TEXT

NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS, NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS/CONSULTANTS. DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR

DIA FOR IR BRANCH; PANAMA FOR ADS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PTER, KPRP, PE

SUBJECT: PROFILE OF POLITICALLY MOTIVATED TERRORISM IN PERU

REFS: (A) 84 LIMA A-08, 84 LIMA A-08

1. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS. SENDERO LUMINOSEO (SL)—PERU'S MARXIST INSPIRED, BUT PECULIARLY ANDEN TERRORIST MOVEMENT—IS CONTINUING TO EXERT A SIGNIFICANT IMPACT ON PERUVIAN LIFE. RELATIVE TO 1983, HOWEVER (REF A), THAT IMPACT HAD DECLINED AS 1984 ENDED. THE CYCLICAL NATURE OF SENDERO VIOLENCE, AND SL'S DETERMINED EFFORT TO DISRUPT THE 1983 MUNICIPAL ELECTION PROCESS, POINT TO RENEWED WAVES OF TERRORIST INCIDENTS AS THE 1985 ELECTORAL SEASON
ADVANCES. WE DOUBT, HOWEVER, THAT SENDERO WILL SUCCEED IN ABORTING THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS. SENDERO'S MOST SIGNIFICANT IMPRINT REMAINS IN THE (NOW 17-PROVINCE) SOUTH-CENTRAL SIERRA "EMERGENCY ZONE" (EZ), WHERE GOP AUTHORITY CONTINUES TO DEPEND ON MILITARY FORCE AND WHERE, FOR THE MOST PART, TERRORIST/COUNTERTERRORIST BLOODSHED IN PERU REMAINS CONCENTRATED. BUT WHILE SENDERO'S SWAY IN 1983 EXTENDED OVER VAST EXTENDS OF THE COUNTRYSIDE, 1984 WITNESSED ATTACKS THAT WERE FAR MORE SPORADIC AND, EXCEPT FOR NORTHERN AYACUCHO, APPEARED TO DECLINE FURTHER AS THE YEAR ENDED. OCCASIONAL BLACKOUTS IN LIMA AND OTHER MAJOR CITIES REMINDED URBAN DWELLERS THAT THE TERRORISTS HAD NOT DISAPPEARED. NEVERTHELESS, THERE WAS NO REPEITION IN 1984 OF THE SL SHOOTINGS THAT CLAIMED MULTIPLE CIVILIAN LIVES IN THE CAPITAL IN JULY AND OCTOBER-NOVEMBER 1983. ELSEWHERE IN PERU, SL DEMONSTRATED SUFFICIENT DEDICATION AND ORGANIZING ABILITY TO BE ABLE TO OPERATE IN REMOTE STRETCHES OF THE SIERRA, WHETHER IN PRE-EXISTING BASE AREAS OR IN NEWLY ESTABLISHED ONES. BUT IT CONSPICUOUSLY LACKED STAYING POWER IN THE UPPER HUALLAGA VALLEY, WHERE (AT MID-YEAR) ITS DRAMATIC EXPANSION LED THE GOP TO ESTABLISH A SECOND REGIONAL EMERGENCY ZONE. AS IN 1983, PERU'S CIVILIAN LEADERS CONTINUED TO RELY ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY ON THE APPLICATION OF FORCE TO CONTROL SL TERRORISM. PARADOXICALLY, THE GREATEST PRESSURE TO ADOPT OTHER MEANS (EMPHASIZING ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT) CAME FROM MILITARY LEADERS. BUT MILITARY RECOGNITION OF THE LONG-RANGE IMPORTANCE OF DEVELOPMENT DID NOT LEAD FIELD COMMANDERS TO CHANGE BASIC SHORT-TERM TACTICS. OUTSIDE OF THE EZ, SENDERO'S PRINCIPAL IMPACT ON PERUVIAN LIFE IN 1984 WAS INDIRECT: IT CAUSED SHORT-LIVED, BUT ACUTE, SWINGS OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL PENDULUM THAT PROVOKED BOTH MILITARY AND CIVILIAN GOP REACTIONS; TERRORIST VIOLENCE AGGRAVATED EXISTING TENSIONS AND FRAYED AN ALREADY TENUOUS SOCIAL FABRIC; AND WHOLE HIGHLAND COMMUNITIES, CAUGHT BETWEEN SL AND SECURITY FORCES, ABANDONED ANCESTRAL HOMES FOR THE RELATIVE SAFETY OF LIMA AND OTHER OVERCROWDED URBAN AREAS.


