



Department of State

E9

TELEGRAM

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PAGE-01 BAGHDA 00879 041342Z  
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 SSO-00 /031 W  
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O 041050Z APR 81  
FM USINT BAGHDAD  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1623  
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 0879

EXDIS CAPTION REMOVED BY S/S (EK) ON 7/20/93

PLEASE PASS TO THE SECRETARY'S PARTY

E.O. 12065: RDS 4/4/01 (EAGLETON, WILLIAM L.) OR-M  
TAGS: OVIP, XF, .S OTRA  
SUBJ: PROSPECTS FOR DAS DRAPER'S VISIT TO BAGHDAD

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. THE IRAQI FOREIGN MINISTRY HAS NOT YET GIVEN US A PROGRAM FOR DAS DRAPER'S APRIL 13 VISIT TO BAGHDAD BUT WE EXPECT IT THE NEXT DAY OR TWO. WE ASSUME DRAPER WILL MEET FOREIGN MINISTER HAMHADI AND POSSIBLY AN RCC MEMBER. IT IS CONCEIVABLE, BUT LESS THAN LIKELY, THAT HE WILL BE RECEIVED BY PRESIDENT SAADAH HUSSAIN. THERE WILL BE AMPLE OPPORTUNITY, INCLUDING A FIVE-HOUR DRIVE FROM THE FRONTIER, FOR US TO DISCUSS WITH DRAPER HOW HE MIGHT BEST APPROACH IRAQI OFFICIALS. MEANWHILE, IN THIS MESSAGE I AM SETTING OUT A FEW THOUGHTS THAT DRAPER MIGHT WISH TO DISCUSS WITH VELIOTES AND THE SECRETARY BEFOREHAND.

3. THE IMPORTANT THING ABOUT DRAPER'S VISIT IS THAT  
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IT IS TAKING PLACE THIS IS THE FIRST VISIT BY A SENIOR

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IS/FPC/CDR Date: 8/17/93

MR Cases Only: \_\_\_\_\_  
EO Citations: \_\_\_\_\_

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DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL SINCE PHIL HABIB STOPPED BY IN 1977. THE ATMOSPHERE HERE IS EXCELLENT FOLLOWING OUR DECISION NOT TO SELL ARMS TO IRAN, THE INCREASED IRAQI COMMERCE AND CONTACTS WITH THE U.S., MUTUAL UPGRADING OF DIPLOMATIC STAFFS AND, MOST RECENTLY, HE GO AHEAD ON FIVE BOEING AIRCRAFT FOR IRAQ. ALTHOUGH THERE REMAIN A NUMBER OF AREAS OF SERIOUS DISAGREEMENT ON REGIONAL MATTERS, WE NOW HAVE A GREATER CONVERGENCE OF INTERESTS WITH IRAQ THAN AT ANY TIME SINCE THE REVOLUTION OF 1958. HENCE, DISCUSSIONS WITH IRAQI OFFICIALS SHOULD NOT BE TENSE OR DIFFICULT, PARTICULARLY SINCE WE SEEK NOTHING SPECIFIC FROM THEM AT THIS TIME. THEY WILL, OF COURSE, BE INTERESTED IN DRAPER'S BRIEFING ON THE PURPOSE AND INITIAL FINDINGS OF THE SECRETARY'S TRIP. THEY WILL NOT EXPECT FULLY DEVELOPED POLICY POSITIONS BUT THEY WILL WELCOME HAVING AN IDEA OF HOW WE INTEND TO APPROACH AREA PROBLEMS.

4. ON MIDDLE EAST PEACE, THEY WILL RE-STATE THEIR HARDLINE POSITION IN RESPONSE TO WHATEVER DRAPER HAS TO TELL THEM ABOUT OUR APPROACH. ON THE GULF AND OUR STRATEGIC CONCERNS THEY WILL EXPRESS OPPOSITION TO AN AMERICAN MILITARY PRESENCE, BUT WILL LISTEN ATTENTIVELY TO OUR REASONING AND WILL NOT MIND HEARING A SOBER ANALYSIS OF THE SOVIET THREAT. ON IRAN OUR VIEWS LARGELY CONVERGE AND THEY WILL BE INTERESTED IN DRAPER'S ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION THERE.

