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Remarks to the United Nations Security Council Secretary Colin L. Powell New York City February 5, 2003 [full video; accompanying slide
presentations and video clips] SECRETARY POWELL: Thank you, Mr.
President. Mr. President and Mr. Secretary General, distinguished
colleagues, I would like to begin by expressing my thanks for the special
effort that each of you made to be here today. This is an important day
for us all as we review the situation with respect to Iraq and its
disarmament obligations under UN Security Council Resolution 1441.
Last November 8, this Council passed Resolution 1441 by a
unanimous vote. The purpose of that resolution was to disarm Iraq of its
weapons of mass destruction. Iraq had already been found guilty of
material breach of its obligations stretching back over 16 previous
resolutions and 12 years. Resolution 1441 was not dealing with an innocent party,
but a regime this Council has repeatedly convicted over the years.
Resolution 1441 gave Iraq one last chance, one last chance
to come into compliance or to face serious consequences. No Council member
present and voting on that day had any illusions about the nature and
intent of the resolution or what serious consequences meant if Iraq did
not comply. And to assist in its disarmament, we
called on Iraq to cooperate with returning inspectors from UNMOVIC and
IAEA. We laid down tough standards for Iraq to meet to allow the
inspectors to do their job. This Council placed the burden on Iraq to comply and
disarm, and not on the inspectors to find that which Iraq has gone out of
its way to conceal for so long. Inspectors are inspectors; they are not
detectives.
I asked for this session today for
two purposes. First, to support the core assessments made by Dr. Blix and
Dr. ElBaradei. As Dr. Blix reported to this Council on January 27, "Iraq
appears not to have come to a genuine acceptance, not even today, of the
disarmament which was demanded of it."
And as Dr. ElBaradei reported, Iraq's declaration of
December 7 "did not provide any new information relevant to certain
questions that have been outstanding since 1998." My second purpose today is to provide you with additional
information, to share with you what the United States knows about Iraq's
weapons of mass destruction, as well as Iraq's involvement in terrorism,
which is also the subject of Resolution 1441 and other earlier
resolutions. I might add at this point that we are providing all
relevant information we can to the inspection teams for them to do their
work. The material I will present to you comes from a variety of
sources. Some are U.S. sources and some are those of other countries. Some
are the sources are technical, such as intercepted telephone conversations
and photos taken by satellites. Other sources are people who have risked
their lives to let the world know what Saddam Hussein is really up to.
I cannot tell you everything that we know, but what I can
share with you, when combined with what all of us have learned over the
years, is deeply troubling. What you will see is an accumulation of facts
and disturbing patterns of behavior. The facts and Iraqis' behavior,
Iraq's behavior, demonstrate that Saddam Hussein and his regime have made
no effort, no effort, to disarm, as required by the international
community. Indeed, the facts and Iraq's behavior show that Saddam
Hussein and his regime are concealing their efforts to produce more
weapons of mass destruction. Let me begin by playing a tape for you. What you’re about
to hear is a conversation that my government monitored. It takes place on
November 26th of last year, on the day before United Nations teams resumed
inspections in Iraq. The conversation involves two senior officers, a
colonel and a brigadier general from Iraq's elite military unit, the
Republican Guard. [The tape is played.] AUDIO
SECRETARY POWELL: Let me pause and
review some of the key elements of this conversation that you just heard
between these two officers. First, they acknowledge that our colleague, Mohammed
ElBaradei is coming, and they know what he's coming for and they know he's
coming the next day. He's coming to look for things that are prohibited.
He is expecting these gentlemen to cooperate with him and not hide
things. But they're worried. We have this modified vehicle. What
do we say if one of them sees it? What is their concern? Their concern is
that it's something they should not have, something that The general was incredulous: "You didn't get it modified.
You don't have one of those, do you?" "I have one." "Which? From where?" "From the workshop. From the Al-Kindi Company."
"What?" "From Al-Kindi." "I'll come to see you in the morning. I'm worried you all
have something left." "We evacuated everything. We don't have anything
left." Note what he says: "We evacuated everything." We didn't
destroy it. We didn't line it up for inspection. We didn't turn it into
the inspectors. We evacuated it to make sure it was not around when the
inspectors showed up. "I will come to you tomorrow." The Al-Kindi Company. This is a company that is well known
to have been involved in prohibited weapons systems activity. Let me play another tape for you. As you will recall, the
inspectors found 12 empty chemical warheads on January 16th. On January
20th, four days later, Iraq promised the inspectors it would search for
more. You will now hear an officer from Republican Guard headquarters
issuing an instruction to an officer in the field. Their conversation took
place just last week, on January 30. [The tape was played.] AUDIO
SECRETARY POWELL: Let me pause again and review the
elements of this message.
"They are inspecting the ammunition you have,
yes?" "Yes. For the possibility there are forbidden
ammo." "For the possibility there is, by chance, forbidden
ammo?" "Yes.