4. 1984: TWELVE MONTH OVERVIEW. AS 1983 ENDED, WE CONCLUDED (REF A) THAT SL TERRORIST PHENOMENON HAD EXPANDED, STRIKING OUT FROM ITS ISOLATED SOUTH-CENTRAL SIERRA BASE TO REACH INTO PERU'S MAJOR CITIES AND
CREATING, IN ADDITIONAL REACHES OF THE SIERRA, STILL MORE RURAL FOCS OF SUBVERSION. BY MID-1984, THE HYPOTHESIS OF AN EXPANDING SENDERO APPEARED TO HAVE BEEN CONFIRMED IN DRAMATIC FASHION, AS TERRORIST-PROVOKED NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS, NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS/CONSULTANTS, DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR DIA FOR IR BRANCH; PANAMA FOR ADS E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PTER, KPRP, PE
SUBJECT: PROFILE OF POLITICALLY MOTIVATED TERRORISM IN VIOLENCE SPREAD THROUGHOUT THE COCA GROWING UPPER HUALLAGA VALLEY IN (DEPARTMENTS OF) HUANUCO AND SAN MARTIN. TERRORIST UPSURGE THERE, ALONG WITH RENEWED INCIDENTS IN LIMA AND OTHER PARTS OF COUNTRY, LED GOP TO DECLARE SECURITY-RELATED NATIONAL "STATE OF EMERGENCY" ON JULY 6 (84 LIMA 8032) AND, AT MID-MONTH, TO PLACE UPPER HUALLAGA REGION UNDER SPECIAL STATE OF EMERGENCY WHILE, AT SAME TIME, GRANTING ARMED FORCES OVERALL CONTROL OF ANTI-SUBVERSIVE EFFORT (84 LIMA 8617) SENDERO'S SEEMINGLY "OVERNIGHT" IMPLANTATION IN AN AREA THAT WAS TOPOGRAPHICALLY, Racially, AND ECONOMICALLY DIFFERENT FROM ITS AYACUCHO HEARTLAND RAISED TROUBLING QUESTIONS CONCERNING ITS ABILITY TO EXPAND ITS POPULAR APPEAL. ANSWERS TO THOSE QUESTIONS WERE NOT IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE. ONCE MILITARY FORCES MOVED INTO THE UPPER HUALLAGA, HOWEVER, THE MYSTERY OF SENDERO'S SURGE DISSIPATED. SOME EIGHTY PERCENT OF CAPTURED SL ACTIVIST PROVED TO BE OUTSIDERS TO THE REGION, AN INDICATION BOTH OF SENDERO LEADERSHIP'S DELIBERATE DECISION TO MAKE VALLEY A PRIME TARGET FOR EXPANSION AND, GIVEN LIMITED LOCAL RESPONSE TO SL'S RECRUITING EFFORTS, OF TERRORISTS FAILURE TO TAKE EFFECTIVE ROOT THERE.
5. THE MILITARY'S ENTRY INTO THE VALLEY, UNLIKE THE CASE OF THE SOUTH-CENTRAL SIERRA EZ, PRODUCED RELATIVELY RAPID AND DRAMATIC CONSEQUENCES. APPARENT MILITARY SUCCESSES IN AYACUCHO IN THE FIRST THREE MONTHS OF 1983 WERE FOLLOWED BY A SERIES OF SL COUNTERATTACKS, INCLUDING THE INSTIGAION OF COMMUNAL MASSACRES THAT SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASED THE TOLL OF CIVILIAN CASUALTIES. SENDERO THEREFORE DEMONSTRATED AN IMPLANTATION AND RESILIENCY IN THE ZONE THAT RESISTED THE ARMED FORCES' EFFORTS TO UPROOT IT AND, BY COUNTERPOSING FORCE OF ITS OWN TO THAT APPLIED BY THE MILITARY, ACCELERATED A PROCESS OF VIOLENCE THAT LEFT MUCH OF THE EZ'S CIVILIAN POPULATION EXPOSED. THE OPPOSITE OCCURRED IN THE UPPER HUALLAGA. WITH ITS SUPPORT BASE TENUOUS, SL MILITANTS APPARENTLY OPTED TO ABANDON THE VALLEY RATHER THAN CONTEST ITS CONTROL WITH THE ARMED FORCES. FOR THEIR PART, MILITARY COMMANDERS MADE A POINT OF NOT ANTAGONIZING THE AREA'S CIVILIAN POPULATION, INCLUDING IN PARTICULAR THOSE PORTIONS OF IT ENGAGED IN THE PRODUCTION OR TRAFFICKING OF COCA. THE REAPPEARANCE OF EXTENSIVE VIOLENCE IN THE VALLEY (END OF JANUARY 1985), ITS TRAPPINGS OF POLITICALLY MOTIVATED SUBVERSION NOTWITHSTANDING, THUS SIGNIFIED
A PUBLIC ORDER PROBLEM OF A DIFFERENT KIND AND MAGNITUDE.

6. SENDERO VIOLENCE SHIFTED INSTEAD TO A NEW, ALTHOUGH "FAMILIAR" LOCALE--THE REMOTE, HIGH SIERRA PROVINCES OF WESTERN HUANUCO AND ADJACENT PORTIONS OF EASTERN ANCASH (SEE 84 LIMA 13579 AND 14494). ALTHOUGH EVIDENCE IS FRAGMENTARY, THE EXPLANATION FOR THIS PHENOMENON APPEARS TO LIE LESS IN SENDERO'S NUMBERS (WHICH, IT APPEARS, INVOLVE A FEW MOBILE BANDS OF 20, 30, OR UP TO 50 ARMED MEMBERS ROAMING OVER LARGE EXPANSES) THAN IN A LACK OF GOVERNMENT FORCES CAPABLE, BY THEIR PRESENCE OF DETERRING SENDERO ATTACKS. COMMUNITIES IN THE AFFECTED ZONE DID NOT RALLY TO SENDERO'S CAUSE. TO THE CONTRARY, SENDERO APPEARED TO ATTRACT LESS SUPPORT THERE THAN HAD BEEN THE CASE MONTHS EARLIER IN THE UPPER HUALLAGA.

7. THE PICTURE EMERGING FROM THIS PATTERN OF APPARENT SL SPREAD, FOLLOWED BY RETREAT AND REAPPEARANCE ELSEWHERE DIFFERS FROM THAT OF A YEAR AGO. TOGETHER WITH EVIDENCE AVAILABLE FROM SL ACTIVITY IN OTHER PARTS OF PERU (SEE "REGION BY REGION BREAKDOWN" BELOW), IT TENDS TO SUGGEST THAT, SENDERO LUMINOSO IS A MORE REGIONALLY-BASED AND LESS VIRULENT ON A NATIONAL BASIS THAN ITS INITIAL SUCCESSES INDICATED. SL RETAINS A CORE OF DEDICATED ACTIVISTS AND ELUSIVE LEADERS WHO, BY SHIFTING SL'S LOCALE OF ACTIVITY, CAN PROJECT AN IMPRESSION OF DYNAMIC EXPANSION. BUT THIS "DYNAMISM" IS APPARENT ONLY WHERE THE GOP'S RESPONSE IS INEFFECTIVE OR LETHARGIC. AT BEST, SL RECRUITS SEEM RARELY ABLE TO REPLACE CADRE LOSSES, AND, WHERE SECURITY NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS, NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS/CONSULTANTS, DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR DIA FOR IR BRANCH; PANAMA FOR ADS

