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Department of State  
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PAGE 02 OF 04 LONDON 27592 01 OF 05 211815Z C15/18 002269 NOD209  
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 /000 W

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FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1434

SECRET SECTION 01 OF 05 LONDON 27592

NODIS CAPTION REMOVED BY S/S (EK) ON 11/29/93

FROM RUMSFELD

DEPARTMENT PASS TO S/SN - MILLER

E. O. 12356: DECL: 12/21/13

TAGS: PREL, IO, LE, SY, IR

SUBJECT: RUMSFELD ONE-ON-ONE MEETING WITH IRAQI DEPUTY  
PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN MINISTER TARIO AZIZ

1. S - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. DEPARTMENT REPEAT TO BAGHAD, AMMAN, BEIRUT, JIDDA,  
RIYADH, DAMASCUS, CAIRO, TEL AVIV, USMISSION USUN NEW YORK.

3. SUMMARY: IN A WIDE RANGING TWO AND ONE-HALF HOUR  
UNEXPECTED ONE-ON-ONE MEETING RUMSFELD HAD WITH DEPUTY  
PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN MINISTER TARIO AZIZ, THE TWO  
AGREED THE U. S. AND IRAQ SHARED MANY COMMON INTERESTS...  
PEACE IN THE GULF, KEEPING SYRIA AND IRAN OFF BALANCE  
AND LESS INFLUENTIAL, AND PROMOTING EGYPT'S REINTEGRATION  
INTO THE ARAB WORLD. TARIO ALSO REVIEWED THE STATUS OF  
IRAQI OIL EXPORTS AND PLANS FOR INCREASING CAPACITY -  
INCLUDING CONSTRUCTION OF NEW PIPELINE. IN RESPONSE TO  
TARIO'S COMPLAINT THAT TOO MANY U. S. FRIENDS WERE  
SUPPLYING ARMS TO IRAN, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY. RUMSFELD

Date: JAN 13 1994

IS/FPC/CDR.  
MR Cases Only:  
EO Citations

TS authority to  
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Department of State

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PAGE 03 OF 04 LONDON 27592 01 OF 05 211815Z C15/18 082269 N00209

SAID THE U. S. WAS SYMPATHETIC TO THIS PROBLEM AND WOULD TALK WITH OUR FRIENDS TO TRY TO GET THEM TO STOP. TARIO COMMENTED THAT LEBANON WAS A MINOR PROBLEM AND ONLY IMPORTANT BECAUSE OF THE CURRENT CRISIS. FOCUSING UNDUE U. S. ATTENTION ONLY STRENGTHENS THE HAND OF LEBANON'S FACTIONAL LEADERS. ON IRAN, TARIO OPINED THAT THE WAR WAS KEEPING THE MULLAHS IN POWER BY SERVING AS A DISTRACTION FROM IRAN'S SERIOUS DOMESTIC PROBLEMS.  
END SUMMARY.

4. COMMENTING THAT THE CHANGES IN MY SCHEDULE RESULTED FROM AN APPOINTMENT WITH KING FAHD IN SAUDI ARABIA. I COMMENTED THAT THE KING WAS VERY PLEASED THAT I WAS COMING TO IRAQ AND ASKED ME TO EXTEND HIS REGARDS. PRESIDENT MUBARAK, KING HUSSEIN, AND KING HASAN ALSO HAD SIMILAR MESSAGES. ALL OF THEM HAD IN ONE WAY OR ANOTHER RECENTLY TALKED TO ME ABOUT IRAQ AND EXPRESSED THE CONVICTION THAT IT WAS A CAPITAL I SHOULD VISIT, THAT THERE WERE PEOPLE I SHOULD MEET, AND THAT IRAQ HAD A ROLE IN THE MIDDLE EAST THAT WAS IMPORTANT. TARIO INDICATED THE LEVELS OF RELATIONSHIPS IRAQ HAD WITH EACH, SAYING HE WAS PLEASED TO KNOW THAT THEY HAD BEEN POSITIVE IN THEIR COMMENTS.