"And we sent you a message yesterday to clean out all the
areas, the scrap areas, the abandoned areas. Make sure there is nothing
there. Remember the first message: evacuate it." This is all part of a system of hiding things and moving
things out of the way and making sure they have left nothing
behind. You go a little further into this message and you see the
specific instructions from headquarters: "After you have carried out what
is contained in this message, destroy the message because I don't want
anyone to see this message." "Okay." "Okay." Why? Why? This message would have verified to the
inspectors that they have been trying to turn over things. They were
looking for things, but they don't want that message seen because they
were trying to clean up the area, to leave no evidence behind of the
presence of weapons of mass destruction. And they can claim that nothing
was there and the inspectors can look all they want and they will find
nothing. This effort to hide things from the inspectors is not one
or two isolated events. Quite the contrary, this is part and parcel of a
policy of evasion and deception that goes back 12 years, a policy set at
the highest levels of the Iraqi regime. We know that Saddam Hussein has what is called "a Higher
Committee for Monitoring the Inspection Teams." Think about that. Iraq has
a high-level committee to monitor the inspectors who were sent in to
monitor Iraq's disarmament -- not to cooperate with them, not to assist
them, but to spy on them and keep them from doing their jobs. The committee reports directly to Saddam Hussein. It is
headed by Iraq's Vice President, Taha Yasin Ramadan. Its members include
Saddam Hussein's son, Qusay. This committee also includes Lieutenant General Amir
al-Sa'di, an advisor to Saddam. In case that name isn't immediately
familiar to you, General Sa'di has been the Iraqi regime's primary point
of contact for Dr. Blix and Dr. ElBaradei. It was General Sa'di who last
fall publicly pledged that Iraq was prepared to cooperate unconditionally
with inspectors. Quite the contrary, Sa'di's job is not to cooperate; it
is to deceive, not to disarm, but to undermine the inspectors; not to
support them, but to frustrate them and to make sure they learn
nothing. We have learned a lot about the work of this special
committee. We learned that just prior to the return of inspectors last
November, the regime had decided to resume what we heard called "the old
game of cat-and-mouse." For example, let me focus on the now famous declaration
that Iraq submitted to this Council on You saw the result. Dr. Blix pronounced the 12,200-page
declaration "rich in volume" but "poor in information and practically
devoid of new evidence." Could any member of this Council honestly rise in
defense of this false declaration? Everything we have seen and heard indicates that instead
of cooperating actively with the inspectors to ensure the success of their
mission, Saddam Hussein and his regime are busy doing all they possibly
can to ensure that inspectors succeed in finding absolutely
nothing. My colleagues, every statement I make today is backed up
by sources, solid sources. These are not assertions. What we are giving
you are facts and conclusions based on solid intelligence. I will cite
some examples, and these are from human sources. Orders were issued to Iraq's security organizations, as
well as to Saddam Hussein's own office, to hide all correspondence with
the Organization of Military Industrialization. This is the organization
that oversees Iraq's weapons of mass destruction activities. Make sure
there are no documents left which would connect you to the OMI. We know that Saddam's son, Qusay, ordered the removal of
all prohibited weapons from Saddam's numerous palace complexes. We know
that Iraqi government officials, members of the ruling Ba'ath Party and
scientists have hidden prohibited items in their homes. Other key files
from military and scientific establishments have been placed in cars that
are being driven around the countryside by Iraqi intelligence agents to
avoid detection. Thanks to intelligence they were provided, the inspectors
recently found dramatic confirmation of these reports. When they searched
the homes of an Iraqi nuclear scientist, they uncovered roughly 2,000
pages of documents. You see them here being brought out of the home and
placed in UN hands. Some of the material is classified and related to
Iraq's nuclear program. Tell me, answer me: Are the inspectors to search the house
of every government official, every Ba'ath Party member and every
scientist in the country to find the truth, to get the information they
need to satisfy the demands of our Council? Our sources tell us that in some cases the hard drives of
computers at Iraqi weapons facilities were replaced. Who took the hard
drives? Where did they go? What is being hidden? Why? There is only one answer to the why: to deceive, to hide,
to keep from the inspectors. Numerous human sources tell us that the Iraqis are moving
not just documents and hard drives, but weapons of mass destruction, to
keep them from being found by inspectors. While we were here in this
Council chamber debating Resolution 1441 last fall, we know, we know from
sources that a missile brigade outside Baghdad was dispersing rocket
launchers and warheads containing biological warfare agent to various
locations, distributing them to various locations in western Iraq.
Most of the launchers and warheads had been hidden in
large groves of palm trees and were to be moved every one to four weeks to
escape detection. We also have satellite photos that indicate that banned
materials have recently been moved from a number of Iraqi weapons of mass
destruction facilities. Let me say a word about satellite images before I show a
couple. The photos that I am about to show you are sometimes hard for the
average person to interpret, hard for me. The painstaking work of photo
analysis takes experts with years and years of experience, poring for
hours and hours over light tables. But as I show you these images, I will
try to capture and explain what they mean, what they indicate, to our
imagery specialists. Let's look at one. This one is about a weapons munition
facility, a facility that holds ammunition at a place called Taji. This is
one of about 65 such facilities in Iraq. We know that this one has housed
chemical munitions. In fact, this is where the Iraqis recently came up
with the additional four chemical weapons shells. Here you see 15 munitions bunkers in yellow and red
outlines. The four that are in red squares represent active chemical
munitions bunkers. How do I know that? How can I say that? Let me give you a
closer look. Look at the image on the left. On the left is a close-up of
one of the four chemical bunkers. The two arrows indicate the presence of
sure signs that the bunkers are storing chemical munitions. The arrow at
the top that says "security" points to a facility that is a signature item
for this kind of bunker. Inside that facility are special guards and
special equipment to monitor any leakage that might come out of the
bunker. The truck you also see is a signature item. It's a decontamination
vehicle in case something goes wrong. This is characteristic of those four
bunkers. The special security facility and the decontamination vehicle
will be in the area, if not at any one of them or one of the other, it is
moving around those four and it moves as needed to move as people are
working in the different bunkers. Now look at the picture on the right. You are now looking
at two of those sanitized bunkers. The signature vehicles are gone, the
tents are gone. It's been cleaned up. And it was done on the 22nd of
December as the UN inspection team is arriving, and you can see the
inspection vehicles arriving in the lower portion of the picture on the
right. The bunkers are clean when the inspectors get there. They
found nothing. This sequence of events raises the worrisome suspicion
that Iraq had been tipped off to the forthcoming inspections at Taji. As
it did throughout the 1990s, we know that Iraq today is actively using its
considerable intelligence capabilities to hide its illicit activities.
From our sources, we know that inspectors are under constant surveillance
by an army of Iraqi intelligence operatives. Iraq is relentlessly
attempting to tap all of their communications, both voice and electronics.
I would call my colleagues' attention to the fine paper that the United
Kingdom distributed yesterday which describes in exquisite detail Iraqi
deception activities. In this next example, you will see the type of concealment
activity Iraq has undertaken in response to the resumption of inspections.
Indeed, in November of 2002, just when the inspections were about to
resume, this type of activity spiked. Here are three examples. At this ballistic missile site on November 10th, we saw a
cargo truck preparing to move ballistic missile components. At this biological weapons-related facility on November
25th, just two days before inspections resumed, this truck caravan
appeared -- something we almost never see at this facility and we monitor
it carefully and regularly. At this ballistic missile facility, again, two days before
inspections began, five large cargo trucks appeared, along with a
truck-mounted crane, to move missiles. We saw this kind of housecleaning at close to 30 sites.