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8. CYCLICAL NATURE OF SL VIOLENCE. REGARDLESS OF OVERALL DECLINE IN SENDERO'S EFFECTIVENESS, GROUPED SERIES OF INCIDENTS CAN PRODUCE A TEMPORARY PUBLIC IMPRESSION OF HEIGHTENED DANGER. THE CONTRARY ALSO HOLDS TRUE, IN THAT PROTRACTED LULLS HAVE LED PERUVIAN POLITICAL AND MILITARY FIGURES TO COUNT SENDERO OUT PREMATURELY. OUR IMPRESSION IS THAT PEAKS AND TROUGHS IN RECURRING WAVES OF TERRORIST VIOLENCE CONSTITUTE THE NORM OF SENDERO ACTIVITY, EVEN THOUGH SECULAR TREND OF THESE OSCILLATIONS IN THE LAST TWELVE MONTHS HAS BEEN DOWNWARD. THIS MAY BE DUE TO THE PECULIAR CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH SENDERO'S CENTRALIZED COMMAND
STRUCTURE IS FORCED TO OPERATE—WITHOUT MODERN COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT AND OVER GREAT DISTANCES—UNDER DECENTRALIZING CONDITIONS. SENDERO'S LAST NATIONALLY COORDINATED OFFENSIVE WAS LAUNCHED JUNE 22-24, 1984 (SEE 84 LIMA 7400). FOLLOWING A PERIOD OF RELATIVE QUIESCENCE, SL UNITS STRUCK AT WIDELY SEPARATED SPOTS IN UPPER HUALLAGA VALLEY, EMERGENCY ZONE, ICA, TRUJILLO, NORTHWESTERN PASCO, AND AT RAILROAD LINKING LIMA TO THE INTERIOR. WE HYPOTHEZIZE THAT SENDERO ALSO WISHED TO ACT SIMULTANEOUSLY IN THE CAPITAL ITSELF BUT, BECAUSE OF POLICE INROADS AGAINST ITS PERSONNEL APPARATUS THERE, WAS UNABLE TO DO SO. IN ANY EVENT, THE RETURN OF SENDERO VIOLENCE TO LIMA WAS DELAYED UNTIL JULY 1-2 (SEE 84 LIMA 7836) AND, EVEN THEN, SENDERO'S "TRADEMARK" ELECTRICAL BLACKOUT PHENOMENON DID NOT RECUR UNTIL JULY 16 (84 LIMA 8396). MANY OF THESE SEPARATE INCIDENTS INVOLVED ANOTHER CHARACTERISTIC SL TRADEMARK—THE USE OF DYNAMITE. WE HYPOTHEZIZE THAT THE EXPLOSIVES USED IN THIS OFFENSIVE WERE THOSE GATHERED IN PRECEDING, RELATIVELY QUIET WEEKS, DURING WHICH SL SQUADS RAIDED DYNAMITE STORAGE FACILITIES AT MINING AND ROAD BUILDING SITES IN LIMA AND THE CENTRAL SIERRA (SEE 84 LIMA 7033 AND 5716). WE FURTHER HYPOTHEZIZE THAT SL'S DYNAMITE-GATHERING ACTIVITIES RESPONDED TO A PRIOR LEADERSHIP DECISION THAT ESTABLISHED GOALS AND TIMETABLES FOR CADRE MILITANTS TO FOLLOW. IN SIMILAR FASHION, WE BELIEVE THE JUNE-JULY OFFENSIVE WAS FOLLOWED-UP BY A PERIOD OF DELIBERATE, PLANNED RETRENCHMENT, INVOLVING SELF-CRITICISM, WOUND-LICKING, AND PREPARING FOR NEXT STAGE IN SENDERO'S ARMED STRUGGLE.

9. THAT "NEXT STAGE" WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY FOCUS ON PERU'S NATIONAL ELECTORAL CAMPAIGN. SENDERO DEMONSTRATED IN 1983 ITS REPUDIATION OF DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS, PULLING OUT ALL STOPS TO WHICH IT HAD ACCESS IN AN EFFORT TO FRUSTRATE EXPRESSION OF POPULAR WILL. IT SUCCESSFULLY FORCED CANCELLATION OF ELECTIONS IN SEVERAL KEY EZ PROVINCES. IN LIMA, HOWEVER, AND DESPITE BLOODY TERRORIST INCIDENTS IN FOUR WEEKS PRECEDING NOVEMBER 13, SL FAILED ITS FAILURE SET STAGE FOR MAJOR GAINS BY MARXIST--BUT LEGAL AND "NON-VIOLENT"--UNITED LEFT (IU), INCLUDING VICTORY BY IU HEAD ALFONSO BARRANTES IN LIMA MAYORALITY RACE. THEIR COMMON MARXIST IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS NOTWITHSTANDING, SL AND THE IU ARE CURRENTLY EMPLOYING DIAMETRICALLY DIFFERENT TACTICS. THE FORMER IS DEDICATED TO EFFECTING RADICAL SOCIAL CHANGE THROUGH VIOLENCE, AND IT SHUNS DIALOGUE OR EVEN TEMPORARY ALLIANCES WITH OTHERS. IU, ON THE OTHER HAND, SEES THE WAY OPEN TO OBTAINING POWER THROUGH THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS AND BELIEVES IT HAS A CHANCE OF WINNING PERU'S PRESIDENCY IN 1985. IF THAT OCCURS, RADICAL YOUTH WOULD HAVE MORE REASON THAN EVER TO OPT FOR THE LEGAL LEFT; AND AN IU IN POWER, REACTING AS ANY GOVERNING FORCE FACED WITH A CHALLENGE NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS, NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS/CONSULTANTS, DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR.
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TO ITS AUTHORITY, MIGHT WELL ATTEMPT TO COMBAT SENDERO
WITH MEANS AVAILABLE TO IT. ALTHOUGH TOP IU LEADERS
APPEAR DIVIDED ON THE WISDOM OF OPENING A DIALOGUE WITH
SENDERO, ALL HAVE ADOPTED POSITION THAT SL AND THE IU
ARE ANTAGONISTIC FORCES. FOR ITS PART, SENDERO HAS
TREATED ELECTED IU OFFICIALS AS ENEMIES, FIT TARGETS
FOR ASSASSINATION AS MUCH AS OFFICEHOLDERS OF ANY OTHER
POLITICAL PARTY. FOR THESE REASONS, WE BELIEVE SENDERO
CANNOT RESPOND TO 1985 NATIONAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN IN ANY
FASHION OTHER THAN WITH REDOUBLED VIOLENCE. SUCCESSFUL
ELECTIONS, ESPECIALLY ELECTIONS RESULTS OF WHICH UNDER-
CUT SENDERO'S APPEAL TO RADICAL YOUTH, WOULD BE PERCEIVED
AS A MAJOR DEFEAT. A CAMPAIGN IN WHICH VIOLENCE PRO-
VOKED (OR OFFERED AN EXCUSE) FOR MILITARY INTERVENTION,
HOWEVER, WOULD HOLD OUT HOPE FOR SENDERISTA LEADERS OF
GIVING FURTHER IMPULSE TO RADICALIZING FORCES IN
PERUVIAN SOCIETY. WHETHER PREPARED OR NOT, THEREFORE,
1985 ELECTORAL CALENDAR COMPELS SL CELLS THROUGHOUT
PERU TO STEP UP THEIR ACTIVITIES IN WEEKS PRECEDING
APRIL 14 VOTE AND, AGAIN, IN PERIOD BEFORE SECOND ROUND
OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS. WE ARE ALREADY SEEING EVIDENCE
OF THIS.