5. ON BILATERAL RELATIONS, BOTH SIDES CAN EXPRESS SOME SATISFACTION. THE IRAQIS WILL NOT APPRECIATE ANY PRESSURE TO RESTORE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BEFORE THE NEW U.S. ADMINISTRATION HAS TAKEN STEPS OR MADE  
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STATEMENTS WHICH THEY CAN REPRESENT AS A CHANGE IN U.S. POLICY MORE FAVORABLE TO THE ARABS (AS WE HAVE JUSTIFIED OUR MORE OPEN ATTITUDE TOWARD IRAQ BY CITING CHANGES IN IRAQI POLICY AWAY FROM THE USSR AND TOWARD OUR FRIENDS IN THE AREA). OUR BEST TACTIC NOW WOULD BE NOT TO RAISE THE QUESTION OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE IRAQIS, EXCEPT INDIRECTLY IN DISCUSSING WHAT FURTHER STEPS WE MIGHT TAKE TO IMPROVE CONTACTS IN THE ABSENCE OF DIPLOMATIC TIES. ON THIS POINT WE WILL HAVE TO USE SOME IMAGINATION SINCE, OTHER

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THAN OUR INCREASED ACCESS TO IRAQI MARKETS, THERE IS NOT MUCH SUBSTANCE AS YET IN THE U.S.-IRAQI RELATIONSHIP. WHAT WE ARE DOING NOW TOWARD "IMPROVING RELATIONS", INCLUDING DRAPER'S VISIT, IS LARGELY SYMBOLIC, BUT SYMBOLS ARE IMPORTANT IN PREPARING THE WAY FOR MORE TANGIBLE TIES AND BENEFITS.

6. I BELIEVE IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR DRAPER TO BE ABLE TO SUGGEST SOME NEXT STEPS IN THE RELATIONSHIP. HE COULD BEGIN BY OFFERING TO ASSIST THE NEW CHIEF OF IRAQINT IN WASHINGTON MAKE CONTACTS IN THE U.S. GOVERNMENT (THOUGH THIS IS NOTHING NEW). HE COULD ALSO SUGGEST THAT A VISIT TO WASHINGTON BY A SENIOR IRAQI OFFICIAL WOULD BE WELL RECEIVED (EVEN THOUGH THE IRAQIS MIGHT NOT FOLLOW-UP SINCE THEY DO NOT WISH TO GIVE THE IMPRESSION THEY ARE PURSUING THE U.S.). ANOTHER POSSIBILITY WOULD BE TO TELL THE IRAQIS WE ARE READY TO SET UP WITH THEM A JOINT COMMISSION FOR ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL COOPERATION. SYMBOLICALLY, A LITTLE CAN GO A LONG WAY.

7. SPECIFICALLY, I RECOMMEND THAT DRAPER BRING WITH HIM A PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY TO FOREIGN MINISTER HAMMAL, EXPRESSING THE HOPE THAT THEY WILL BE ABLE TO MEET ON THE FIRST APPROPRIATE OCCASION, WHICH WILL PROBABLY BE AT THE UNGA IN NEW YORK IN SEPTEMBER.  
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SUCH A MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY COULD OPEN THE WAY FOR FUTURE EXCHANGES VIA USINT IN WHICH WE WOULD KEEP THE IRAQI LEADERSHIP INFORMED OF OUR THINKING ON A MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT AND THE DEPLOYMENT OF MEANS TO COUNTER SOVIET MOVES IN THE AREA. DRAPER'S VISIT CAN BE PRESENTED AS THE INAUGURATION OF SUCH A HIGH LEVEL TWO-WAY EXCHANGE.  
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