Days after this activity, the vehicles and the equipment that I've just
highlighted disappear and the site returns to patterns of normalcy. We
don't know precisely what Iraq was moving, but the inspectors already knew
about these sites so Iraq knew that they would be coming. We must ask ourselves: Why would Iraq suddenly move
equipment of this nature before inspections if they were anxious to
demonstrate what they had or did not have? Remember the first intercept in which two Iraqis talked
about the need to hide a modified vehicle from the inspectors. Where did
Iraq take all of this equipment? Why wasn't it presented to the
inspectors? Iraq also has refused to permit any U-2 reconnaissance
flights that would give the inspectors a better sense of what's being
moved before, during and after inspections. This refusal to allow this
kind of reconnaissance is in direct, specific violation of operative
paragraph seven of our Resolution 1441. Saddam Hussein and his regime are not just trying to
conceal weapons; they are also trying to hide people. You know the basic
facts. Iraq has not complied with its obligation to allow immediate,
unimpeded, unrestricted and private access to all officials and other
persons, as required by Resolution 1441. The regime only allows interviews
with inspectors in the presence of an Iraqi official, a minder. The
official Iraqi organization charged with facilitating inspections
announced publicly and announced ominously, that, "Nobody is ready" to
leave Iraq to be interviewed. Iraqi Vice President Ramadan accused the inspectors of
conducting espionage, a veiled threat that anyone cooperating with UN
inspectors was committing treason. Iraq did not meet its obligations under 1441 to provide a
comprehensive list of scientists associated with its weapons of mass
destruction programs. Iraq's list was out of date and contained only about
500 names despite the fact that UNSCOM had earlier put together a list of
about 3,500 names. Let me just tell you what a number of human sources have
told us. Saddam Hussein has directly participated in the effort to prevent
interviews. In early December, Saddam Hussein had all Iraqi scientists
warned of the serious consequences that they and their families would face
if they revealed any sensitive information to the inspectors. They were
forced to sign documents acknowledging that divulging information is
punishable by death. Saddam Hussein also said that scientists should be told
not to agree to leave Iraq; anyone who agreed to be interviewed outside
Iraq would be treated as a spy. This violates 1441. In mid-November, just before the inspectors returned,
Iraqi experts were ordered to report to the headquarters of the Special
Security Organization to receive counter-intelligence training. The
training focused on evasion methods, interrogation resistance techniques,
and how to mislead inspectors. Ladies and gentlemen, these are not assertions. These are
facts corroborated by many sources, some of them sources of the
intelligence services of other countries. For example, in mid-December, weapons experts at one
facility were replaced by Iraqi intelligence agents who were to deceive
inspectors about the work that was being done there. On orders from Saddam
Hussein, Iraqi officials issued a false death certificate for one
scientist and he was sent into hiding. In the middle of January, experts at one facility that was
related to weapons of mass destruction, those experts had been ordered to
stay home from work to avoid the inspectors. Workers from other Iraqi
military facilities not engaged in illicit weapons projects were to
replace the workers who had been sent home. A dozen experts have been
placed under house arrest -- not in their own houses, but as a group at
one of Saddam Hussein's guest houses. It goes on and on and on. As the examples I have just
presented show, the information and intelligence we have gathered point to
an active and systematic effort on the part of the Iraqi regime to keep
key materials and people from the inspectors, in direct violation of
Resolution 1441. The pattern is not just one of reluctant cooperation, nor
is it merely a lack of cooperation. What we see is a deliberate campaign
to prevent any meaningful inspection work. My colleagues, Operative Paragraph 4 of UN Resolution
1441, which we lingered over so long last fall, clearly states that false
statements and omissions in the declaration and a failure by Iraq at any
time to comply with and cooperate fully in the implementation of this
resolution shall constitute -- the facts speak for themselves -- shall
constitute a further material breach of its obligation. We wrote it this way to give Iraq an early test, to give
Iraq an early test. Would they give an honest declaration and would they,
early on, indicate a willingness to cooperate with the inspectors? It was
designed to be an early test. They failed that test. By this standard, the standard of this Operative
Paragraph, I believe that Iraq is now in further material breach of its
obligations. I believe this conclusion is irrefutable and
undeniable. Iraq has now placed itself in danger of the serious
consequences called for in UN Resolution 1441. And this body places itself
in danger of irrelevance if it allows Iraq to continue to defy its will
without responding effectively and immediately. This issue before us is not how much time we are willing
to give the inspectors to be frustrated by Iraqi obstruction. But how much
longer are we willing to put up with Iraq's non-compliance before we, as a
Council, we as the United Nations say, "Enough. Enough." The gravity of this moment is matched by the gravity of
the threat that Iraq's weapons of mass destruction pose to the world. Let
me now turn to those deadly weapons programs and describe why they are
real and present dangers to the region and to the world. First, biological weapons. We have talked frequently here
about biological weapons. By way of introduction and history, I think
there are just three quick points I need to make. First, you will recall
that it took UNSCOM four long and frustrating years to pry, to pry an
admission out of Iraq that it had biological weapons. Second, when Iraq
finally admitted having these weapons in 1995, the quantities were vast.
Less than a teaspoon of dry anthrax, a little bit -- about this amount.
This is just about the amount of a teaspoon. Less than a teaspoonful of
dry anthrax in an envelope shut down the United States Senate in the fall
of 2001. This forced several hundred people to undergo emergency
medical treatment and killed two postal workers just from an amount, just
about this quantity that was inside of an envelope. Iraq declared 8500 liters of anthrax. But UNSCOM estimates
that Saddam Hussein could have produced 25,000 liters. If concentrated
into this dry form, this amount would be enough to fill tens upon tens
upon tens of thousands of teaspoons. And Saddam Hussein has not verifiably
accounted for even one teaspoonful of this deadly material. And that is my
third point. And it is key. The Iraqis have never accounted for all of the
biological weapons they admitted they had and we know they had. They have never accounted for all the organic material
used to make them. And they have not accounted for many of the weapons
filled with these agents such as their R-400 bombs. This is evidence, not
conjecture. This is true. This is all well documented. Dr. Blix told this Council that Iraq has provided little
evidence to verify anthrax production and no convincing evidence of its
destruction. It should come as no shock then that since Saddam Hussein
forced out the last inspectors in 1998, we have amassed much intelligence
indicating that Iraq is continuing to make these weapons. One of the most worrisome things that emerges from the
thick intelligence file we have on Iraq's biological weapons is the
existence of mobile production facilities used to make biological
agents. Let me take you inside that intelligence file and share
with you what we know from eyewitness accounts. We have first-hand
descriptions of biological weapons factories on wheels and on
rails. The trucks and train cars are easily moved and are
designed to evade detection by inspectors. In a matter of months, they can
produce a quantity of biological poison equal to the entire amount that
Iraq claimed to have produced in the years prior to the Gulf
War. Although Iraq's mobile production program began in the
mid-1990s, UN inspectors at the time only had vague hints of such
programs. Confirmation came later, in the year 2000. The source was an
eyewitness, an Iraqi chemical engineer who supervised one of these
facilities. He actually was present during biological agent production
runs. He was also at the site when an accident occurred in 1998. 12
technicians died from exposure to biological agents. He reported that when UNSCOM was in country and
inspecting, the biological weapons agent production always began on
Thursdays at midnight, because Iraq thought UNSCOM would not inspect on
the Muslim holy day, Thursday night through Friday. He added that this was important because the units could
not be broken down in the middle of a production run, which had to be
completed by Friday evening before the inspectors might arrive
again. This defector is currently hiding in another country with
the certain knowledge that Saddam Hussein will kill him if he finds him.