5. I OPINED THAT THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES HAD BEEN STRAINED SINCE 1967. WHEN ASKED TO UNDERTAKE THIS JOB, I HAD LOOKED AT A MAP, TALKED TO PEOPLE, AND IN SHORT ORDER CONCLUDED THAT IRAQ WAS A COUNTRY I WISHED TO VISIT. IT WAS CLEAR FROM A GEOSTRATEGIC STANDPOINT, WE HAD INTERESTS THAT WERE SIMILAR AND THAT IT WAS WORTH TALKING ABOUT BOTH THE SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES OF OUR VIEWS. I SAID TO HIM THAT I WAS NOT HERE TO SEEK DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS; THAT

WAS SOMETHING THAT EACH NATION HAD TO DECIDE FOR ITSELF. AS HE KNEW, IRAQ HAD BROKEN RELATIONS IN 1967 AND WE

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S/S-0  
INCOMING

PAGE 04 OF 04 LONDON 27592- 01 OF 05 211815Z C15/18 002269 NOD209  
WERE READY IF THEY FELT THAT A HIGHER PROFILE IN THE  
RELATIONSHIP WOULD BE USEFUL IN INDICATING TO THE WORLD  
THAT RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR COUNTRIES ARE IMPORTANT AND  
THAT THERE ARE MORE SIMILARITIES THAN DIFFERENCES.

6. TARIO RESPONDED BY NOTING THAT WE HAD HAD CONTACTS.  
HE DESCRIBED THE VARIOUS LEVELS OF CONTACTS BETWEEN OUR  
TWO COUNTRIES. HE WENT ON TO POINT OUT THAT THEY DID NOT  
WANT PEOPLE TO FEEL THAT THEY CHANGED THEIR POSITIONS  
BECAUSE THEY WERE IN A WAR WITH IRAN OR WERE HAVING  
DIFFICULTIES. IN FACT IRAQ HAD A LONGSIGHTED VIEW AND  
FELT THAT RELATIONSHIPS WERE IMPORTANT AND NEEDED TO BE  
UNDERPINNED BY STRONG SENSE OF REALITY. HE ADDED THAT  
U. S.-IRAQI RELATIONS WAS AN ISSUE THAT MIGHT BE  
ADDRESSED BY THE PRESIDENT DURING OUR MEETING THE NEXT  
DAY.

7. I SAID I THOUGHT WE HAD AREAS OF COMMON INTEREST,  
PARTICULARLY THE SECURITY AND STABILITY IN THE GULF  
WHICH HAD BEEN JEOPARDIZED AS A RESULT OF THE IRANIAN  
REVOLUTION. I ADDED THAT THE U. S. HAD NO INTEREST IN AN  
IRANIAN VICTORY; TO THE CONTRARY, WE WOULD NOT WANT  
IRAN'S INFLUENCE EXPANDED AT THE EXPENSE OF IRAQ. AS  
WITH ALL NATIONS WE RESPECT IRAQ'S INDEPENDENCE,  
SOVEREIGNTY, AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY. IN OUR VIEW, THE  
BEHAVIOR OF IRAN, SYRIA AND LIBYA IS UNACCEPTABLE. IT  
IS IN OUR INTEREST AND THE INTEREST OF THOSE NATIONS THAT

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Department of State

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PAGE 02 OF 04 LONDON 27592 02 OF 05 211816Z C15/18 002270 N00210  
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1435

S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 05 LONDON 27592

NODIS

FROM RUMSFELD

DEPARTMENT PASS TO S/SN - MILLER

E. O. 12356: DECL: 12/21/13

TAGS: PREL. IO. LE. SY. IR

SUBJECT: RUMSFELD ONE-ON-ONE MEETING WITH IRAQI DEPUTY

FAVORED STABILITY AND OPPOSED TERRORISM, EXPANSIONISM  
AND TROUBLE-MAKING TO BEHAVE IN A WAY THAT REFLECTED THIS  
REALITY.

