THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT). THE BILATERAL STRATEGIC FORCES AGREEMENTS SIGNED WITH RUSSIA IN JULY RESTATE MINSK'S COMMITMENT TO ABIDE BY START PROVISIONS.

(3) (S) WHILE THE RUSSIAN SUPREME SOVIET HAS FINISHED PREPARATIONS FOR START RATIFICATION, SOME MEMBERS HAVE DEMANDED THAT UKRAINE FIRST RATIFY THE NPT AND THEN ENTER START AS A NONNUCLEAR NATION BEFORE RATIFYING START. THOUGH LESS LIKELY, SOME RUSSIANS HAVE PROPOSED PROMPTLY RATIFYING START BUT DELAYING EXCHANGING THE INSTRUMENTS OF RATIFICATION UNTIL AGREEMENT IS REACHED WITH KIEV.

(4) (S) FOR KIEV'S PART, ONGOING UKRAINIAN DOMESTIC DISPUTES OVER NUCLEAR POLICY WILL DELAY START RATIFICATION. PRESIDENT KRAVCHUK OFFICIALLY SUPPORTS PROMPT RATIFICATION OF START, BUT A SMALL GROUP OF INFLUENTIAL MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT CONTINUES TO OPPOSE ACCESS TO THE NPT AND RATIFICATION OF START. KIEV IS SEEKING SECURITY GUARANTEES FROM BOTH RUSSIA AND THE UNITED STATES AND A SHARE OF ANY PROFITS FROM THE SALE OF ENRICHED URANIUM FROM UKRAINIAN, DEPLOYED MISSILES, AS WELL AS FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE. COMPLICATING THE ISSUE IS KIEV'S COMMITMENT TO ACQUIRING ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL OVER STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES DEPLOYED IN UKRAINE.

(5) (S) START: STATUS OF RATIFICATION:

UNITED STATES RATIFIED 1 OCTOBER 1992.


BYELARUS SUPREME SOVIET MEETS 20 OCTOBER TO CONSIDER RATIFICATION.

RUSSIA COMPLETED RATIFICATION PREPARATIONS; NEGOTIATIONS UNDER WAY WITH UKRAINE TO RESOLVE OUTSTANDING ISSUES.

UKRAINE WILL CONSIDER TREATY RATIFICATION BY END OF YEAR; OPPOSITION TO START AND POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INSTABILITY WILL MOST LIKELY DELAY RATIFICATION.

(6) (S) MOUNTING INTERNAL UKRAINIAN POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PRESSURES THREATEN TO DELAY START RATIFICATION. UKRAINIAN RATIFICATION IS KEY TO RUSSIA'S ACCEPTANCE OF START AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE START TREATY VERIFICATION MEASURES. UKRAINE'S INABILITY OR UNWILLINGNESS TO RATIFY START COULD PUT THE ENTIRE START PROCESS AT RISK AND JEOPARDIZE THE UNITED STATES' ABILITY TO FULLY MONITOR COMMONWEALTH STRATEGIC FORCE COMPLIANCE WITH START PROVISIONS.

B. (U) DESTRUCTION OF COMMONWEALTH ICBM SILOS PICKS UP SPEED

(1) (S) THE NUMBER OF SILOS THAT THE COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES/RUSSIA HAS DEACTIVATED AND DESTROYED SINCE AUGUST 1991 SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCES RUSSIA'S START-ACCOUNTABLE LAUNCHER TOTALS. THIS ACTIVITY ALSO REDUCES THE BURDEN OF ELIMINATING SILOS TO TREATY SPECIFICATIONS AND THUS DEFRAYS SOME POTENTIAL COSTS OF PROVIDING ONSITE INSPECTION SUPPORT.

(2) (S) SHORTLY AFTER THE START TREATY WAS SIGNED ON 31 JULY 1991, THE SOVIET UNION BEGAN SUBSTANTIAL ICBM SILO REDUCTIONS IN PREPARATION FOR TREATY ENTRY INTO FORCE, AS WELL AS FOR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC GAIN. WITH THE CONTINUING DELAYS IN THE START RATIFICATION PROCESS, HOWEVER, SILO DESTRUCTIONS LAGGED.
BEHIND DEACTIVATIONS AS THE RUSSIANS REMAINED AT OR NEAR THE SALT II LIMIT OF 1,398 ACCOUNTABLE LAUNCHERS. FROM AUGUST 1991 UNTIL JUNE 1992, THE FORMER SOVIET UNION/RUSSIA (\(\text{\textcopyright} 0\))