His eyewitness account of these mobile production facilities has been
corroborated by other sources. A second source. An Iraqi civil engineer in a position to
know the details of the program confirmed the existence of transportable
facilities moving on trailers. A third source, also in a position to know, reported in
summer, 2002, that Iraq had manufactured mobile production systems mounted
on road-trailer units and on rail cars. Finally, a fourth source. An Iraqi major who defected
confirmed that Iraq has mobile biological research laboratories in
addition to the production facilities I mentioned earlier. We have diagrammed what our sources reported about these
mobile facilities. Here you see both truck and rail-car mounted mobile
factories. The description our sources gave us of the technical features
required by such facilities is highly detailed and extremely accurate.
As these drawings, based on their description show, we
know what the fermentors look like. We know what the tanks, pumps,
compressors and other parts look like. We know how they fit together, we
know how they work, and we know a great deal about the platforms on which
they are mounted. As shown in this diagram, these factories can be concealed
easily -- either by moving ordinary looking trucks and rail-cars along
Iraq's thousands of miles of highway or track or by parking them in a
garage or a warehouse or somewhere in Iraq's extensive system of
underground tunnels and bunkers. We know that Iraq has at least seven of these mobile,
biological agent factories. The truck-mounted ones have at least two or
three trucks each. That means that the mobile production facilities are
very few -- perhaps 18 trucks that we know of. There may be more. But
perhaps 18 that we know of. Just imagine trying to find 18 trucks among
the thousands and thousands of trucks that travel the roads of Iraq every
single day. It took the inspectors four years to find out that Iraq
was making biological agents. How long do you think it will take the
inspectors to find even one of these 18 trucks without Iraq coming forward
as they are supposed to with the information about these kinds of
capabilities. Ladies and gentlemen, these are sophisticated facilities.
For example, they can produce anthrax and botulinum toxin. In fact, they
can produce enough dry, biological agent in a single month to kill
thousands upon thousands of people. A dry agent of this type is the most
lethal form for human beings. By 1998, UN experts agreed that the Iraqis had perfected
drying techniques for their biological weapons programs. Now Iraq has
incorporated this drying expertise into these mobile production
facilities. We know from Iraq's past admissions that it has
successfully weaponized not only anthrax, but also other biological agents
including botulinum toxin, aflatoxin and ricin. But Iraq's research
efforts did not stop there. Saddam Hussein has investigated dozens of biological
agents causing diseases such as gas gangrene, plague, typhus, tetanus,
cholera, camelpox, and hemorrhagic fever. And he also has the wherewithal
to develop smallpox. The Iraqi regime has also developed ways to disperse
lethal biological agents widely, indiscriminately into the water supply,
into the air. For example, Iraq had a program to modify aerial fuel tanks
for Mirage jets. This video of an Iraqi test flight obtained by UNSCOM
some years ago shows an Iraqi F-1 Mirage jet aircraft. Note the spray
coming from beneath the Mirage. That is 2,000 liters of simulated anthrax
that a jet is spraying. In 1995, an Iraqi military officer, Mujahid Saleh Abdul
Latif told inspectors that Iraq intended the spray tanks to be mounted
onto a MiG-21 that had been converted into an unmanned aerial vehicle, or
UAV. UAVs outfitted with spray tanks constitute an ideal method for
launching a terrorist attack using biological weapons. Iraq admitted to producing four spray tanks, but to this
day, it has provided no credible evidence that they were destroyed,
evidence that was required by the international community. There can be no doubt that Saddam Hussein has biological
weapons and the capability to rapidly produce more, many more. And he has
the ability to dispense these lethal poisons and diseases in ways that can
cause massive death and destruction. If biological weapons seem too terrible to contemplate,
chemical weapons are equally chilling. UNMOVIC already laid out much of
this and it is documented for all of us to read in UNSCOM's 1999 report on
the subject. Let me set the stage with three key points that all of us
need to keep in mind. First, Saddam Hussein has used these horrific
weapons on another country and on his own people. In fact, in the history
of chemical warfare, no country has had more battlefield experience with
chemical weapons since World War I than Saddam Hussein's Iraq. Second, as with biological weapons, Saddam Hussein has
never accounted for vast amounts of chemical weaponry: 550 artillery
shells with mustard, 30,000 empty munitions and enough precursors to
increase his stockpile to as much as 500 tons of chemical
agents. If we consider just one category of missing weaponry, 6500
bombs from the Iran-Iraq War, UNMOVIC says the amount of chemical agent in
them would be on the order of a thousand tons. These quantities of chemical weapons are now unaccounted
for. Dr. Blix has quipped that, "Mustard gas is not marmalade. You are
supposed to know what you did with it." We believe Saddam Hussein knows
what he did with it and he has not come clean with the international
community. We have evidence these weapons existed. What we don't have
is evidence from Iraq that they have been destroyed or where they are.
That is what we are still waiting for. Third point, Iraq's record on chemical weapons is replete
with lies. It took years for Iraq to finally admit that it had produced
four tons of the deadly nerve agent VX. A single drop of VX on the skin
will kill in minutes. Four tons. The admission only came out after
inspectors collected documentation as a result of the defection of Hussein
Kamel, Saddam Hussein's late son-in-law. UNSCOM also gained forensic evidence that Iraq had
produced VX and put it into weapons for delivery, yet to this day Iraq
denies it had ever weaponized VX. And on January 27, UNMOVIC told this
Council that it has information that conflicts with the Iraqi account of
its VX program. We know that Iraq has embedded key portions of its illicit
chemical weapons infrastructure within its legitimate civilian industry.
