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CONTROLS:
S G R B T NATO SECRET FOR NATO ADDRESSES
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BODY:
SUBJ: DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE REPORT ODB 27-92, UKRAINE -- NUCLEAR
WITHDRAWAL SUSPENSION (U)
1. (U) THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS AUTHORIZED FOR RELEASE TO NATO
MEMBER NATIONS AS NATO SECRET.
2. (U) KEY JUDGMENTS
   A. (C) UKRAINIAN PRESIDENT KRAVCHUK'S 12 MARCH ANNOUNCEMENT OF
      A "TEMPORARY HALT" TO THE WITHDRAWAL OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO
      RUSSIA REFLECTS GROWING FRICITION BETWEEN UKRAINE AND RUSSIA.
      KRAVCHUK WILL CONTINUE TO USE THE NUCLEAR ISSUE TO ENSURE CONTINUED
      WESTERN FOCUS ON UKRAINE, TO CREATE A MORE EQUITABLE RELATIONSHIP
      WITH RUSSIA, AND AS LEVERAGE TO PUSH UKRAINIAN POSITIONS WITHIN THE
      COMMONWEALTH AND INTERNATIONALLY. ALTHOUGH KRAVCHUK WILL PROBABLY
      USE THE SAME TACTICS WHEN STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPON REMOVAL BEGINS,
      DIA BELIEVES THE UKRAINIAN NONNUCLEAR POLICY WILL PREVAIL IN THE
      LONG RUN.
   B. (C) UP TO (C) TACTICAL NUCLEAR WARHEADS ARE ESTIMATED TO
      REMAIN IN UKRAINE. RECENT RUSSIAN STATEMENTS INDICATE THE JULY
      1992 DEADLINE FOR THE REMOVAL OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM
      UKRAINE WILL NOT BE MET UNLESS THE TRANSFERS RESUME IMMEDIATELY.
      DIA JUDGES, HOWEVER, THAT IF THE TRANSFERS RESUME BY EARLY MAY, THE
      DEADLINE PROBABLY COULD BE MET. DESPITE PRESS REPORTS, THE
      UKRAINIANS HAVE NOT INDICATED WHEN THE WITHDRAWAL WILL RESUME, BUT
      THEY HAVE REITERATED THEIR COMMITMENT TO THE JULY 1992 DEADLINE.
C. OFFICIAL UKRAINIAN STATEMENTS INDICATE THAT, AT A MINIMUM, IMMEDIATE NEGOTIATIONS WITH RUSSIA AND OTHER COMMONWEALTH STATES ON JOINT OR INTERNATIONAL VERIFICATION MECHANISMS, OR WESTERN SECURITY GUARANTEES, WOULD BE REQUIRED BEFORE THE SUSPENSION WOULD BE LIFTED. TRANSFERS PROBABLY WILL BE HELD UP UNTIL UKRAINE IS CONVINCED THAT THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS WITHDRAWN ACTUALLY WILL BE DESTROYED. DESPITE THE NEGATIVE WESTERN REACTION TO THIS RECENT UKRAINIAN MOVE, PRESIDENT KRAVCHUK PROBABLY WILL CONTINUE TO USE THE NUCLEAR DEPLOYMENT ISSUE AS POLITICAL LEVERAGE.

3. (U) UKRAINE VERSUS RUSSIA -- THE STRUGGLE INTENSIFIES

A. (U) POLITICAL PRESSURES ON KRAVCHUK

(1) PRESIDENT KRAVCHUK IS ENGAGED IN A CONTEST OF WILLS WITH RUSSIA ON A NUMBER OF ISSUES WITH OUTCOMES PERCEIVED AS CRITICAL TO UKRAINE'S SOVEREIGNTY AND SECURITY. THE NUCLEAR DEPLOYMENT ISSUE PROVIDES KRAVCHUK HIGHLY EFFECTIVE LEVERAGE IN HIS ONGOING STRUGGLE TO CRAFT A NEW, MORE EQUITABLE RELATIONSHIP WITH RUSSIA AND ALSO PLAYS A PART IN THE NEGOTIATION OF OTHER CONTENTIOUS ISSUES, SUCH AS CRIMEAN INDEPENDENCE AND THE COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES (CIS) DEBATE OVER THE DIVISION OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION'S ARMED FORCES.

