January 10, 1992

SECRET

Points for January 15-21 Meetings

- Welcome this opportunity to meet with you as an independent state.

- We recognize that your new status brings with it many challenges, particularly the need for economic and political reform and to forge a new relationship with the nations of the west.

- In late December, President Bush sent two important letters to President Yeltsin (Kravchuck, Shushkevich, Nazarbayev). The first extended formal recognition of your country as an independent state. The second dealt with security matters, and included a detailed agenda for our meeting today. Propose that we go through all of the items on that agenda, with the objective of agreeing on practical steps that can rapidly enhance the security of your country and mine and indeed all nations.

Information on US implementation and US forces

- This first chart describes the steps the US has taken to implement the unilateral initiative announced by President Bush on September 27.

  (Walk through paper)

- The second chart shows the steps the United States has taken to downsize our forces in recognition of the new situation in the world, particularly the end of the Soviet Union.

  (Walk through paper)

- As you see, the US is in the process of making major reductions in its forces that reflect the new situation we are in. We urge you as well to bring your own forces down to a level that corresponds to the actual security situation that your country faces.

- It is important that the resources devoted to your military establishment move to a much lower level. We will not be able to justify assistance if it is perceived that the result is to subsidize military forces out of proportion to the real security risk.

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AS AMENDED
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It is also in our mutual interest to have as much transparency as possible in the plans and budgets for your military forces. We urge you to make public the sort of information on forces and plans and budgets that the US makes public annually.

Command and control

- Would like to turn to the agenda that was attached to the President's December 28 letter.

- As you know, the United States believes it is essential that all the nuclear weapons of the former Soviet Union remain under single control. This is without prejudice to the political relationships that develop among the independent states; that is for them to decide.

- We do not want to see as a result of the breakup of the former Soviet Union the proliferation of additional nuclear states.

- We note the important progress that was made in Alma Ata and subsequently in Minsk toward the establishment of a single authority for control of all the nuclear weapons of the former Soviet Union.

- We want to hear from you how this command and control system works, and hear about your plans for implementing this approach.

- We have also noticed your efforts to work out the question of control of other military units of the former Soviet Union.

- The whole question of military relationships among the newly independent states is of course for you to decide.

- We note with satisfaction that a great many issues were resolved at the meeting in Alma Ata and the follow-up meeting in Minsk, and we want to see this issue of control of forces resolved through negotiation as well, and not drag on as a point of dispute.

- We expect that these matters will be worked out in a way that is consistent with the CSCE principles and other international obligations, such as the CFE treaty.

- Finally, resolution of this question and getting it behind you would contribute to stability and to the common interests of the states in pursuing responsible security policies and in building democratic and free market systems. As you move to settle the question of control you should at the same time substantially reduce the overall size of military establishments, as it will be very difficult to justify assistance that appears to subsidize military forces out of proportion to the real security risk.
Safety, security, and disabling of tactical nuclear weapons

- A number of steps can be taken to rapidly enhance the security of tactical nuclear weapons.

- Nuclear weapons can be disabled by removing critical components such as fuzes, neutron generators, and tritium reservoirs. There may be other disabling steps as well for particular weapons.

- This would reduce substantially the danger if such weapons fall into unauthorized hands. Technical experts on both sides agree that this can be done quickly.

- We understand that action is already underway to disable tactical nuclear weapons. We would like to hear from you a report on your plans and on actions underway to disable tactical nuclear weapons. We could then consider whether and how the United States could be of assistance in expanding or accelerating this effort.

- Physical protection of sites where nuclear weapons are stored needs to be maintained at a high level, and weapons can be consolidated in sites that are most secure. We understand that a major effort to consolidate tactical nuclear weapons is underway, including moving to Russia all tactical nuclear weapons now outside Russia for dismantling by the middle of 1992.

- We would like to hear from you a report on your plans and actions underway to move and consolidate tactical nuclear weapons. We could then consider whether and how the United States would be of assistance in expanding or accelerating this effort as well.

- In November, we formed an experts group on safety, security, and dismantling of nuclear weapons, chaired on our side by Amb. Courtney with Dr. Barker and Dr. Turner. Once you and I have taken this issue as far as we can, propose that these experts meet to continue in greater detail. The US team is prepared to remain in Moscow and meet into next week.

- In Washington, the US team provided detailed briefings on US procedures for ensuring the safety and physical security of nuclear weapons, for dismantling them, and for responding to accidents. We followed up by providing a detailed list of questions that we would like your experts to address at the next meeting. Propose that when you and I are finished with this subject, the experts meet and begin by addressing the questions we have provided.