8. I NOTED THAT IRAQ'S OIL EXPORTS WERE IMPORTANT. WE  
TALKED ABOUT THE BEST WAYS TO INCREASE THEIR OUTPUT  
WOULD BE THE POSSIBILITY OF THEIR HAVING A PIPELINE  
CONNECTED TO SAUDI ARABIA. HE SAID THAT EVEN WITHOUT  
PUMPING STATIONS, IRAQ COULD INCREASE FROM 500,000 BPD  
TO 1.2 MILLION BPD; WITH PUMPING STATIONS OUTPUT COULD GO  
UP TO AN EVEN LARGER NUMBER. I RAISED THE QUESTION OF A  
PIPELINE THROUGH JORDAN. HE SAID HE WAS FAMILIAR WITH  
THE PROPOSAL. IT APPARENTLY WAS A U. S. COMPANY'S  
PROPOSAL. HOWEVER, HE WAS CONCERNED ABOUT THE PROXIMITY  
TO ISRAEL AS THE PIPELINE WOULD ENTER THE GULF OF AQABA.  
HE SEEMED TO FEEL THAT THE ONLY WAY TO THREATEN ISRAEL

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Department of State

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PAGE 03 OF 04 LONDON 27592 02 OF 05 211816Z C15/18 002270 N00210

FROM ATTACKING SUCH A VULNERABLE POINT WOULD BE TO HAVE A NUMBER OF COUNTRIES INVOLVED WITH THE PROPOSED PIPELINE AND WITH THE REFINERY. HE SAID THEY ARE INTERESTED BUT NEED TO FIND THE RIGHT FORMULA. HE FELT THAT IT COULD BE DONE FOR LESS THAN TWO BILLION DOLLARS AND RECOGNIZED THAT IT WOULD TAKE ABOUT TWO YEARS BECAUSE OF THE PLANNING REQUIRED. I SAID I COULD UNDERSTAND THAT THERE WOULD NEED TO BE SOME SORT OF ARRANGEMENTS THAT WOULD GIVE THOSE INVOLVED CONFIDENCE THAT IT WOULD NOT BE EASILY VULNERABLE. (THIS MAY BE AN ISSUE TO RAISE WITH ISRAEL AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME.)

9. WE DISCUSSED SYRIA AND AGREED THAT IT WAS IN BOTH OF OUR INTERESTS THAT THERE BE LIMITS ON SYRIA'S AMBITION. WE TALKED AT LENGTH ABOUT IRAQI-EGYPTIAN RELATIONS. NOTING THAT IRAQ HAD STEPPED FORWARD AND BEEN RELATIVELY BOLD WITH RESPECT TO UNDERTAKING A SERIES OF CONTACTS WHICH RECOGNIZED THE VALUE OF EGYPT IN THE ARAB WORLD. HE THEN SAID THAT WHILE THERE ARE SOME COUNTRIES LIKE LEBANON AND SYRIA THAT FROM TIME TO TIME MAY HAVE SOME IMPORTANCE BECAUSE OF SPECIFIC PROBLEMS RELATED TO THEM, THERE ARE COUNTRIES LIKE IRAQ, SAUDI ARABIA, AND EGYPT THAT ARE IMPORTANT YEAR IN AND YEAR OUT. WHAT WAS IMPORTANT WAS THAT THOSE COUNTRIES REGARDLESS OF CRISES, IN GOOD TIMES AND BAD, HAD A STABILIZING ROLE TO PLAY IN THE REGION. BECAUSE EGYPT WAS ONE OF THOSE, HE FELT IT WAS UNNATURAL FOR THEM NOT TO BE A PART OF THE ARAB WORLD.

10. I EMPHASIZED OUR INTEREST IN OPPOSING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND EXTREMISM. WE TALKED ABOUT ISRAEL AND A FAIR ARAB-ISRAEL PEACE. WE DISAGREED ABOUT HOW TO DEAL WITH THE PLO. TAMMO IS CONVINCED THAT UNLESS THE U. S. DEALS WITH THE PLO, THERE WOULD BE NO SOLUTION. HE

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PAGE 04 OF 04 LONDON 27592 02 OF 05 211816Z C15/18 002270 NOD210

FEELS THAT HUSSEIN IS WISER THAN SADAT [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] AND KNOWS THAT HE CANNOT STEP FORWARD WITHOUT ARAFAT AND THE PALESTINIANS; HE SAID FLATLY THAT WITHOUT THE PLO HUSSEIN WILL NOT STEP FORWARD AND SHOULD NOT.

