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In Bermuda discussions nuclear testing consensus US and British experts was US retains over-all nuclear advantage even after recent Soviet tests but Soviets have matched or surpassed us in several areas and in absence US tests could gain over-all advantage in two or three years. Particular concern is Soviet interest in tests relating to anti-missile defense.

Prime Minister spoke at length of risks, costs, and waste of indefinite arms race in this field. Urged major new effort at time resumed disarmament negotiations and before US preparations for early spring tests finished and final decision reached. Argued differences between US and Soviet disarmament plans small, agreement in test ban negotiations only narrowly missed, and current developments in Soviet economy and society give hope they would respond to new effort--preferably at highest level--to change direction

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world efforts dramatically and thus obviate need for US to test. He had no specific proposals to put forward other than renewed high level approaches.

While sharing PM's concern and determined make serious effort in resumed disarmament negotiations, President unwilling make personal approach to Khrushchev since continued Soviet expansion and pressure on Free World gave no grounds for expectation of results and we would run risk tying our hands indefinitely from making nuclear advances necessary to our security. Concrete progress in forthcoming discussions on Berlin or disarmament might offer adequate reason to withhold testing but in absence such significant change in situation his final decision would have to be to test.

Conclusion reached in discussions that Soviet actions fully justify US testing, that preparations must go ahead, and that maximum effort will be made in 18-nation talks to break disarmament deadlock. Regarding availability Christmas Island Prime Minister will consult his Cabinet and advise us soonest whether he is prepared to accede ~~XXXXXX~~ to our use of Island, regardless of his own ultimate position on atmospheric testing, if President decides to go ahead.

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