(2) KRAVCHUK HAS SHOWN PARTICULAR SENSITIVITY TO WHAT HE VIEWS AS UNILATERAL CHANGES IN CIS STRATEGIC FORCE STATUS BY RUSSIAN PRESIDENT YELTSIN AND UKRAINE'S LACK OF ANY REAL CONTROL OVER THE USE OF THESE WEAPONS. STATING THAT YELTSIN "HAS NOT RECEIVED A MANDATE FROM US," KRAVCHUK EXPRESSED ANGER AT NOT HAVING BEEN CONSULTED WHEN YELTSIN OFFERED HIS OWN STRATEGIC ARMS CONTROL INITIATIVE TO THE UNITED STATES WITH CALLS FOR RADICAL CUTS BELOW STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TALKS (START) TREATY LEVELS. KRAVCHUK ALSO EXPRESSED ANNOYANCE WITH RUSSIAN STATEMENTS THAT ICBMs HAD BEEN TAKEN OFF ALERT IN UKRAINE AND BEEN RETARGETED, AND HE DENIED THAT THERE HAD BEEN ANY CHANGE IN STATUS TO MISSILES BASED IN UKRAINE.

(3) NATIONALIST POLITICAL GROUPS IN UKRAINE HAVE BEEN INCREASING PRESSURE ON KRAVCHUK TO REVERSE HIS PLEDGE TO BECOME NUCLEAR FREE. THE MOVE TO TEMPORARILY SUSPEND NUCLEAR WEAPON TRANSFERS TO RUSSIA COULD BOLSTER Waning SUPPORT FOR HIS LEADERSHIP FROM NATIONALIST POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS.

(4) KRAVCHUK'S CONSERVATIVE ADVISERS ARGUE THAT WESTERN FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE AND INTEREST IN UKRAINE IN GENERAL WILL DISAPPEAR ONCE ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN UKRAINE HAVE BEEN ELIMINATED. ALTHOUGH UKRAINIAN OFFICIALS PUBLICLY STATE THAT THIS MOVE DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A REVERSAL OF THEIR NONNUCLEAR POLICY, PRESIDENT KRAVCHUK MAY BE SERIOUSLY CONSIDERING RETAINING NUCLEAR WEAPONS AS THE ONLY WAY TO ENSURE UKRAINIAN SECURITY.

(5) PRESIDENT KRAVCHUK'S STATEMENTS ON NUCLEAR DEPLOYMENTS:

-- "WHEN WE ELIMINATE AND DISASSEMBLE THE ENTIRE NUCLEAR SYSTEM BY 1994, AS PLANNED, WE WILL NOT HAVE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES IN UKRAINE." VECHERNIY KIEV, 10 JANUARY 92.

-- "BORIS YELTSIN SAID AT HIS MEETING WITH PRESIDENT BUSH THAT HE IS REDUCING THE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES. I WOULD LIKE TO COMMENT: YOU CAN ONLY REDUCE THE FORCES WHICH YOU POSSESS. IF
HE WAS SPEAKING OF THE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES OF THE WHOLE COMMONWEALTH, HE HAS NOT RECEIVED SUCH A MANDATE FROM US."
IZVESTIYA, 21 FEBRUARY 92.

-- "WE WANT TO GET RID OF ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS -- OF THE TACTICAL ONES BY 1 JULY OF THIS YEAR AND OF THE STRATEGIC ONES BY THE END OF 1994." BERLINER ZEITUNG, 10 MARCH 92.