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11. WE TALKED ABOUT BILATERAL COMMERCIAL RELATIONS. HE POINTED OUT THAT THE BUILDING WE WERE SITTING IN COULD NOT HAVE BEEN BUILT AS WELL OR AS QUICKLY AS IT WAS WITHOUT THE HELP OF AMERICANS, FRENCH, GERMANS, OR JAPANESE. IF A COUNTRY IS TRULY INTERESTED IN MODERNIZATION AS IRAQ IS, THE ONLY WAY IS TO HAVE TIES WITH WESTERN NATIONS.

12. WE DISCUSSED THE IRAN/IRAQ WAR IN DETAIL. I ASKED HIM A GREAT MANY QUESTIONS ABOUT THE DETAILS OF THE FIGHTING. THERE ARE FOUR OR FIVE SECTORS. WEAPONS USED RUN THE ENTIRE SPECTRUM, BUT MACHINE GUNS AND ARTILLERY HAVE BEEN PARTICULARLY EFFECTIVE. THE IRANIANS ARE USING RELATIVELY FEW TANKS. THEY TEND TO PREPARE FOR A MAJOR ATTACK FOR WEEKS ONLY TO HAVE IT REPULSED BY MACHINE GUNS AND ARTILLERY. THE IRANIAN FORCES ESSENTIALLY MOUNT HUMAN-WAVE ASSAULTS WITH THE SO-CALLED KHOMEINI GUARDS (YOUNG PEOPLE WITH A PIECE OF PAPER IN THEIR POCKETS THAT IS THEIR TICKET TO PARADISE), HEAVING THEMSELVES FORWARD UNTIL THEY BREAK AND RUN AS A RESULT OF THE RETURN FIRE. TARIO SAID THAT HE FELT THE WAR WAS OVER IN THE STRATEGIC SENSE IN THAT IRAQ WILL NOT LOSE. WHAT HE DIDN'T KNOW WAS THE TACTICAL ISSUE OF WHEN THE

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PAGE 02 OF 04 LONDON 27592 03 OF 05 211817Z C15/18 002272 NOD211  
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1436

SECRET SECTION 03 OF 05 LONDON 27592

NODIS

FROM RUMSFELD

DEPARTMENT PASS TO S/SN - MILLER

E. O. 12356: DECL: 12/21/13  
TAGS: PREL. IO. LE. SY. IR  
SUBJECT: RUMSFELD ONE-ON-ONE MEETING WITH IRAQI DEPUTY

WAR WOULD END -- ONE, TWO, THREE, FOUR YEARS FROM NOW.

13. TARIO EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE IRANIAN ECONOMY IN THAT THEY HAVE ENOUGH OIL TO CONTINUE THE WAR INDEFINITELY. THE LIMITING FACTOR HE FELT WAS THEIR WEAPONRY. WE TALKED AT SOME LENGTH ABOUT THE NATIONS THAT ARE SUPPLYING WEAPONS TO THE IRANIANS. I TOLD HIM THAT THERE WAS NO QUESTION BUT THAT THE U. S. OPPOSED OTHER COUNTRIES SUPPLYING WEAPONS TO IRAN AND ASKED HIM FOR SPECIFICS. I SET FORTH OUR EFFORTS TO HALT ILLEGAL DIVERSIONS OF THE U.S.-CONTROLLED EQUIPMENT TO IRAN, AND OUR CONVICTION THAT SUCH EQUIPMENT IS NOT NOW REACHING IRAN.

[REDACTED]

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


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Department of State

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PAGE 03 OF 04 , LONDON 27592 03 OF 05. 211817Z C15/18 00272 NOD211



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I ASSURED HIM I WOULD TAKE HIS LIST OF COUNTRIES HELPING IRAN AND THAT THE U.S. WOULD WORK WITH THE COUNTRIES INVOLVED ON A SUSTAINED BASIS TO TRY TO REDUCE THE FLOW OF ARMS TO IRAN. AFTER PRESSING HIM FOR MORE FACTS I WAS INTERESTED IN HIS RESPONSE. HE SAID YOU KNOW IF SOMEONE WANTS TO DO SOMETHING THAT IS NOT IN THEIR INTERESTS THEY CAN HIDE IT. FARID SAID WHAT IS IMPORTANT IS THAT THE U.S. USE ITS INFLUENCE, NOT TO STOP A PARTICULAR WEAPONS TRANSACTION, BUT TO CREATE AN UNDERSTANDING ON THE PART OF THOSE COUNTRIES THAT WHAT THEY'RE DOING IS DAMAGING THEIR OWN INTERESTS.