- First I would like to hear what you can tell me about disabling and consolidation of tactical nuclear weapons.
Accelerated destruction of tactical nuclear weapons

- Gorbachev's October 5 statement included a commitment to destroy large numbers of tactical nuclear weapons -- warheads for short-range missiles, naval weapons, air-defense weapons, land mines.

- We would like to understand your plan for eliminating these weapons, including priorities, schedule, the locations where this dismantling will take place, and transportation plans.

- Once we understand your plans for dismantling, we are prepared to consider whether and how we can help to facilitate and accelerate this process.

- Again, would like to take this discussion as far as you and I can, and then have the experts in the safety, security, and dismantling group continue in more detail.

(If asked about the $400 million:)

- As I have said, once we understand your plans for disabling and consolidating and enhancing the security and dismantling nuclear weapons, we are prepared to consider whether and how the United States can be of assistance.

- We do not have a US plan for dismantling Soviet nuclear weapons, nor do we have preconceived ideas on where we can help. But once we understand what it would make sense for the US to do to help implement and accelerate your plan, we are prepared to move quickly with assistance.

- The Congress has already authorized $400 million for this purpose, so if you and I can reach agreement that certain specific steps would make sense, the US is prepared to move quickly.

- You should also be aware that the Congress has imposed several conditions on US assistance under this Act. Before the US expends any of the $400 million, the President must certify that the recipient is committed to:
  
  -- Making a substantial investment of its own in weapons destruction.
  
  -- Forgoing any military modernization program that exceeds legitimate defense requirements and forgoing the replacement of destroyed weapons of mass destruction.
  
  -- Forgoing any use of components of destroyed nuclear weapons in new nuclear weapons.

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-- Facilitating US verification of weapons destruction that is carried out with US financial assistance.

-- Complying with all relevant arms control agreements.

-- Observing internationally recognized human rights.

**Accelerated deactivation of strategic forces**

- At the outset I pointed out the steps the US is already taking to deactivate now missiles scheduled for elimination under START. This implements one element of President Bush's September 27 initiative.

- Let me urge you to move quickly to deactivate now strategic forces scheduled for elimination under START, by removing and disabling their warheads and removing missiles from their launchers, as President Bush called for in his December 28 letter.

- This would be seen in the United States as an important political indication that the new independent states are moving to quickly reduce the number of missiles targeted on the United States.

- Full implementation of START can be spread over 7 years. But the steps I am talking about can be done very quickly, in a matter of weeks. We are already doing them ourselves.

- Simply identify the missiles that will be eliminated from your forces to meet the START levels, remove and disable the warheads, and remove the missiles from the launchers.

- We would like to be in a position to announce at the end of my meetings here that you have agreed to do this. Urge you to consider a prompt and positive response.

**Force structure and modernization plans**

- On the margins of earlier meetings in Moscow and Washington, Mr. Hadley and Gen. Shalikashvili began a discussion of strategic nuclear force structures and modernization plans.

- We continue to believe that such a candid discussion of programs and plans can lead to a shared view of how to improve stability, and will facilitate subsequent discussion of further steps, such as our proposal to eliminate MIRVed ICBMs and your proposal to further reduce the levels of strategic weapons.
We believe that in the new situation, we can approach these issues in a new spirit of openness and transparency, and this would greatly simplify and accelerate discussions of further steps. We also recognize that at the same time there are sensitivities here, and we propose that these exchanges be carried out in a small group.

Mr. Hadley and Gen. Shalikashvili are prepared to meet with a few counterparts to address the strategic force structures on both sides, modernization programs, projected forces following implementation of the START reductions, and possible forces following the elimination of ICBM MIRVs. If you can designate the people you want to address this subject, they can arrange to meet.

**START follow-on**

President Bush has proposed eliminating the systems we view as the most destabilizing -- multiple warhead ICBMs. Your side has focussed on further reductions in the overall levels of strategic forces.

During his visit in December, Secretary Baker suggested doing both -- eliminating MIRVed ICBMs in the context of moving to lower force levels on both sides.

He also made clear that in this context the US is prepared to take a significant step on SLBMs as well.

This approach would enhance stability, build on START to further reduce strategic forces on both sides, and eliminate a number of expensive and unnecessary programs. Urge you to accept this as the basis for further reductions beyond START.

**START, CFE, NPT, CW, and BW agreements**

We welcome the commitment in the Alma Ata declaration to fulfill international obligations stemming from the treaties and agreements of the former Soviet Union.