-- "IN SHIPPING NUCLEAR WEAPONS OFF TO RUSSIA, THE REPUBLIC CANNOT GUARANTEE THAT THEY WILL BE DESTROYED OR THAT THEY WILL NOT FALL INTO THE WRONG HANDS. WE HAVE THEREFORE MADE REPEATED REQUESTS THAT THE WORLD COMMUNITY ENSURE INTERNATIONAL VERIFICATION OF THE DESTRUCTION OF THESE MISSILES." NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 14 MARCH 92.

B. (U) CRIMEAN INDEPENDENCE

(1) (U) FRictions are building over what Ukrainians see as Russian efforts to encourage Crimean separatism, with the ultimate goal of Russia regaining control of the Crimea. At the news conference during which President Kravchuk announced the halt in nuclear weapon transfer, he also discussed the Crimea. He flatly rejected the Crimean independence, which would mean "changing Ukraine's borders, carving up its territory." The Don Cossacks' intervention in Moldova is fueling Ukrainian suspicions that Russia is determined to intervene in the internal affairs of other states on behalf of Russian minorities. President Kravchuk took action on 17 March to enhance security along its western border out of concern that fighting in the Dnestrov region of Moldova could spread to the Odessa region. In return for support by Crimean Tatars for Crimea to remain part of Ukraine, Ukrainian officials are believed to be supporting Tataria's efforts to break away from Russia.

(2) (U) NEGOTIATIONS FOR INDEPENDENCE

(A) (U) The Crimea is likely to achieve a greater degree of autonomy in the near future. Either Ukrainian officials will negotiate directly with the Crimeans to provide autonomy within the confines of the Ukrainian constitution, or a Crimean referendum will be held this spring, possibly to seek total independence. The latter course is fraught with danger because the policy of Ukrainian President Kravchuk is that a referendum is precluded by the constitutionality of the 1954 transfer of the Crimea to Ukraine and by the CIS treaty to which Ukraine and Russia are signatories (the treaty establishes the inviolability of existing borders). Russia's Supreme Soviet Committee for International Relations recently concluded that the 1954 transfer was unconstitutional. The Crimean separatist movement apparently has sufficient momentum to sustain support for the referendum effort. Crimea probably will avoid entering into negotiations with Kiev unless the Ukrainian terms are particularly favorable.

C. (U) DIVISION OF THE FORMER SOVIET ARMED FORCES -- STRATEGIC VERSUS NONSTRATEGIC FORCES

(1) (U) While Ukraine and Russia have agreed that all nuclear weapons will eventually be withdrawn to Russia, the debate on the division of other former Soviet forces deployed in the non-Russian states continues. This debate is central to the ultimate
DISPOSITION OF THE BLACK SEA FLEET, WHICH ALSO WILL BE AFFECTED BY THE OUTCOME OF THE CRIMEAN INDEPENDENCE ISSUE. UNDER THE TERMS OF THE CIS SUMMIT AGREEMENTS IN LATE 1991 AND EARLY 1992, "STRATEGIC" NUCLEAR ASSETS WERE TO BE PLACED UNDER CIS JOINT CONTROL. IN ADDITION TO THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS THEMSELVES, THESE FORCES WERE TO INCLUDE MILITARY TRAINING INSTITUTES FOR THE STRATEGIC MISSILE TROOPS; AIR, NAVAL, AND AIR DEFENSE FORCES; AND EQUIPMENT AND OTHER MILITARY FACILITIES DESIGNED TO CONTROL AND MAINTAIN THE STRATEGIC FORCES. UKRAINIAN NATIONALISTS PRESSURING KRAVCHUK FAVOR A BROAD INTERPRETATION OF THE FORCES DEFINED AS NONSTRATEGIC THAT WILL BE ALLOWED TO REMAIN IN UKRAINE UNDER UKRAINIAN CONTROL. THE ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS TO DEFINE STRATEGIC ASSETS ARE COMPLICATED BY THE FRACTURED LOYALTY OF PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO CONTENTED MILITARY UNITS.