HE INDICATED THAT MOST OF THOSE COUNTRIES FURNELING ARMS TO IRAN HAVE PEOPLE WHO, TO THE EXTENT THESE COUNTRIES ARE GOING SOMETHING AGAINST THEIR INTERESTS, IT WILL BECOME KNOWN. I THOUGHT THAT IF WE APPROACHED THE LEADERSHIP OF THESE COUNTRIES ON A BROAD PHILOSOPHICAL BASIS IT MIGHT BE HELPFUL. HE WAS CLEARLY PLEASED AND RELIEFED THAT I UNDERSTOOD HIS CONCERN AND THAT I

CONVICTED THE U.S. TO UNDERTAKE SUCH AN EFFORT. COMMENT: [REDACTED] AT FIRST WIFE THAT WE HAD TO OP



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
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Department of State

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PAGE 04 OF 04 LONDON 27592 03 OF 05 211817Z C15/18 002272 N00211  
SUFFICIENT EFFORT AND VIGOR THAT IT DOES SOME GOOD AND  
THAT WE GET BACK TO HIM WITH REPORTS OF THOSE EFFORTS.)

15. TARIO EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR U. S. SUPPORT OF  
RESOLUTION 540 AT THE UN. I INDICATED OUR DESIRE TO HAVE  
THE WAR MEDIATED AND END PEACEFULLY WITHOUT FURTHER  
ESCALATING TENSION IN THE MIDDLE EAST. I OFFERED OUR  
WILLINGNESS TO DO MORE.



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I MADE CLEAR THAT OUR EFFORTS TO  
ASSIST WERE INHIBITED BY CERTAIN THINGS THAT MADE IT  
DIFFICULT FOR US CITING THE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS,  
POSSIBLE ESCALATION IN THE GULF, AND HUMAN RIGHTS. I  
POINTED OUT THAT WE WERE IMPROVING OUR CONTINGENCY  
PLANNING WITH GULF STATES AS TO OUR GOAL OF KEEPING THE  
STRAITS OPEN.

FROM US STANDPOINT, OBVIOUSLY ANYTHING THAT IS DONE  
THAT COMPLICATES LIFE FOR IRAN AND SYRIA IS  
HELPFUL, AND CONTRIBUTES TO STABILITY IN THE REGION.  
FOR EXAMPLE WE FAVORED IRAQI COOPERATION WITH  
TURKEY, OUR NATO ALLY.

15. ON LEBANON I INDICATED IT IS A SERIOUS  
SITUATION, THAT SYRIA IS INFLUENCING THE  
FACTIONS THERE TO KEEP THE CONFLICT GOING, AND

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PAGE 02 OF 04 LONDON 27592 04 OF 05 211818Z C15/18 002273 NOD212  
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FM AMEMBASSY LONDON  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1437

S E C R E T SECTION 04 OF 05 LONDON 27592

NODIS

FROM RUMSFELD

DEPARTMENT PASS TO S:SN - MILLER

E. O. 12356: DECL: 12/21/13  
TAGS: PREL. IO. LE. SY. IR  
SUBJECT: RUMSFELD ONE-ON-ONE MEETING WITH IRAQI DEPUTY

THAT OUR INTENTION WAS THAT IT WOULD END WITHOUT BRETTING THE APPETITE OF SYRIA. I EXPRESSED AMAZEMENT THAT AFTER THE KINDS OF COMMENTS HE MADE ABOUT THE PLO AND THE PALESTINIENS THE ARAB WORLD COULD SIT QUIETLY BY WHILE SYRIA KILLED PLO FIGHTERS. HE REPLIED THAT SYRIA NATIONALIZED HIS POLICE WITH ARAFAT BY CONTINUING IT WAS PLO INTERNATIONAL FIGHTING. I ASKED IF SYRIA WOULD GO IN TO JORDAN COULD NOT THEY FIND STILL ANOTHER PRETEXT TO JUSTIFY ACTIVITY AGAINST JORDAN? IF NATIONS WISHED TO COOPERATE THE SYRIANS THEY CAN ALWAYS FIND EXCUSES. HE SAID JORDAN IS A SOVEREIGN NATION AND SUCH A CLAIM OF POLICE SHOULD BE JUSTIFIED ON A PRETEXT. HE TALKED ABOUT THE GOAL OF EXPANDING POLICE AUTHORITY, THE GOAL OF HIS POLICE OFFICERS, AND THAT THE GOALS ARE...  
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PAGE 03 OF 04 LONDON 27592 04 OF 05 211818Z C15/18 002273 NOD212