10. REGION-BY-REGION BREAKDOWN: THE EMERGENCY ZONE.
SL'S "HEARTLAND" IS THE (NOW 17-PROVINCE) SOUTH-
CENTRAL SIERRA REGION COMPOSED OF ALL OF HUANCAVELICA
DEPARTMENT, MOST OF AYACUCHO, AND PART OF APURIMAC
(SEE LIMA 1596). ALTHOUGH VIOLENCE CONTINUES IN LARGE
PORTIONS OF THE ZONE, SECURITY FORCES HAVE MADE
CONSIDERABLE PROGRESS SINCE REF A EVALUATION ONE YEAR AGO.
THE MOST STRIKING EXAMPLE OF THIS CHANGE IS, PERHAPS, IN
CANGALLO AND VICTOR FAJARDO PROVINCES. THE SCENE OF BOTH
SL AND SECURITY FORCE COUNTER-VIOLENCE THROUGHOUT 1983,
THE AREA HAS BEEN VIRTUALLY WITHOUT INCIDENT SINCE
DECEMBER. THE SAME CAN BE SAID OF LUCANAS PROVINCE,
WHERE SENDERO VIOLENCE—which never had been wide-scale-
petered out in first half of August. APURIMAC, THE ONLY
REGION WHERE SECURITY FORCES ACHIEVED SIGNIFICANT SUCCESS
IN 1983, CONTINUED RELATIVELY QUIET THROUGH 1984. MOST
OF HUANCAVELICA DEPARTMENT ALSO APPEARED PACIFIED AT
YEAR'S END, ALTHOUGH OCCASIONAL DYNAMITE EXPLOSIONS
CONTINUED TO SHAKE DEPARTMENTAL CAPITAL AND NEARBY
COMMUNITIES, AND REGION'S MANY MINES (WITH THEIR TEMPTING
STORES OF EXPLOSIVES) ATTRACTION OF SL RAIDING
PARTIES.

11. THE EXCEPTION TO THIS DOWNWARD PATTERN OF EZ
VIOLENCE IS NORTHERN AYACUCHO WHERE, CONTINUING INTO
1985, PROVINCES OF HUANTA AND LA MAR HAVE BEEN CORE FOR
SL-SECURITY FORCE CONFRONTATIONS AND CLASHES BETWEEN
SENDERO-ALIGNED AND OPPOSED COMMUNITY "MILITIAS." (THESE
VIGILANTE BANDS ARE REFERRED TO BY VARIOUS TERMS:
"RONDAS CAMPESINAS," "RONDEROS," "MONTONEROS.")
NOT UNCOINCIDENTALLY, THESE PROVINCES ALSO WERE SCENE OF SOME OF WORST Instances OF SECURITY FORCE HUMAN RIGHT ABUSE, INCLUDING CASES OF "DISAPPEARED" JOURNALIST JAIME AYALA (84 LIMA 9488) AND MASS GRAVES FOUND AT PUCAYACU (84 LIMA 10128), BADO CHICO (84 LIMA 12599), AND ELSEWHERE (LIMA 683).

12. FALLING SOMEWHERE IN BETWEEN—BOTH IN GEOGRAPHIC TERMS AND IN LEVEL OF VIOLENCE—ARE DEPARTMENTAL CAPITAL, (CITY OF) AYACUCHO, AND ITS PROVINCE OF HUAMANGA HINTERLAND. THIS MAY BE WHERE SENDERO BEGAN AND WHERE, THROUGH MUCH OF 1983, MILITARY CONCENTRATED PRESENCE WAS ENOUGH TO DENY SL EFFECTIVE CONTROL ONLY BY DAY. NEVERTHELESS, SENDERO'S SUBTLE "CO-GOVERNANCE" WITH THE MILITARY ERODED IN 1984 AND, WE JUDGE, IN 1985 SECURITY FORCES DOMINATE THE SITUATION IN MOST OF HUAMANGA BOTH BY DAY AND BY NIGHT. WHAT THE MILITARY CANNOT DO, HOWEVER, IS PREVENT OCCASIONAL DYNAMITINGS AND ELECTRICAL BLACKOUTS WHICH, THROUGH ALL OF 1984, CONTINUED TO MANIFEST TERRORISTS' BACKGROUND PRESENCE IN AN AREA THEY ONCE NEARLY CONSIDERED A "LIBERATED ZONE."

13. TERRORISM IN THE CITIES. METROPOLITAN TERRORIST NOT releasable to FOREIGN NATIONALS, NOT releasable to CONTRACTORS/CONSULTANTS, DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR DIA FOR IR BRANCH; PANAMA FOR ADS

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SUBJECT: PROFILE OF POLITICALLY MOTIVATED TERRORISM IN VIOLENCE continued to attract public attention in 1984 and, by its cyclical reappearance, to provoke crisis-like responses from urban public and governing elite alike. Such was the case in LIMA in July when, following major SL-provoked blackout July 16 (84 LIMA 8396), GOP responded with series of measures designed to reassure psychologically shaken public that matters were not out of control (84 LIMA 9264). Less noticeable, but potentially more destabilizing, was SENDERO'S TARGETING OF VULNERABLE POLICEMEN. COP KILLING, BOTH OPPORTUNISTIC AND PLANNED (E.G. LIMA 473 AND 2750), APPEARED TO ASSUME GREATER SIGNIFICANCE IN SENDERO'S METROPOLITAN AREA OPERATIONS FOLLOWING SL'S SUCCESSFUL NOV. 4 ATTACK AGAINST SOLDIERS AT LIMA'S MORRO SOLAR (84 LIMA 13253). More such provocative acts appear to be inevitable over balance of electoral campaign. Judged by police counter-measures, however, SENDERO FARED WORSE IN LIMA IN 1984 THAN 1983. ARRESTS CONTINUED TO TAKE A HIGH TOLL OF SL'S URBAN PERSONNEL INFRASTRUCTURE, AND QUALITY OF RECRUITS SL DID ATTRACT CLEARLY WAS NOT UP TO STANDARDS SET BY MORE SEASONED CADRE. SENDERO'S INABILITY TO INCREASE "ITS OPERATIVE CAPACITY IN TERMS OF PERSONNEL, ARMS, AND/OR EXPLOSIVES" THUS SEEMS PARTICULARLY APT WITH RESPECT TO LIMA.

14. OTHER MAJOR PERUVIAN CITIES, ESPECIALLY THOSE IN JUNIN DEPARTMENT'S MANTARO RIVER VALLEY, DID NOT
GO UNSCATHED IN 1984. AS WITH LIMA, HOWEVER, SL'S CYCLICAL PATTERN OF VIOLENCE WAS CHARACTERIZED BY PEAKS AND VALLEYS THAT, ON THE WHOLE, TRENDED DOWNWARD. THE ON NON-LIMA EVENT IN "MAJOR URBAN VIOLENCE" CATEGORY THAT SEEMED MOST THREATENING--JULY 24 ASSASSINATION OF HUANCAYO MAYOR SAUL MUNOZ (84 LIMA 8742)--FORTUNATELY DID NOT RPT NOT PROVE TO BE FIRST IN A SERIES. (TO DATE, MUNOZ' MURDER REMAINS UNRESOLVED, AND IT IS SPECULATIVE TO ATTRIBUTE HIS DEATH TO SENDERO OR ANY OTHER ORGANIZATION.)