(2) NUMEROUS SERIOUS DISPUTES REGARDING LOYALTY OATHS AND STRATEGIC FORCES HAVE ARisen WITH REGARD TO THE BLACK SEA FLEET, BOMBER FORCES, AND TRAINING ESTABLISHMENTS IN UKRAINE. RUSSIA CONTINUES TO PRESS FOR THE BLACK SEA FLEET TO BE CONSIDERED PART OF THE CIS STRATEGIC FORCES, WHILE UKRAINE MAINTAINS THAT THEY FALL OUTSIDE THE AGREED-UPON "STRATEGIC FORCES" DEFINITION. LOYALTY OATHS AMONG PERSONNEL IN THE FLEET HAVE BEEN SPLIT BETWEEN THE TWO STATES. DIA ASSESSES THAT AN ACCOMMODATION TO SPLIT THE FLEET WILL EVENTUALLY BE REACHED, WITH THE MAJORITY OF THE LARGER ASSETS (SUCH AS SUBMARINES AND CRUISERS) GOING TO RUSSIA.

(3) ON 17 FEBRUARY, MAJOR GENERAL BASHKIROV, THE COMMANDER OF THE STRATEGIC AVIATION UNIT AT UZIN CHEPELEVKA AIRFIELD, SPOKE AN OATH OF LOYALTY TO UKRAINE AND WAS PROMPTLY DISMISSED BY CIS AUTHORITIES. HE WAS REINSTATED BY THE UKRAINIAN MINISTRY OF DEFENSE IN A POLITICAL STRUGGLE THAT CAUSED LOYALTY Rifts IN THE PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO THE UZIN AVIATION REGIMENTS. WHILE THE PERSONNEL OF THE UZIN TANKER REGIMENT HAD TAKEN THE OATH OF ALLEGIANCE TO UKRAINE, THERE WERE COMPLAINTS FROM UZIN HEAVY BOMBER REGIMENT PERSONNEL OF COERCION TO FOLLOW SUIT. LOSS OF CIS CONTROL OF THE MIDAS TANKER REGIMENT AT UZIN TO UKRAINE WOULD RESULT IN THE LOSS OF ONE-HALF OF THE ENTIRE MIDAS FLEET AND ABOUT ONE-THIRD OF THE TOTAL LONG RANGE AVIATION TANKER FORCE. SUCH A LOSS WOULD HAVE A MAJOR IMPACT ON CIS/RUSSIAN LONG-RANGE STRATEGIC BOMBER CAPABILITIES.

(4) THE CONTEST OVER THESE STRATEGIC AVIATION ELEMENTS PRESAGES STRUGGLES THAT ARE LIKELY TO ENSUE AS THE DEBATE INTENSIFIES OVER WHICH "STRATEGIC FORCES" CAN BE WITHDRAWN TO RUSSIA. HOWEVER, THE ISSUE OF WHO CONTROLS THE STRATEGIC HEAVY BOMBER REGIMENT AT UZIN, WHICH CONTINUES TO CONDUCT FLIGHT OPERATIONS UNDER CIS CONTROL, PROBABLY WILL BE A CONTINUING SOURCE OF TENSION BETWEEN RUSSIA AND UKRAINE. PROBABLY TO AVOID ANY FUTURE CONTENTION ON ITS BASING, A NEWLY PRODUCED BLACKJACK HEAVY BOMBER DEPLOYED IN FEBRUARY TO THE LONG RANGE AVIATION TANKER BASE AT ENGELS IN RUSSIA RATHER THAN TO THE SOLE BLACKJACK REGIMENT AT PRILUKI IN UKRAINE.

