

Authority *NN 0971037*

By *LCM* NARA Date *7/25/63*

S/S - MR. READ
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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

RECORD OF ACTIONS

NSC
ACTION

2468. INSTRUCTIONS FOR HARRIMAN MISSION
(Revised draft July 9 instructions for the
Harriman Mission)

Following discussion by the Council of the
draft instructions for the Honorable W.
Averell Harriman's mission to the USSR,
the President approved the attached re-
vised text.

July 9, 1963
515th NSC Meeting
NSC Action No. 2468

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July 10, 1963

INSTRUCTIONS FOR HONORABLE W. AVERELL HARRIMAN

Your mission involves both negotiating and exploratory aspects.

On the negotiating side, you should seek to negotiate the most comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty possible in accordance with existing guidelines.

On the exploratory side, you should canvass, in so far as appears practical, the range of issues involving peace and security which divide us from the Soviets. You should give especial attention to two points:

1. What other acceptable measures of disarmament the Soviets are interested in undertaking;
2. What are Soviet intentions in dealing with the problems related to European security, as raised in Khrushchev's speech of July 2.

I. TEST BAN

1. Our judgment that a test ban treaty is in the national interest rests on two grounds. First, it may be a significant first step toward the halting of the arms race and thus reduce international tensions. Second, and more important, it is an indispensable first step toward the limitation of the further diffusion of nuclear weapons. The prospects of a further increase in the number of powers possessing nuclear weapons poses a potentially serious threat to our security and to world stability and peace. Therefore, a test ban treaty must be viewed in relation to the problem of checking the further diffusion of nuclear weapons.

2. Accordingly, the achievement of a comprehensive test ban treaty outlawing testing in all environments remains our objective. However, Chairman Khrushchev's speech makes it unlikely that we can reach agreement with the Soviets on a comprehensive treaty at this time.

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Therefore, we should seek an agreement banning testing in three environments along the lines of the August 27, 1962, draft treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in atmosphere, outer space and underwater, presented to the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament in Geneva. You are authorized to carry such negotiations as far as you can.

3. The achievement of such an agreement should be viewed as a first step toward the achievement of a comprehensive test ban treaty. If the Soviets show an interest in pursuing the topic, you should initiate technical discussions with the Soviet Union which may resolve the present disagreements between the Soviet Union on the one hand, and ourselves and the United Kingdom on the other, on the need for inspections in any comprehensive test ban treaty. The Soviets may, in one way or another, raise the issue of a moratorium on underground tests. If the Soviets do this, you may explore the usefulness of responding to such an initiative by means of a limited quota of underground tests in addition to the total prohibition of testing in other environments, but without discussing specific numbers, unless on further instructions.

II. NON-DISSEMINATION

1. You should continue to emphasize the relation between the nuclear test ban treaty and our desire to control the diffusion of nuclear weapons. In pursuing this subject, you should be guided by the talks on non-dissemination of nuclear weapons between Secretary Rusk and Ambassador Dobrynin. You may indicate that the United States will endeavor to secure adherence to or observation of any non-dissemination agreement by those powers associated with it, if the Soviet Union is willing to undertake a parallel responsibility for those powers associated with it. In this connection, you should maintain our position that the MLEF proposals now under discussion are not inconsistent with the goal of a non-dissemination agreement.

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SECRETIII. OTHER MEASURES OF DISARMAMENT

1. Our talks on general and complete disarmament in the 18-Nation Disarmament Conference in Geneva have made little progress. Recently Foreign Minister Gromyko made a proposal which at least raises the question of whether or not the Soviets are willing to consider serious first-stage disarmament measures not tied to an agreement to proceed rapidly to complete and general disarmament on terms which we have always found unacceptable. Gromyko's proposal still presents serious problems, including the question of the extent of reduction of strategic nuclear forces in relation to the reduction of other forces. Nonetheless, you should explore the possibility that the Gromyko proposal is intended to open a serious discussion of separable first stages, on terms to which we can respond.

2. In addition, you should attempt to discover Soviet interest in other measures previously authorized as separable measures. These include, but need not be limited to:

a. An agreement not to put weapons of mass destruction in orbit. This is a matter of particular interest to the United States.

b. A halt to the production of fissionable materials, under appropriate safeguards, and in combination with the transfer from military stockpiles of agreed quantities of fissionable materials to peaceful uses. In this connection, you should be prepared to discuss an arrangement in which we transfer more fissionable materials than the Soviets.

c. An agreement to establish nuclear free zones in areas where nuclear weapons do not form an integral part of the security arrangements upon which the countries in the areas rely. (This refers to Latin America and Africa.)

d. The scrapping on a one-for-one basis of B-47's and BADGERS at a rate to be agreed.

e. Measures on the reduction of risk of war through accident, miscalculation or failure of communication.

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SECRETIV. OTHER MEASURES

1. Chairman Khrushchev, in his speech, stated a connection between the test ban treaty and a non-aggression pact between the NATO and Warsaw Pacts. Neither the degree of this connection nor the nature of the proposals to which Chairman Khrushchev referred are clear. In exploring Soviet intentions in this respect, you should be guided by the following objectives:

a. If possible, we should separate the non-aggression arrangements from the test ban treaty and other disarmament matters. We should press the discussions on these, and defer to a later date the further discussions of non-aggression arrangements. We would prefer to go as far as possible in discussing the three environment test ban treaty first, and then explore other measures of disarmament, as well as the Soviet proposals for non-aggression arrangements.

b. Even if it proves impossible to agree on this procedure it is useful to explore Soviet purposes. The phrase, "non-aggression pact", has been loosely used to cover a wide variety of possible arrangements about the way in which relations between Eastern European Communist states and Soviet Russia on the one hand, and the NATO allies, on the other are conducted. In discussing these arrangements, we must continue to make clear that we can accept no arrangement which formally recognizes the East German regime or which is inconsistent with the ultimate reunification of Germany as a policy goal. Further, we can make no arrangements which do not insure the present Western position in Berlin. In all these matters we must take into account the interests of our allies. Within these constraints a non-aggression arrangement could be advantageous to the West by reducing the possibility of further Berlin crises. Accordingly, you should explore Soviet purposes in advancing this suggestion, and the possible modes which, in the Soviet view, would meet these purposes.

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2. You should also be prepared to explore any other matters which the Soviets wish to raise under the general heading of improving relations between the Soviet Bloc and NATO; or between the United States and the Soviet Union. In the context of such a discussion, you may wish to raise the problem of enforcing the Geneva Agreements in Laos.

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