15. UPPER HUALLAGA/HUANUCO SIERRA EMERGENCY ZONE. GOP FORMALLY RECOGNIZED FACT OF SENDERO'S SPREAD TO UPPER HUALLAGA VALLEY WITH DECLARATION JULY 20 OF (SECOND) REGIONAL "STATE OF EMERGENCY" TO COVER ALL OF HUANUCO AND A PORTION OF SAN MARTIN DEPARTMENTS (84 LIMA 8617 AND 10011). WITH INITIAL OPERATIONS AN APPARENT SUCCESS, AND WITH RELOCATION OF SENDERO CADRE TO HUANUCO'S WESTERN (SIERRA) PROVINCES, GOP REDEFINED AREA COVERED BY EMERGENCY DECREES TO EXCLUDE CERTAIN JUNGLE AREAS AND, AT SAME TIME, INTEGRATE AdjACENT PORTION OF PASCO DEPARTMENT'S SIERRA. (SEE LIMA 1371 FOR AREA CURRENTLY AFFECTED.) MILITARY SUCCESSES IN THIS REGION DURING SECOND HALF OF 1984 APPEARED TO BE RESULT OF DEGREE OF PREPAREDNESS MILITARY DISPLAYED WHEN IT ENTERED ZONE AND, CONVERSELY, SENDERO'S RELATIVE UNPREPAREDNESS. ARMED FORCES COMMANDERS INCORPORATED INTO THEIR ANTI-SUBVERSIVE STRATEGY AN EMPHASIS ON MAINTAINING GOOD RELATIONS WITH LOCAL POPULATION AND, AS PART OF THIS APPROACH, AVOIDANCE OF ACTS THAT MIGHT PROVOKE HOSTILE RESPONSES FROM LOCAL FORCES ALLIED WITH NEITHER SENDERO NOR THE GOVERNMENT. THE PRESCRIPTION ENTAILS ACTIVE PROSECUTION OF ANTI-TERRORIST MEASURES, WHILE POLICE EFFORTS TO ENFORCE ANTI-DRUG LAWS AND PROGRAMS GROUND TO A HALT. WHAT MILITARY STRATEGISTS APPARENTLY FAILED TO CONSIDER, HOWEVER, WAS STRATEGIC LAW ENFORCEMENT IMPLICATIONS OF A POLICY THAT, FOR TACTICAL REASONS, ALLOWED CRIMINAL ELEMENTS A FREE HAND. A FLOURISHING DRUG TRAFFIC INTRODUCED LARGE QUANTITIES OF ADDITIONAL COCA-DOLLARS INTO THE AREA, PERHAPS UPSETTING POWER BALANCES WITHIN LOCAL UNDERWORLD AND CREATING CONDITIONS FOR LATER EXPLOSION IN REGION'S RATE OF CRIME-RELATED VIOLENCE. EMBASSY MESSAGES (E.G. LIMA 1845, 2183, AND 3055) HAVE ATTEMPTED TO DESCRIBE THIS VIOLENCE, WITHOUT NECESSARILY ATTRIBUTING RESPONSIBILITY FOR IT. IDENTITY OF PRINCIPAL LAW BREAKERS MAY NEVER BE ESTABLISHED. MUCH OPPORTUNISTIC SCORE-SETTING MAY BE NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS, NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS/CONSULTANTS, DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR.

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REMAINS ONLY MARGINALLY UNDER CENTRAL GOVERNMENT'S CONTROL.

16. REST OF PERU. REF A REFERRED TO RURAL SL FOCI OUTSIDE OF AYACUCHO; PROVINCE OF DANIEL CARRION IN PASCO (NOW IN HUANUCO EZ), HUAMACHUCO IN LA LIBERTAD, PORTIONS OF SOUTHERN CUSCO, AND SPECIAL PERIL IN FUNO. PERIODIC REPORTING (E.G. 84 LIMA 9264 AND 14251; LIMA 1190, 2056) MAKES CLEAR THAT HUAMACHUCO/OTUZO/SANTIAGO DE CHUCO REGION OF LA LIBERTAD SIERRA CONTINUES TO BE AREA OF RESIDUAL SL ACTIVITY. AT SAME TIME, HOWEVER, OUR IMPRESSION IS THAT SANDINISTAS THERE HAVE NOT EXPANDED SCOPE OR RANGE OF THEIR OPERATIONS BEYOND LEVEL ACHIEVED AT END OF 1983. THERE HAS BEEN NO SIGNIFICANT SL ACTIVITY IN SOUTHERN CUSCO SINCE AUGUST (SEE LIMA 9264). FUNO, APART FROM OCCASIONAL DYNAMITE EXPLOSIONS IN DEPARTMENT'S PRINCIPAL CITIES, ALSO WAS QUIET IN LATTER HALF OF 1984. RECURRING INCIDENTS IN AND AROUND JUNIN'S MANTARO RIVER VALLEY DEMONSTRATE THAT SENDERO RECOGNIZES THIS REGION'S STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE. NEVERTHLESS, IT DOES NOT APPEAR THAT SL HAS BEEN ABLE TO ESTABLISH A POPULAR VALLEY FOOTHOLD, AND POLICE ARRESTS CONTINUE TO ERODE WHATEVER RECRUITING PROGRESS TERRORISTS HAVE ACCOMPLISHED IN REGION'S CITIES.

17. SENDERO'S IMPACT ON PERUVIAN SOCIETY. SENDERO'S IMPACT OBVIOUSLY HAS BEEN GREATEST IN THOSE AREAS OF RURAL PERU, MOST OF WHICH ARE IN ONE OF THE TWO REGIONAL EMERGENCY ZONES, WHERE ITS PRESENCE HAS BEEN ENDEMIC. LIFE IN THESE AREAS HAS COME TO BE CHARACTERIZED BY EITHER REALITY OF VIOLENCE OR PREPARATIONS FOR VIOLENCE. EZ MILITARY AUTHORITIES IN AYACUCHO, IN PARTICULAR, HAVE ENCOURAGED FORMATION OF LOCAL PEASANT MILITIAS WHOSE OFFICIAL PURPOSE IS THAT OF DEFENDING THEIR COMMUNITIES AGAINST SL ATTACK. THESE "RONDAS" TEND TO BE POORLY ARMED, POORLY TRAINED, AND SUBJECT TO ONLY LIMITED SUPERVISION. PRECISE DATA CONCERNING THE "RONDAS" IS NOT AVAILABLE. OUR IMPRESSION, HOWEVER, IS THAT RONDAS' CONTRIBUTION TO ENHANCED LOCAL SECURITY IS, AT BEST, MARGINAL; AT WORST, RONDAS REPRESENT ADDITIONAL INCREMENT OF ORGANIZED VIOLENCE--PITTING RIVAL PEASANT COMMUNITIES AGAINST EACH OTHER--IN REGIONS ALREADY INUNDATED BY VIOLENCE. SENDERO'S DISRUPTION OF NORMAL LIFE IN THESE ZONES, THUS, IS ALL-ENCOMPASSING, WITH TERRORISTS, SECURITY FORCES, AND CAMPESINOS ALIKE INVOLVED IN DISTORTION OF COMMUNITIES' PREVIOUS ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, CIVIC, AND MORAL NORMS.