(5) ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS, 90 PERCENT OF THE STAFF AND 50 PERCENT OF THE CADETS AT THE STRATEGIC ROCKET FORCE TRAINING ACADEMY IN KHARKOV HAVE TAKEN THE OATH OF ALLEGIANCE TO
UKRAINE. A HIGH PERCENTAGE OF THE PERMANENT PARTY STAFF AND ABOUT
HALF THE CADETS ARE OF ETHNIC UKRAINIAN ORIGIN. THE SCHOOL'S
COMMANDER, WHO WAS THE FIRST TO SWEAR ALLEGIANCE, SAID THAT THE
PRIMARY BENEFIT WAS UKRAINE'S GUARANTEE OF "SOCIAL AND LEGAL
PROTECTION" FOR MILITARY PERSONNEL. MOREOVER, THE SCHOOL HAD
RECEIVED NO CIS SUPPLIES OR FUNDING SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE
ACADEMIC YEAR.

(6) THE LOYALTY OF THE PERSONNEL IN THIS FACILITY
COULD PRECIPITATE PROTRACTED AND DIFFICULT NEGOTIATIONS WITHIN THE
CIS, WHICH HAS ALREADY DEFINED TRAINING FACILITIES FOR STRATEGIC
MISSILE TROOPS AS "STRATEGIC" AND THEREFORE UNDER CIS JOINT
CONTROL. RUSSIA PROBABLY WILL CONTEST THE KHARKOV ACADEMY'S
SUBORDINATION TO UKRAINE BASED ON THAT AGREEMENT. SUBSTANTIAL
PROGRESS IS UNLIKELY ON THE QUESTION OF WHICH SUPPORTING ASSETS CAN
LEGITIMATELY BE VIEWED AS THOSE EXCLUSIVELY FOR STRATEGIC FORCES
AND WHICH CAN BE DEFINED AS NONSTRATEGIC IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

4. (U) IMPLICATIONS FOR TACTICAL NUCLEAR WITHDRAWALS

A. (U) [REDACTED]

B. (U) UKRAINE, THROUGH ITS CONTROL OF THE RAIL SYSTEM WITHIN
ITS BORDERS, POSSESS THE CAPABILITY TO INTERFERE WITH THE REMOVAL
OF TACTICAL AND STRATEGIC WARHEADS AND MISSILE AIRFRAMES FROM ICBMS
BASED THERE. ACCORDING TO ONE UKRAINIAN OFFICIAL, SHIPMENTS OF
STRATEGIC CDMAT EQUIPMENT TAKE PLACE UNDER CENTRAL JURISDICTION,
WITH LICENSES ISSUED BY OBLAST EXECUTIVE COMMITTEES. IN ADDITION,
THE CHAIRMAN OF THE OFFICERS' UNION IN UKRAINE CLAIMS THAT ITS
MEMBERSHIP OF OVER 70,000 SOLDIERS IS SUFFICIENT TO MONITOR ANY
ATTEMPTS TO COVERTLY TRANSFER NUCLEAR WEAPONS OUT OF UKRAINE.

C. (U) RUSSIA APPARENTLY HAS CONTINGENCY PLANS IN THE EVENT
UKRAINE REFUSES TO RESUME THE NUCLEAR WEAPON TRANSFERS. SHORTLY
AFTER KRAVCHUK'S NEWS CONFERENCE, THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE NUCLEAR
LOGISTICS ORGANIZATION OF THE CIS STATED, "IF WORSE CAME TO WORSE,
THE WEAPONS CAN BE DESTROYED WHERE THEY ARE (IN UKRAINE)."

D. (U) AN ESTIMATED 50 PERCENT OF THE TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS
HAD BEEN WITHDRAWN TO RUSSIA AT THE TIME OF THE SUSPENSION, LEAVING
UP TO [REDACTED] TACTICAL WARHEADS AND OVER [REDACTED] STRATEGIC WARHEADS IN
UKRAINE, [REDACTED] OF WHICH ARE DEPLOYED ON BALLISTIC MISSILES. THE
MAJORITY OF THE TACTICAL WARHEADS REMAINING IN UKRAINE ARE ASSESSED TO BE AIR-LAUNCHED AND NAVAL WEAPONS, AS COMMONWEALTH OFFICIALS REPEATEDLY HAVE STATED THAT GROUND FORCE-RELATED NUCLEAR WEAPONS WOULD BE THE FIRST ITEMS REMOVED FROM THE NON-RUSSIAN STATES.