To all outward appearances, even to experts, the infrastructure looks like
an ordinary civilian operation. Illicit and legitimate production can go
on simultaneously or on a dime. This dual-use infrastructure can turn from
clandestine to commercial and then back again. These inspections would be unlikely, any inspections at
such facilities, would be unlikely to turn up anything prohibited,
especially if there is any warning that the inspections are coming. Call
it ingenious or evil genius, but the Iraqis deliberately designed their
chemical weapons programs to be inspected. It is infrastructure with a
built in alibi. Under the guise of dual-use infrastructure, Iraq has
undertaken an effort to reconstitute facilities that were closely
associated with its past program to develop and produce chemical weapons.
For example, Iraq has rebuilt key portions of the Tareq State
Establishment. Tareq includes facilities designed specifically for Iraq's
chemical weapons program and employs key figures from past
programs. That's the production end of Saddam's chemical weapons
business. What about the delivery end? I'm going to show you a small part
of a chemical complex called "Al Musayyib", a site that Iraq has used for
at least three years to transship chemical weapons from production
facilities out to the field. In May 2002, our satellites photographed the
unusual activity in this picture. Here we see cargo vehicles are again at this transshipment
point, and we can see that they are accompanied by a decontamination
vehicle associated with biological or chemical weapons activity. What
makes this picture significant is that we have a human source who has
corroborated that movement of chemical weapons occurred at this site at
that time. So it's not just the photo and it's not an individual seeing
the photo. It's the photo and then the knowledge of an individual being
brought together to make the case. This photograph of the site taken two months later, in
July, shows not only the previous site which is the figure in the middle
at the top with the bulldozer sign near it, it shows that this previous
site, as well as all of the other sites around the site have been fully
bulldozed and graded. The topsoil has been removed. The Iraqis literally
removed the crust of the earth from large portions of this site in order
to conceal chemical weapons evidence that would be there from years of
chemical weapons activity. To support its deadly biological and chemical weapons
programs, Iraq procures needed items from around the world using an
extensive clandestine network. What we know comes largely from intercepted
communications and human sources who are in a position to know the
facts. Iraq's procurement efforts include: equipment that can
filter and separate microorganisms and toxins involved in biological
weapons; equipment that can be used to concentrate the agent; growth media
that can be used to continue producing anthrax and botulinum toxin;
sterilization equipment for laboratories; glass-lined reactors and
specialty pumps that can handle corrosive chemical weapons agents and
precursors; large amounts of thionyl chloride, a precursor for nerve and
blister agents; and other chemicals such as sodium sulfide, an important
mustard agent precursor. Now, of course, Iraq will argue that these items can also
be used for legitimate purposes. But if that is true, why do we have to
learn about them by intercepting communications and risking the lives of
human agents? With Iraq's well-documented history on biological and
chemical weapons, why should any of us give Iraq the benefit of the doubt?
I don't. And I don't think you will either after you hear this next
intercept. Just a few weeks ago we intercepted communications between
two commanders in Iraq's Second Republican Guard Corps. One commander is
going to be giving an instruction to the other. You will hear as this
unfolds that what he wants to communicate to the other guy, he wants to
make sure the other guy hears clearly to the point of repeating it so that
it gets written down and completely understood. Listen. (Transmission.) AUDIO
Let's review a few selected items of this conversation.
Two officers talking to each other on the radio want to make sure that
nothing is misunderstood. Why does he repeat it that way? Why is he so forceful in
making sure this is understood? And why did he focus on wireless
instructions? Because the senior officer is concerned that somebody might
be listening. Well, somebody was. "Nerve agents." "Stop talking about it." "They are
listening to us" "Don't give any evidence that we have these horrible
agents." But we know that they do and this kind of conversation confirms
it. Our conservative estimate is that Iraq today has a
stockpile of between 100 and 500 tons of chemical weapons agent. That is
enough agent to fill 16,000 battlefield rockets. Even the low end of 100
tons of agent would enable Saddam Hussein to cause mass casualties across
more than 100 square miles of territory, an area nearly five times the
size of Manhattan. Let me remind you that -- of the 122 mm chemical warheads
that the UN inspectors found recently. This discovery could very well be,
as has been noted, the tip of a submerged iceberg. The question before us all, my friends, is when will we
see the rest of the submerged iceberg? (VIDEO)
Saddam Hussein has chemical weapons. Saddam Hussein has
used such weapons. And Saddam Hussein has no compunction about using them
again -- against his neighbors and against his own people. And we have
sources who tell us that he recently has authorized his field commanders
to use them. He wouldn't be passing out the orders if he didn't have the
weapons or the intent to use them. We also have sources who tell us that since the 1980s,
Saddam's regime has been experimenting on human beings to perfect its
biological or chemical weapons. A source said that 1,600 death-row prisoners were
transferred in 1995 to a special unit for such experiments. An eyewitness
saw prisoners tied down to beds, experiments conducted on them, blood
oozing around the victims' mouths, and autopsies performed to confirm the
effects on the prisoners. Saddam Hussein's humanity -- inhumanity has no limits.
Let me turn now to nuclear weapons. We have no indication
that Saddam Hussein has ever abandoned his nuclear weapons program. On the
contrary, we have more than a decade of proof that he remains determined
to acquire nuclear weapons. To fully appreciate the challenge that we face today,
remember that in 1991 the inspectors searched Iraq's primary nuclear
weapons facilities for the first time, and they found nothing to conclude
that Iraq had a nuclear weapons program. But, based on defector
information, in May of 1991, Saddam Hussein's lie was exposed. In truth,
Saddam Hussein had a massive clandestine nuclear weapons program that
covered several different techniques to enrich uranium, including
electromagnetic isotope separation, gas centrifuge and gas diffusion.
We estimate that this illicit program cost the Iraqis
several billion dollars. Nonetheless, Iraq continued to tell the IAEA that
it had no nuclear weapons program. If Saddam had not been stopped, Iraq
could have produced a nuclear bomb by 1993, years earlier than most worst
case assessments that had been made before the war. In 1995, as a result of another defector, we find out
that, after his invasion of Kuwait, Saddam Hussein had initiated a crash
program to build a crude nuclear weapon, in violation of Iraq's UN
obligations. Saddam Hussein already possesses two out of the three key
components needed to build a nuclear bomb. He has a cadre of nuclear
scientists with the expertise and he has a bomb design. Since 1998, his efforts to reconstitute his nuclear
program have been focused on acquiring the third and last component:
sufficient fissile material to produce a nuclear explosion. To make the
fissile material, he needs to develop an ability to enrich uranium. Saddam
Hussein is determined to get his hands on a nuclear bomb. He is so determined that has made repeated covert attempts
to acquire high-specification aluminum tubes from 11 different countries,
even after inspections resumed. These tubes are controlled by the Nuclear
Suppliers Group precisely because they can be used as centrifuges for
enriching uranium. By now, just about everyone has heard of these tubes and
we all know that there are differences of opinion. There is controversy
about what these tubes are for. Most U.S. experts think they are intended
to serve as rotors in centrifuges used to enrich uranium. Other experts,
and the Iraqis themselves, argue that they are really to produce the
rocket bodies for a conventional weapon, a multiple rocket launcher.