18. SOME OF THIS DISTORTION CAN BE SEEN IN REGION'S REDUCED AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION, PARTICULARLY IN CENTRAL AND NORTHERN PARTS OF AYACUCHO. FORMERLY PRODUCTIVE FIELDS LIE ABANDONED, AND PRODUCE THAT ONCE ABOUNDED IN LOCAL MARKETS IS NOW ABSENT. CAMPESINOS FLED THEIR RURAL COMMUNITIES FOR RELATIVE SAFETY OF (CITY OF) AYACUCHO OR, IN OTHER CASES, ABANDONED REGION ENTIRELY AND MIGRATED TO URBAN SLUMS OF LIMA, RURAL HINTERLAND AROUND HUANCAEYO, NORTHERN JUNIN, AREQUIPA, CUSCO, ICA, OR PIONEERING SETTLEMENTS IN JUNGLE. NEW ELECTORAL
REGISTER COMPILED FOR UPCOMING NATIONAL ELECTIONS SHOWS SHARP DROP IN NUMBER OF AYACUCHO DEPARTMENT'S VOTERS—A UNIQUE SITUATION IN COUNTRY WHERE POPULATION RISE IS THE RULE. SOCIOLOGISTS WILL HAVE TO CATALOGUE NATURE AND EXTENT OF DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGES BUT, FOR PRESENT, IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT SENDERNO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR CONSIDERABLE, AND PROBABLY PERMANENT, ALTERATIONS OF PRE-EXISTING RURAL AND URBAN SETTLEMENT NORMS.

14. FOR MOST PERUVIANS, HOWEVER, CONCENTRATED IN CITIES ON OR NEAR THE COAST, SENDERNO'S 1984 IMPACT WAS INDIRECT FOR THEM, PERU'S ONGOING TERRORIST-COUNTERTERRORIST VIOLENCE HIT HOME ONLY OCCASIONALLY. THE PRINCIPAL SUCH OCCASION CAME IN SECOND HALF OF JULY, WHEN CYCLICAL SWELL IN SL VIOLENCE CAUSED LIMA'S LIGHTS TO FLICKER, NOT RELEASEABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS, NOT RELEASEABLE TO CONTRACTORS/CONSULTANTS, DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR DIA FOR IR BRANCH; PANAMA FOR ADS E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PTER, KPRP, PE

SUBJECT: PROFILE OF POLITICALLY MOTIVATED TERRORISM IN THEN EXTINGUISH, AND SOUNDS OF DYNAMITE EXPLOSIONS AND GUNFIRE COULD BE HEARD IN BACKGROUND. PUBLIC REACTION, FANNED BY WIDESPREAD NEWSPAPER/MEDIA COVERAGE AND AGITATED EDITORIALS, IMPELLED GOP TO "ACT." WITH PSYCHOLOGICAL PRESSURES MOUNTING, CIVILIAN LEADERS DEMONSTRATED THEY WERE ON TOP OF SITUATION BY ANNOUNCING JULY 20, AN INCREASED ROLE FOR MILITARY IN COMBATTING SUBVERSION (84 LIMA 9264). EXTENT TO WHICH DECISION ANNOUNCED JULY 20 ACTUALLY SHIFTED BALANCE BETWEEN MILITARY AND NON-MILITARY INSTITUTIONS, AS OPPOSED TO RATIFYING SHIFTS ALREADY IN PLACE, IS NOT CLEAR. WE UNDERSTAND THAT POLICE UNITS IN EMERGENCY ZONE, ON WHOSE SHOULDERS PRINCIPAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR COMBATTING TERRORISTS WAS SUPPOSED TO LIE, HAD LONG SINCE BEEN RELEGATED TO LESS PROMINENT ROLES. REGARDLESS OF TRUE DIVISION OF LABOR, HOWEVER, JULY 20 ANNOUNCEMENT SYMBOLICALLY INDICATED EXTENT TO WHICH CIVILIAN LEADERS AND CIVILIAN-DIRECTED POLICE SERVICES WERE PREPARED TO CEDE AUTHORITY TO MILITARY. PRESIDENT BELAUDE'S IRRITATED REASSERTION OF CIVILIAN SUPREMACY IN LATE AUGUST, WITH REMOVAL OF EZ POLITICAL-MILITARY COMMANDER GEN. ADRIAN HUAMAN (84 LIMA 10224), DID NOT REDRESS THIS BALANCE. MILITARY LEADERS RECOGNIZED THAT HUAMAN HAD OVERSTEPSED PUBLICLY ACCEPTABLE BOUNDS OF BEHAVIOR WITH HIS REPEATED CRITICISMS OF CIVILIAN AUTHORITIES' LEATHARGY IN DOING THEIR SHARE TO COMBAT SENDERNO. NEVERTHELESS, HIS VIEWS REPRESENTED INSTITUTIONAL THINKING WITHIN ARMY'S HIGH COMMAND, AND HIS REPLACEMENT—COL. WILFREDO MORI—MAINTAINED HUAMAN'S OPERATIONAL APPROACH IN EZ UNCHANGED. AS YEAR ENDED, MILITARY'S PUBLIC AND SELF IMAGES PROBABLY BOTH STOOD HIGHER THAN THEY HAD AT OUTSET, WHILE THOSE OF ELECTED CIVILIAN AUTHORITIES—ALREADY BUFFETED BY SHORTCOMINGS IN HANDLING HOST OF ECONOMIC PROBLEMS—FARED POORER BECAUSE OF
GOP'S INEPTITUDE IN DEALING WITH SENDERO MENACE.
20. WHILE IT IS DIFFICULT TO GAUGE EXTENT OF CIVILIAN
LEADERSHIP'S REDUCED MORAL GOVERNING STATURE, WHAT IS
EVEN LESS EASY TO MEASURE IS EXTENT TO WHICH PERU'S
SOCIAL FABRIC AS A WHOLE HAS CONTINUED TO FRAY. REF A
REFERRED TO "NUMBING" EFFECT ON PERUVIAN SOCIETY OF
INCREASING VIOLENCE, AN EFFECT AUGMENTED BY STEADILY
WORSENING LIVING STANDARDS AND CONDITIONS OF LIFE THAT
CONFRONT MOST OF POPULATION. AS POPE JOHN PAUL'S VISIT
SHOWED (LIMA 889), A SENSE OF CIVIC SPIRIT REMAINS
WHICH, WHEN PROPERLY MOBILIZED, IS CAPABLE OF GENERATING
SELFLESS SACRIFICE FROM THOUSANDS. BUT THE RULE TO WHIC
PAPAL VISIT'S EFFECTS WERE EXCEPTION IS THAT, FOR MOST
PERUVIANS, SENSE OF COMMUNITY CONSCIOUSNESS AND NEED FOR
INVOLVEMENT ARE LESS ATTRACTIVE THAN EVER. SENDERO
VIOLENCE CANNOT BE CONSIDERED THIS PHENOMENON'S CAUSE.
BUT IT SEEMS EQUALLY CERTAIN THAT, SO LONG AS
TERRORIST GENERATED VIOLENCE LASTS, IT WILL CONTRIBUTE TO
FULLING PERUVIAN SOCIETY APART AND HELP ASSURE THAT THE
TREND OF SOCIAL SPIRAL CONTINUES DOWNWARD.
21. ASSESSING CIVILIAN AUTHORITIES' RESPONSE. EXAMINING
CHARGES OF WIDESPREAD HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN PERU, A
PROMINENT U.S. ORGANIZATION ISSUED A REPORT IN LATE 1984
ENTITLED, "ABDICATING DEMOCRATIC AUTHORITY." THIS
TITLE DESCRIBES ACCURATELY A FUNDAMENTAL CAUSE FOR
PERU'S INABILITY TO DEAL MORE EFFECTIVELY WITH SL'S
TERRORIST CHALLENGE. IT WAS MILITARY AUTHORITIES IN
EL WHO, IN 1984, TOOK LEAD IN URGING GOP TO DEVOTE
PRIORITY ATTENTION TO DEVELOPING REGION'S ECONOMIC
INFRASTRUCTURE, TO MAKING GOVERNMENT AGENCIES THERE MORE
RESPONSIVE TO NEEDS OF PUBLIC, TO FIRING CORRUPT AND
INEFFICIENT OFFICIALS, AND TO REFORMING ANTIQUATED LEGAL
SYSTEM THAT FEW OF REGION'S CAMPESINOS COULD UNDERSTAND,
LET ALONE MASTER. YET PATTERN OF RESPONSE FROM LIMA IN
1984, AS IN 1983, WAS TO EVADE "HARD CHOICES THE
TERRORIST SITUATION POSES. . . . WHILE (CONCENTRATING)
PUBLICLY ON MINIMIZING SENDERO'S SIGNIFICANCE AND BLAMING
THE PROBLEM ON A VARIETY OF NON-PERUVIAN FACTORS
NOT RELEASEABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS, NOT RELEASABLE TO
CONTRACTORS/CONSULTANTS, DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF
INFO CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR
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TAGS: PTER, KPRP, PE
SUBJECT: PROFILE OF POLITICALLY MOTIVATED TERRORISM IN
(REF A). IN CONSEQUENCE, GOP LEADERS CONTINUED TO RELY
ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY ON MILITARY REPRESSIVE AND/OR POLICE
DETECTIVE WORK TO COUNTER SENDERO. AT SAME TIME, THEY
DECLINED TO ACKNOWLEDGE CERTAIN INEVITABLE CONSEQUENCES
OF THIS APPROACH AND TOOK POSITION, AT LEAST PUBLICLY,
THAT BECAUSE GOP POLICY WAS TO SUPPORT HUMAN RIGHTS
IT WAS UNTHINKABLE THAT SUBSTANTIAL VIOLATIONS COULD
OCURR IN THE FIELD.