5. (U) IMPLICATIONS FOR STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DEPLOYMENTS

A. (S) CURRENTLY, 130 SS-19S AND 46 SS-24 MOD 2S ARE BASED IN UKRAINE AT TWO DIVISIONS, DERAZHNYA AND PEROVSK. NO ACTIVITY SUGGESTIVE OF MISSILE AIRFRAME OR WARHEAD WITHDRAWAL HAS BEEN DETECTED, AND NO ACTIVITY HAS INDICATED PREPARATIONS FOR THE TRANSFER OF WEAPONS/LAUNCHERS. (S/I) A RUSSIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY SPOKESMAN CLAIMED THAT ICBMS IN UKRAINE HAD BEEN TAKEN OFF ALERT AND THAT THEIR WARHEADS HAD BEEN "DETACHED."

B. (S) KRAVCHUK HAS CONSISTENTLY DIFFERENTIATED BETWEEN THE 130 SS-19S AND THE 46 SS-24 MOD 2S BASED IN UKRAINE. WHILE STATING THAT THE 130 SS-19S WOULD BE DESTROYED OVER A 7-YEAR PERIOD AS REQUIRED BY START, HE HAS DEMURRED ON THE FATE OF THE REMAINING 46, EXCEPT TO SAY HE FAVORS DESTRUCTION OF ALL MISSILES. KRAVCHUK MAY BE EVASIVELY ON PLANS FOR THE SS-24 MOD 2S UNDER THE BELIEF THAT RUSSIA WANTS TO RETAIN THE OPTION TO TRANSFER THEM FOR REDEPLOYMENT ON ITS OWN TERRITORY. WHILE HE MAY INTEND TO DISCUSS THE FATE OF THESE SYSTEMS IN FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS WITH RUSSIA, ANY REDEPLOYMENT OF STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES TO RUSSIA WOULD BECOME A SERIOUS POINT OF FUTURE CONTENTION WITHIN THE CIS.

C. (S) IN LIGHT OF UKRAINIAN CONCERN WITH TACTICAL NUCLEAR WITHDRAWALS TO RUSSIA, KIEV IS LIKELY TO SIMILARLY INSIST ON ARRANGEMENTS FOR UKRAINIAN PARTICIPATION IN ELIMINATING STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND ICBM AIRFRAMES BASED ON ITS TERRITORY UNDER START. THE UKRAINIANS' ASSERTIVENESS IN THE STRATEGIC FORCE REDUCTION AREA IS LIKELY TO INCREASE BECAUSE OF THEIR CONCERN THAT RUSSIA ALONE IS SPEAKING FOR CIS-CONTROLLED FORCES.

6. (U) PROSPECTS FOR DESTRUCTION IN UKRAINE

A. (S) THE MINSK AGREEMENT STIPULATED THAT DESTRUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WOULD TAKE PLACE WITH THE PARTICIPATION OF UKRAINE AND BELARUS UNDER THE JOINT AUSPICES OF THE CIS. KRAVCHUK'S SUSPENSION OF NUCLEAR WEAPON TRANSFERS WAS APPARENTLY MOTIVATED IN PART BY A LACK OF ASSURANCE THAT RUSSIA HAD THE RESOURCES OR WAS ACTUALLY COMMITTED TO DISMANTLING THE WARHEADS. HIS ASSERTION THAT NUCLEAR WARHEADS SHOULD BE DISMANTLED IN SPECIAL FACILITIES TO BE BUILT IN UKRAINE, HOWEVER, IS CLEARLY PROBLEMATIC AND UNREALISTIC.