Let me tell you what is not controversial about these
tubes. First, all the experts who have analyzed the tubes in our
possession agree that they can be adapted for centrifuge use. Second, Iraq had no business buying them for any purpose.
They are banned for Iraq. I am no expert on centrifuge tubes, but this is an old
army trooper. I can tell you a couple things. First, it strikes me as quite odd that these tubes are
manufactured to a tolerance that far exceeds U.S. requirements for
comparable rockets. Maybe Iraqis just manufacture their conventional
weapons to a higher standard than we do, but I don't think so. Second, we actually have examined tubes from several
different batches that were seized clandestinely before they reached
Baghdad. What we notice in these different batches is a progression to
higher and higher levels of specification, including in the latest batch
an anodized coating on extremely smooth inner and outer
surfaces. Why would they continue refining the specifications? Why
would they continuing refining the specification, go to all that trouble
for something that, if it was a rocket, would soon be blown into shrapnel
when it went off? The high-tolerance aluminum tubes are only part of the
story. We also have intelligence from multiple sources that Iraq is
attempting to acquire magnets and high-speed balancing machines. Both
items can be used in a gas centrifuge program to enrich
uranium. In 1999 and 2000, Iraqi officials negotiated with firms in
Romania, India, Russia and Slovenia for the purchase of a magnet
production plant. Iraq wanted the plant to produce magnets weighing 20 to
30 grams. That's the same weight as the magnets used in Iraq's gas
centrifuge program before the Gulf War. This incident, linked with the tubes, is another indicator
of Iraq's attempt to reconstitute its nuclear weapons program. Intercepted communications from mid-2000 through last
summer showed that Iraq front companies sought to buy machines that can be
used to balance gas centrifuge rotors. One of these companies also had
been involved in a failed effort in 2001 to smuggle aluminum tubes into
Iraq. People will continue to debate this issue, but there is no
doubt in my mind. These illicit procurement efforts show that Saddam
Hussein is very much focused on putting in place the key missing piece
from his nuclear weapons program, the ability to produce fissile
material. He also has been busy trying to maintain the other key
parts of his nuclear program, particularly his cadre of key nuclear
scientists. It is noteworthy that over the last 18 months Saddam Hussein
has paid increasing personal attention to Iraq's top nuclear scientists, a
group that the government-controlled press calls openly his "nuclear
mujaheddin." He regularly exhorts them and praises their progress.
Progress toward what end? Long ago, the Security Council, this Council, required
Iraq to halt all nuclear activities of any kind. Let me talk now about the systems Iraq is developing to
deliver weapons of mass destruction, in particular Iraq's ballistic
missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles, UAVs. First, missiles. We all remember that before the Gulf War
Saddam Hussein's goal was missiles that flew not just hundreds, but
thousands, of kilometers. He wanted to strike not only his neighbors, but
also nations far beyond his borders. While inspectors destroyed most of the prohibited
ballistic missiles, numerous intelligence reports over the past decade
from sources inside Iraq indicate that Saddam Hussein retains a covert
force of up to a few dozen Scud-variant ballistic missiles. These are
missiles with a range of 650 to 900 kilometers. We know from intelligence and Iraq's own admissions that
Iraq's alleged permitted ballistic missiles, the al-Samoud II and the
Al-Fatah, violate the 150-kilometer limit established by this Council in
Resolution 687. These are prohibited systems. UNMOVIC has also reported that Iraq has illegally imported
380 SA-2 rocket engines. These are likely for use in the al-Samoud II.
Their import was illegal on three counts: Resolution 687 prohibited all
military shipments into Iraq; UNSCOM specifically prohibited use of these
engines in surface-to-surface missiles; and finally, as we have just
noted, they are for a system that exceeds the 150-kilometer range limit.
Worst of all, some of these engines were acquired as late as December,
after this Council passed Resolution 1441. What I want you to know today is that Iraq has programs
that are intended to produce ballistic missiles that fly over 1,000
kilometers. One program is pursuing a liquid fuel missile that would be
able to fly more than 1,200 kilometers. And you can see from this map, as
well as I can, who will be in danger of these missiles. As part of this effort, another little piece of evidence,
Iraq has built an engine test stand that is larger than anything it has
ever had. Notice the dramatic difference in size between the test stand on
the left, the old one, and the new one on the right. Note the large
exhaust vent. This is where the flame from the engine comes out. The
exhaust vent on the right test stand is five times longer than the one on
the left. The one of the left is used for short-range missiles. The one on
the right is clearly intended for long-range missiles that can fly 1,200
kilometers. This photograph was taken in April of 2002. Since then,
the test stand has been finished and a roof has been put over it so it
will be harder for satellites to see what's going on underneath the test
stand. Saddam Hussein's intentions have never changed. He is not
developing the missiles for self-defense. These are missiles that Iraq
wants in order to project power, to threaten and to deliver chemical,
biological -- and if we let him -- nuclear warheads. Now, unmanned aerial vehicles, UAVs. Iraq has been working
on a variety of UAVs for more than a decade. This is just illustrative of
what a UAV would look like. This effort has included attempts to modify
for unmanned flight the MiG-21 and, with greater success, an aircraft
called the L-29. However, Iraq is now concentrating not on these airplanes
but on developing and testing smaller UAVs such as this. UAVs are well
suited for dispensing chemical and biological weapons. There is ample
evidence that Iraq has dedicated much effort to developing and testing
spray devices that could be adapted for UAVs. And in the little that Saddam Hussein told us about UAVs,
he has not told the truth. One of these lies is graphically and
indisputably demonstrated by intelligence we collected on June 27th last
year. According to Iraq's December 7th declaration, its UAVs
have a range of only 80 kilometers. But we detected one of Iraq's newest
UAVs in a test flight that went 500 kilometers nonstop on autopilot in the
racetrack pattern depicted here. Not only is this test well in excess of the 150 kilometers
that the United Nations permits, the test was left out of Iraq’s December
7th declaration. The UAV was flown around and around and around in this
circle and so that its 80-kilometer limit really was 500 kilometers,
unrefueled and on autopilot -- violative of all of its obligations under
1441. The linkages over the past ten years between Iraq's UAV
program and biological and chemical warfare agents are of deep concern to
us. Iraq could use these small UAVs which have a wingspan of only a few