TO EXTENT
THAT VICTORY OVER A POPULARLY-BASED PROTEST MOVEMENT INVOLVES ELIMINATING THAT ORGANIZATION'S BASE OF SUPPORT, EVENTUAL GOP VICTORY OVER SENDERO LUMINOSO TERRORISM DEPENDS ON INCORPORATION INTO OFFICIAL STRATEGY OF ELEMENTS OF PERSUASION TO ACCOMPANY COERCION. STRATEGY ALSO MUST IMPOSE LIMITS ON COERCION'S USE, TO ASSURE THAT IT DOES NOT SENDERO VIOLENCE CANNOT BE CONSIDERED THIS PHENOMENON'S CAUSE. BUT IT SEEMS EQUALLY CERTAIN THAT, SO LONG AS TERRORIST GENERATED VIOLENCE LASTS, IT WILL CONTRIBUTE TO PULLING PERUVIAN SOCIETY APART AND HELP ASSURE THAT THE TREND OF SOCIAL SPIRAL CONTINUES DOWNWARD.

21. ASSESSING CIVILIAN AUTHORITIES' RESPONSE. EXAMINING CHARGES OF WIDESCALE HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN PERU, A PROMINENT U.S. ORGANIZATION ISSUED A REPORT IN LATE 1984 ENTITLED, "ABDICATING DEMOCRATIC AUTHORITY." THIS TITLE DESCRIBES ACCURATELY A FUNDAMENTAL CAUSE FOR PERU'S INABILITY TO DEAL MORE EFFECTIVELY WITH SL'S TERRORIST CHALLENGE. IT WAS MILITARY AUTHORITIES IN ES WHO, IN 1984, TOOK LEAD IN URGING GOP TO DEVOTE PRIORITY ATTENTION TO DEVELOPING REGION'S ECONOMIC INFRASTRUCTURE, TO MAKING GOVERNMENT AGENCIES THERE MORE RESPONSIVE TO NEEDS OF PUBLIC, TO FIRING CORRUPT AND INEFFICIENT OFFICIALS, AND TO REFORMING ANTITRUST LEGAL SYSTEM THAT FEW OF REGION'S CAMPESINOS COULD UNDERSTAND, LET ALONE MASTER. YET PATTERN OF RESPONSE FROM LIMA IN 1984, AS IN 1983, WAS TO EVADE "HARD CHOICES THE TERRORIST SITUATIONPOSES...WHILE [CONCENTRATING] PUBLICLY ON MINIMIZING SENDERO'S SIGNIFICANCE AND BLAMING THE PROBLEM ON A VARIETY OF NON-PERUVIAN FACTORS NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS, NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS/CONSULTANTS, DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR DIA FOR IR BRANCH; PANAMA FOR ADS E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PTER, KPFP, PE SUBJECT: PROFILE OF POLITICALLY MOTIVATED TERRORISM IN (REF A). IN CONSEQUENCE, GOP LEADERS CONTINUED TO RELY ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY ON MILITARY REPRESSAL AND/OR POLICE DETECTIVE WORK TO COUNTER SENDERO. AT SAME TIME, THEY DECLINED TO ACKNOWLEDGE CERTAIN INEVITABLE CONSEQUENCES OF THIS APPROACH AND TOOK POSITION, AT LEAST PUBLICLY, THAT BECAUSE GOP POLICY WAS TO SUPPORT HUMAN RIGHTS IT WAS UTHINKABLE THAT SUBSTANTIAL VIOLATIONS COULD OCCUR IN THE FIELD. 

