two specific conclusions - that Iraq possessed chemical and biological weapons, and that it was reconstituting its nuclear weapons program, noting that "these were the centerpieces of the NIE and of the case for war and it appears likely that both were wrong."

Harman went on to call for creation of a Director of National Intelligence who would serve as a member of the president's cabinet, increased collaboration within the intelligence community, and "virtual reorganization" - creating "task forces" through altered personnel policies and providing virtual workplaces.

Document 42: Transcript of David Kay testimony before Senate Armed Services Committee, January 28, 2004

Source: http://www.ceip.org/files/projects/npp/ pdf/Iraq/kaytestimony.pdf

David Kay appeared before the Senate Armed Services Committee shortly after he resigned as special advisor to the Iraq Survey Group. Kay states, referring to the expectation that there would be substantial stocks of, and production lines for, chemical and biological weapons in Iraq, that "we were almost all wrong, and I certainly include myself here." He also notes that other foreign intelligence agencies, including the French and the German, also had believed that Iraq possessed such stocks and production lines. In addition, he discusses the issue of whether political pressure had any impact on the content of the October 2002 national intelligence estimate (Document 15). Kay also notes that "based on the work of the Iraq Survey Group … Iraq was in clear violation of the terms of [U.N.] Resolution 1441. He goes on to note the discovery of hundreds of instances of activities prohibited by U.N. Resolution 687.

Document 43: George J. Tenet, Iraq and Weapons of Mass Destruction, remarks prepared for delivery at Georgetown University February 5, 2004.

Source: http://www.cia.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/2004/tenet_georgetownspeech_02052004.html

In the midst of the continuing post-war controversy over intelligence estimates of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction program, Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet gave this speech in which he addressed "how the United States intelligence community evaluated Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs over the past decade, leading to a National Intelligence Estimate in October of 2002."

In his talk, Tenet reviewed the "three streams of information" available concerning Iraqi WMD programs - Iraq's history, the inability of Iraq to account for weapons that it possessed at the time of the 1991 Gulf War, and information obtained after U.N. inspectors left Iraq in 1998. He also compared the estimate's descriptions of Iraqi WMD activities with what has been discovered by the Iraq Survey Group. He argued that "it would have been difficult for analysts to come to any different conclusions than the ones reached in October of 2002," but went on to say that "in our business that is not good enough."

Tenet also spoke about the role of U.S. and British intelligence in monitoring Libyan WMD, the activities of Pakistani nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan, and related topics.


1. George W. Bush, National Security Directive 54, Responding to Iraqi Aggression in the Gulf, January 15, 1991. Top Secret. See National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book Number 39, Operation Desert Storm: Ten Years After, January 17, 2001, Document 4.

2. See Sharon A. Squassoni, Congressional Research Service, Iraq: U.N. Inspections for Weapons of Mass Destruction, October 7, 2003, pp. 13-14.

3. Accounts of the war and the diplomatic battles prior to it, include Todd S. Purdum, A Time of Our Choosing: America's War in Iraq (New York: Times Books, 2003); William Shawcross, Allies: The U.S., Britain, Europe, and the War in Iraq (New York: Public Affairs, 2004).

4. James Risen, "U.S. Asks Ex-U.N. Inspector To Advise on Arms Search," New York Times, June 12, 2003, p. A14; Central Intelligence Agency, "DCI Tenet Announces Appointment of David Kay as Special Advisor," June 11, 2003, (available at www.cia.gov); Kenneth Gerhart, "The Changing Face of ISG's Home Base," Communique, July-August 2003, pp.5-7.

5. On the various element of the controversy, see Kenneth M. Pollack, "Spies, Lies, and Weapons: What Went Wrong," The Atlantic, January 2004, pp. 78-92; Joseph Cirincione, Jessica T. Matthews, and George Perkovich, WMD in Iraq: evidence and implications (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2004); Thomas Powers, "The Vanishing Case for War," New York Review of Books, December 4, 2003, pp. 12-17. With regard to the possibility that human sources knowingly provided false information on weapons of mass destruction as well as Saddam's whereabouts on the opening night of the war, see Bob Drogin, "U.S. Suspects It Received False Iraq Arms Tips," Los Angeles Times, August 28, 2003; Bill Gertz and Rowan Scarborough, "Inside the Ring," Washington Times, January 2, 2004, p. A7.

6. See note 5, the citations for Pollack; Cirincione, Matthews and Perkovich; and Powers.

7. Joby Warrick, "Some Evidence on Iraq Called Fake," Washington Post, March 8, 2003, pp. A1, A18.

8. Mike Allen and Barton Gellman, "Preemptive Strikes Part of U.S. Strategic Doctrine," Washington Post, December 11, 2002, pp. A1, A26.

9. Douglas Jehl, "Iraqi Trailers Said to Make Hydrogen Not Biological Arms," New York Times, August 9, 2003, pp. A1,

For Further Reading

David Albright, Iraq's Aluminum Tubes: Separating Fact from Fiction, December 5, 2003, (available at http://www.isis-online.org)

Joseph Cirincione, Jessica T. Matthews, and George Perkovich, WMD in Iraq: evidence and implications (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2004) (available at http://www.ceip.org)

Anthony Cordesman, Intelligence and Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Lessons from the Iraq War, July 1, 2003 (available at http://www.csis.org)

Barton Gellman, "Iraq's Arsenal Was Only on Paper," Washington Post, January 7, 2004, pp. A1, A14-A15.

International Institute for Strategic Studies, Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Net Assessment (London: IISS, September 2003).

Kenneth M. Pollack, "Spies, Lies, and Weapons: What Went Wrong," The Atlantic, January 2004, pp. 78-92 (also available at http://www.theatlantic.com)

Thomas Powers, "The Vanishing Case for War," New York Review of Books, December 4, 2003, pp. 12-17.


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