B. (S) UKRAINE DOES NOT HAVE THE TECHNOLOGY, FACILITIES, OR TECHNICAL EXPERTISE TO DISASSEMBLE NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND WOULD REQUIRE MASSIVE FINANCIAL AID FROM THE WEST AND TECHNICAL COOPERATION FROM RUSSIA TO DEVELOP THE CAPABILITY TO DISASSEMBLE NUCLEAR WEAPONS. A DISMANTLEMENT FACILITY WOULD REQUIRE AT LEAST 6 TO 8 YEARS TO CONSTRUCT AND WOULD COST BILLIONS OF DOLLARS. IN
ADDITION, FOR THE UKRAINIANS TO DISASSEMBLE THE WEAPONS, THEY MUST HAVE ACCESS TO THE MANUALS AND EQUIPMENT USED TO FABRICATE THEM; THESE ITEMS WOULD HAVE TO BE PROVIDED BY RUSSIA. THE DISMANTLEMENT PROCESS WOULD PROVIDE THE UKRAINIANS ACCESS TO DETAILED RUSSIAN NUCLEAR WEAPON DESIGN INFORMATION. ONCE GIVEN THE FACILITIES AND TECHNOLOGY TO DISMANTLE NUCLEAR WEAPONS, THE UKRAINIANS WOULD HAVE THE TECHNOLOGY AND MATERIALS TO MANUFACTURE THEM. THE RUSSIANS ARE HIGHLY UNLIKELY TO BE AMENABLE TO SUCH ASSISTANCE IN LIGHT OF THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY'S IMPLICATIONS OF SUCH TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND THE RESULTING INTENSIFICATION OF INTERNATIONAL CONCERN.

C. COMMONWEALTH OFFICIALS HAVE STATED THAT THEY HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO DISMANTLE 4,000 TO 8,000 NUCLEAR WARHEADS A YEAR; HOWEVER, THIS CAPABILITY CANNOT BE CONFIRMED.

7. (U) OUTLOOK
   A. AFTER PRESIDENT KRAVCHUK SUSPENDED WEAPON TRANSFERS TO RUSSIA, BELARUS ALSO NOTED THE NEED TO IMPROVE THE VERIFICATION PROCESS. WHILE BELARUS AND KAZAKHSTAN WILL EXPRESS GREATER INTEREST IN JOINT CIS VERIFICATION MEASURES, THEY ARE NOT LIKELY TO TAKE ACTIONS THAT WOULD IMPede THE REMOVAL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AGREED. AN AIDE OF THE RUSSIAN ATOMIC ENERGY MINISTER REPORTEDLY STATED THAT ONLY THOSE MATERIALS CREATED AS A RESULT OF DISMANTLING SHOULD BE SUBJECT TO INTERNATIONAL CONTROL. HE CLAIMED THAT FACILITIES USED TO DISMANTLE NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE A STATE SECRET. AS A RESULT, WHETHER ANY RUSSIAN CONCEPTS FOR JOINT VERIFICATION WILL MEET UKRAINIAN REQUIREMENTS FOR OVERSIGHT AND CONTROL REMAINS HIGHLY QUESTIONABLE.

   B. UKRAINIAN MISTRUST OF RUSSIA IS DEEP, AND THE POTENTIAL FOR FUTURE UKRAINIAN-RUSSIAN DISPUTES IS HIGH. SOME UKRAINIANS ARGUE THAT ONLY IF UKRAINE RETAINS A NUCLEAR CAPABILITY WILL THE WEST INTERVENE TO MEDIATE SUCH CONFRONTATIONS. PRESIDENT KRAVCHUK PROBABLY PREFERS TO CONTINUE TO PURSUE HIS NONNUCLEAR POLICY AS A LONG-TERM GOAL BUT WILL MANIPULATE THE NUCLEAR ISSUE IN AN ATTEMPT TO GAIN WESTERN SECURITY ASSURANCES AND FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE.

9. (U) CLASSIFIED BY MULTIPLE SOURCES.