meters to deliver biological agents to its neighbors or, if transported,
to other countries, including the United States. My friends, the information I have presented to you about
these terrible weapons and about Iraq's continued flaunting of its
obligations under Security Council Resolution 1441 links to a subject I
now want to spend a little bit of time on, and that has to do with
terrorism. Our concern is not just about these illicit weapons; it's
the way that these illicit weapons can be connected to terrorists and
terrorist organizations that have no compunction about using such devices
against innocent people around the world. Iraq and terrorism go back decades. Baghdad trains
Palestine Liberation Front members in small arms and explosives. Saddam
uses the Arab Liberation Front to funnel money to the families of
Palestinian suicide bombers in order to prolong the Intifadah. And it's no
secret that Saddam's own intelligence service was involved in dozens of
attacks or attempted assassinations in the 1990s. But what I want to bring to your attention today is the
potentially much more sinister nexus between Iraq and the al-Qaida
terrorist network, a nexus that combines classic terrorist organizations
and modern methods of murder. Iraq today harbors a deadly terrorist
network headed by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi an associate and collaborator of
Usama bin Laden and his al-Qaida lieutenants. Zarqawi, Palestinian born in Jordan, fought in the Afghan
war more than a decade ago. Returning to Afghanistan in 2000, he oversaw a
terrorist training camp. One of his specialties, and one of the
specialties of this camp, is poisons. When our coalition ousted the Taliban, the Zarqawi network
helped establish another poison and explosive training center camp, and
this camp is located in northeastern Iraq. You see a picture of this
camp. The network is teaching its operatives how to produce
ricin and other poisons. Let me remind you how ricin works. Less than a
pinch -- imagine a pinch of salt -- less than a pinch of ricin, eating
just this amount in your food, would cause shock, followed by circulatory
failure. Death comes within 72 hours and there is no antidote. There is no
cure. It is fatal. Those helping to run this camp are Zarqawi lieutenants
operating in northern Kurdish areas outside Saddam Hussein's controlled
Iraq. But Baghdad has an agent in the most senior levels of the radical
organization Ansar al-Islam that controls this corner of Iraq. In 2000,
this agent offered al-Qaida safe haven in the region. After we swept al-Qaida from Afghanistan, some of those
members accepted this safe haven. They remain there today. Zarqawi's activities are not confined to this small corner
of northeast Iraq. He traveled to Baghdad in May of 2002 for medical
treatment, staying in the capital of Iraq for two months while he
recuperated to fight another day. During his stay, nearly two dozen extremists converged on
Baghdad and established a base of operations there. These al-Qaida
affiliates based in Baghdad now coordinate the movement of people, money
and supplies into and throughout Iraq for his network, and they have now
been operating freely in the capital for more than eight
months. Iraqi officials deny accusations of ties with al-Qaida.
These denials are simply not credible. Last year, an al-Qaida associate
bragged that the situation in Iraq was "good," that Baghdad could be
transited quickly. We know these affiliates are connected to Zarqawi because
they remain, even today, in regular contact with his direct subordinates,
include the poison cell plotters. And they are involved in moving more
than money and materiel. Last year, two suspected al-Qaida operatives were
arrested crossing from Iraq into Saudi Arabia. They were linked to
associates of the Baghdad cell and one of them received training in
Afghanistan on how to use cyanide. From his terrorist network in Iraq, Zarqawi can direct his
network in the Middle East and beyond. We in the United States, all of us,
the State Department and the Agency for International Development, we all
lost a dear friend with the cold-blooded murder of Mr. Laurence Foley in
Amman, Jordan, last October. A despicable act was committed that day, the
assassination of an individual whose sole mission was to assist the people
of Jordan. The captured assassin says his cell received money and weapons
from Zarqawi for that murder. After the attack, an associate of the
assassin left Jordan to go to Iraq to obtain weapons and explosives for
further operations. Iraqi officials protest that they are not aware of the
whereabouts of Zarqawi or of any of his associates. Again, these protests
are not credible. We know of Zarqawi's activities in Baghdad. I described
them earlier. Now let me add one other fact. We asked a friendly
security service to approach Baghdad about extraditing Zarqawi and
providing information about him and his close associates. This service
contacted Iraqi officials twice and we passed details that should have
made it easy to find Zarqawi. The network remains in Baghdad. Zarqawi
still remains at large, to come and go. As my colleagues around this table and as the citizens
they represent in Europe know, Zarqawi's terrorism is not confined to the
Middle East. Zarqawi and his network have plotted terrorist actions
against countries including France, Britain, Spain, Italy, Germany and
Russia. According to detainees Abu Atiya, who graduated from Zarqawi's
terrorist camp in Afghanistan, tasked at least nine North African
extremists in 2001 to travel to Europe to conduct poison and explosive
attacks. Since last year, members of this network have been
apprehended in France, Britain, Spain and Italy. By our last count, 116
operatives connected to this global web have been arrested. The chart you
are seeing shows the network in Europe. We know about this European network and we know about its
links to Zarqawi because the detainees who provided the information about
the targets also provided the names of members of the network. Three of
those he identified by name were arrested in France last December. In the
apartments of the terrorists, authorities found circuits for explosive
devices and a list of ingredients to make toxins. The detainee who helped piece this together says the plot
also targeted Britain. Later evidence again proved him right. When the
British unearthed the cell there just last month, one British police
officer was murdered during the destruction of the cell. We also know that Zarqawi's colleagues have been active in
the Pankisi Gorge, Georgia, and in Chechnya, Russia. The plotting to which
they are linked is not mere chatter. Members of Zarqawi's network say
their goal was to kill Russians with toxins. We are not surprised that Iraq is harboring Zarqawi and
his subordinates. This understanding builds on decades-long experience
with respect to ties between Iraq and al-Qaida. Going back to the early
and mid-1990s when bin Laden was based in Sudan, an al-Qaida source tells
us that Saddam and bin Laden reached an understanding that al-Qaida would
no longer support activities against Baghdad. Early al-Qaida ties were
forged by secret high-level intelligence service contacts with al-Qaida,
secret Iraqi intelligence high-level contacts with al-Qaida. We know members of both organizations met repeatedly and
have met at least eight times at very senior levels since the early 1990s.