We have specific proposals for implementing this commitment for several arms control agreements.

**START**

We have sent the START treaty to the Senate for consent to ratification, and expect that action will begin soon. The reductions, verification, and data exchange called for by START will contribute to stability, and we want to bring the treaty into force as soon as possible.
START is a bilateral treaty, but strategic forces and facilities are located on four of the newly independent states. Before START can come into effect, it will be necessary to resolve the question of responsibility for the START obligations which were assumed by the former Soviet Union.

Let me begin with several principles that guide our approach to the implementation of arms control treaties generally, and to START in particular:

-- We do not consider it necessary to use the same legal approach for all treaties. We should consider the best approach on a treaty-by-treaty basis.

-- We do not wish to depend on legal theories of state succession. We want instead to codify in legal documents our approach to START, and include all the relevant states.

-- Our approach to ratification and implementation of START should advance other objectives such as our shared desire to ensure single control of nuclear forces of the former Soviet Union, and our shared desire to facilitate the accession of all the newly independent states (except Russia) to the NPT as non-nuclear weapons states.

-- The treaty must be implemented in a uniform manner throughout all the relevant territory.

-- START must be implemented in a manner which allows us to deal with a single entity for treaty implementation. It was designed as a bilateral treaty and must be implemented on that basis.

We have considered several ways to bring START into force consistent with these principles. Let me describe to you what we consider the preferred approach, provided it proves acceptable to Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan.

Under this approach, Russia would become the party to START, and Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan would make commitments to, over a period of time, renounce control of nuclear weapons.

We believe this is consistent with the agreements reached at Alma Ata and Minsk.
To implement this approach, the United States and Russia would conclude a brief agreement which would confirm that Russia assumes the obligations of the former Soviet Union under START, and makes several amendments to the treaty to take into account the temporary presence of strategic forces located outside the territory of Russia and extend verification and inspection provisions to facilities outside Russia.

In addition, there would be another agreement between the United States, Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan to provide for their cooperation in implementing START, such as allowing inspections of facilities on their territory.

Other newly independent states could become parties as well, but at a minimum all four with strategic forces would need to participate.

Let me give you draft texts of the sort of agreements we propose.

I have with me legal experts who are prepared to address any questions you or your experts may have, and pursue this in greater detail.

Let me repeat that this approach seems to us to conform to the accords reached in Alma Ata and Minsk. We plan to offer these proposed texts at each capital. Would like to have your response as soon as possible so that we may bring this treaty into force at an early date.

We have also considered a second approach, in which START would be a treaty between the United States and a collective group of states.

To implement this approach, the United States and at least the Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan would sign an agreement committing the signatories to collectively assume the obligations of the former Soviet Union under the START treaty.

Each of the signatories would ratify START in accordance with their own procedures.

In our view, either approach is legally acceptable. The choice between them is a policy decision, and would depend on the preference of the states involved.

Let me finally say that we proceed on the basis that the newly independent states will ensure continued adherence not only with obligations of the former Soviet Union, but also the political commitments.
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-- I refer specifically to the politically-binding declarations on Backfire and sea-launched cruise missiles. I would appreciate confirmation that our assumption is correct.

CFE

- The United States has ratified the CFE treaty, as have many other participants. This treaty will also make a major contribution to security and stability in Europe, and in fact represents the foundation for a security structure in the new Europe. We want to bring it into force as soon as possible.

- We welcome the constructive meeting held in Brussels on January 10, and feel that we are well on the way to bringing the newly independent states with territory in the ATTU into the CFE treaty.

- The basic steps are:

  -- The new states should among themselves divide up the allowances for treaty-limited equipment to which the former Soviet Union was entitled, including equipment entitlements, reduction obligations, and data.

  -- Each state with territory in the ATTU zone should ratify the treaty.

  -- All CFE participants can then meet in Vienna to express consensus for the participation of the newly independent states.

- The January 10 meeting represents a first step toward this goal. We look to you to work together to reallocate the former Soviet Union's entitlements and to ratify the treaty.

- By joining CFE you will become part of the basic security structure of Europe.

NPT

- The Non-proliferation treaty also includes fundamental obligations that have been undertaken by the former Soviet Union and many other nations.

- We call on all of the newly independent states to join the NPT by ratifying the treaty and submitting an instrument of accession to a depositary. Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and all other states except Russia should join as non-nuclear weapons states and take all steps necessary to fulfill their obligations under the treaty, including accepting full-scope safeguards on all peaceful nuclear facilities; this requires that they renounce control over nuclear weapons.