17. TARIO POINTED OUT THAT LEBANON REALLY WAS A MINOR PROBLEM. ITS ONLY IMPORTANCE WAS THAT IT WAS A CRISIS NOW. IT REALLY WAS NOT A COUNTRY AND THE PEOPLE OF LEBANON THINK OF THEMSELVES AS OF A CERTAIN SECT. HE SAID WHEN AN IRAQI IS ASKED WHO HE IS, THE REPLY IS "I AM AN IRAQI." OTHER COUNTRIES HAVE A SIMILAR PRIDE OF NATIONAL IDENTITY -- BUT NOT IN LEBANON. IN LEBANON THEY THINK OF THEIR SECT OR THEIR VILLAGE AND HAVE NO SENSE OF COHESION. HE SAID THE PROBLEM WITH THE US FOCUSING ON A MINOR PROBLEM LIKE LEBANON IS THAT IT ELEVATES SYRIA TO A ROLE IT DOESN'T DESERVE. THIS IS UNNATURAL. FURTHER IT ELEVATES THE FACTIONAL LEADERS. IT MAKES JUMBLATT SOMEBODY. OBVIOUSLY, ANYBODY IN THAT SITUATION IS GOING TO PLAY IT TO THE MAXIMUM. HE IS GOING TO MAKE THE BEST DEAL, TAKE SOME MONEY, AND DO WHATEVER HE FEELS LIKE DOING. BECAUSE THIS IS HIS MOMENT IN THE SUN. IMAGINE A SUPERPOWER PAYING ATTENTION TO A JUMBLATT. HE HOPED THAT WE WOULD NOT FOCUS ON LEBANON EXCESSIVELY, BECAUSE SOMETIMES YOU CAN SOLVE LITTLE PROBLEMS BY DEALING CORRECTLY WITH THE LARGER ONES. EVEN PRYING THE FACTIONS AWAY FROM SYRIA REALLY WOULDN'T DO MUCH NOW. THERE HAD TO BE A GREATER DEGREE OF COHESION WITHIN THE COUNTRY BEFORE THINGS COULD COME TOGETHER. I TOLD HIM THE SOL NEEDED HARKER COUNTERS. HE INDICATED IRAQI WOULDN'T BE OF ANY HELP BECAUSE TO DO SO WOULD WEAKEN ITS ABILITY TO GET ASSISTANCE FROM OTHERS.

18. WITH RESPECT TO THE PEACE PROCESS, TARIO  
 SAID THE CURRENT SITUATION WAS THE BEST

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PAGE 04 OF 04 LONDON 27592 04 OF 05 211818Z C15/18 002273 NOD212  
 HUSSEIN WAS DEPENDENT ON THE PLO. AFTER A LENGTHY DISCUSSION, HE FELT THAT MY VIEW THAT THE PLO HAD NOT DELIVERED IS NOT ENOUGH. IN FACT, HE AGREED, THE PLO HAS SURVIVED CLOSE TO TWO DECADES, IT IS THE POLITICAL VOICE OF THE PALESTINIANS, AND NO MATTER WHAT KING HUSSEIN DOES HE CAN'T MOVE WITHOUT THEM. FURTHER, HUSSEIN KNOWS THAT AND HE WON'T MOVE WITHOUT THEM. IT'S UP TO THE US TO FIND A WAY TO COMMUNICATE WITH ARAFAT.