\( (3) \) (\(\text{\textcopyright} 0\)) SINCE JUNE, HOWEVER, A DRAMATIC INCREASE IN SILO DESTRUCTIONS HAS BEEN OBSERVED. THIS ACTIVITY SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCES THE NUMBER OF DEACTIVATED SILOS AWAITING DESTRUCTION AND INDICATES PREPARATION FOR START IMPLEMENTATION AND ITS ASSOCIATED DATA EXCHANGE. SPECIFICALLY, \( (0) \) DESTRUCTION OF THESE SILOS IS ADVANTAGEOUS BECAUSE IT REDUCES THE NUMBER OF ACCOUNTABLE LAUNCHERS AND FACILITIES TO BE DECLARED IN THE DATA UPDATE EXCHANGE 30 DAYS AFTER ENTRY INTO FORCE.

\( (0) \) SINCE AT LEAST 22 ACCOUNTABLE SS-18 LAUNCHERS MUST BE ELIMINATED EACH YEAR ACCORDING TO THE TREATY, DESTRUCTION OF THESE DEACTIVATED SILOS WILL MOST LIKELY BE DELAYED UNTIL AFTER TREATY ENTRY INTO FORCE.

\( (4) \) (\(\text{\textcopyright} 0\)) THE EARLY DEACTIVATIONS AND DESTRUCTIONS PROVIDE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC BENEFITS FOR RUSSIA AND ALLOW A HEAD START FOR REDUCTIONS REQUIRED UNDER START. THESE EARLY DESTRUCTIONS REDUCE THE BURDEN OF ELIMINATING SILOS TO START-TREATY-REQUIRED DEPTHS (EXPLOSION TO 6 METERS OR EXCAVATION TO 8 METERS), AND THEIR REMOVAL FROM THE START LIST OF FACILITIES IN AN OPERATIONAL STATUS REDUCES THE NEED FOR ONSITE INSPECTION. THE RUSSIANS ARE FULLY CAPABLE OF MEETING THE REQUIRED TREATY-MANDATED REDUCTIONS WITHIN THE 7-YEAR START DRANDOWN PERIOD.

- C. (U) RUSSIAN CFE GROUND FORCE DATA: ANOTHER REFLECTION OF THE CRUMBLING EMPIRE

\( (1) \) (\(\text{\textcopyright} 0\)) THE REDUCTIONS AND WITHDRAWALS OF RUSSIAN GROUND FORCES ARE REFLECTED IN THE NET DECREASE OF 94 OBJECTS OF VERIFICATION IN RUSSIA'S CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE TREATY DATA DECLARATION SINCE NOVEMBER 1990. FURTHER DECREASES IN RUSSIAN OBJECTS OF VERIFICATION, DISPUTES OVER OWNERSHIP, AND MILITARY, POLITICAL DISPUTES WILL REDUCE AND COMPLICATE NATO CFE ONSITE INSPECTIONS. \( (\text{\textcopyright} 0) \)

\( (2) \) (\(\text{\textcopyright} 0\)) HOWEVER, A NET REDUCTION OF 94 OBJECTS OF VERIFICATION (OVS)--BRIGADES, REGIMENTS, AND SEPARATE BATTALIONS OR STORAGE SITES THAT HOLD TREATY-LIMITED EQUIPMENT AT SPECIFIED LOCATIONS--HAS OCCURRED IN THE RUSSIAN GROUND FORCES SINCE THE DATA SUBMISSION OF NOVEMBER 1990. THE DATA SHOW A NET REDUCTION OF 62 MANEUVER REGIMENT OVS IN THE GROUND FORCES CLAIMED BY RUSSIA--37 OF THEM FROM THE WESTERN GROUP OF FORCES (GOF) IN GERMANY. THE FEW NET GAINS OF OVS IN RUSSIAN MILITARY DISTRICTS (HDS) REFLECT THE MOVEMENT OF FORCES BACK TO RUSSIA, WHERE THEY REPLACE DISBANDED UNITS.

\( (3) \) (U) CHANGES IN RUSSIAN GROUND FORCE OVS SINCE 1990:

\[\begin{array}{ccc}
1992 & MANEUVER REGIMENT & MANEUVER BATTALION \\
OVS & ARTILLERY REGIMENT/BRIGADE
\end{array}\]