

the Cabinet. The sequence of these events to be decided after careful consideration by Messrs. Bundy, Rusk, McNamara and the President himself.

[Here follows discussion not related to China.]

59. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State¹

Taipei, October 19, 1964, 11 p.m.

328. Met President this afternoon [1 line of source text not declassified].² Less than 1 line of source text not declassified, present were President, Madam and interpreter. President asked if I had any news for him. I stated that at Saturday meeting with FonMin I had passed all available information and guidance on ChiCom atomic event and on Soviet change of leadership.³ I said no developments but we were evaluating carefully statements of *Izvestia* and *Pravda* and world reaction. I then gave him sanitized version of State and CIA analysis.

I then asked him if he could give me any views these two events I could pass USG.

President passed by specific comment on Soviet shift and concurred on ChiCom event.

President stated that event of such far reaching importance that he had been unable up to the present to make any detailed or specific statement or comment. He stated however that he would like to pass to me "as US Ambassador and friend" his own personal views on impact on Asian peoples. He said that psychological reaction was enormous and far reaching. He said it was a turning point in the attitude of people of this part of the world and that their views on world affairs would henceforth be different from those of the past. He said the psychological effect could not be overestimated.

President stated that Americans at home and abroad were not capable of truly appraising the psychology of Asian people. He said this event

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12-1 CHICOM, Secret. Repeated to Hong Kong, Tokyo, and CINCPAC for POLAD. Received at 1 p.m.

² Text not declassified

³ On October 15 Khrushchev was removed as Chairman of the Council of Ministers and replaced by Alexei N. Kosygin.

required special efforts by US to see the change in its true light and urged that we do all possible to this end.

I said the US was studying the situation with all resources in Asia and at home. I agreed with inadequacy of Americans in true appraisal of Asian thought and stated that we respected his judgement more than any other in his position as true leader of Chinese people.

President then said that Asia henceforth would never be the same as it was in the past. He said the United States and the Republic of China should at this point reevaluate their policy toward Mainland China based not on the past but the present and future and work jointly for a new solution. This latter point emphasized by the Madam.

Wright

60. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, October 19, 1964, 1:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

President's meeting with Congressional Leadership, Oct. 19

The President met with the bipartisan Congressional Leadership on Monday, October 19, at 1:30 p.m. The President worked from the attached briefing memorandum (Tab A)² and the discussion at the meeting generally followed the attached agenda.

The President opened the meeting by giving his welcome to the Leadership and his thanks for their return from their homes and whatever else they were doing. He then asked Director McCone to explain what we know of the Chinese nuclear effort.

Director McCone gave a general explanation of the capabilities of the United States in satellite reconnaissance, and then described our current understanding of their capabilities. A copy of the notes from which he worked is attached (Tab B). The Director was followed by Chairman

¹ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Bundy Files, Miscellaneous Meetings, Vol. I, Secret. The memorandum is dated October 20.

² The tabs are attached but not printed.

Seaborg who gave a general discussion of the problems of the technology of nuclear weapons. Chairman Seaborg indicated the probability but not the certainty that the Chinese weapon was made of plutonium (an assumption that was challenged by evidence from debris later in the day). He indicated his belief that the Chinese would begin with a device and that it would take sometime to "weaponize" such a device. Chairman Seaborg indicated that the speed of the Chinese development would depend on how much the Chinese knew about the technical details—quality of material and design details—in weaponmaking. He thought that if they had been fully cut off from what the Soviets knew for several years, it might be a matter of about 4 or 5 years before they would have a thermonuclear device. On the other hand, if they wished to make a thermonuclear explosion simply for its political and psychological impact, they could use the bulk of their production for this specific purpose and produce such an explosion considerably sooner.

The President asked Secretary McNamara to give an account of the military position of the United States vis-à-vis the Chinese bomb. Secretary McNamara began by discussing the dangers in the spread of nuclear weapons. He pointed out that there are half a dozen countries which could move rapidly in this direction if they made the political decision to do so, and that the cost of developing a nuclear device was now on the order of \$120 million—not a prohibitive figure. He underlined the importance of finding ways and means to limit nuclear spread.

Secretary McNamara then turned to the strategic position of the U.S. and pointed out that Chinese targets as well as Soviet targets were included in our strategic planning. He explained that we had 2700 nuclear weapons in our survivable alert force, and said that 800 of these weapons would suffice to inflict unacceptable damage on the Soviet Union. The additional weapons were important for their damage-limiting capability.

Ambassador Thompson discussed the developments in the Soviet Union, along the lines of the attached memo of his talking notes (Tab C).

Senator Hickenlooper asked if the immediate meaning of the Chinese bomb was not more important in its psychological impact than in its military meaning. Secretary Rusk replied that we were taking every possible measure in consultation with interested nations to limit this psychological impact. We had given important assurances in the President's statements. The Secretary reported that a number of Ambassadors had told him that his warning of September 29 had been very useful in limiting the impact of this event.

[Here follows discussion not related to China.]

McG. B.

61. Memorandum of a Conversation¹

Washington, October 20, 1964, 6:10 p.m.

SUBJECT

Chinese Communist Nuclear Detonation

PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin—USSR

The Secretary

Ambassador Adlai Stevenson—USUN

After discussing other matters, Ambassador Dobrynin asked what else could the US and USSR do to improve relations. Mention was made of the explosion of a nuclear device by the Chinese Communists. Ambassador Dobrynin stated that it would take some time before the Chinese Communists would become a nuclear power. He suggested the extension of the test ban treaty to all environments as a possible next step. The Secretary stated the US position with respect to the need for adequate and effective verification. Ambassador Dobrynin reiterated the standard Soviet position.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12-1 CHICOM. Secret. Drafted by Polansky. The conversation took place in the Secretary's office. A handwritten notation on the source text reads "Uncleared. Never distributed." The source text indicates it is Part 3 of 4.

62. Report of Meetings¹

Taipei, October 23-24, 1964.

Report of Meeting Between Chinese Nationalist Officials and Dr. Ray S. Cline
Dr. Cline held two briefings in Taipei²—one on 23 October was attended by Foreign Minister Shen, Defense Minister Yu, and Chiang

¹ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, Central Intelligence Agency. Secret; Eyes Only. No drafting information appears on the source text. Filed with a covering note of October 24 from McCone's Executive Assistant, Walter Elder, to McGeorge Bundy stating that McCone asked that it be brought to Bundy's personal attention.

² According to a record of a telephone conversation between McCone and Ball on October 20, McCone gave Ball the gist of Carter's report of his conversation with Chiang and told him Cline was planning to go to Taipei, stating that because of Cline's "background and relationship with those people, it would be useful to get his appraisal of the attitude of the people." (Johnson Library, Ball Papers, China (Taiwan))