19. WE TALKED AT LENGTH ABOUT THE CONSENSUS DIRECTION-MAKING PROBLEM THAT WAS INHIBITING THE FUTURE OF THE ARAB WORLD. IF THE ARAB WORLD CONTINUES DOWN THE PATH OF USING CONSENSUS TEN YEARS FROM NOW, IT WILL ALWAYS HAVE BEEN THE LOWEST COMMON DENOMINATOR FOR EACH DECISION. AS A RESULT, IT WILL END WITH THE SPOILER WINNING AND THE SENSIBLE MAJORITY UNABLE TO MOVE ITSELF FORWARD, TO MODERNIZE, TO DEVELOP, OR TO CREATE STABILITY AND AN ENVIRONMENT WITH CONSTRUCTIVE INTERACTION WITH THE WEST. HE PRESSED AS TO WHAT THE VIEWS OF OTHER ARAB NATIONS WERE. I TOLD HIM THAT I BELIEVED THAT MOROCCO, JORDAN, UZBEK, AND EGYPT AGREED WITH THIS CONJECTURE. HE ASKED ABOUT THE SAUDIS.

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PAGE 02 OF 03 LONDON 27592 05 OF 05 211818Z C15/18 002274 N00213  
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S E C R E T SECTION 05 OF 05 LONDON 27592

NODIS

FROM RUMSFELD

DEPARTMENT PASS TO S/SN - MILLER

E. O. 12356: DECL: 12/21/13

TAGS: PREL. IO. LE. SY. IR

SUBJECT: RUMSFELD ONE-ON-ONE MEETING WITH IRAQI DEPUTY

I SAID THEY ARE QUIET ON THE QUESTION OF CONSENSUS AND THAT I TAKE AS NOT BEING IN AGREEMENT. WE ALSO DISCUSSED THE SOVIET UNION. I SAID THE US SPEKS PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF CONFLICTS, RECOGNITION OF THE RIGHT OF SOVEREIGN NATIONS TO MAKE THEIR OWN JUDGMENTS AND BELIEF IN A STRONG SAIT AND DEFENSE, AND SECURITY IN THE GULF. CURRENTLY OUR EFFORTS ARE AIMED TOWARDS STRENGTHENING OUR FRIENDS AND HELPING TO CREATE A ZONE OF SECURITY AND STABILITY.

20. WHAT STUCK HE WAS HIS INTEREST IN THE ECONOMIC AREA. I DID NOT BELIEVE IT COULD HAVE BEEN CLOSED TO HIM IN THE MOR. HE DID MENTION THAT THERE WAS NO WAY FOR HIS COUNTRY TO BE INVOLVED WITH OTHER COUNTRIES IN DEVELOPMENT. THE REASONS FOR THIS WERE: 1. POLITICAL 2. ECONOMIC 3. SECURITY 4. STABILITY

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PAGE 03 OF 03 LONDON 27592 05 OF 05 211818Z C15/18 002274 NOD213

IF THE WAR CONTINUED, HE FELT IRAQ HAD TO BE IN CONTACT WITH THE OTHER COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD.

21. HE SAID THAT THE BEST RESULT FOR NATIONS INTERESTED IN STABILITY WAS FOR IRAN TO LOSE THE WAR. HIS REASON FOR THIS IS THAT THE MULLAHS CANNOT COPE WITH THE ECONOMY AND THEY CAN'T MANAGE A SOCIETY OR A COUNTRY. THEY CANNOT HANDLE THE ADMINISTRATIVE DETAILS. IT IS ONLY THE WAR THAT IS DISTRACTING THE IRANIAN PEOPLE FROM THE INCOMPETENCE AND INABILITY OF THE MULLAHS. HIS JUDGMENT IS THAT THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION, WHILE IT WILL TAKE SOME YEARS, WILL EVENTUALLY DIE OR MODERATE. IF THE WAR ENDED THEY WOULD HAVE NOTHING TO DO BUT ADDRESS THE DOMESTIC PROBLEMS. SINCE THEY LACK THE ABILITY TO HANDLE THESE PROBLEMS OVER TIME, THERE WILL BE CHANGE.

22. OTHER SUBJECTS COVERED: TARIO SPOKE HIGHLY OF BOTH MITTERAND AND CHEYSSON AND SAID HE KNEW THEM BOTH PERSONALLY. THEY HAVE A DEVELOPED WORLD VIEW.

23. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. PRICE

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