In 1996, a foreign security service tells us that bin Laden met with a
senior Iraqi intelligence official in Khartoum and later met the director
of the Iraqi intelligence service. Saddam became more interested as he saw al-Qaida's
appalling attacks. A detained al-Qaida member tells us that Saddam was
more willing to assist al-Qaida after the 1998 bombings of our embassies
in Kenya and Tanzania. Saddam was also impressed by al-Qaida's attacks on
the USS Cole in Yemen in October 2000. Iraqis continue to visit bin Laden in his new home in
Afghanistan. A senior defector, one of Saddam's former intelligence chiefs
in Europe, says Saddam sent his agents to Afghanistan sometime in the
mid-1990s to provide training to al-Qaida members on document
forgery. From the late 1990s until 2001, the Iraqi Embassy in
Pakistan played the role of liaison to the al-Qaida organization.
Some believe, some claim, these contacts do not amount to
much. They say Saddam Hussein's secular tyranny and al-Qaida's religious
tyranny do not mix. I am not comforted by this thought. Ambition and
hatred are enough to bring Iraq and al-Qaida together, enough so al-Qaida
could learn how to build more sophisticated bombs and learn how to forge
documents, and enough so that al-Qaida could turn to Iraq for help in
acquiring expertise on weapons of mass destruction. And the record of Saddam Hussein's cooperation with other
Islamist terrorist organizations is clear. Hamas, for example, opened an
office in Baghdad in 1999 and Iraq has hosted conferences attended by
Palestine Islamic Jihad. These groups are at the forefront of sponsoring
suicide attacks against Israel. Al-Qaida continues to have a deep interest in acquiring
weapons of mass destruction. As with the story of Zarqawi and his network,
I can trace the story of a senior terrorist operative telling how Iraq
provided training in these weapons to al-Qaida. Fortunately, this
operative is now detained and he has told his story. I will relate it to
you now as he, himself, described it. This senior al-Qaida terrorist was responsible for one of
al-Qaida's training camps in Afghanistan. His information comes firsthand
from his personal involvement at senior levels of al-Qaida. He says bin
Laden and his top deputy in Afghanistan, deceased al-Qaida leader Muhammad
Atif, did not believe that al-Qaida labs in Afghanistan were capable
enough to manufacture these chemical or biological agents. They needed to
go somewhere else. They had to look outside of Afghanistan for
help. Where did they go? Where did they look? They went to Iraq.
The support that this detainee describes included Iraq offering chemical
or biological weapons training for two al-Qaida associates beginning in
December 2000. He says that a militant known as Abdallah al-Iraqi had been
sent to Iraq several times between 1997 and 2000 for help in acquiring
poisons and gasses. Abdallah al-Iraqi characterized the relationship he
forged with Iraqi officials as successful. As I said at the outset, none of this should come as a
surprise to any of us. Terrorism has been a tool used by Saddam for
decades. Saddam was a supporter of terrorism long before these terrorist
networks had a name, and this support continues. The nexus of poisons and
terror is new. The nexus of Iraq and terror is old. The combination is
lethal. With this track record, Iraqi denials of supporting
terrorism take their place alongside the other Iraqi denials of weapons of
mass destruction. It is all a web of lies. When we confront a regime that harbors ambitions for
regional domination, hides weapons of mass destruction, and provides haven
and active support for terrorists, we are not confronting the past; we are
confronting the present. And unless we act, we are confronting an even
more frightening future. And, friends, this has been a long and a detailed
presentation and I thank you for your patience, but there is one more
subject that I would like to touch on briefly, and it should be a subject
of deep and continuing concern to this Council: Saddam Hussein's
violations of human rights. Underlying all that I have said, underlying all the facts
and the patterns of behavior that I have identified, is Saddam Hussein's
contempt for the will of this Council, his contempt for the truth, and,
most damning of all, his utter contempt for human life. Saddam Hussein's
use of mustard and nerve gas against the Kurds in 1988 was one of the 20th
century's most horrible atrocities. Five thousand men, women and children
died. His campaign against the Kurds from 1987 to '89 included mass
summary executions, disappearances, arbitrary jailing and ethnic
cleansing, and the destruction of some 2,000 villages. He has also conducted ethnic cleansing against the Shia
Iraqis and the Marsh Arabs whose culture has flourished for more than a
millennium. Saddam Hussein's police state ruthlessly eliminates anyone who
dares to dissent. Iraq has more forced disappearance cases than any other
country -- tens of thousands of people reported missing in the past
decade. Nothing points more clearly to Saddam Hussein's dangerous
intentions and the threat he poses to all of us than his calculated
cruelty to his own citizens and to his neighbors. Clearly, Saddam Hussein
and his regime will stop at nothing until something stops him. For more than 20 years, by word and by deed, Saddam
Hussein has pursued his ambition to dominate Iraq and the broader Middle
East using the only means he knows: intimidation, coercion and
annihilation of all those who might stand in his way. For Saddam Hussein,
possession of the world's most deadly weapons is the ultimate trump card,
the one he must hold to fulfill his ambition. We know that Saddam Hussein is determined to keep his
weapons of mass destruction, is determined to make more. Given Saddam
Hussein's history of aggression, given what we know of his grandiose
plans, given what we know of his terrorist associations, and given his
determination to exact revenge on those who oppose him, should we take the
risk that he will not someday use these weapons at a time and a place and
in a manner of his choosing, at a time when the world is in a much weaker
position to respond? The United States will not and cannot run that risk for
the American people. Leaving Saddam Hussein in possession of weapons of
mass destruction for a few more months or years is not an option, not in a
post-September 11th world. My colleagues, over three months ago, this Council
recognized that Iraq continued to pose a threat to international peace and
security, and that Iraq had been and remained in material breach of its
disarmament obligations. Today, Iraq still poses a threat and Iraq still remains in
material breach. Indeed, by its failure to seize on its one last
opportunity to come clean and disarm, Iraq has put itself in deeper
material breach and closer to the day when it will face serious
consequences for its continue defiance of this Council. My colleagues, we have an obligation to our citizens. We
have an obligation to this body to see that our resolutions are complied
with. We wrote 1441 not in order to go to war. We wrote 1441 to try to
preserve the peace. We wrote 1441 to give Iraq one last chance. Iraq is not, so far, taking that one last chance.
We must not shrink from whatever is ahead of us. We must
not fail in our duty and our responsibility to the citizens of the
countries that are represented by this body. Thank you, Mr. President. Released on February 5, 2003 |