TO EXTENT THAT VICTORY OVER A POPULARLY-BASED PROTEST MOVEMENT INVOLVES ELIMINATING THAT ORGANIZATION'S BASE OF SUPPORT, EVENTUAL GOP VICTORY OVER SENDERO LUMINOSO TERRORISM DEPENDS ON INCORPORATION INTO OFFICIAL STRATEGY OF ELEMENTS OF PERSUASION TO ACCOMPANY COERCION. STRATEGY ALSO MUST IMPOSE LIMITS ON COERCION'S USE, TO ASSURE THAT IT DOES NOT BECOME COUNTERPRODUCTIVE. TO DATE, HOWEVER, GOP CIVILIAN LEADERS HAVE DECLINED TO
ADDRESS SUBVERSION PROBLEM ON BASIS OF SUCH A LONGER
TERM APPROACH AND, ACCORDINGLY, WHATEVER PROGRESS HAS BEEN
MADE HAS COME FROM SHORT-TERM COERCION ALONE.
22. MRTA. THE "REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT TUPAC AMARU"
(MRTA) BURST INTO INTERNATIONAL SPOTLIGHT WITH COORDINATED
SERIES OF ATTACKS SEPT. 28-29 AGAINST EMBASSY, AP AND UPI
OFFICES, AND SEARS AT TIME WHEN PRESIDENT BELAUNDE WAS
MAKING APPEARANCES IN WASHINGTON AND AT UN (84 LIMA
11620). MRTA'S "PLATFORM" FOCUSED ON POPULIST, PRO-
NATIONALIST/ANTI-IMPERIALIST THEMES, AND AVOIDED
PREDOMINANTLY MARXIST JARGON (84 LIMA 10898). FOLLOWING
A MULTI-WEEK LULL, MRTA AGAIN MADE NEWS AT END
NOVEMBER, WHEN POLICE IN CUSCO UNCOVERED TERRORIST CELL
AND EXTENSIVE CACHES OF MODERN WEAPONS. ALLEGEDLY TO
PROTEST POLICE'S MISTREATMENT OF CAPTURED CADRE,
MRTA SQUAD IN LIMA KIDNAPPED TWO TV NEWSPEOPLE DEC. 8
AND ATTEMPTED TO COERCER BROADCAST OF PRERECORDED
CASSETTE (84 LIMA 14311). LIMA POLICE ANNOUNCED
IN EARLY FEBRUARY CAPTURE OF SUSPECTS IN THESE CASES
(LIMA 1811). NEVERTHELESS, FURTHER SERIES OF MRTA-
CLAIMED INCIDENTS TOOK PLACE IN CAPITAL MARCH 19
AND 20. (LIMA 3088 AND 3201).
23. THESE EVENTS, TOGETHER WITH MRTA'S SPECIFICALLY
ANTI-AMERICAN RHETORIC AND TARGETING, MAKE ORGANIZATION
LEGITIMATE OBJECT OF USG INTEREST AND CONCERN.
PRESS ARTICLES ON MRTA'S SUPPOSED FOREIGN CONNECTIONS
AND FUNDING, ALONG WITH CONFLICTING INTELLIGENCE REPORTS
AS TO CLANDESTINE (RATHER THAN PERUVIAN) SOURCE OF ITS
ARMS, AUGMENT THIS CONCERN. AT SAME TIME, HIGHLY
SUSPICIOUS COMPORTMENT OF (MOSCOW-LINKING) COMMUNIST-
CONTROLLED LIMA DAILY "EL DIARIO" SUGGESTS, INDIRECTLY,
EXISTENCE OF FOREIGN LINK (84 LIMA 14903, LIMA 1307,
3088). BUT, BOTTOM LINE, IN OUR VIEW, IS THAT HARD
EVIDENCE AVAILABLE REMAINS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT
FIRM CONCLUSIONS ABOUT MRTA'S CHARACTER, ARMS/
FINANCING SOURCES, ULTIMATE AIDS, OR EXTENT OF DANGER
IT REPRESENTS. POLICE INTERROGATIONS OF CUSCO AND LIMA
SUSPECTS MAY PROVIDE USEFUL CLUES (WE DO NOT NOW HAVE
ACCESS TO THIS INFORMATION). TRACES ON WEAPONS
CAPTURED IN CUSCO ALSO COULD PROVIDE INVALUABLE LEADS.
PENDING APPEARANCE OF SUCH DATA, HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE
IT BEST TO ACKNOWLEDGE THAT MRTA JURY IS STILL OUT AND
VERDICT MUST HANG IN ABYANCE.
24. THE NEAR TERM FUTURE. AS DESCRIBED ABOVE, WE
CONSIDER IT VIRTUALLY CERTAIN THAT ANOTHER PEAK PERIOD
IN TERRORIST ACTIVITY HAS ALREADY BEGUN IN CONTEXT OF
NATIONAL ELECTIONS. EVENTS OF PAST FEW DAYS STRONGLY
SUGGEST THAT MRTA AS WELL AS SENDERO WILL ENGAGE IN A
SERIES OF ATTACKS INTENDED TO INTERRUPT OR AT LEAST
DISRUPT THE ELECTORAL PROCESS. CAN THEY SUCCEED?
NATURE OF TERRORIST VIOLENCE MAKES IT EXTREMELY
DIFFICULT TO ANSWER THAT QUESTION. NEITHER POPULAR
SUPPORT NOR GREAT RESOURCES ARE NECESSARY TO
PERPETRATE A SERIES OF SELECTED ASSASSINATIONS OR
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS, NOT RELEASABLE TO
CONTRACTORS/CONSULTANTS, DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR
DIA FOR IR BRANCH; PANAMA FOR AID
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SUBJECT: PROFILE OF POLITICALLY MOTIVATED TERRORISM IN BOMBINGS. PERU'S SECURITY FORCES ARE POISED TO DEAL WITH AN INCREASED CLIMATE OF VIOLENCE, BUT THAT DOES NOT MEAN THEY CAN STOP IT. DANGER TO PROCESS ITSELF DERIVES FROM POSSIBILITY THAT TERRORISTS MIGHT KILL ONE OF FRONT-RUNNING CANDIDATES, OR THAT INDISCRIMINATE BOMBINGS OF ELECTORAL RALLIES OR VOTING FACILITIES COULD GENERATE PUBLIC PANIC (LIMA 1308). WE BELIEVE THAT IN ALL BUT MOST DIRE SITUATIONS, PERUVIAN MAIN-STREAM IS LIKELY TO CLOSE RANKS AGAINST TERRORISTS TO DEFEND DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION INSTEAD OF PRESSING FOR MILITARY INTERVENTION IN PROCESS. JORDAN